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Foreword

TheWar

International

Law Studies ("Blue Book")

series

was initiated by the Naval

College in 1901 to publish essays, treaties and articles that contribute to

the broader understanding of international law. This, the eighty- sixth

the "Blue Book" series,

is

volume of

a compilation of scholarly papers and remarks derived

from the proceedings of a conference hosted here at the Naval War College on June
23-25, 2009 and entitled "The War in Iraq: A Legal Analysis."

The June 2009 "War

in Iraq" conference served as a

proceeding to the Experts Workshop "The
sis,"

hosted by the Naval

War

War

second and "companion"

in Afghanistan:

A Legal Analy-

College in June 2008 and the resulting scholarly

works of which appear in Volume 85 of the "Blue Book"

The purpose of
the conference, similar to the previous year's Afghanistan workshop, was to provide a comprehensive legal examination of the armed conflict in Iraq during the
second Gulf War that began in 2003. The issues were examined by five panels of
experts, addressing topics that spanned the entire spectrum of the conflict and the
series.

re-establishment of Iraqi sovereignty. Panelists discussed legal issues associated
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Introduction

On

March

20, 2003, after a year of very dramatic public discourse concern-

ing the appropriate response to Iraq's continuing violation of its interna-

under numerous

tional obligations
States, together

with the United

UN Security Council resolutions, the United

Kingdom and a coalition of "willing" partners, in-

Denmark and Poland, launched Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF). OIF commenced the military operations intended to eliminate Saddam
Hussein's regime and the specter of his use of weapons of mass destruction. From
cluding Australia,

OIF's inception, and continuing through the next six years of military operations

spanning invasion, occupation and restoration of Iraqi sovereignty, the meaning,
application

and viability of the law of armed

Following

its

conflict

tradition of the in-depth study

were repeatedly tested.

and teaching on the manner

in

which the law impacts military operations, the Naval War College hosted a confer-

War in Iraq: A Legal Analysis." The conference was envisioned
as a companion colloquium to the Experts Workshop hosted by the Naval War
College the previous June entitled "The War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis." By
ence entitled "The

the time of the June 2009 conference, events in Iraq had sufficiently progressed to

begin developing an objective assessment of what had transpired. The conference

brought together distinguished international law scholars and practitioners to ex-

amine international and operational law

issues that arose

throughout the various

phases of the Iraq conflict.

Judge Raid Juhi al-Saedi, the former chief investigative judge for the Iraqi High
Tribunal, opened the conference

Saddam Hussein,

by sharing

his experiences with the trial

as well as the current status of the Iraqi judiciary.

of

The speakers

presented their material over the next two and a half days in five thematic panels.

On the first day, attendees were privileged to attend a luncheon address delivered
by Major General Michael Oates, US Army, on the "commander's perspective"
of military operations in Iraq. Professor

Yoram

Dinstein provided conference-

concluding remarks in which he reflected on the influence the conflict in Iraq

would have on the future development of the international law of armed conflict.
The presenters remained in Newport for an additional day after the general conference to attend an experts' working group to clarify the overall conference

themes and focus in on their respective scholarly contributions.
This edition of the International
the incredibly thoughtful insights

Law Studies

("Blue Book") series encapsulates

and lessons learned

that each presenter brought

Introduction

to the conference, including
in the conflict zone.

found within

this

many gained from personal experience while

serving

The product of their scholarship and roundtable discussions is

volume.

The conference was organized by Major Michael D. Carsten, US Marine Corps,
of the International Law Department (ILD) with the invaluable assistance of Mrs.
Jayne Van Petten and other ILD faculty and staff. The conference was made possible

through the support of the Naval

War College Foundation, the Center for Na-

tional Security Law, University of Virginia School of Law
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Human Rights. Without the
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Yearbook
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I
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Preface

From June 23 to
nowned

25,

2009 the Naval War College hosted over one hundred

international scholars

and

practitioners, military

and

civilian,

re-

and

students representing government and academic institutions at a conference that

examined a number of legal issues pertaining to the war
featured opening, luncheon and closing addresses, as well

in Iraq.

The conference

as five panel discussions

addressing specific legal issues encountered during the conflict. Panelist comments

were summarized by a commentator, followed by questions from attendees. These
discussions resulted in a detailed analysis of the key issues.

The following conference summary was prepared by Commander

Eric Hunt,

JAGC, US Navy, a member of NR Naval War College (Law), the reserve unit that
supports the International Law Department. The summary expertly recaps the
highlights of each of the conference speakers' presentations. As editor, I am deeply
indebted to Commander Hunt for his attention to detail and assistance in facilitating the publication of this "Blue Book." I would also be remiss if I did not thank
Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), Commander Sandra Selman, US
Coast Guard, and Major Michael Carsten, US Marine Corps, for their outstanding
support and dedication in preparing this work.
I also extend my sincere appreciation to Susan Meyer and Ken DeRouin of the
Naval War College's Desktop Publishing

office,

preparing the page proofs. Additionally,

I

for their excellent

The

volume

is

would

like to

thank Albert Fassbender

work in proofreading the conference papers.
a reflection of their professionalism and outstanding

and Shannon Cole
quality of this

who were responsible for expertly

expertise.

Tribute to Professor Howard

S.

Levie

With the passing of former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law
Howard S. Levie on April 19, 2009, this year's conference was dedicated to his
memory. Professor Jack Grunawalt, the current Stockton professor, opened the
conference with a tribute to Professor Levie.

and scholar, Professor Levie leaves a legacy of scholarly excellence in the
development and study of the law of war. One of the nation's foremost legal experts on
the law of war and the key draftsman of the Korean War Armistice Agreement,
Soldier

Preface

them multi-volume works) and over
on matters ranging
from the treatment of prisoners of war to the legality of conventional and nuclear/
chemical/biological weapons; from war crimes and terrorism to the protection of the
victims of armed conflict. Among the books he authored are Prisoners of War in
International Armed Conflict, The Code of International Armed Conflict, and Terrorism
Professor Levie authored ten books (several of

eighty articles.

He was

internationally recognized as an authority

War: The Law of War Crimes. He also served as the editor of six volumes of the series
Documents of International and Local Control. The last volume was
published in 1997 when he was 88.
in

Terrorism:

In 1998, the U.S. Naval

Law

of

War

writings

on

to

War College in Newport, Rhode Island published Levie on

the

honor Professor Levie and to recognize the enormous impact of his
armed conflict. In the book's Foreword, it was

the law applicable during

observed:

Once

in a great while,

someone comes along who makes

lasting contribution to his or her

comes

to

a significant

and

chosen profession, a contribution that

define the paradigm of that calling.

With

respect to the

development and articulation of the law of war, Professor Howard Levie
just such an individual.

A veteran

of World

War

II

and the Korean

is

Conflict, Professor Levie served in

New

Guinea and the Philippines, in post-war Japan, and in Korea. He provided legal reviews
of Japanese war crime trials for General Douglas MacArthur. He was assigned to the
Staff of the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation when he drafted the

Korean Armistice Agreement. A member of the US Army Judge Advocate General's
Corps, Professor Levie was the first Chief of the Army JAG Corps' International Affairs
Division at the Pentagon. Other assignments included postings in Italy, France, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas and the Presidio of San Francisco.

He retired in

1963 in the rank

of Colonel.

In September of 1963 he joined the faculty of Saint Louis University School of Law.
While there, Professor Levie authored over 20 articles on a broad spectrum of law of
war topics. It was also during this tenure that he spent a sabbatical year at the Naval

War

College as the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law.

He

retired

from Saint Louis University in 1977 having attained Professor Emeritus of Law status,
and returned to Rhode Island where he resumed his association with the Naval War
College as a lecturer on the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the laws of war. In October
1994, his enormous contribution to the College was formally recognized with the
establishment of the

On

Howard S.

Levie Military Chair of Operational Law.

the occasion of his 100th birthday, Professor Levie was awarded the prestigious

Leibman Award by the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
National Security Law. The award citation noted that his career as a soldier and a
Morris

I.
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scholar spanned

more than

concluded, "The impact of

and

six

decades and was marked by distinction throughout.

[his]

It

enormous body of work on the thinking of domestic
commanders and scholars cannot be

international policy makers, military

overstated."

Howard S. Levie was born on December

19,

1907 in Wolverine, Michigan and grew up

and New York City. He earned Bachelor of Arts and Juris Doctor degrees
from Cornell University and a Master of Laws degree from George Washington
University. He also studied at the Sorbonne in Paris and the Academy of International
Law at The Hague.
in Baltimore

Professor Levie was married to the late Blanche

Krim Levie, an artist and WAC during

WWII. Together in their 90s, they worked on writing an autobiography [,] Memories of
an Ordinary Couple. Professor Levie died on April 19, 2009 at his home in Portsmouth,
Rhode Island. He was 101.

Opening Address
Judge Raid Juhi al-Saedi, formerly the Chief Investigative Judge of the Iraqi High

on the restoration of the rule of law in Iraq.
of modern Iraq and explored how the rule of law

Tribunal, provided the keynote address

Judge Juhi outlined the history

had eroded into

virtual non-existence during the

that, since 2003, Iraq
this

Saddam Hussein

has been on the road to restoring the rule of law.

long and difficult process was the

fair trial

He stated
One step in

era.

received by Saddam Hussein, where

he enjoyed the right to confront witnesses. Judge Juhi indicated, however,
while the restoration of the rule of law in Iraq

progressing, there are

is

challenges ahead that will require the assistance of the international

still

that,

many

community.

Panel I: Legal Bases for Military Operations in Iraq
Panel I explored the "legal bases for military operations in Iraq." The panel opened

with Andru Wall laying out the legal bases of the United States for using force
against Iraq in 2003. These were, for the

Council resolutions dating back to 1991's

first

grave breach of the ceasefire agreement.

United States viewed
Iraq.

most

part,

grounded

UN

Security

Gulf War, including finding Iraq in

With

itself as legally justified in

these resolutions in hand, the

resuming military action against

Ms. Alexandra Perina argued that regardless of the bases for invading

once in Iraq the United States took on the role of occupier with
responsibilities, responsibilities

sor

in

made more

difficult

by a

David Turns sought to address the nature of the

xxv

all

Iraq,

of the attendant

rising insurgency. Profes-

conflict in Iraq in terms of

Preface

whether

it

conflict or

should, at any particular time, be classified as an international

non- international armed

conflict.

not defined in international law, making
flict

in Iraq. This categorization

is

vital in

it

He

armed

observed that "armed conflict"

is

properly categorize the con-

difficult to

determining what laws apply to situations

new category of conflict, "transnational armed conflict," was touched upon as a possible way to describe conflicts with
non-State actors. The attendees posed a number of questions, dealing mainly with
such as detainee treatment.

Finally, the issue

the rationale for the invasion of Iraq

and the

of a

issue of anticipatory self-defense.

Luncheon Address
Major General Michael Oates, US Army, Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division, gave the luncheon address, the "Commander's Perspective in Iraq."
His remarks and opinions were based on his personal experiences in Iraq during
various periods of the conflict. General Oates indicated that the major lesson

learned during the
tary

maxim: "you

initial

What was

summed up by the age-old mili-

The US military forces were tremendously
opening phase of the war because they fought like they

fight like

successful during the
trained.

phase of the war can be

not

you

train."

known then

is

were not well trained, well

that the forces

resourced or well prepared for the post-combat phase.
In turning to counterinsurgency
that

it is

important to look

first place.

He

(COIN)

operations, General Oates observed

at the situation that

gave

rise to

observed that the insurgency was

split

along religious, cultural and

the insurgency in the

power and control, most of these groups
shared an intense hatred of the coalition forces, which they saw as occupiers. How
to defeat the insurgency in Iraq was something of a "chicken and egg" dilemma:
ethnic lines. In addition to their desire for

do you concentrate on solving the problems of the
things like "essential services

first,"

bad guys, and, once things are

Iraqi people,

most notably

or do you focus on killing and capturing the

secure, concentrate

on improving the

daily lives of

the Iraqi people?

He indicated that the United States and the other coalition forces traveled along
the "essential services
it

first"

school of thought for the

first

few years, but eventually

was determined that the successes were not widespread or sustainable. Too often

raw numbers were
meant.

What was

relied on, instead of

an analysis of what those numbers

learned over time was that counterinsurgency

is

really

about people,

not about data. As a military force, the United States became much more successful

and others
this fight was

against the insurgency when, under the leadership of General Petraeus

who had taken a hard look at counterinsurgency, it was realized that
about people. He observed that people and relationships are the center of gravity in
xxvi
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COIN

Under General Petraeus and General Odierno, the United States
transitioned to the alternate view of improving daily lives and began to secure the
a

fight.

population.

General Oates concluded his remarks with a discussion of stability operations.

He

By

indicated the development of Iraqi security forces was the key to stability.

letting the Iraqi forces take the lead, the Iraqi people

began to see them

as a force

that could be trusted.

Rule of law was one of the major lines of effort.
start rule

of law efforts during the last year. The

The second was

uation.

Two things combined to jump-

first

was the improved security sit-

the implementation of the US-Iraq security agreement.

One of the major keys to stability in any country is having a legal system the citizens
can trust and depend on. Without a system for the peaceful resolution of disputes,
order breaks

down and people take the law into their own hands. He observed that

the work in the rule of law arena had been a significant force in promoting stability,
especially in central

and southern

Iraq.

Panel II: The Law of Armed Conflict and the
Panel

II

War in Iraq

focused on the application of the law of armed conflict to the war in Iraq.

Major General Charles Dunlap, US Air Force, opened the panel presentation with a
discussion of the impact of technology and advanced information systems

war

calculus of the

in Iraq.

The combination of

on

the

real-time, detailed intelligence

from the battlefront and the predominant use of precision-guided weapons has resulted in a heightened threshold of error for

threshold

armed

is

it is

that little or

missions. This heightened

not necessarily consistent with the standards imposed by the law of

conflict.

required,

bombing

As the enemy puts forth the concept

that 100 percent accuracy

is

engaged in a sort of "lawfare" that creates an unrealistic expectation

no collateral damage can result. General Dunlap argued that "lawfare"

must be countered through effective strategic communications.
Mr. Marc Warren then returned to the always-present issue of detainees in Iraq.
While the nature of the conflict might have changed over time and the determination of which portion of the law was applicable was often unclear, detainees were
always treated as though
plied. This

Common Article 3

treatment was important, as the detainee pool contained a mixture of

criminals, prisoners of

overwhelming

size,

war and insurgents. As the number of detainees grew

to

the detainee policy continued to require compliance with the

Geneva Conventions; any deviations were

Commodore Neil Brown,
armed

of the 1949 Geneva Conventions ap-

conflict to the sea

isolated

and non-sanctioned.

Royal Navy, addressed the application of the laws of

campaign

in the

xxvn

war

in Iraq. Spatially, this area

was

Preface

limited since Iraq's navy had been virtually destroyed during the

first

Gulf War. Es-

tablishment and enforcement of regulations applying to the various maritime

zones during naval operations in the region involved

visit

and

search, stop

and in-

and diversion of ships. Commodore Brown discussed the application of
of engagement by coalition naval forces during combat operations, as well as

spection,
rules

during post-hostilities maritime zone enforcement

activities.

Before opening the panel to questions, Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

observed that misinterpretations of the requirements imposed by the laws of war

need to be quickly countered and that countering information operations must be
proactive.

A failure to

confront

false

perceptions allows the

enemy

to control the

information war and win the battle for public support. Questioners explored the
issues of the

enemy's use of the law to attempt to negate the advantages of technol-

ogy. Professor Heintschel

von Heinegg

stressed that the canard that 100 percent

weapon accuracy is required ignores that the law of armed conflict

recognizes that

there will be civilian casualties.

Panel III: Occupation
Panel

III

in Iraq

began the second day of the conference by shifting focus to the "occupa-

tion of Iraq." Professor Eyal Benvenisti delved into the issue of when an occupation
begins.

The Hague Conventions speak

in terms of control over territory, while the

Geneva Conventions address control of the population. Whether
cise control,

and the nature of its ability to

a State can exer-

may establish occupa-

establish control,

tion as a matter of law regardless of the formal declarations of the parties. Professor

power has the

Benvenisti argued that the occupying
State's

domestic laws. In

fact,

it

ability to alter the

would be almost impossible

occupied

to maintain the status

quo, since the original regime has been overthrown. But the ability to alter the law
left

unanswered the question of what

Iraqi laws the occupiers

observe. Another question was whether the occupiers'
rights laws applied to their actions as

own

were required to
national

human

an occupying power.

US Army, spoke from the perspective of the military forces as implementers of an occupation. He emphasized that for occupiers it
Brigadier General Clyde Tate,

is

imperative that the rule of law be observed in

gating soldiers for

all

all

situations. This

meant

investi-

misconduct involving the occupied population. Brigadier

General Tate stressed that following the return of governance to Iraqi authorities,
the focus of US forces shifted to respecting Iraqi law, but not to the detriment of
safety or operational requirements.

The panel was questioned concerning the Hague and Geneva Conventions and
their application to the occupation of Iraq. The sense was that the Hague
xxvin
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Conventions were concerned with preserving the status quo of an occupied terriFourth Geneva Convention was focused on the protection of the

tory, while the

occupied population.

A question was also raised as to whether the applicable UN

Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq provided

more protections for Iraqi

sovereignty than did the traditional law of occupation.

Panel IV: Stability Operations in Iraq
Panel IV turned

its

attention to the issue of stability operations in Iraq

and the dy-

namic nature of these operations given the changing legal status and environment
in Iraq. Although the Iraqi government requested a continued US presence in Iraq
after

December

31, 2008, this created

own

its

set

of problems. Ms. Shelley Young

US

observed that in negotiating a security agreement to address the post- 2008
presence in Iraq,

many

issues

needed to be resolved. Ms. Young noted the

final

US jurisdiction over US military personnel and
for the withdrawal of US forces and established a termination

agreement established exclusive
civilians,

provided

date for the agreement of December 31, 201

1.

Colonel Richard Pregent provided the military view on
stressed the

Iraq
the

need to appreciate three

simple and the rule of law

is

US

status

is

He

stability operations.

truths: security drives everything,

—not American—

Iraqi

justice.

nothing in

The change

from occupying power to an invited presence created

in

challenges.

Foremost among these was the treatment of detainees. Under Iraqi law there

is

no

must be charged or released. This and the continued re-establishment of the rule of law are but two of the challenges going
provision for internment; detainees

forward in the conduct of stability operations.

Mr. Laurent Colassis outlined the

Red Cross (ICRC)
activities

largest

of the

role of the International

in stability operations.

ICRC have

increased.

Committee of the

With the decrease

Mr. Colassis noted that Iraq

in violence, the
is

now the third-

mission of the ICRC, behind Darfur and Somalia, with a focus on detainee

operations. Despite the requirement to charge or release, releasing detainees

always simple.

treatment by the State to

The questions

US

not

Where and to whom detainees are released is an issue with legal im-

plications. Ultimately, a balance

the

is

military

must be found between security and possible mis-

whom the detainee is released.

for the panel covered a

is

broad gamut of issues, including whether

proficient at nation building

and whether nation building should

even be a military mission. There was general agreement that military forces are not
particularly adept at nation building, but that they possess capabilities

to complete non-traditional missions.

tasks should be

handled by

It

was observed

civilian agencies

xxix

that

many

and resources

nation-building

but these agencies were often not
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A question was also raised about the status of individuals cov-

effectively resourced.

ered as protected persons and who should receive those protections during an insurgency, illustrating again that the issue of detainees was of prime concern

—and

importance.

Panel V: Issues Spanning the

War in Iraq

Panel V looked at "legal issues spanning the war in Iraq." Captain Brian

Bill,

JAGC,

US Navy, addressed the issue of detainees. At the height of operations in Iraq there
were twenty-six thousand detainees in US custody. Task Force 134 was created to
oversee

all

detainee operations. Detentions under the authority of

UN

Security

Council resolutions were driven by a determination as to whether the detainee

posed an imperative

Captain

threat.

Bill

pointed out that the determination of this

status involved giving the detainee a certain level of

due process. In

fact,

the due

process afforded detainees was above and beyond that required by Article 78 of the

Fourth Geneva Convention. Task Force 134 directives went so

women,

children and those

who needed assistance

ings with special representatives to aid

Mr. Robert Boorda noted the
agencies involved in stability

continues to be,

for cooperating with
difficult to obtain.

US

there are multiple

efforts. In Iraq there

and military

civil

Iraqis are often targeted

These problems, combined with the

make

making

by insurgents

local

inability to

involvement

determine the

the restoration of Iraq an ongoing challenge.

Ms. Naz Modirzadeh posed the question
conflict,

was, and

environment on the ground and hampers recon-

efforts to rebuild the country,

civil society,

during an armed

when

difficulties that arise

Mr. Boorda explained that

struction efforts.

in understanding the proceed-

coordination or communication between

little

provide

in their detention hearings.

and reconstruction

agencies. This creates a chaotic

needs of Iraqi

them

far as to

as to

what human

rights

law applied

during an occupation and during the post-occupation

period while coalition forces remained in Iraq. While the United States does not
recognize the extraterritorial application of human rights law, other countries have

been moving in that direction. Ms. Modirzadeh argued

would appear to

benefit civilians

territorial application
its

while on

its

by creating new levels of legal protections,

of human rights law

proponents seek. As

that,

may not bring the

face

it

extra-

positive results that

human rights laws are applied extraterritorially, a corollary

question arises as to which rights should be recognized and applied.

Many questions were addressed to the panel, with a focus on the impact of the
application of human rights law to armed conflicts. Comments of both panelists
and conference attendees suggested
world,"

it

would

certainly create a

that while

new layer
xxx

it

would not "mean the end of the

of "fog of war" in the legal context.
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Closing Address

The conference ended with Professor Yoram Dinstein
the conference.

assessing the highlights of

He indicated that the concept of "lawfare" cannot be ignored, that

must be dealt with proactively and with a focus on educating societies on the true
legal requirements in an armed conflict. He argued that the conflict in Iraq began
as an international armed conflict and, in his opinion, continues to be an internait

tional armed conflict because hostilities have not concluded. Additionally, international

armed

conflict

occurred in Iraq.

is

a prerequisite to belligerent occupation of the type that

He stated that military forces must adapt to the circumstances in

using high technology to fight an
striking the

enemy using very low technology.

wrong target can lead to

defeat in the

Professor Dinstein noted that in deciding who
ian, the

ual

who

concept of direct participation in
is

Precision in

war of information.

is

entitled to protection as a civil-

hostilities

comes to the

an insurgent during the day cannot come

home

at

fore.

An individ-

night and expect to

The concept of direct participation has
interesting applications to private military contractors. Their role must be strictly
defined if contractors are to be employed in the conflict. One of the main goals of
have the protections accorded to a

belligerent occupation

is

civilian.

to ensure security.

Occupation begins when control is ex-

when does occupation end? Finally, the application of human rights
law in the context of armed conflict may not be a positive development. The law of
ercised,

but

armed conflict is a well-understood body of law that is designed to protect civilians
and military members alike. To interject an array of other laws into the arena
would not be beneficial for those in harm's way.
Conclusion

In closing,

I

trust that

you

will find the articles

practitioners that contributed to this
in shaping the debate

on the

volume

from the preeminent scholars and

to be thought provoking

conflict in Iraq for future generations.

RAUL "PETE" PEDROZO
Associate Professor
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Regime Change and the Restoration of the
Rule of Law in Iraq

Raid Juhi al-Saedi*
Introduction

After Allied forces overthrew Hitler's regime at the end of World War
US

blueprint for running

Germany included dismantling

II,

the Nazi Party,

dismissing Nazis from government employment, prosecuting Hitler and his
cials as

tivity

the

offi-

war criminals, dissolving all German courts and forbidding any political ac-

without permission from

US military authorities.

Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, the United States
tried to use the

same

sional Authority

CPA

strategy in Iraq, albeit using a

(CPA) Order No.
3

Order No. 2 dissolved the

I

1

new formula.

Coalition Provi-

was issued to de-Baathificate 2

Iraqi intelligence

and

Iraqi society.

security agencies,

and the

armed forces, as well as dismissed the Baathist employees and members of those organizations. Subsequently, CPA Order No. 15 was issued with the stated purpose of
reforming the "Iraqi justice system [which] has been subjected to political interference and corruption over the years of Iraqi Baath Party rule." 4 This order established the Judicial

Review Committee, which dismissed a

large

number of judges

and prosecutors.

*

Clarke Middle East Fellow, Cornell University

Iraqi

High Tribunal. Portions of this

article are

Law School. Former Chief Investigative

Judge,

derived from Raid Juhi al-Saedi, Glance into the

Criminal Procedures under the Iraqi Judiciary, 41
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On September

13,

2003 the

CPA issued Order No. 35, 5 which re-established the

Council of Judges that had existed prior to the Hussein regime, and charged

it

with

the supervision of Iraq's judicial and prosecutorial systems. Order No. 35 gave the

Council of Judges independence from the Ministry of Justice in terms of its budget

and

authority.

At the end of 2003, the

CPA

issued Order No. 48, 6

Governing Council 7 the authority to establish an
were important steps

many,

Iraqi Special Tribunal. 8

in the transitional justice process.

used in Iraq was modeled

after the successful

which gave the

Even though the

These

strategy

US policy in post-World War II Ger-

policies in Iraq failed to take into consideration the history of the

country

following the assassination of the Iraqi royal family in 1958.

modern history is full of stories that illustrate the lack of the rule of law.
1958 General Abdul Kareem Qassim ended the royal regime, which had been
Iraq's

In
in

power since 1921. He executed the king and his family without trial, as well as
Prime Minister Nori Al-Saed, who is today considered one of the most respected
politicians of that period. Qassim changed Iraq from a monarchy to a republic. The
and based on

royal family's executions were illegal

a desire for revenge, a trait that

many believe is deeply entrenched in Iraqi culture. History repeated itself five years
later when a group of Baath Party members and military officers headed by General
Abdul Salam Arif overthrew the regime. Qassim and

his officials

were executed.

Qassim's body was thrown in the Tigris River and never found.

The Baath Party conducted another coup in 1968, when General Ahmed Hassan
Al-Baker took power. Then in July 1979, Saddam Hussein became president when
he overthrew General Al-Baker. Hussein's reign was bloody from the start: on his
first day in office he held a meeting with high-level Baath Party leaders and accused
certain members of attempting a coup. He asked them to leave the room. They
were never seen again; rumors circulated that they had been executed.
During Hussein's presidency, Iraqis suffered tremendously. One of the hardships

was the deportation of Iraqis of Iranian

back to Iran under

difficult

origin.

Numerous families were sent

and dangerous circumstances. These

families

were

left

on the border during the Iran-Iraq war; that was the first step to dividing Iraqis
based on race. Older Iraqis of Iranian origins were sent back to Iran, while younger
men, aged eighteen to forty, were arrested and executed. 9 The government seized
and sold all their property and belongings.
In 1988 the regime used chemical

they had allegedly supported Iran in

weapons against Kurdish

its

war with

villages

Iraq; those allegations

because

were

later

proven wrong. The Al-Anfal attack on the Kurds began in February 1988 and

ended
gust

8,

in

mid-September despite the

1988.

The

nounced made

it

fact that a ceasefire

fact that the attacks

continued even

clear that the operation

was announced on Au-

after the ceasefire

was an-

was intended to annihilate the Kurds. 10
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The crudest page

when Hussein

was written on a

women and

children,

day in March 1991,

single

quelled an uprising in the south by killing,

thousand men,
killings led to

in Iraq's history

and burying them

it is

in

estimated, over

mass

graves.

11

two

These

suppressed anger and a desire for revenge in the hearts of the Shiites

and the Kurds.
After the

fall

of Hussein's regime in 2003,

wounds the Hussein

era

it

was important to find a salve for the

had wrought.

The Judicial System

in Iraq

Reliable judicial institutions are critical to developing stable nations,

and establish-

ing and expanding the rule of law. In Iraq, however, the role of judicial institutions
is

sometimes confusing to the public because before 2003

many

courts were not

part of the judiciary or because the Ministry of Justice circumvented the judicial

system entirely in applying its

own concepts of justice. Outside the judicial system,

courts could be found in the Ministry of Interior, the General Security

Agency and

the intelligence agencies. These courts often answered to the president's office alone.

Because the Iraqi legal system is so complex,

tem

as

it

existed prior to 2003,

it is

useful to review the judicial sys-

and then address the changes

that have occurred

Saddam's overthrow.

since

The Judicial System before 2003
Iraq's

temporary constitution of 1970 12 referred to the judicial system in only two

simple, vague articles in chapter 4. Article 60 addressed the types of courts

and pro-

cedures for appointing judges and for their retirement, and Article 61 addressed
the General Prosecutor Department.
Civil Procedures

and Action Law No. 83 of 1969 13 categorized the types of

courts in Articles 31 through 35 as the Courts of First Instance, including the

Courts of Personal Status (for Muslims) and Courts of Personal Issues (for non-

Muslims); the Courts of Appeal; and the Courts of Cassation, the highest courts
in Iraq.

According to Article 137 ofCriminal Procedures Code Law No. 23 of 1971, 14 the
criminal courts included the Courts of Misdemeanor, Courts of Felony and Courts

of Cassation (the appellate courts). Articles

1

through 136 explained the authority

of investigative judges and the procedures to be followed. Juvenile court procedures were covered in Articles 233 through 242.
It

was not

until

enactment of Judicial Organization Law No. 160 in 1979 15 that

courts were categorized through Article

1 1

into ten civil

and criminal

courts, in-

cluding Juvenile Courts, Investigative Courts and Labor Courts. At the same time,
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the law clarified that the Courts of Appeal (also called Courts of Cassation) are the
highest courts of Iraq. In addition to these courts, there were "special courts" that

were independent from the Council of Justice 16 and the Ministry of Justice. Most of
these courts were established to serve for a temporary purpose, such as the court established in 1970 to prosecute
allegedly conducting a

Mohammed Al-Madhlum and other defendants for

coup attempt. Other special courts, such as those associated

with the Ministry of Interior and the General Security Agency, were permanent.
Their decisions were usually sent to the president's

office,

not to the Court of

Cassation.

The procedures for the Council of Justice's courts included investigation, trial
and appeal for criminal cases; and first-degree court session, Supreme, and cassation for civil cases. The special courts, which were all criminal courts connected to
the Revolutionary

Command

Council, 17 handled political cases, and their deci-

sions were final. However, a copy of the decision
office for

approval

if

would be

sent to the president's

the verdict was the death penalty. In

all

other cases the

decision was sent for review only.

The system continued
thrown in April 2003.

to function in this

manner

until the regime

was over-

The Judicial System after 2003
After the

fall

of the Hussein regime and the establishment of the CPA,

sador Paul Bremer, the

CPA

Administrator, issued

CPA

Order No.

US Ambas35,

18

which

gave the Council of Judges independence from the Ministry of Justice in terms of

budget and authority. The Council expanded the number of courts to one in each
province and two in Baghdad, giving the country a total of sixteen. Kurdistan 19
the only region where courts
first

is

do not fall under the Council of Judges. Following the

Gulf War, the three provinces in Kurdistan came under the protection of the

international

ment

community and were semi-independent from

in terms of

its

judicial system. Kurdistan has

its

the central govern-

own

separate Cassation

Court and Courts of Appeal.

The requirements to be

a judge in the Iraqi judicial system differ not only

from

those of the United States, but from those of most other judicial systems as well.

Some

nations elect their judges; others like Jordan, Egypt and Italy appoint them;

while

still

others, like the

United

States, use

both election and appointment. In or-

der for an individual to be a judge in Iraq, he must

fulfill

Article 36( 1 ) of the Iraq Judicial Organization Law.

the requirements found in

These requirements are to have

graduated from law school with a bachelor of laws degree, have three years' experience in the legal

field,

be no younger than twenty-eight or older than

born of Iraqi parents, be married and have no criminal record.

forty-five,

be
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An

individual

accepted into

its

by applying to the Judicial Institute and being
internship program. That program consists of two years of workbecomes

a judge

morning and taking classes in the evening. To graduate the student must demonstrate his mastery of the legal and judicial sciences, and
pass the required exams and tests.
There is an exception in Article 36(3) that allows a lawyer, who must be younger
ing for and with judges in the

than forty- five, to be appointed as a judge by presidential order without the Judidegree with ten years of legal experience.

cial Institute

The Judicial Authority in Iraq
According to Article 89 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, "The federal juridical

power

comprised of the Higher Juridical Council, the Federal Supreme Court,

is

the Federal Court of Cassation, the Public Prosecution Department, the Judiciary

Oversight Commission, and other federal courts that are regulated in accordance

with the law." 20

The Higher Juridical Council

The Higher Juridical Council oversees the

affairs

of the judicial committees. 21

It is

comprised of the following:
•

The Court of Cassation: There

federal for

is

another just for that region.
•

two Courts of Cassation

now in Iraq; one

of Iraq except the northern region of Iraq, Kurdistan, where there

is

all

are

The Supreme Court: There

are sixteen

Supreme Courts

all

over Iraq except

in Kurdistan.
•

The Board of the Supreme Judicial Council: The Council is comprised of the

following:
•

The

President:

therefore he

is

He is the Chief Justice of the Judicial Authority in Iraq;

the Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation, the Federal

Supreme Court and the Supreme
•

Judicial Council.

The Chief Justice Deputies of the Federal Court of Cassation. There

are five justices.
•

The

•

The Director of the Public Prosecution Department

•

The Director of the

Judiciary Oversight

•

The Director of the

State Council.

sixteen Chief Judges of the

Supreme Courts

Commission

According to Article 91 of the Iraqi Constitution, the Higher Juridical Council
exercises the following authorities:

Regime Change and the Restoration of the Rule of Law
First:

To manage

the affairs of the judiciary

and supervise the

in Iraq

federal judiciary.

To nominate the Chief Justice and members of the Federal Court of Cassation,
and the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Oversight Commission, and to present them to the Council of Representatives [the Parliament of Iraq] to
Second:

the Chief Public Prosecutor,

approve their appointment.

Third:

To propose the draft of the annual budget of the federal judiciary authority, and

present

to the Council of Representatives for approval.

it

Federal Supreme Court
Article 93 provides that the Federal

Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the

following:

First:

Overseeing the constitutionality of laws and regulations in

effect.

Second: Interpreting the provisions of the Constitution.

Third: Settling matters that arise from the application of the federal laws, decisions,
regulations, instructions,

and procedures issued by the

federal authority.

The law shall

guarantee the right of direct appeal to the Court to the Council of Ministers, those

concerned individuals, and others.

Fourth: Setding disputes that arise between the federal government and the govern-

ments of the regions and governorates, municipalities, and

Fifth:

Settling disputes that arise

local administrations.

between the governments of the regions and

governments of the governorates.

Sixth: Settling accusations directed against the President, the

Ministers,

and

this shall

Prime Minister and the

be regulated by law.

Seventh: Ratifying the final results of the general elections for

membership

in the

Council of Representatives.

competency disputes between the federal judiciary and the
institutions of the regions and governorates that are not organized

Eight[h]: A. Settling

judicial

in a region.

B. Settling

competency disputes between

judicial

institutions of the

regions or governorates that are not organized in a region.
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Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court are final and binding for all authorities. 22

Court of Cassation

According to Article 12 of Judicial Organization Law No. 160 of 1979, 23 the Court
of Cassation

is

considered the highest federal court in Iraq. There was only one

Court of Cassation in Iraq before the establishment of the Court of Cassation in
Kurdistan.
trials at

The Court of Cassation supervises

the Court of Cassation;

it

all

the courts of Iraq. There are

no

reviews other courts* judgments.

The Court of Cassation has the following committees:
•

The General Committee, which

comprised of the thirty judges of the

is

Court of Cassation. These consist of the chief justice,
justices in the

five justice deputies

and

all

Court of Cassation.

—
—

•

The High Committee:

It

has seven justices

•

The

It

has five justices

•

The Criminal Cases Committee:

Civil

Committee:

It

a chief and six justices.

a chief and four justices.

has five justices

—

a chief

and four

justices.
•

The Committee of Personal

—

a chief

and two

regulated by Public Prosecution

Law No.

Status: It has three justices

justices.

Public Prosecution Department

The Public Prosecution Department

is

159 of 1979.

The

goals of the Public Prosecution

Department

are as follows:

protect the State's order;
participate in revealing crimes;

supervise the exercise of the law, the regulations

and the

penalties;

evaluate current regulations;

monitor the criminal phenomena and recommend solutions to reduce them;

and

work on protecting the

family, the cell of the society.

The Public Prosecution Department
ties, at least

deputies

The

one prosecutor

is

comprised of a director and two depu-

in each felony court,

and two prosecutors and

on the board of the Department.

tasks of the Public Prosecutor are

•

asking for public rights in front of the judiciary;

•

supervising the collection of information and the detection of crimes;

their
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•

attending investigation sessions conducted by the investigative judge;

•

visiting detention centers

•

attending

trials at

and

the Felony

prisons;

and Misdemeanor Courts, but not

at sessions

of the Court of Cassation; and
•

the

appealing the decisions and/or the procedures of the investigative and/or
trial

judges.

Judiciary Oversight Commission

The Commission has a director, a deputy director and judicial supervisors. The Judiciary Oversight Commission supervises the judiciary and the decisions of the
courts. It also follows up on the rank of the judiciary personnel and the judiciary
records.

Other Courts

There are two types of courts under the judiciary authority in

Iraq: civil courts

and

criminal courts.
Civil Courts. Civil courts are divided into the Courts of First Instance, the Courts

of Appeal or Supreme Courts, the Courts of Personal Status, the Courts of Civil
Matters and the Labor Courts.

The Courts of First Instance have one judge each. The courts handle cases of
debt, real estate, contracts and compensation for illegal work. The decisions of the
courts are usually considered primary and are reviewed by the Courts of Appeal,
which consist of panels of three judges.

The Courts of Personal Status have one judge apiece and handle marriage, divorce, wills and estates for Muslims.
The Courts of Civil Matters each have one judge and handle marriage, divorce,
wills and estates for non-Muslims.
The Labor Courts have one judge each and handle labor cases.
Criminal Courts. There are two different kinds of criminal courts, depending on
the age of the defendant: Criminal Courts for Adults and Juvenile Courts.

Defendants in the Criminal Courts for Adults are adults who are over the age of
eighteen at the time the alleged crime was committed. There are three courts that

handle criminal cases. The Investigation Courts, each consisting of one judge, conduct the investigation from the time the crime
ferred to a trial court. There
that has a

is

is

committed

until the case

one Investigation Court or more

Court of First Instance.

24

10

is

re-

in each location
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The trial courts are the Felony and Misdemeanor Courts. The Felony Courts are
equivalent to the civil Supreme Courts. They are established in the centers of the
provinces. The cases are referred to the Felony Courts by the investigative judges.
The court has the right to either conduct the trial 25 or hear an appeal of the investigative judge's decision. The Felony Courts consist of three-judge panels, and the
courts' decisions are usually based on the majority of opinions. The Misdemeanor
Courts are usually established wherever there

misdemeanor violations

The

is

a

Court of First Instance. Cases of

are referred to the courts

by the

investigative judges.

Juvenile Courts handle those cases in which the defendant

is

younger than

26

The Juvenile Courts are divided into the investigation chamber and the trial court. The chamber in the trial court is comprised of a
chief judge, a right member who is a specialist in sociology and a left member who
eighteen but older than nine.

should have a law degree with experience as investigator or legal

assistant.

The Iraqi High Tribunal

US and coalition forces entered Iraq and the discussion turned to promoting
rule of law in Iraq, concerned parties began to wonder how Saddam Hussein

After

the

—

would be prosecuted whether he would be tried by Iraqi courts or whether he
would be prosecuted by an international court similar to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Given the

political

disagreements

Security Council concerning the

war

among

the five permanent

members of the

in Iraq, obtaining Security Council approval

ICTY- type international court was not an available option. Moreover, history shows that such international courts take years to conduct
trials and reach decisions; therefore, it was logical to try Hussein in Iraq.
for the establishment of an

In

December 2003, the CPA issued Order No. 48, 27 which gave Iraq's Governing

Council the authority to establish an Iraqi Special Tribunal "to try Iraqi nationals
or residents of Iraq accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or violations of certain Iraqi laws." 28 This Tribunal
entity of the judicial system

by Statute Number

Council. That statute was replaced by
the Tribunal as the Iraqi

The

Law No.

1

as

an independent

of 2003 of the Iraqi Governing

10 of 2005, 29 which also

renamed

High Tribunal (IHT).

Iraqi Constitution considers the

tional period with the

was established

IHT to be

a transitional court in a transi-

duty to examine "the crimes of the defunct dictatorial

re-

30

The IHT has jurisdiction over Iraqi nationals or residents
of Iraq accused of war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity committed
between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003 in Iraq or elsewhere. 31 The Council of Repgime and

its

symbols."

resentatives has the right to dissolve the Tribunal after the completion of its work. 32

11
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The IHT

is

independent, both financially and administratively, from the Higher

Juridical Council of Iraq.

The IHT contains two entities: the judicial and prosecution committees. The
Judicial Committee consists of the Appeal Chamber, the Trial Chamber, the Investigative Judges and the Prosecution. The Appeal Chamber has a chief judge and
eight judges. It is equivalent to the Court of Cassation. The Trial Chamber has a
chief judge and four judges. It is equivalent to the Felony Courts. The investigative
judges are a chief judge and twenty-four investigative judges. They are each the
equivalent of the Investigative Courts. The prosecution has a chief and sixteen
prosecutors. It is equivalent to the Public Prosecution Department under the
Higher Juridical Council. There is a separate Administrative Department to support the IHT.

The New Rule of Law in Iraq
The Iraqi High Tribunal began its mission in 2004. By the end of 2006, it had made
substantial headway in addressing the claims presented to it, and processing the
documents and other evidence that supported those claims. As the number of
complainants increased from different parts of the country, however, it became
important to open additional offices, to reduce the amount of work in the Baghdad
headquarters. Offices were opened in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil to cover the northern region of Iraq, in Najaf to cover the central region and in Basra to cover the
southern region. All four offices were supplied with the necessary personnel, investigative resources

and equipment

to facilitate their tasks. These offices

and the

headquarters in Baghdad interviewed thousands of witnesses, victims and
complainants.

number of documents. In addition to the
official Iraqi government records, the IHT received approximately eighteen tons of
documents during the first six months of its existence. It was impossible to read
and authenticate each document manually; therefore it was important to find a
process to organize and categorize them. The documents were moved to a special
building and more than one hundred individuals specialized in analyzing documents were hired. The documents were categorized, scanned and entered into an
Additionally, they dealt with a huge

electronic database.

The investigative judges, along with their staff of investigators and paralegals,
went through the documents they needed in the cases to which they were assigned.
At the same time, prosecutors and defense attorneys were provided access to the

documents used

in the investigation.

The

12

electronic database proved to be an
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effective

way

and

to save time

Millions of important documents were

effort.

categorized in that database.

A huge issue in Iraq was the mass graves in which the victims of the Hussein reTwo sources were used in locating the burial sites.
The first source was witnesses who helped not just in locating them and establishgime's atrocities were buried.

ing the year they were buried, but also in identifying the victims. 33

The second

human rights organizations, working in coordination with US military forces, who used modern technology in locating the graves.
source was non-governmental

More than 250 mass

grave

sites

were found; each contained more than eighty

skeletal remains.

Because the grave

sites

were often found in isolated locations, the concerned

Human

Rights, Ministry of Health

and

the Archaeology Department) didn't possess the resources to investigate each

site.

Iraq government ministries (Ministry of

The IHT, with the support from the Regime Crimes Liaison Office based in the US
embassy in Iraq, was able to hire international experts and purchased a mobile laboratory to assist in the investigation of the grave sites. Taken together, the testimony of the witnesses, the documentary evidence and the mass graves starkly
illustrated the policy

of the former regime toward each group of victims.

Conclusion

Many experts
however, the

have questioned the work of the Iraqi High Tribunal. In doing

critics

judicial history.

neglected to analyze

its

work

in the context of Iraq's

modern

The IHT achieved justice and helped keep peace in Iraq in the period

immediately following the

fall

of the former regime in 2003.

It

represented the

hopes of Iraqis for the rule of law, and contributed to the process of restoring

and confidence

so,

faith

in the Iraqi judicial system.
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Procedure and Actions Law No. 83 of 1969 hyperlink).
Criminal Procedures Code (Law No. 23), Feb.

14, 1971.

An unofficial version of the code
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.org/wp-content/uploads/judicial-organization.pdf [hereinafter

Law No.

160].
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19. Kurdistan Iraq is the northern region of the country. It contains three provinces: Erbil,
Sulaymaniyah and Duhok. For more information on Kurdistan Iraq, see the Kurdistan Regional

Government website
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23.
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minimum

wp-content/uploads/juvenile-welfare-law-76-of- 1983.pdf, increased the

age to ten

for prosecution.
27.
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PART II
OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ

II

Iraq and the "Fog of Law"

John F. Murphy*

The

conference "The War in Iraq:

A Legal Analysis," from which this volume

derives, covered a variety of topics

and a plethora of legal

issues. It

was

fol-

lowed by a workshop consisting of moderators of the various panels, panelists and

commentators with a view to continuing the dialogue begun at the conference. As a

commentator at the conference,

1

this

author was struck not only by the large

num-

ber of controversial issues arising out of the conflict in Iraq, but also by the absence of clear resolution of many of these issues, both at the conference and in the

wider world outside of the conference, hence
of the

title

of this

article.

my choice of the "fog of law" as part

2

By the "fog of law," I mean not only the debate over the law as it was interpreted
and applied in Iraq; but also the issue of what law applied

—national

the law of Iraq; the law of armed conflict (or, as preferred

law, especially

by some, "international

humanitarian law"); the law of the United Nations Charter, including Security
Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII; or no law

Although the

first

at

all.

3

panel of the conference was titled "Legal Bases for Military

Operations in Iraq," and Andru Wall presented a defense of the legality of the

March 2003 invasion of Iraq and the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime from
power, 4 this topic was not a primary focus of the conference. Perhaps
as well, since the legality

this

was just

of the war in Iraq under the jus ad helium, the law of resort

* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.

Iraq and the "Fog of Law'

to the use of

armed

force, has

been debated extensively in various other forums.

Moreover, with the passage of time and a rash of developments in Iraq that have
raised a host of other issues, the legality of the 2003 invasion has arguably become a

matter of academic interest only.

It

may be

appropriate, however, to

make two

The first is that there was general agreement in the Security Council debates concerning Iraq on a "strict constructionist"
approach to the jus ad bellum. That is, the strict limits on the use of force set forth in

brief observations before leaving the topic.

Article 2(4) of the

response to an
rity

UN Charter

5

two exceptions:

are subject to only

armed attack and

(2) military action

(1) self-defense in

taken or authorized by the Secu-

Council.

and after the invasion, there was no

in-

as a basis for the invasion. Rather, the debate focused

on

In the Security Council debates prior to

vocation of Article 51

6

whether the particular Security Council resolutions on

Iraq, including especially,

7

March 2003 invasion of Iraq
without the need for a further resolution explicitly authorizing such an action. The
but not limited

to,

Resolution 1441, authorized the

"fog of law" in this case

may have been Resolution

1441

itself,

which

this

author has

masked real
and the United Kingdom, on the one

described elsewhere as "a masterpiece of diplomatic ambiguity that
differences of view between the United States

hand, and France, Germany, and Russia, on the other, in
its

how Iraq's failure to fulfill
8

obligations under Resolution 687 should be handled." In a similar vein, Michael

Glennon has suggested

that Resolution 1441 "can accurately be said to lend sup-

port to both claims. This

is

not the hallmark of great legislation." 9

The second observation concerns whether, assuming arguendo that none of the
applicable Security Council resolutions authorized the March 2003 invasion of
Iraq, this

was a

"failure of the Security Council," as suggested

whether the Security Council should have accepted the
adopt a resolution
its

explicitly authorizing the use

US and UK proposal that it

of force

if

Iraq failed to carry out

obligation to disarm. There has been considerable debate over whether

necessary or desirable as a matter ofpolicy to remove the
tain international peace

and

against this proposition are
it

by Glennon, or

suffices to

security,

little

to

was

main-

but a discussion of the arguments for and

beyond the scope of this

note that there was

Saddam regime

it

article.

For present purposes,

or no prospect that the Security Council

would adopt a resolution authorizing such action, however compelling the reasons
for doing so. There is considerable evidence that, far from helping to enforce Resolution 687, France, Russia and China engaged in deals with the Saddam Hussein
government that undermined the resolution's enforcement. 10 In short, the
Saddam regime was one favored by three permanent members of the Security
Council, and it is reasonable to conclude that they had no interest in its removal

20
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and would have exercised

their veto
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power

tion that sought to authorize such removal.
Parenthetically,

2(4) of the

it

to block

any Security Council resolu-

11

may be noted that Michael Reisman

has argued that Article

UN Charter should be construed in such a way as to enhance "the ongo-

ing right of peoples to determine their

own

political destinies"

and "to maintain

the political independence of territorial communities so that they can continue to

form appropriate to them." 12
view, some interventions are permissible under Article 2(4) if they

express their desire for political

Hence, in his

community

in a

"serve, in terms of aggregate consequences, to increase the probability of the free

choice of peoples about their government and political structure." 13 Since the

Saddam Hussein regime was a brutal dictatorship on a local level and had twice invaded its neighbors to deny them the right of self-determination, it could be argued
that the March 2003 invasion of Iraq was not a violation of Article 2(4) and that
there was therefore no need for a Security Council resolution authorizing it.
To be sure, this kind of argument has been effectively, in my opinion, refuted by
Oscar Schachter. In a direct response to Reisman, 14 Schachter

stated:

The difficulty with Reisman's argument is not merely that it lacks support in the text of
the Charter or in the interpretation that states have given Article 2(4) in the past
decades.

It

would introduce a new normative basis for recourse to war that would give

powerful states an almost unlimited right to overthrow governments alleged to be
unresponsive to the popular will or to the goal of self-determination. 15

Assuming arguendo that, as a policy matter, the Saddam Hussein regime should
have been removed from power, but the lack of Security Council authorization
stood in the

way of such removal, what are

the implications for appropriate ac-

tion should such a situation arise again in the future? If

one agrees with Michael

Glennon's argument that, because they have been so often flouted in the past, Arti-

and other limitations on

cle 2(4)

resort to force in the

UN Charter are no longer in

would agree with Glennon that " [b]y 2003 the
main question facing countries considering whether to use force was not whether it
effect, it necessarily

follows that one

was lawful. Instead, as in the nineteenth century, they simply questioned whether it
was wise." 16 But for reasons I have set forth elsewhere, Glennon's premise that limitations

on the use of force

Shortly after the

in the

UN Charter are no longer in effect is not valid.

March 2003 invasion of

Iraq, Lee Feinstein, then Acting

Director of the Washington Program of the Council

Anne-Marie Slaughter, then Dean of the
of International Law, proposed a

new

on Foreign

Woodrow Wilson

International Affairs at Princeton University

17

Relations,

and

School of Public and

and President of the American Society

doctrine, a "collective 'duty to prevent*

21

Iraq

and

the "Fog of Law'

on their power from acquiring or
[weapons of mass destruction]." With specific reference to Iraq,

nations run by rulers without internal checks

using

WMD

18

the authors suggested:

how

Consider, for instance,

debate over the war in Iraq.

recognizing a duty to prevent could have changed the

Under

existing law, the

intervention only by arguing that Iraq held
resolutions.

.

.

.

Now

suppose that

last

Bush administration could justify

WMD in violation of Security Council

March, the United

States

and the United

Kingdom had accepted a proposal by France, Germany, and Russia to blanket Iraq with
Presumably those inspectors would have found what
evidence of Iraq's intention and capacity to build
U.S. forces seem to be finding today
WMD, but no existing stocks. Would the appropriate response then have been to send
the inspectors home and leave Saddam's regime intact? The better answer would have
inspectors instead of attacking

it.

—

been to recognize from the beginning the combined threat posed by the nature of his
regime and his determination to acquire and use

WMD. Invoking the duty to prevent,

the Security Council could have identified Iraq as a subject of special concern and, as

was blanketing the country with inspectors, sought
19
against humanity committed back in the 1980s.

There are a number of problems with

Saddam's

Iraq. First,

it

this

to prosecute

Saddam

it

for crimes

proposed alternative approach to

should be noted that Security Council Resolution 687 had

Commission (UNSCOM) consisting of inspectors who were
to inspect and verify that Iraq had destroyed all capability for weapons of mass
destruction, but Iraq had consistently refused to allow UNSCOM to carry out its
mandate, and in 1998 had forced it to leave Iraq and refused it or a successor team
to resume this function. Only in 1999 was the Security Council able to establish
the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
established a Special

(UNMOVIC) 20

as a successor to

UNSCOM.

This result

is

largely attributable to

heavy bombing by the United States and the United Kingdom

as part

of Operation

Desert Fox, which occurred in response to the withdrawal by Iraq of cooperation

with the

UN weapons inspectors.

the Council's

21

In mid-September 2002, Iraq finally acceded to

demand that it allow UN inspectors back into its territory, and Reso-

lution 1441 decided that

the

Government of Iraq shall provide

to

UNMOVIC, the IAEA

[International

Atomic

Energy Agency], and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution,

and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to
develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery
a currently accurate,

systems

full,

22

In Resolution 1441, the Council also decided that

22
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false

statements or omissions to the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this

resolution

and

failure

implementation

by Iraq

of, this

at

any time to comply with, and cooperate

fully in the

resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's

and will be reported
paragraphs 11 and 12 below. 23

to the Council for assessment in accordance with

obligations

On December 7, 2002, Iraq's declaration of its weapons fell far short of the full disclosure

demanded by Resolution

spector for chemical

and

1441. Nonetheless,

Hans

Blix, the chief

UN in-

biological weapons, in a clash with the view of

US

Secretary of State Colin Powell, maintained that the inspection process was work-

ing and should be given

more time and requested four more months. 24

In light of Saddam's refusal to cooperate with
likely that

UN inspectors,

it is

highly un-

he would have accepted "blanketing the country with inspectors," espe-

was part of an

cially if this

effort to prosecute

him

for crimes against

humanity

would have required the use of
armed force. Support of Saddam by the Russian, French, German and Chinese
governments would have precluded any Security Council authorization of such
committed

in the 1980s. Carrying out this policy

use of force.

More

and Slaughter, in support of their proposal for a
prevent weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands

generally, Feinstein

doctrine of a duty to

of regimes like North Korea or Iran, recognize that the "contentious issue
decides

when and how

to use force."

They

is

who

further recognize that the Security

Council "remains the preferred enforcer of collective measures." 25 At the same
time they

state:

paralysis, alternative means of
The
enforcement must be considered.
second most legitimate enforcer is the regional
organization that is most likely to be affected by the emerging threat. After that, the
next best option would be another regional organization, such as NATO, with a less
direct connection to the targeted state but with a sufficiently broad membership to

Given the Security Council's propensity for

permit serious deliberation over the exercise of a collective duty.

It is

only after these

options are tried in good faith that unilateral action or coalitions of the willing should

be considered.

In any event, the resort to force

is

subject to certain "precautionary principles." All

nonmilitary alternatives that could achieve the same ends must be tried before force

may be used, unless they can

reasonably be said to be

the smallest scale, for the shortest time,
its

objective; the objective itself must

the likelihood of

futile.

Force must be exerted on

and at the lowest intensity necessary to achieve

be reasonably attainable when measured against

making matters worse.

fundamental principles of the laws of war:

it

23

Finally, force

should be governed by

must be a measure of last

resort,

used in

Iraq

and

the "Fog of Law'

proportion to the harm or the threat of the
spare civilians.

harm

it

targets,

From a strict legal perspective,

it

must be noted that the Security Council

only the "preferred enforcer of collective measures";
lective

and with due care

to

26

measures under the

it is

is

not

the only enforcer of col-

UN Charter paradigm qualified to use or to authorize

the use of force as a collective measure. Regional organizations, including

NATO,

require Security Council approval to use force unless they are acting in collective
self-defense.

But in the case of Security Council

paralysis, as suggested

and Slaughter, they may well be the most legitimate

by Feinstein

alternative to the Security

Council to engage in armed force, subject to certain "precautionary principles"

and "fundamental principles of the laws of war."
At

this point

it is

time to turn to the "fog of law" topics that

focus of the rest of this

article:

human

The Occupation

the

be the primary

the occupation in Iraq and the relationship between

the law of armed conflict and international

It is

will

rights law.

in Iraq

Hague Regulations on land warfare 27 and
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 28 constitute the primary legal documents
generally recognized that the 1907

governing the traditional law of belligerent occupation. 29 According to Eyal
Benvenisti, however, in the case of the 2003 occupation of Iraq
States,

by the United

Great Britain and the "coalition of the willing," the occupants "were

reluctant to use the term occupation.
their status as

1'

30

They

also did not "explicitly

initially

acknowledge

occupying powers nor did they invoke the Hague Regulations of

1907 or the Fourth Geneva Convention as applicable to their actions in Iraq." 31

Approximately seven months
2003, David
States

J.

Scheffer published an article that demonstrates

and Great

as stated

by

invaded Iraq on March 20,

after the coalition

Britain were reluctant to use the

why

term occupation.

Scheffer, "[t]he occupation clauses of the

32

the United

For example,

Fourth Geneva Convention

more relevant to a belligerent occupation than to an occupation designed to
liberate a society from its repressive governance and transform it as a nation guided
by international norms and the self-determination of its liberated populace." 33
Elaborating on this thesis, Scheffer states:
are far

In recent years, multilateral or humanitarian occupation, particularly that aimed at

enforcing international

human

rights

law and atrocity law, has become the more

relevant factor in occupation practice. Occupation law

was never designed

for such

transforming exercises. While the humanitarian condition of the occupied society

is

a

paramount concern of the Hague Regulations of 1907, [under] the Fourth Geneva

24

John
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a society in political, judicial, and economic

overthrown a repressive leader and seeks radical
more latitude for transformational development than

collapse or a society that has

transformation requires far

would be

anticipated under these instruments.

changes in

its

economy

(including

implementation of international
judiciary,

and a new

a

human

political structure

The

leap

society

may require revolutionary

robust capitalism),

into

rights standards, a

(most

new

likely consistent

rigorous

and

constitution

with principles of

democracy) never contemplated by occupation law or the domestic law of the
occupied territory. As just one example, the penal law requirements set forth in Article
64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention serve little, if any, purpose in areas such as Kosovo
or Iraq or, had it been in force at the time, in Germany after World War II where the
Nazi-era national penal system failed to protect individual and collective rights. 34

Despite the reluctance of the United States and the United

term "occupation," and despite

Kingdom to

use the

their clear intention to transform Iraqi society,

Hague
This was followed by

they acknowledged their respective obligations to act in accordance with the
Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention.

35

the Security Council issuing Resolution 1483, 36 which "[c]alls upon

all

concerned

comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907." 37
to

Scheffer criticizes Resolution 1483

and suggests

that

methodology that should have been invoked
was a UN Security Council
mandate establishing the transformational tasks of a military deployment and civilian
administration of a liberated society that explicitly or implicitly implemented only the
provisions of occupation law relevant to the particular situation. That methodology
was rejected by the United States immediately following the intervention. 38
[t]he

.

.

.

Instead of supporting a Security Council resolution along the lines suggested by
Scheffer, the

United States and the United Kingdom established the "Coalition

Provisional Authority" (CPA), which "replaced the domestic system of governance

with a temporary command structure that ruled the country based on the authority

of the Relevant U.N. Security resolutions, and the laws and usages of war."' 39

The

Security Council formally recognized the

CPA in Resolution

1511 of October

40
16, 2003.

These developments created a major "fog of law" in Iraq because, as noted by

Yoram

Dinstein, "[wjithin a brief stretch of time, the Coalition Provisional

thority carried a

Au-

whole string of legislative and other measures designed to bring

about large-scale reforms." 41 As Scheffer notes, however, by enacting Resolution
1483, the Council "specified additional obligations not required
law, but in doing so invited the Authority to act

25

by occupation

beyond some of the

barriers that

and

Iraq

the "Fog of Law'

occupation law otherwise would impose on occupying powers." 42

He

suggests

further that

[i]n

each of these areas of responsibility, a strict reading of occupation law likely would

prohibit such bold and transformational control of Iraqi society

one views the Security Council decisions
of occupation law.[ 43

]

If

such

is

and economy, unless
norms

as legitimately overriding conflicting

the case, then the Council's insistence elsewhere in

Resolution 1483 on compliance with occupation law breeds confusion. 44

Interestingly, Scheffer sets forth a lengthy list of acts or omissions of the

powers in Iraq that " [i] f proven true

.

.

.

occupying

may invite varying degrees of civil liability or
" 45

criminal culpability under occupation law

Later, Scheffer admits that

anemic body of international law remains difficult to enforce against either
governments or individuals. This is not surprising given the paucity of enforceable
this rather

penalties

under international treaties and national criminal codes and the reluctance of

national courts to second guess the public policy decisions that dominate occupation

For example, a private right of action against the U.S. government for

practice.

its

conduct during an occupation of foreign territory would be problematic. 46

Gregory Fox has extensively examined the issue of the extent to which the CPA's
actions were compatible with the traditional law of occupation. 47

source" of legitimacy of

CPA

As an "alternative

reforms, he also evaluates the argument that, by

adopting Resolution 1483, the Security Council "ratified the [CPA] reforms by effectively legislating a set

of goals for the occupation that superseded the limitations

of Hague and Geneva law." 48

many of the CPA's
tion

and

He

concludes, correctly in this author's view, that

reforms were incompatible with the traditional law of occupa-

that the Security Council

Eyal Benvenisti has a

somewhat

had not

ratified these reforms. 49

different

view from Fox's concerning the

effect

of Resolution 1483 on the law of occupation applicable to the CPA:

Resolution 1483 can be seen as the

latest

and most authoritative restatement of several

basic principles of the contemporary law of occupation.

It

endorses several theses

developed in

this

Occupation

a temporary measure for reestablishing order and

of active

is

hostilities,

book.

First,

it

revives the neutral connotation of the doctrine.

benefiting also,

if

not primarily, the

occupation does not amount to unlawful alien domination that
population to struggle against

it.

the end
As such,

civil life after

civilian population.

entities the local

Second, sovereignty inheres in the people, and

consequently regime collapse does not extinguish sovereignty. Thus, the Resolution
implicitly confirms the

sovereign

title

demise of the doctrine of debellatio, which would have passed

to the occupant in case of total defeat

and disintegration of the

governing regime. Instead, and notwithstanding the requirement of Article 43 of the

26
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Hague Regulations to "respect

.

.

.

,

unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the

country," Resolution 1483 grants a mandate to the occupants to transform the

previous legal system to enable the Iraqi people "freely to determine their own political

and control their own natural resources ... to form a representative government
based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without
future

regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender." Hence, the law of occupation, according to

Resolution 1483, connotes respect to popular sovereignty, not to the demised regime.
Resolution

the

Third,

international

occupation.

human

recognizes

rights

in

principle

law in occupied

continued applicability of

the

territories in

tandem with the law of

Human rights law may thus complement the law of occupation on specific

matters. Fourth, Resolution 1483 envisions the role of the

of the heavily involved regulator,
"effective administration"

when

of Iraq. This

it calls

call

upon

modern occupant as the role

the occupants to pursue an

stands in contrast to the

initial

of the Hague Regulations, which envisioned a disinterested occupant

orientation

who

does not

intervene in the lives of the occupied population. In the years since, such an "inactive

custodian" approach has been rejected as unacceptable.

The

call to

administer the

occupied area "effectively" acknowledges the several duties that the occupants must

perform to protect the occupied population.
behind the

limits

imposed on

its

powers

It

precludes the occupant from hiding

as a pretext for inaction.

50

Elsewhere, Benvenisti acknowledges that Resolution 1483 "did not address a

number of key questions concerning the further adaptation of the law of occupation
to

contemporary governance." 51 Nonetheless,

it is

clear that

he considers the con-

temporary law of occupation more adequate for governing an occupation like that
in Iraq,

where the goal is regime change and radical changes in law and policy of the

occupied

territory,

than do Scheffer and Fox. In such situations, the

latter

two

commentators appear to favor "the establishment of a United Nations legal frame-

work to govern

the foreign military deployment

and

civilian administration." 52

This author tends to favor the Scheffer/Fox approach because a United Nations
legal

framework would have the potential

and thus

lift,

at least in part, the "fog

to bring greater clarity to a

of law."

It is

murky area

unclear, however, the extent to

which future occupations will have goals similar to those of the occupation in Iraq.
If

UN member States were to take seriously the so-called "responsibility to pro-

tect," there

model. At

would be

a considerable likelihood of occupations along the Iraq

this writing,

however, the "responsibility to protect"

the United Nations and

its

future

is

uncertain.

is

under attack in

53

The Law of International Armed Conflict and International Human Rights

By way of

transition

from the previous

section,

it

should be noted, as

Yoram

Dinstein has helpfully pointed out, that, despite the reluctance of the occupying

powers in Iraq to apply the ordinary norms of belligerent occupation because of
27

Iraq

and

the "Fog of Law"

their being ill-suited to the transformative objectives they

remained

event, the status of belligerent occupation in Iraq
little

" 54

over a year

train the process

By adopting Resolution

whereby the

had

1546,

belligerent occupation

55

in

mind, "[i]n the

legally valid for just a

the Security Council set in

came

to

an end.

Specifically,

the Council declared that "by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist,
eignty." 56

Two

and

days earlier than the deadline

.

.

.

Iraq will reassert

CPA

its full

sover-

Administrator Paul Bremer

formally transferred political authority to the Iraqi interim government and left the
country. 57

The practical effect of Resolution 1546, however,

is

unclear.

Yoram Dinstein has

suggested:

In theory, since the end of June 2004, the continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq

by invitation of the new Iraqi government. In practice, there was little change on the
ground following the decreed termination of the occupation. As long as coalition
forces are engaged in combat in order to extinguish pockets of resistance of the ancien
is

regime (or

its

putative supporters)

—

in certain areas of Iraq

As we

—

exercising at least

the occupation has

come

some

administrative authority

to a close only "notionally." 58

shall see later in this article, the situation has

changed

radically recently with

the adoption of two international agreements between the United States

and the

Iraq government.

As

to the applicability of human rights law to the period of belligerent occupa-

tion of Iraq, this has been a question of some controversy.

example, takes the position that

The United States, for
the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (ICCPR) 59 does not apply outside of the United States or

time and territorial jurisdiction and that

it

special mari-

does not apply to operations of the mili-

an international armed conflict. 60 The

tary during

its

US position that the ICCPR does

not apply outside of the territory of the United States has been rejected by the

United Nations

Human Rights Committee 61 and the International Court of Justice

(ICJ) in an advisory opinion. 62

Human

It is

worth noting, however, that neither the views of

Committee nor the ICJ's advisory opinion has any binding effect, and the United States and other countries have maintained their position.
The United States has also maintained that the Convention against Torture and

the

Rights

Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment applies only
within

US

articles

of this convention contains the phrase "in any territory under

tion."

63

territory,

although the

territorial

scope clause that appears in several
its

jurisdic-

Leading authorities on the drafting history of the Convention have con-

cluded that this phrase extends the treaty to "territories under military occupation,
to colonial territories

and

to

any other

territories

28

over which a State has factual

—
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UN Committee against Torture, which the Convention's counterpart to the UN Human Rights Committee, has endorsed an "effeccontrol." 64 For

tive control"

is

is

standard and concluded that "this includes all areas under the de facto

effective control

control

part, the

its

of the State party, by whichever military or

The Committee considers

exercised.

are geographically limited to

the United States

has maintained

is

such

US] view that those provisions

own de jure territory to be regrettable." 65 Again,

its

not bound by the views of the Committee against Torture and
position to the contrary.

its

[the

civil authorities

As

is

so often his practice, however,

Dinstein adds another consideration to the mix:

As

Covenant and the European Convention (whatever the correct

treaty laws, the

in-

terpretations of their texts) are, of course, limited in application to Contracting Parties.

But

it is

necessary to pay heed to the customary law of human rights, which

is

Customary human
on human beings wherever they are. Irrefutably, the inhabitants of
occupied territories are in principle entitled to benefit from the customary corpus of
human rights that coexists with the law of belligerent occupation. The International
frequently reflected in the substantive clauses of these instruments.
rights are conferred

Court of Justice observed, in the Armed Activities

human

tional law, namely, international

law,

would have

rights

case, that

"both branches of interna-

law and international humanitarian

66
to be taken into consideration" in occupied territories.

The US view that the ICCPR does not apply to operations of the military during
international armed conflict is contrary to the view expressed in two advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear

Weapons67 and Legal Consequences of the Construction ofa Wall in
estinian Territory.

68

In

its

the Occupied Pal-

Nuclear Weapons opinion, the Court stated that "the pro-

tection of the International

Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in

times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions

may

be derogated from in a time of emergency." 69 Similarly, the Court

opined in Wall that "the Court considers that the protection offered by
rights conventions

human

does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect

of provisions for derogation of the kind found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." 70
Dinstein has provided a concise rationale to support the ICJ view: "The very fact

derogation

Covenant

is

in

required to suspend the operation of given stipulations of the

wartime

—when no permissible derogation

attests that

is

in effect

human rights continue to be in force." 71
To be

sure, as Dinstein notes, Article 4(1) of the

explicit reference to

Thomas

Buergenthal,

war or even armed

now

a judge

ICCPR72

conflict.

73

does not contain any

Dinstein, however, quotes

on the International Court of Justice and an

29
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eminent authority on human

and

the "Fog of Law"

rights, to

deny any legal significance to this omission:

"the omission of specific reference to war was surely not intended to deny the right

of derogation in wartime; war

which might 'threaten the

life

is

the most dramatic example of a public emergency

of the nation/" 74

It is

noteworthy that neither the

United States nor the United Kingdom has invoked Article 4 of the Covenant with
respect to Iraq.

Law

Elsewhere in his treatise The International

of Belligerent Occupation^

Dinstein discusses in detail Article 4(1), as well as the general subject of

human

derogations from obligations to respect

derogable

human rights,

76

rights. 75 In a section

on non-

Dinstein compares the non-derogable provisions of the

ICCPR, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
and the American Convention on Human Rights. 77 He concludes that "[t]he lists
of non-derogable

human rights appearing in the three instruments coincide in part

but they are not conterminous" 78 and

illustrates this fact in

the most interesting observation Dinstein

It is

surprising that the

the instruments

—

detail.

79

Perhaps

makes in this exercise is set forth below:

human right to judicial guarantees of fair trial

not included in the

is

some

list

—enshrined

of non-derogable

rights.

in

all

Only the

American Convention enumerates as non-derogable those judicial guarantees that are
essential to the protection of other non-derogable rights. This loose end was deftly used
by the Inter- American Court of Human Rights in two Advisory Opinions delivered
on the subject in 1987 to extrapolate that judicial remedies like the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo can never be derogated, and they can therefore be used to exercise

—

—

control also over the suspension of derogable rights. [ 80 ]

Rights

—

2001

that the

Covenant)

list

of non-derogable rights

(as

More

radically, the

Human

—

in General

it

appears in Article 4(2) of the

Committee expressed the non-binding view

Comment No.

29 of

not exhaustive, and there can be no derogation (in particular) from

is

judicial guarantees.

81

In subsequent sections of his treatise, Dinstein, in a tour deforce^ explores the

many nuances

of the following topics: "Built-in limitations of human rights,"

including "Explicit limitations" and "Implicit limitations"; 82 "Balance between

competing human

rights"; 83

occupation and the law of

and "The Interaction between the law of belligerent

human

rights," including

"Convergence and diver-

gence," "The advantages of the law of belligerent occupation," "The advantages of

human

rights law"

and "The

lex specialis rule." 84

Time and space

limitations pre-

clude exploring Dinstein's treatment of these important topics in any depth.
fair to say,

however, that

it

tant issues. In particular,
tional

armed

conflict

helps to

it

lift

the "fog of law" covering

some very impor-

effectively refutes the thesis that the

and international human

30

It is

law of interna-

rights are mutually exclusive;

John F. Murphy

illustrates

how, "[f]or the most part, in occupied territories, there

for a symbiotic relationship

is

enough room

between the two [branches of international law] "; 85

suggests that

[w]hen both alternative paths of

human

rights

law and the law of belligerent

occupation are open to a protected person whose rights have been infringed in an

occupied territory, there maybe a practical advantage in exploring the former, since an
international

and obtain

mechanism may be

effective redress

readily available, enabling the injured party to seek

86
.

.

.

and points out that, in the event of an irreconcilable conflict between the two fields
of law, "the special law of belligerent occupation trumps the general law of human
rights

on

ground of lex specialis derogat lex generali." 87

the

As noted

earlier,

on June

28, 2004,

CPA Administrator

Paul Bremer formally

transferred political authority to the Iraqi interim government, 88

the date decreed by the Security Council in Resolution 1546.
to Resolution 1546, the occupation
sovereignty.

90

To be

came

cause there was
the occupation.

little

two days prior to

At that time, pursuant

end and Iraq asserted its full
Dinstein, quoting and citing Adam

to an

sure, as reported earlier,

Roberts, has suggested that the occupation

89

came

to a close only "notionally" be-

change on the ground following the decreed termination of

91

At present, however, the occupation has come to a close more than notionally.
Exercising

its

sovereign powers, the government of Iraq has entered into two inter-

national agreements with the United States that have radically changed the

power

balance in Iraq.

The Strategic Framework Agreement and the Security Agreement
In Resolution 151 1, 92 the Security Council authorized the multinational force in
Iraq. This resolution

was followed by Resolution 1546, 93 which,

in addition to

bringing the occupation of Iraq to an end, reaffirmed the authorization for the
multinational force. 94 Resolution 1546 was in turn followed by a series of other
resolutions that reaffirmed
force.

The

last

and extended the authorization

of these was Resolution 1790,

95

for the multinational

which provided that the authoriza-

would expire on January 1, 2009. Prior to the expiration of the authorization of the multinational force, on November 17, 2008 the
United States and Iraq entered into two bilateral agreements that took the authotion of the multinational force

rization's place.
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The two agreements are ( 1 ) the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the
Republic of Iraq (SFA) 96 and (2) the Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from
Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in
Iraq (SA). 97 Interestingly, the executive branch initially intended that the SFA
would be a non-binding political commitment in order that it would be free from
the

US

constitutional constraints that apply to international legal agreements; 98

however, the United States and Iraq decided to recast the SFA as a legally binding
treaty
It is

commitment,

like the

SA. 99

noteworthy that neither agreement uses the term "status of forces agreement"

or SOFA. 100

Commander Trevor A. Rush has explained the reason for the absence

of the term SOFA:

First, in

a technical sense,

agreements. The

it is

not accurate to use the term

SFA is an agreement

SOFA for either of the two

that defines the long-term strategic relationship

between the U.S. Government and the [government of Iraq]. It contains none of the
typical provisions one might expect to find in a SOFA and, with regard to "Defense and

SFA

Security Cooperation," the

contains

no

actual substance. Instead,

refers to the U.S.-Iraq SA, for the nature of that cooperation.

goes far beyond a regular

SOFA,

it

specifically

On the other hand, the SA

to include authorizing

combat missions and

and the termination of U.N.
safeguard Iraqi economic assets

detentions, discussing the deterrence of "security threats"

Security Council measures, as well as U.S. efforts to

and obtain Iraq debt

forgiveness.! 101 ]

Second, and more importandy, the reason not to use the term

agreements

is

SOFA

for these

two

related to the significant political sensitivities surrounding the presence

of foreign forces in the Middle East. The coalition campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan

have added

new

twenty-first century images to those deep-seated regional concerns.

History has witnessed various western powers seek to control Middle Eastern
territories,

but these attempts

at colonization

always, been rejected. In this context, a

and foreign domination have

"SOFA" can

ultimately,

give the impression of a willing

consent to permanent foreign military occupation. Skeptics need only look to such

and Japan and
presence operating under SOFAs. 102
places as Europe, Korea,

Rush

gives an extensive

attempt will be
ever, that

as a

Rush

made
is

more than

half a century of U.S. military

excellent overview of both the

in this article to

match Rush's

SFA and

the SA.

efforts. It is significant,

No

how-

of the view that "these U.S.-Iraq agreements should be heralded

major step forward in

and governance."

and

see

103

agreements can give

Iraq's

assumption of responsibility for

its

own

security

At the same time, Rush recognizes that application of the
rise to

disputes between the United States

32

and

Iraq.

He notes

John F. Murphy

that, at the

the

time of writing, the United States had already been accused of violating

SA through

first

a military raid that left

two people dead, 104 and suggests that "the

true test of public perception could come in 2009

agreements

is

held as planned."

105

if an Iraqi

At this writing, however,

it is

referendum on the
uncertain whether

such a referendum will take place. Although Sunni lawmakers insisted that a

endum on

the

SA be

held as a condition for their support, and a referendum was

originally scheduled for July of 2009,
cially set a

refer-

it

was delayed. In August,

Iraq's cabinet offi-

new date of January 16, 2010 for the referendum, a date coinciding with

nationwide parliamentary polls. 106

by the end of 20 ll. 107 If
Iraqi voters reject the SA in a referendum held on January 16, 2010, this would
force an accelerated US withdrawal, resulting in a full American troop withdrawal

The SA

calls for all

American troops

to be out of Iraq

almost a year ahead of schedule. Recent reports, however, indicate that worry over

endum

force an early

—

from the United States faster should the referAmerican withdrawal "appears to have cooled some

Iraq's ability to take over security

—

Sunnis' insistence on the referendum," and

some Sunni politicians have reportedly
said that a referendum was no longer necessary because the US military had so far
abided by the SA. 108
Even if no referendum is held on the SA, Article 30, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the

SA

allows either party to terminate the agreement one year after written notice

given to the other party. 109 As noted by
provisions in the

SA

United States and

that

Iraq.

110

may prove
As

to

Rush

in his article, there are a

to be significant friction points

is

number of

between the

ways to minimize the chances of a breakdown in

US-Iraqi relations leading to termination of the SA, Rush sets forth the following

poignant suggestions in the concluding paragraph of his

There are two clear ways to help ensure the

article:

SA is viewed positively by the Iraqis.

First,

must make every effort to adhere to the terms. This article has identified
various gray areas where friction may occur. These areas must be handled delicately
and in cooperation with Iraqi counter-parts [sic]. Although the United States must
protect its interests, it must not do so in a way that sacrifices the greater objective of
maintaining good relations with Iraq. The United States cannot be seen as exploiting its
position or strong-arming Iraq. To do so risks public condemnation and loss of public
support. The second way to help ensure the SA is viewed positively falls on the
shoulders of every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, Coast Guardsman, and Civilian of
the U.S. Forces serving in Iraq. There is no room for any misconduct toward Iraqi
citizens, nor can individuals afford to act beyond the scope of their missions. A single
failure in this area is potentially catastrophic to the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The
U.S. chain of command must continue to impress upon all members of the U.S. Forces
in Iraq that mission success can only be achieved through their individual good
U.S. leaders

33

Iraq

and

the "Fog of Law'

conduct and their good relations with the
protect.

Iraqis that they are in Iraq to

support and

111

A Few Concluding Observations
SA appears to be functioning effectively. In accordance with
all US combat forces have been withdrawn from Iraqi cities,
Article 24 of the SA,
At

this writing, the

112

villages

and

and have been stationed in agreed facilities and areas outvillages and localities. Although this is not entirely clear from

localities

side these cities,

published reports,
locations

it

to train

is

appears that the primary function of US troops in their

and advise

Iraqi forces, rather than carry a

new

major burden

in

combat.

To be

sure, areas of instability

still

remain, especially in the city of Mosul and

northern Iraq, where unresolved Kurdish-Arab tensions over
trol

of the area remain. Nonetheless, the top

mond

Odierno, has reportedly said he

oil

and political con-

US commander in Iraq, General Ray-

is

increasingly confident Iraq's recent security gains are irreversible despite high-profile
attacks like the string of bombings in

Baghdad last month [August]

that killed roughly

100 people. "We'll have bad days in Iraq," he said. "But the bad days are becoming

The numbers of deaths

fewer.

l

progress.

are

becoming

fewer.

We're making slow, deliberate

"

Perhaps the most encouraging development
cline of the religious

at this

juncture

is

reports of the de-

and sectarian parties that have fractured Iraq since 2003 and of

movement emphasizing national unity that seeks to reach across ethnic or sectarian lines. 114 If this movement continues, the chances of the national elections

a

scheduled for January 2010 going well
Last year the United States

will greatly

and Iraq agreed

be out of Iraq by August 2010, leaving

fifty

the Iraqis.

American

forces to that level even before the

forces

would

General Odierno, however, has reportedly stated that he could reduce

ary elections in Iraq go well.

up

American combat

thousand troops to advise and support

115

free

that

improve.

extra

116

combat troops

summer of 2010 if the expected JanuThis could ease the current strain on US forces and

for duty in the Afghanistan war, especially if the

Obama administration decides to accede to the military's request for more combat
troops in Afghanistan.

There

of course, no guarantee of success in Iraq. But

is,

success or failure
cess in Iraq

is

dle East will

is

it is

clear that ultimate

now largely in the hands of a sovereign Iraq government. If suc-

ultimately achieved, the implications for greater stability in the

be enormous. Not a bad denouement for a "war of choice."
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proceedings was the relationship between the law of international armed conflict and Article
6(1) of the ICCPR, which provides that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." The
87. Id.

tional

Court

stated:

In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's

life

applies also in

The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict
which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of
life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary
hostilities.

deprivation of

life

contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by

reference to the law applicable in

Covenant

armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the

itself.
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108.

1.

Chon, supra note 106.
paragraph

1, of the SA provides: "This Agreement shall be effective for a
period of three years, unless terminated sooner by either Party pursuant to paragraph 3 of

109. Article 30,
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this Article."
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Paragraph 3 provides: "This Agreement

1

shall terminate

one year

after a Party pro-

vides written notification to the other Party to that effect."

For example, Rush highlights Article 4 of the SA, which covers "missions" or military op-

110.

erations.

As to

Article 4,

Rush

states:

SA covers "missions" or military operations and is one of the articles
which make the agreement fundamentally different from all other U.S. SOFAs. Article 4
begins with a request from the GOI [government of Iraq] for "the temporary assistance
of the United States Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its efforts to maintain
security and stability in Iraq, including cooperation in the conduct of operations
against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of the former
regime." Standard SOFAs do not discuss engaging in combat operations, whereas this
Article 4 of the

SA provision

invites U.S. Forces to participate in Iraq's internal

armed

conflict. It also

provides internationally accepted legal authority for U.S. Forces to conduct combat
operations in Iraq. This was necessary to

of

[UN

fill

the legal

vacuum created by the expiration

Security Council Resolution] 1790.

The SA's grant of authority

for military operations

is

based upon Iraq's sovereignty,

which includes the right to consent to the presence of the U.S. military and to allow the
United States to conduct military operations that comply with international and
domestic Iraqi law. This differs from the U.N. Security Council's Chapter VII
authorization to the multinational force to "take all necessary measures to contribute to
the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq." Now, instead of U.S. Forces operating
unilaterally, subject only to multinational force regulations and rules, their operations
"conducted with the agreement of the Government of Iraq" and, in fact,
must be
must "be fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities." This coordination "shall be overseen
.

by a

.

.

Joint Military Operations Coordination

Committee

[hereinafter

JMOCC]

to be

upon the
Government of Iraq."

established pursuant to" the SA. Lastly, military operations "shall not infringe

sovereignty of Iraq and

its

national interests, as defined by the

The practical reality of these limitations is that U.S. commanders must work "by, with,
and through" the Iraqis and develop processes for obtaining the appropriate Iraqi
operating authorities. Preferably this cooperation and coordination is occurring at the
lowest levels through U.S. commanders' relationships with the GOI and Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) leadership. However, the exact level of mission coordination required by
Article 4 may prove to be a significant friction point between the United States and Iraq.
For instance, in April 2009, U.S. Forces conducted a raid in Wasit province that left two
Iraqis dead and resulted in the detention of six men. The raid "set off public protests
and drew a pointed complaint from Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki that the
operation violated [the SA]." U.S. Forces issued a statement that "the raid had been
'fully coordinated and approved' by the Iraqi government." At the same time, "the Iraqi
Defense Ministry announced it had detained two top Iraqi military officials in Wasit
province for authorizing the American raid without obtaining approval from their
commanders." This incident illustrates the difficulties of coordination, but despite the
inherent challenges in such processes, the transition of security responsibilities to the
ISF

is

a necessary part of creating a stable Iraq in

which the ISF assumes the major

for defending the nation.

Rush, supra note 100, at 38-40.
111.

Mat 60.

112. Article 24 of the SA, supra note 97, reads as follows:
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Article 24

Withdrawal of the United

States Forces

from Iraq

Recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, the
assumption of full security responsibility by those Forces, and based upon the strong
relationship between the Parties, an agreement on the following has been reached:
1.

All the

December
2.

All

United States Forces
31, 201

shall

United States combat forces

localities

withdraw from

Iraqi territory

no

later

than

Iraqi cities, villages, and
assume full responsibility
province, provided that such withdrawal is completed no later
shall

no later than the time at which

for security in

all

1.

an Iraqi

withdraw from

Iraqi Security Forces

than June 30, 2009.
3.

United States combat forces withdrawn pursuant to paragraph 2 above

designated by the JMOCC

and

shall

be

and localities to be
[Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee] before

stationed in the agreed facilities

areas outside

cities, villages,

the date established in paragraph 2 above.
4.

The United

States recognizes the sovereign right of the

Government of

Iraq to

request the departure of the United States Forces from Iraq at any time.

The

Government of Iraq recognizes the sovereign right of the United States to withdraw the
at any time.

United States Forces from Iraq
5.

The Parties agree to establish mechanisms and arrangements to reduce the number

of the United States Forces during the periods of time that have been determined, and
they shall agree on the locations where the United States Forces will be present.
113. See

Youchi

J.
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115. See
Well,

Thorn Shanker,
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NEW YORK TIMES, Sept.

30, 2009, at A5.
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Legal Bases for Military Operations in Iraq

Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo*
Introduction

On

March

23,

2003 coalition forces invaded Iraq

material breach of

numerous

obligations under

two months later, on May

resolutions. Less than
historic "mission

its

1,

accomplished" speech from the

Lincoln, declaring that

after

it

was found to be

UN

in

Security Council

made his
USS Abraham

2003, President Bush

flight

deck of the

"major combat operations in Iraq have ended [and that] in

the battle of Iraq, the United States

and our

allies

have prevailed." Six years
1

later,

US combat troops remain in Iraq fighting a violent insurgency. Although the situation has improved over the past year, President Obama has vowed to end US comno later than August 3 1 20 1 0. 2 Even if the President does not live up
to his campaign promise, all US forces must withdraw from Iraq no later than
December 31, 2011, unless otherwise authorized by the Iraqi government. 3 This

bat operations

,

article will briefly discuss the legal bases for the

legal bases for

follow-on operations after

May

invasion of Iraq in
1,

March 2003, the

2003 and the characterization of

the conflict across the spectrum of operations.

Legal Bases for Launch of Operations
Justifications for

On March 23,

Going to War

2003 US, British and other coalition forces invaded

tary intervention

was

justified primarily

* Associate Professor, International

along two

lines:

Iraq.

The

mili-

repeated Iraqi violations

Law Department, US Naval War College.

—
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of a

number of United Nations

and the

Security Council resolutions

defense, and, to a lesser extent, humanitarian intervention.

4

While

I

right of self-

tend to agree

UK Attorney General that the right of self-defense and the principle of hu-

with the

manitarian intervention did not provide a sound legal basis for the invasion, 5
believe there

was

sufficient justification to attack Iraq

flagrant disregard of its
rity

continuous and

It is

true that weapons inspectors failed to find large quan-

of chemical and biological weapons following the invasion and that evidence

relied
e.g.,

its

disarmament and other obligations under numerous Secu-

Council resolutions.

tities

based on

do

1

on by the United

States

and the United Kingdom

to justify the invasion

Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda, Iraq's pursuit of biological, chemical

ons programs,

etc.

—was subsequently shown

ments or unsubstantiated assertions of Iraqi
that, at the

to be based

defectors.

6

and nuclear weap-

on fraudulent docu-

However, the

remains

fact

time of the invasion, Iraq was in breach of all fourteen of its weapons of

mass destruction

(WMD)

lutions, as well as

its

numerous

obligations set out in

obligations under Resolution 687

(

Security Council reso-

1991 ) 7 to renounce terror-

ism; under Resolution 688 (1991) 8 to cease internal oppression of
9

population; under Resolutions 686 (1991), 687 and 1284 (1999)

10

its

civilian

to account for

Kuwaiti and third-country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq; and Resolutions

686 and 687 to return

all

Kuwaiti property

Iraq's Violations of Its Obligations

it

had

seized. 11

under UN Security Council Resolutions

No one disagrees with the fact that Iraq flagrantly and repeatedly violated countless
Security Council resolutions, 12 as well as
tional instruments, 13

its

obligations under various interna-

and that it failed to cooperate with United Nations and Inter-

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors

national

months after agreeing to the
first Gulf War, Iraq commenced

decades. Four

ceasefire

ended the

its

ceasefire

agreement and

minating in US and
after the

terms in Resolution 687 that

with

UN and IAEA weapons in-

throughout the remainder of the decade, 15 cul-

UK airstrikes against military targets in Iraq in December 1998

UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)

Council indicating that Iraq had
officials

more than two

pattern of noncompliance with the

failure to fully cooperate

spectors. 14 This pattern continued

for

failed to

submitted a report to the Security

cooperate fully with

its

inspectors. 16 Iraqi

did not allow weapons inspectors to return to Iraq until 2002. 17

Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002)
In September 2002, Iraqi officials met with UN Monitoring, Verification and

Commission (UNMOVIC) and IAEA officials
of weapons inspections in Iraq. During that meeting,

spection
tion

accept

"all

18

the rights of inspection provided for in

46

all

to discuss the

In-

resump-

Iraqi officials agreed to

of the relevant Security Council
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resolutions

.

.

.

[and that

this]

acceptance was stated to be without any conditions

UNMOVIC

attached." 19 Specifically, Iraq agreed that

and the IAEA would be

"granted immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites" in Iraq. 20

October

8,

2002,

requesting that

On

UNMOVIC and the IAEA sent a letter to the government of Iraq

it

confirm the terms of the inspection arrangements agreed to in

September. Concerned by the continued failure by Iraq to provide the requested
confirmation, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441

on November 2, 2002

comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council." 21 Two months later, in its Twelfth
Quarterly Report to the Security Council, UNMOVIC reported that Iraq had yet to
in order to afford Iraq "a final opportunity to

comply as required with

its

disarmament obligations. 22

The Need for Further Security Council Action?
In Resolution 1441 the Security Council decided, inter
•

That Iraq was in "material breach of

its

alia,

obligations under relevant

resolutions," including Resolution 687 (operative paragraph 1);
•

To

comply with its disarmament
and establish an enhanced inspection

afford Iraq a "final opportunity to

obligations" under previous resolutions

regime (operative paragraph
•

That

or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq

"false statements

pursuant to

this resolution

2);

and

failure

by Iraq

at

any time to comply with and

cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution shall constitute a further
material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for

assessment in accordance with paragraphs
•

That

"UNMOVIC and

interference

.

.

.

IAEA

by Iraq with inspection

comply with

its

.

.

.

1 1

and 12" (operative paragraph

4);

report immediately to the Council any

activities, as well as

disarmament obligations, including

its

any

failure

by Iraq

to

obligations regarding

inspections under this resolution" (operative paragraph 11);
•

To "convene immediately upon

paragraph 4 or

1 1

compliance with

.

all

international peace
It is

clear

breach" of

.

.,

receipt of a report in accordance with

in order to consider the situation

and the need

for full

of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure

and

security" (operative paragraph 12).

from the foregoing that even though Iraq was found to be

in "material

and other relevant

resolutions,

its

obligations under Resolution 687

the Security Council did not intend that the use of force authorization in Resolution 678 should revive immediately, since Resolution 1441 afforded Iraq a "final

opportunity to comply with

its

disarmament obligations." 23 What

47

is less

clear

is
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whether paragraph 12 of 1441 required the Council to adopt a second resolution
before States could use force against Iraq.

The US 24 and

UK25 ambassadors clearly

believed that a second resolution was not necessary. France, Russia, China, Ireland,

Mexico, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cameroon and Syria indicated that the use of force

had

to be authorized

by the Security Council. 26

A close analysis of the language in
US and British

the resolution, as well as that of previous resolutions, supports the
position.

Resolution 687 "suspended, but did not terminate," the authority to use force in
Resolution 678. 27 Moreover, the ceasefire was conditioned on Iraqi compliance

with the obligations imposed by 687 and subsequent relevant resolutions. 28 In
regard, the Security Council decided in Resolution 1441 that Iraq "has been

this

and re-

mains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions," including

and indicated

687,

that Iraq

had "been warned repeatedly that

quences'" would result from continued violations of

1441 also makes clear that compliance with
the ceasefire resolution

its

its

obligations. 29 Resolution

terms was Iraq's

would be enforced should Iraq

fail

hanced inspection regime established by paragraphs 3 and
Pursuant to paragraph
in

its

1 1

of 1441,

'serious conse-

to
4.

last

chance before

comply with the en30

UNMOVIC reported to the Security Council

Twelfth Quarterly Report in January 2003 that Iraq was not in compliance

with the disarmament obligations established in paragraphs 3 and 4 and other

rele-

vant resolutions. 31 The Council then convened "in order to consider the situation

and the need for

full

compliance with

all

of the relevant Council resolutions in or-

der to secure international peace and security." 32 But does paragraph 12 require a
further Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force?
that the answer to that question

is

I

would suggest

"no."

Resolution 1441 does not indicate that the Security Council must "decide" what
action to take based

with

its

on

a report

from

disarmament obligations.

situation."

There

is

It

UNMOVIC that Iraq is

simply requires that the Council "consider the

a clear distinction

"decide" in resolutions.

33

between the meaning of "consider" and

Note, for example, the language used in paragraph 33 of

Resolution 1874 (2009), condemning North Korea's nuclear
in

which the Council

not in compliance

test

of May 25, 2009,

specifically states "that further decisions will

should additional measures be necessary."

34

be required,

Moreover, during the drafting of 1441

France and Russia proposed language that would have required the Security Coun-

amounted to a "material breach";
however, the proposal was rejected by the US and UK representatives precisely to
avoid the need for a second resolution. 35 The US delegation clearly indicated
throughout the debate "that they would not accept a text which subjected the use of
cil

to "decide" that subsequent Iraqi conduct

force to a further Council decision," arguing that the determination of "material

48
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breach" in paragraphs

1

and 4 of 1441 remained valid regardless of further Security

Council action. 36 Therefore, the French and other members of the Council knew

what they were voting for when they chose to use the word "consider" rather than
"decide" in paragraph 12. Additionally, the Security Council determination in Resolution 1137 (1997) that the situation in Iraq "continues to constitute a threat to
international peace
Iraq's failure to
as reported

by

and security" remained in effect. 37 Under these circumstances,

comply with the enhanced inspection regime

UNMOVIC,

established in 1441,

revived the use of force authorization contained in

Resolution 678. 38

Operation Desert Fox (1998)
It is

also

important to note that the United States and United Kingdom had taken a

similar position in 1998,

when US and British forces conducted a series of airstrikes

against Iraqi military targets after

an

UNSCOM report clearly indicated that Iraq

UNSCOM. 39 They justified
their action on Iraq's failure to cooperate fully with UNSCOM, arguing that Resohad

failed to

keep

its

promises to cooperate

fully

with

lution 687 (or any subsequent resolution) did not terminate the authority to use
force in Resolution 678, but, rather, only suspended that authority. 40

It

was further

argued that a serious violation of Iraq's obligations under 687 that undermined the
basis of the ceasefire

would revive the use offeree authorization

in 678. 41 Portugal42

and Japan 43 supported the US and UK position. Russia, China, France, Brazil,
Costa Rica, Kenya and Sweden disagreed, however, indicating that Security Council
action was necessary before military strikes could be conducted to enforce Resolution 687. 44 Slovenia,

Gambia and Gabon voiced neither opposition to nor support
for the operation. Under these circumstances, it should have come as no surprise
that the United States and United Kingdom would take military action independ45

ent of further Security Council action

if Iraq

did not comply with the terms of Res-

olution 1441.

Effect of Ceasefire Violations?

One

additional point regarding whether a second resolution was required to au-

thorize the use of force against Iraq to
cussion.

The

ceasefire

coalition forces

and

implement Resolution 1441

also merits dis-

agreement established in Resolution 687 was between the

Iraq,

not the United Nations and Iraq. In accordance with the

agreement and long-standing principles of international law reflected in the 1907

Hague

Regulations, 46 the coalition agreed to suspend offensive military operations

against Iraq in exchange for Iraq's full compliance with the terms of the ceasefire

and

its

Once

disarmament obligations under previous Security Council resolutions.

Iraq was found to be in material breach of the conditions of the ceasefire,

49
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beginning with Resolution 707 in 1991 and culminating with Resolution 1441 in
2002, the coalition partners were free to nullify the ceasefire and rely

resume

force authorization in Resolution 678 to

on

the use of

hostilities against Iraq to

enforce

Resolution 687 and restore international peace and security to the area. 47

Legal Bases for Follow-On Operations

Occupation and the Coalition Provisional Authority
President Bush declared an end to major

week

combat operations on May

1,

2003. 48

while avoiding the use of the term "occupying power," the

later,

States of the coalition created the Coalition Provisional Authority

One
member

(CPA) on May 8,

2003 "to exercise powers of government temporarily, and, as necessary,

... to

pro-

vide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons

of mass destruction." 49 Specifically, the coalition partners, working through the

CPA, were

WMD program,

to provide for security in Iraq, eliminate Iraq's

of refugees and displaced persons, maintain

tate the return

eliminate

all terrorist

terrorists

were denied

infrastructure

and

law and order,

and resources within Iraq and work to ensure
demining operations, promote

ac-

committed by the previous regime and

as-

safe haven, coordinate

countability for crimes

civil

facili-

atrocities

sume control of the institutions responsible for military and security matters. 50
The statuses of CPA, Multi-National Forces (MNF), foreign liaison missions, diplomatic and consular missions and contractor personnel were governed by

Order No. 17 (Revised).

51

Specifically, section 2

of the Order provided that the

MNF, CPA and foreign liaison mission personnel,
tants,

were "immune from Iraqi

as well as international consul-

and were "subject

legal process"

to the exclusive

jurisdiction of their Sending State." Similarly, section 3 granted contractors
nity, albeit

more limited,

for acts

company personnel to

immu-

performed pursuant to the terms and conditions

of their contracts. Additionally, section 14 authorized the
rity

CPA

"possess and carry arms while

MNF and private secu-

on

official

duty in accor-

dance with their orders or under the terms and conditions of their contracts."

and consular personnel could carry arms while on

Similarly, diplomatic

duty

if

official

authorized by the ambassador or charge d'affaires of a sending State.

Consistent with the 1907
tive to the Protection

ulation No.

1

Hague

Regulations, 52 1949 Geneva Convention Rela-

of Civilian Persons 53 and 1977 Geneva Protocol I, 54

provided that the

CPA would

"exercise powers of

government

temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq
store conditions of security
Iraqi people can freely

vested the

CPA

"with

and

stability,

determine their
all

.

.

.,

to re-

[and] to create conditions in which the

own political future

executive, legislative

50

CPA Reg-

and

"

Regulation

1

also

judicial authority necessary to
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achieve
the

its

objectives"

and provided

commander of coalition

forces,

maintaining Iraq's

hostilities;

that

Commander, US

would

Central

"directly support the

territorial integrity

and

Command,

as

CPA by deterring

security;

.

.

.

destroying

weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy

" 55

Security Council Resolution 1483 recognized the "special authorities, responsi-

and obligations under applicable international law of these states [the
United States and United Kingdom] as occupying powers" and called on the CPA
"to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of
the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions
bilities,

of security and

stability

and the creation of conditions

can freely determine their

own political future."
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in

which the

Iraqi people

Resolution 1483 also supported

"the formation ... of an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional administra-

by Iraqis, until an internationally recognized, representative government
established by the people of Iraq and assumes the responsibilities of the

tion run
is

Authority."

On July

13, 2003, consistent

with Resolution 1483, the

CPA

"recognized the

formation of the Governing Council as the principal body of the Iraqi interim administration, pending the establishment of an internationally recognized, representative

government by the people of Iraq." 57 Section 2 of CPA Regulation No. 6

provided that "the Governing Council and the

on

all

CPA shall consult and coordinate

The Security
Governing Council on August 14,

matters involving the temporary governance of Iraq

Council welcomed the establishment of the

.

.

.

."

On June 1, 2004, the Governing Council was dissolved following the establishment of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq. 59 The CPA officially ceased to
2003. 58

exist,

and the occupation phase ended on June 30, 2004 when the Interim Govern-

ment of Iraq assumed full responsibility and authority for governing
elected transitional

government of Iraq could assume

Iraq until an

office. 60

United Nations Mandate
In view of the increasingly unstable security conditions in Iraq, the Security Council

authorized a multinational force "to take all necessary measures to contribute to

the maintenance of security

contribute

.

.

.

and

stability in Iraq"

military forces to the multinational force

reaffirmed by the Security Council

Government of Iraq.
the

MNF, to

and urged "Member

62

on June

However, the

8,

2004

" 61

This mandate was

at the request

Iraqi request did

States to

of the Interim

impose some conditions on

include

The MNF and Iraqi security forces (ISF) would coordinate "on all
policy and operations issues in order to achieve unity of command of
operations" in which the ISF were engaged with the MNF.
•

51

security

military
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The

•

of their

MNF and Iraqi government leaders would "keep each other informed

activities,

consult regularly to ensure effective allocation and use of

personnel, resources and
issues
•

up the

facilities,

[would] share intelligence, and [would] refer

respective chains of command

The ISF would

where necessary."

progressively assume greater responsibility.

The MNF would work with the Ministerial Committee for National Security
to "reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues,
ensure full partnership
including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and
between MNF and Iraqi forces, through close coordination and consultation." 63
•

.

Operative paragraph
the

1

3 of Resolution

1

.

.

546 also established a new mission for

MNF, the establishment of a separate organization under unified command of

MNF with a dedicated mission to provide security for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, and paragraph 14 recognized that the MNF would also
the

assist in

building the capacity of the ISF and institutions through a program of "re-

cruitment, training, equipping, mentoring and monitoring."

The Transitional National Assembly was

on January 30, 2005 and the
draft constitution was approved by the Iraqi people on October 15, 2005. 64 Notwithstanding these positive political developments, the Iraqi government recogelected

nized that the ISF was not prepared to assume
Iraq

and requested

that the

full responsibility for

the security of

UN extend the MNF mandate for another year in ac-

cordance with the tasks and arrangements outlined in Resolution 1546 (2004). 65
Accordingly, on

November

2005, the Security Council extended the mandate

8,

(including participation in the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance) of the

MNF until December 31, 2006. 66

The following month

elections for a

new

Iraqi National

Assembly were held

under the 2005 constitution and a new national unity government was formed

May 2006.

67

Again, despite progress on the political front and the turnover of secu-

rity responsibilities to the

ernment renewed

November

in

1 1,

its

ISF in

Muthanna and Dhi Qar

request for military assistance

provinces, the Iraqi gov-

on June

2006, 69 and the Security Council extended the

9,

2006 68 and

MNF's mandate

for

another year. 70

UNMOVIC and IAEA mandates were terminated in June 2007 following a Sewas

curity Council determination that Iraq

in

compliance with

its

disarmament

months later, on November 26, 2007,
the United States and Iraq issued a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the
obligations under relevant resolutions.

71

Five

United States of America. 72 The United States agreed to provide "security assurances and commitments to

.

.

.

Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq"

52

and
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combat all terrorist groups." 73 Iraq agreed to request
an extension of the MNF mandate "for a final time" 74 and on December 7, 2007
submitted a letter to the Security Council requesting an extension of the mandate
support Iraq "in

"one
•

last

efforts to

time," subject to the following conditions:

"The functions of recruiting,

Army and
•

its

.

.

training,

[ISF] are the responsibility

.

"The Government of Iraq

arming and equipping of the

of the Government of Iraq."

assume responsibility

will

control of all Iraqi forces, and MNF, in coordination with the
will
•

Iraqi

for

command and

Government of Iraq,

provide support and backing to those forces."

"The Government of Iraq

imprisonment

maximum

tasks.

levels

When

be responsible for

will

those tasks are carried out by

arrest,

detention and

MNF-I,

there will be

of coordination, cooperation and understanding with the

Government of Iraq."
•

"The Government of Iraq considers

extension of the

this to

be

its final

request" for the

MNF mandate. 75

Following the signing of the Agreement Between the United States of America

and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United
(hereinafter US-Iraq security agreement),

the Security Council

on December

76

States Forces

from Iraq

the Prime Minister of Iraq informed

on December 7, 2008 that the MNF mandate would terminate

77
31, 2008.

US-Iraq Security Agreement

The US

military presence

and activities

in Iraq are currently authorized

by the US-

on January 1, 2009. Pursuant to
Article 24, all US forces shall be withdrawn from Iraq no later than December 31,
201 1. Article 24 also provides that all US combat forces were to be withdrawn from
Iraqi cities and villages when the ISF assumed full responsibility for security in an
Iraqi province or by June 30, 2009, whichever occurred first, and would be stationed in agreed facilities and areas designated by the Joint Military Operations
Coordination Committee (JMOCC). In addition, the government of Iraq will assume full responsibility for the Green Zone, although it may request "limited and
temporary support" from the US forces to secure the zone. 78
Iraq security agreement, which entered into force

While US forces may continue to engage
Iraq, their
rizes

freedom to do so

is

limited

in offensive military operations within

by the

security agreement. Article 4 autho-

US forces to support Iraq "in its efforts to maintain security and stability in

Iraq, including cooperation in the

conduct of operations against al-Qaeda and

other terrorist groups, outlaw groups, and remnants of the former regime." Article

4 further specifies that

all

"military operations that are carried out pursuant to
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this

Agreement shall be conducted with the agreement of the Government of Iraq"

and

"shall

be

fully

coordinated with Iraqi authorities."

Any disagreement

ing a proposed military operation that cannot be resolved

by the

forwarded to the Joint Ministerial Committee for resolution.

79

regard-

JMOCC shall be

US

forces are also

prohibited from conducting a detention or arrest unless authorized or requested

by Iraqi

officials,

provided that any person detained or arrested by

US forces must

be handed over to competent Iraqi authorities within twenty- four hours of the
or detention.

rest

80

Additionally, Article 22 prohibits

US

forces

ar-

from searching

a

house or other property "except by order of an Iraqi judicial warrant and in full coordination with the

Government of Iraq," except

in the case of combat operations

authorized by Article 4 of the security agreement.

Notwithstanding these provisions,

and

are authorized to carry

authority granted to
duties."

82

tion over

agreed

weapons owned by the United

States retains the

and

areas;

States "according to the

to their requirements

component,

for "matters arising inside

during duty status outside agreed

With

.

.

member

is

risdiction over

committed outside agreed

and

facilities

areas."

when such

.

and areas outside duty

that exception, the United States has primary jurisdiction over

the force even for crimes
the

facilities

and

facilities

Iraq has primary jurisdiction over "grave premeditated felonies

crimes are committed outside agreed

and

primary right to exercise criminal jurisdic-

forces, including the civilian

facilities

forces retain the right of self-defense 81

them under orders and according

The United

US

US

status." 83

members of

areas

and even

if

not in a duty status. Iraq does have the primary right to exercise ju-

US

contractors and their employees. 84

In addition to authorizing

US

military operations in Iraq, the US-Iraq security

agreement provides for more traditional security assistance
gard, Article 4 provides that

US
and

In this re-

forces shall continue to "cooperate to strengthen

Iraq's security capabilities including, as

ping, supporting, supplying,

activities.

may be mutually agreed, on training,

establishing

and upgrading

equip-

logistical systems, in-

cluding transportation, housing and supplies" for the ISF. Similarly, Article 27

provides that the parties "agree to continue close cooperation in strengthening and

maintaining military and security institutions

... in Iraq,

tually agreed, cooperation in training, equipping,

including, as

and arming

."
.

.

may be mu-

the ISF

upon the

request by the Iraqi government. Article 27 also provides that, in the event of an external or internal threat or aggression against Iraq

government, the "Parties

shall

immediately

and upon the request of the Iraqi

initiate strategic deliberations

and, as

may be mutually agreed, the United States shall take appropriate measures, including diplomatic, economic, or military measures, or any other measure, to deter

such a threat."

54

Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo

It

has been argued by

some

that the US-Iraq security agreement

is

invalid be-

cause the domestic legal authority to engage in military operations in Iraq expired

on December 31, 2008. 85 Section 3 of Congress's 2002 Joint Resolution to Autho86
authorizes the President to use the US
rize the Use of Military Force Against Iraq
armed forces to (1) defend US national security against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq and (2) enforce all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding
Iraq. However, in November 2008 the United States agreed that Iraq's designation
87
as a threat to international peace and security would end on December 31, 2008,
contemporaneously with the expiration of the

MNF mandate.

Consequently, the

authority to use force under the 2002 Joint Resolution has expired.

Of course, this

argument has merit only if you subscribe to the position that the President does not
have the constitutional authority to deploy

US

forces abroad without the concur-

rence of Congress.
It

should also be noted that a bill was introduced in the US House of Representa-

on January 8, 2009 that would invalidate the US-Iraq security agreement. 88
H.R. 335, which is currently in committee, provides in section 3 that any agreement that sets out broad parameters for the overall bilateral relationship between
the United States and Iraq should "involve a joint decision by the executive and
legislative branches." Section 6 goes on to prohibit the entry into force of any
agreement between the United States and Iraq that contains a security commitment or security arrangement, as well as the obligation or expenditure of funds to
implement such an agreement, unless the agreement has been authorized by a subsequent law or has the advice and consent of the Senate. The proposed legislation is
based on a faulty premise that the President cannot enter into a bilateral agreement
without the advice and consent of the Senate. Clearly, executive agreements have
the same legal effect under US law as a treaty that has received Senate advice and
tives

consent. 89 However, should such a law be enacted in conjunction with legislation
that restricts the expenditure of

Department of Defense appropriations to fund

military activities under the security agreement, the status of US personnel in Iraq

would be

in question.

Characterization of the Conflict

Without question, the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in March 2003 was an international

armed

occupation in

conflict,

which quickly transitioned into a period of belligerent

May 2003. With the
90

disestablishment of the

CPA in June

2004, the

occupation period ended; however, a violent insurgency quickly evolved. As a
coalition forces

remained in Iraq

at the request

result,

of the Iraqi government to help

suppress the insurgency and restore international peace and security. 91 During this
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period was the coalition engaged in a non-international armed conflict or an international

armed conflict? There was significant international involvement in the in-

surgency, but coalition forces were not fighting against the government of Iraq.

From a US perspective, does it really matter? US policy applies the laws of war to all
armed

conflicts, regardless

operations.
rights

92

From

of how they are characterized, and to

all

a practicable point of view, the real question

other military

is:

does

human

law applicable during a non- international armed conflict provide greater

protection to combatants and noncombatants than

is

afforded to these individuals

under international humanitarian law applicable during an international armed

would suggest that the answer to that question is "no." The protections
afforded to combatants and noncombatants under both bodies of law are qualitatively and quantitatively alike.
conflict?

I

Conclusion

The invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003 clearly constituted a short-lived international armed conflict between the States of the Multi-National Forces and Iraq.
Whether the United States can justify the military intervention on the grounds of
self-defense and/or humanitarian intervention

is

questionable; however, there

is

no doubt that Iraq failed to fully cooperate with the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency, and was in material breach of its obligations under
at least twenty-five Security

Council resolutions covering two decades. Although

Resolution 1441 could have been clearer,

it

did not specifically indicate that a fur-

would be required should additional measures be necessary if Iraq
failed to comply with its terms. In fact, efforts by France and Russia to include such

ther decision

a requirement failed in the Security Council. Additionally, traditional armistice

Under these
under Resolution 1441 and the

law would support the resumption of hostilities by coalition
circumstances, Iraq's violation of

its

obligations

forces.

Resolution 687 ceasefire agreement revived the use of force authorization contained in Resolution 678 and provided a sufficient legal basis for coalition forces to

conduct offensive military operations against

Iraq.

The international armed conflict quickly transformed into a period of belligerent
occupation that began on May 8, 2003 with the establishment of the CPA. Although
the occupation phase ended on June 30, 2004 when the CPA was disestablished and
the Interim Government of Iraq assumed full authority for governing Iraq, coalition forces and the ISF remained engaged in an armed conflict with the insurgents.
Whether that conflict should be characterized as non- international or international is a matter of academic debate, but has little practical effect on the way US
forces conduct themselves

on the

battlefield.
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The continued presence of the MNF during this phase of the conflict was at the
request of the government of Iraq and was authorized by Security Council Resolutions 1511, 1546, 1637, 1723 and 1790. Each of these resolutions incrementally reduced the authority of the MNF to engage in offensive military operations without
coordination with the government of Iraq. With the expiration of the

UN mandate

on December 31, 2008 and the entry into force of the US-Iraq security agreement
on January 1, 2009, US military activities have been further limited. It will be interesting to see if the security agreement stands the test of time and survives US congressional scrutiny, and whether the President vetoes any legislation that would
purport to invalidate

it.
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•
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failing to return
•

The

Iraqi

property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait.
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against other nations
•

The

Iraqi

and

its

own

its

capability and willingness to use

WMD

people.
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its

continuing hostility toward, and
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•
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terrorist organizations,
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•

The September

the threat

1 1

,

200 1 attacks on the United States underscored the gravity of

posed by the acquisition of

WMD

by international

terrorist

organizations.

WMD
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Iraqi violations included:
•

Security Council Resolution 660 (Aug. 2, 1990)

demands

Iraq's

withdrawal

from Kuwait.
•

Security Council Resolution 661 (Aug. 6, 1990) imposes economic sanctions

on Iraq
•

for

its

failure to

comply with Resolution 660.
demands once again

Security Council Resolution 662 (Aug. 9, 1990)

that Iraq

withdraw from Kuwait.

demands

no action

•

Security Council Resolution 664 (Aug. 18, 1990)

to

harm

•

Security Council Resolution 665 (Aug. 25, 1990) imposes a maritime blockade

of Iraq for
•

Iraq take

third-State nationals in Kuwait.

its

failure to

comply with Resolutions 660, 661, 662 and 664.

Security Council Resolution 666 (Sept. 13, 1990) reaffirms Iraq's obligations

under Resolution 664 with regard to third- State nationals.
• Security Council Resolution 667 (Sept. 16, 1990) condemns aggressive acts
perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait,
including the abduction of foreign nationals, and demands their immediate
release.

condemns Iraq for its
and
continued violation of Resolutions 660, 662, 664
667 and the treatment of
Kuwaiti nationals by Iraqi forces, and enhances economic sanctions imposed by
•

Security Council Resolution 670 (Sept. 25, 1990)

Resolution 661.
Security Council Resolution 674 (Oct. 29, 1990) demands Iraq cease and desist
from taking third-State nationals hostage, and mistreating and oppressing
Kuwaiti and third-State nationals, and comply with its obligations under various
international agreements regarding third-State nationals and diplomatic and
•

consular missions.

condemns attempts by Iraq to
alter the demographic composition of Kuwait and to destroy civil records
maintained by the government.
•

Security Council Resolution 677 (Nov. 28,

•

Security Council Resolution 678

1

990)

(Nov. 29, 1990) affords Iraq one

opportunity to comply fully with Security Council Resolution 660 and

subsequent relevant resolutions, and authorizes

means

member

States to

use

last
all
all

uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent
and to restore international peace and security in the area.
• Security Council Resolution 687 (Apr. 3, 1991) suspends Resolution 678 by
declaring a formal ceasefire between Iraq and Kuwait and the member States
necessary

to

relevant resolutions

cooperating with Kuwait; decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the
destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of
all

chemical and biological weapons and
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all

stocks of agents

and

related
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subsystems and components and

manufacturing facilities, and
kilometers and related major

research,

all

all ballistic

parts

and

development, support and

missiles with a range greater than 150

repair

and production

facilities;

decides

weapons
or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components of any
research, development, support or manufacturing facilities; and requires Iraq to
inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of
international terrorism or allow any terrorist organization to operate within its
that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear

territory.
•

Security Council Resolution 688 (Apr.

5,

1991) condemns, and

demands

that

Iraq end, the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, including the Kurds.
•

Security Council Resolution 707 (Aug. 15, 1991) affirms Iraq

is

in material

breach of Resolution 687; condemns Iraq for

failing to comply with the terms of
and cooperate with the UN Special Commission and
and requires Iraq to comply fully and without delay with all its

the ceasefire agreement

IAEA inspectors;

obligations, including Resolution 687.

demands

meet
unconditionally all its obligations under the plans approved in the resolution and
cooperate fully with the UN Special Commission and the IAEA.
•
Security Council Resolution 949 (Oct. 15, 1994) condemns Iraq's military
deployment in the direction of the border with Kuwait, and demands the
immediate withdrawal of all forces and that Iraq not take any other action to
enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq.
• Security Council Resolution 1060 (June 12, 1996) deplores the refusal by Iraq
to allow access to sites designated by the UN Special Commission and in violation
of Resolutions 687, 707 and 715, and demands Iraq cooperate fully with the UN
Special Commission and allow inspection teams immediate, unconditional and
•

Security Council Resolution 715 (Oct. 11, 1991)

that Iraq

unrestricted access to anything they wish to inspect.
•

Security Council Resolution 1115 (June 21, 1997)

condemns the repeated

by the UN Special Commission,
in violation of Resolutions 687, 707, 715 and 1060, and demands that Iraq
cooperate fully with the UN Special Commission and allow inspection teams
immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to anything they wish to
refusal of Iraq to allow access to sites designated

inspect.
•

Security Council Resolution 1134 (Oct. 23, 1997)

condemns

the repeated

by the UN Special Commission,
by Iraq endangering the safety, and interfering with the freedom of
movement, of UN Special Commission personnel and the removal and
destruction of documents of interest to the UN Special Commission; decides Iraq
is in flagrant violation of Resolutions 687, 707, 715 and 1060; and demands that
Iraq fully cooperate with the UN Special Commission and allow the inspection
teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to anything they wish to
inspect and personnel they wish to interview.
• Statement by the President of the Security Council (Oct. 29, 1997) condemns
the October 29 decision of Iraq to try to dictate the terms of its compliance with
its obligations to cooperate with the UN Special Commission, demands that Iraq
refusal of Iraq to allow access to sites designated

actions

cooperate fully without conditions

or
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Commission, and reminds Iraq of its responsibility for the
the personnel of the UN Special Commission.
•

Security Council Resolution

safety

and

security of

1137 (Nov. 12, 1997) determines that the

situation continues to constitute a threat to international peace

and

stability;

condemns the continued violations by Iraq of
and unconditionally with the UN Special Commission, including Iraq's October
29 decision to seek to impose conditions on cooperation with the UN Special
Commission, its refusal on October 30 and November 2 to allow entry to two
officials of the UN Special Commission, its denial of entry to inspectors on
November 3-7 to sites designated by the UN Special Commission for inspection,
its implicit threat to the safety of surveillance aircraft operating on behalf of the
its

obligations to cooperate fully

UN Special Commission, its removal of significant pieces of dual-use equipment
from their previous sites, and its tampering with monitoring cameras of the UN
Commission; demands that Iraq rescind immediately its October 29
demands that Iraq cooperate fully and immediately and without
condition or restrictions with the UN Special Commission; imposes travel
restrictions on Iraqi officials responsible for these violations; and reaffirms Iraq's
responsibility to ensure the safety and security of the personnel and equipment of
the UN Special Commission.
Special

decision;

•

Statement of the President of the Security Council (Nov.

13, 1997)

the unacceptable decision of Iraq to expel personnel of the

condemns

UN

Special

Commission, demands the immediate and unequivocal revocation of this action
and demands that Iraq comply immediately and fully with its obligations under
the relevant resolutions.
•

Statement of the President of the Security Council (Jan.

Iraq's statement

provide the

1998) deplores

of January 12 and its subsequent failure to fulfill its obligations to

UN Special Commission full, unconditional and immediate access to
and reiterates the
and immediately and without conditions or
Special Commission.

all sites,

which

demand

that Iraq cooperate fully

is

a clear violation of relevant resolutions,

restrictions with the
•

14,

UN

Security Council Resolution 1154 (Mar.

2,

1998) endorses the February 23,

1998 memorandum of understanding between the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

and the Secretary-General and looks forward to its early and full implementation.
• Security Council Resolution 1194 (Sept. 9, 1998) condemns the decision of
Iraq of August 5, 1998 to suspend cooperation with the UN Special Commission
and the IAEA, which constitutes a totally unacceptable contravention of its
obligations under Resolutions 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115 and 1154 and the
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq
and the Secretary-General on February 23, 1998.
•
Security Council Resolution 1205 (Nov. 5, 1998) condemns the decision by
Iraq of October 31, 1998 to cease cooperation with the UN Special Commission
as a flagrant violation of Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions; demands
that Iraq rescind immediately and unconditionally the decision of October 3 1, as
well as the decision of August 5, 1998, to suspend cooperation with the UN
Special Commission and to maintain restrictions on the work of the IAEA; and
demands that Iraq provide immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation
with the UN Special Commission and the IAEA.
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Security Council Resolution 1284 (Dec. 17, 1999) recalls that Iraq has not yet
complied with its obligations under Resolutions 686 and 687 to return all Kuwaiti
and third-country nationals present in Iraq and to return all Kuwaiti property it
•

had

seized,

Inspection
•

and established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace the UN Special Commission.

Security Council Resolution 1441 (Nov.

cooperate fully with

8,

2002) deplores that Iraq failed to

UNSCOM and the IAEA; deplores that Iraq failed to comply

commitments in Resolution 687 with regard to terrorism, Resolution 688
to end repression of its civilian population, and Resolutions 686, 687 and 1284 to
account for Kuwaiti and third-country nationals; decides that Iraq remains in
with

its

material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions through

cooperate with

its

failure to

UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors and to complete actions required

by Resolution 687; decides to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to
comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions; decides that
Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC, the IAEA and the Security Council within thirty
days a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its
and ballistic missile programs; decides that false statements or omissions in the
declarations submitted by Iraq and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and
cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution shall constitute a further

WMD

material breach of Iraq's obligations; decides that Iraq will provide

UNMOVIC

and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access to
anything they wish to inspect or any persons they wish to interview; directs
UNMOVIC and the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference
with inspection activities or Iraq's failure to comply with its disarmament
obligations; and decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report of
noncompliance in order to consider the situation.
13. E.g., U.N. Charter; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR 301 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) (treatment of Kuwaiti nationals by
Iraqi forces during its occupation in 1990) [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (Iraqi acts
against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (Iraqi acts against diplomatic and consular
missions in Kuwait); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S.
8061, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra, at 158 (Iraq made statements
threatening to use chemical and biological weapons and used chemical weapons on prior occasions); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161 (Iraq made attempts to acquire materials for a nuclear weapons program).
14. S.C. Res. 707, U.N. Doc. S/RES/707 (Aug. 15, 1991).
15. Joint Resolution, Iraq Compliance with International Obligations, Pub. L. No. 105-235,
112 Stat. 1538 (1998); Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-338, 112 Stat. 3178 (1998);
Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 4. Examples of Iraq's continuing material
breach of its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions include:
• August 1991
Iraq failed to comply with the terms of the ceasefire agreement
and cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.

—

•

January/February 1992

equipment and cameras

—

Iraq rejected plans to install long-term monitoring

called for in Security Council resolutions.
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•

February 1992

—

Iraq continued to obstruct the installation of monitoring

equipment and failed to comply with UNSCOM orders
missiles and other proscribed weapons.
•

July 1992

—

Iraq denied

Agriculture.

UNSCOM

to allow destruction of

inspectors access to the Iraqi Ministry of

—

December 1992 Iraq violated the southern no-fly zone, raided a weapons
depot in Kuwait and denied landing rights to a plane carrying UN weapons
•

inspectors.

former President
— orchestrated
Kuwait.
of cameras and
prevented UNSCOM's
June 1993 —
monitoring equipment.
threatened
October 994—
end cooperation with weapons
•

April 1993

a failed plot to assassinate

Iraq

George Bush during

his visit to

Iraq

•

•

installation

Iraq

1

Kuwait.
•

April

1995

—UNSCOM

—
Kurds.
1995 —
April 1995

reported that Iraq had concealed
failed to

biological

its

account for seventeen tons of biological

July

•

March 1996

Iraq continued repression of its civilian population, including the

•

Iraq threatened to

—

barred

Iraq

end cooperation with

UNSCOM

documents and weapons on four separate

—
—

inspectors

UNSCOM.
from

containing

sites

days.

•

June 1996 Iraq repeatedly barred UNSCOM inspectors from military
August 1996 Iraqi troops overran Irbil in Iraqi Kurdistan.

•

December 1996

•

if

and massed ten thousand troops along the border with

weapons program and had
weapons material.
•

inspectors

to

sanctions were not ended

—

Iraq prevented

UNSCOM from removing

sites.

130 Scud missile

engines from Iraq for analysis.
•
•

—
June 1997—

April 1997

controls

Iraq violated the southern no-fly zone.

Iraqi officials on board UNSCOM aircraft interfered with the
and inspections, endangering inspectors and obstructing the UNSCOM

mission.
•

September 1997

—an

Iraqi official attacked

photographing illegal Iraqi activities.
•
October 1997 Iraq announced that

—

it

UNSCOM

officials

engaged

would no longer allow US

in

inspectors

working with UNSCOM to conduct inspections in Iraq, blocked UNSCOM
teams containing US inspectors from conducting inspections and threatened to

down US U-2
November 1997

shoot
•

surveillance flights in support of

—

Iraq

expelled

US

UNSCOM.

inspectors

from

Iraq,

leading

to

UNSCOM's decision to pull out its remaining inspectors.
•

January 1998

—an UNSCOM team

led

by an American was barred from

conducting inspections.
•
June 1998 the UNSCOM director presented information to the Security

—

Council indicating clearly that Iraq, in direct contradiction to information
provided to

UNSCOM, had a weaponized nerve agent.

—
—

Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and threatened to
end long-term monitoring activities by the IAEA and UNSCOM.
•
October 1998 UN weapons inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq.
•

August 1998

63

Legal Bases for Military Operations in Iraq

—
—

December 1998 Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA
and did not agree to allow inspectors to return until 2002.
• November 2002
Iraq failed to provide complete disclosure of its
programs and to cooperate fully with weapons inspectors.
•

inspectors,

WMD

16.

S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 11.

17.

Id.

18.

UNMOVIC was the successor organization to UNSCOM and was established pursuant

to Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999).
19.

S.C. Res. 1441, supra note

20.

Id.

1 1,

Annex.

21. Id.y operative para. 2.

and enclosure from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AfDonald Anderson MP, Chair, Foreign Affairs Committee: Iraq: Legal Position Concerning the Use of Force (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/
22.

Letter

fairs to

20080205132101/fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Iraq%20-%20use%20of%20force.pdf [hereinafter Secretary of State letter],
23.

S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 11, operative paras.

24.

The US ambassador

if there is

1

& 2.

to the United Nations indicated that

a further Iraqi breach, reported to the council by

UNMOVIC, the IAEA, or a

Member State, the matter will return to the council for discussion
Council

fails

But if the Security

to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution does

not constrain any member state from acting to defend

by
Iraq or to enforce the relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and
itself against

the threat posed

security.

WorldPress.org, The United Nations, International Law, and the

War

http://www

in Iraq,

.worldpress.org/specials/iraq/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
25.

The

UK government was of the opinion that, although a second resolution would have

been desirable,

it

was not a legal prerequisite

was required was reporting to and discusbut not an express further decision to authorize

("all that

sion by the Security Council of Iraq's failures,
force"). Iraq Military Action, supra note 4.

The French ambassador indicated that "a two-stage approach would ensure that the Sewould maintain control of the process at each stage." The Russian representative
"made clear that the resolution just adopted contains no provisions for the automatic use of
" The Chinese delegate agreed with the French, indicating that "China supports the twoforce
stage approach." The Irish delegate stated that "it is for the Council to decide on any ensuring acwith prior
tion." The Mexican ambassador agreed, saying "that the use of force is valid only
explicit authorization required from the Security Council." The Bulgarian delegate said that the
"resolution is not a pretext for automatic recourse to the use of force." The Colombian represen26.

curity Council

.

tative agreed, indicating that the "resolution

is

not

...

.

.

a resolution to authorize the use of force."

The Cameroonian ambassador stated that the "resolution does not contain traps or
automaticity." The Syrian ambassador said that "the resolution should not be interpreted ... as
authorizing any State to use force
[and that] it reaffirms the central role of the Security Council." The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq, supra note 24.
27. Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister, supra note 5, para. 7.
.

.

.

28.

S.C. Res. 1441, supra note

29.

According to the Attorney General:

The previous

1 1,

para. 12.

practice of the Council

and statements made by Council members

during the negotiation of resolution 1441 demonstrate that the phrase "material

64

Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo
breach" signifies a finding by the Council of a sufficiently serious breach of the ceasefire

conditions to revive the authorisation in resolution 678 and that "serious

consequences"

is

accepted as indicating the use of force.

Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister, supra note

5,

para. 10.

30. Id., para. 12.

supra note 22, para. 12.

31.

Secretary of State

32.

Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister, supra note

letter,

5, para. 13.

33. Id., para. 15.
34.
35.

S.C. Res. 1874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009).
Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister, supra note

5,

para. 20.

36. Id., para. 22.
37.

S.C. Res. 1137, para. 11,

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1137 (Nov.

12, 1997).

United States and Great Britain made any diplomatic mistakes in the months leading up to the invasion, it was in introducing a draft resolution with Spain in February 2003 that
proposed realizable "tests and a timetable for completion of those tests." The draft also "sought
38.

If the

would not have taken the final opportunity"
that had been afforded to it under Resolution 1441. The Security Council was unable, however,
to reach consensus on the draft resolution, so it was tabled on February 24, 2003, with the United
States, the United Kingdom and Spain reserving "the right to take their own steps to secure the
an understanding

that, if Iraq failed those tests,

it

disarmament of Iraq." Iraq Military Action, supra note 4.
In my opinion, these efforts weakened the US and UK position and bolstered the opposition's
argument that a second resolution was necessary to authorize the use offeree against Iraq for its
failure to comply with Resolution 1441. The US and UK efforts beg the question: if they really felt
that they had sufficient legal authority to conduct military operations against Iraq under 1441,

why did they seek a second
39.

resolution?

Press Release SC/66 1

Strikes Against Iraq;

1,

UN Security Council, Security Council Meets to Discuss Military

Some Members Challenge Use of Force without Council Consent

(Dec. 16,

1998), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981216.sc661 l.html.
40.

The US representative stated that US and British forces "were acting under the authority

provided by Council resolutions" and that the airstrikes were "undertaken only when

it

was

evi-

He further indicated that Iraq was aware of the Counand complete disclosure of all aspects of Iraq's programmes
to develop weapons of mass destruction," but that Iraq was repeatedly in flagrant material breach
of Council resolutions. Specifically, "by refusing to make available documents and information
requested by UNSCOM
by imposing new restrictions on the weapons inspectors and by repeatedly denying access to facilities which UNSCOM wished to inspect, Iraq had acted in flagrant
dent that diplomacy had been exhausted."

cil's

conditions requiring

.

"full, final

.

.,

material breach of resolution 687 (1991)." Id.

The

UK representative indicated that Resolution

687 "had made

it

a condition of ceasefire

weapons of mass destruction and agree to the monitoring of its
He further reiterated that Iraq had never cooperated with
UNSCOM and had "concealed evidence, blocked inspections and failed to produce documents
relevant to its programmes of mass destruction weapons which were known to exist." Id.
41. Attorney General Note to the Prime Minister, supra note 5.
42. The Portuguese representative supported the US and the UK position, arguing that the
United States and the United Kingdom had made it clear in November that "in the absence of full
cooperation by Iraq, they would act without returning to the Council." He also emphasized that
the "main cause of the current crisis was the obstinate policy of Iraq's rulers in refusing to comply

both that Iraq destroy

its

obligation to destroy such weapons."
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with Council resolutions," highlighting that the latest

UNSCOM report stated that Iraq had "not

commitments." Press Release SC/661 1, supra note

39.
up to its
43. The Japanese representative also supported the use of force by the United States and the
United Kingdom, emphasizing that "Iraq had failed to provide its full cooperation to
UNSCOM" and that had led to the airstrikes. He also strongly urged Iraq "to comply immediately and unconditionally with all its obligations under Council resolutions." Id.
44. The Russian representative, on the other hand, argued that the airstrikes "violated the
principles of international law and the principle of the Charter," arguing that "no one could act
" The Chinese representative agreed, indicating
independently on behalf of the United Nations
that the airstrikes were "completely groundless," and the French representative "deplored the situation that had led to the airstrike." Costa Rica supported the Russian Federation's position indicat[and that] only the
ing that the use offeree "was the sole and exclusive faculty of the Council
United Nations could authorize such actions." The Brazilian representative agreed, emphasizing
that "the Council remained the sole body with legal authority to mandate actions aimed at reinforcing compliance with its own resolutions." Kenya also supported the Russian position, indicating that "Kenya had repeatedly said any decision to take further action against Iraq remained
the sole responsibility of the Security Council." The Swedish representative, while recognizing
that "Iraq had again and again refused to abide by the clear obligations decided by a unanimous
Security Council, and it was clear Iraq had not fulfilled the promise given to the Secretary-General
only a month ago that it would cooperate fully and without conditions with United Nations
weapons inspectors," indicated that he regretted that the attacks had occurred before the Coun." Id.
cil had "a chance to conclude its evaluation of the latest developments

lived

.

.

45.

Id.

46.

Hague Convention No. IV Respecting

1907, 36 Stat. 2227, reprinted in
inafter

47.

Hague

.

.

.

.

the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 13, at 69 [here-

IV].

Authority of the President, supra note

4;

YORAM

DlNSTEIN,

WAR, AGGRESSION AND

SELF-DEFENCE 57-59, 298-299 (4th ed. 2005). See also Hague IV, supra note 46,
48.

Sanger, supra note

arts.

36

8c 40.

1.

from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the UN Security Council, U.N.
49.

Letter

Doc. S/2003/538 (May
50.

8,

2003) [hereinafter United States/United

Kingdom

letter].

Id.

51. CPA Order No. 17 (Revised) (June 27, 2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition_Rev_with_Annex_A.pdf.
52.
53.
54.

Hague IV, supra note 46, arts. 42-56.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 13, arts. 47-78.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating

See

Armed Conflicts, June 8,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 13, at 422.

Protection of Victims of International
in

55.

CPA Regulation

No.

1, sec. 1

(May

1977,

16, 2003), available at

1

125 U.N.T.S.

to the

3, reprinted

http://www.cpa-iraq.org/

regulations/200305 16_CPAREG_l_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf.
56.

S.C. Res. 1483, para. 13

57.

CPA

Regulation No.

& operative para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).

6, sec.

1

(July 13, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/

regulations/200307 1 3_CPAREG_6_Governing_Council_of_Iraq_.pdf.

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500 (Aug. 14, 2003).
& operative para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June

58.

S.C. Res. 1500,

59.

S.C. Res. 1546, para. 7

60. Id., operative paras.

1

& 2.
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& 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511
& 14-15.

61.

S.C. Res. 1511, operative paras. 13

62.

S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 59, operative paras. 9-11

63. Id.,
64.

Annex.

S.C. Res. 1637,

65. Id.,

Annex

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1637 (Nov.

8,

2005).

I.

66. Id., para. 12

& operative para.

1.

Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006).
from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations,

67.

S.C. Res. 1723,

68.

Letter

U.N. Doc. S/2006/377 (June
69.

(Oct. 16, 2003).

9,

2006).

S.C. Res. 1723, supra note 67,

Annex I.

& operative para. 1.
1762, para. 6 & operative para.

70. Id., paras.

1-2

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1762 (June 29, 2007).
72. Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship
Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America, Nov. 26, 2007, available athttp://
71.

S.C. Res.

1,

georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/ 1 1/20071 126-1
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1. html.
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IV
Was the 2003 Invasion of Iraq Legal?

Andru E. Wall*
I.

Introduction

Discussion of the jus ad bellum and the Iraq war is anything but simple and
no shortage of opinions on the subject.
One of the author's favorite quotes is from General Wesley Clark, who said the
2003 invasion was legal, but illegitimate. You will appreciate the irony if you remember that the Independent International Commission on Kosovo established
by the United Nations called General Clark's 1999 Kosovo campaign illegal, but
uncontroversial. There

is

certainly

1

legitimate. 2

When several leading international law professors were asked by a British news"Was the 2003 Iraq war legal?" their responses were illustrative. 3 Professor
Malcom Shaw replied: " [0]n the basis of the intelligence we had at the time and the
paper,

publicly available knowledge, there

was a credible and reasonable argument

in favor

of the legality of the war." Professor Christine Chinkin answered "no" because she
believed

UN Security Council Resolution 1441 preserved for the Security Council

the decision

was

on enforcement

action. Professor Sir

Adam

Roberts replied: "There

in principle a possible case for the lawfulness of resort to

war by the US and

small coalition." Professor James Crawford answered simply: "It
political

comes down

to a

judgment."

Unfortunately this author thinks Professor Crawford's statement
rate, as

its

it

reflects the

is

quite accu-

truism that law and policy are mutually affecting; nowhere

Commander, JAGC, US Navy. This article is derived in part from Andru
The Legal Case for Invading Iraq, 32 ISRAEL YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 165 (2002).

*Lieutenant
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the interrelationship between law and policy
helium. Nevertheless,

2003.

First,

more evident than

in the jus

ad

us briefly examine the legality of the recourse to force in

let

the legal argument articulated

by the

coalition will be

summarized;

then three criticisms of the coalition's legal basis will be examined.

II.

The Legal lustification for the 2003 Invasion

On March 20, 2003 as the invasion of Iraq began, the United States, United Kingdom and Australia delivered letters to the President of the Security Council providing notice that coalition forces had
letters stated

commenced

military operations in Iraq.

the use of force was necessary in response to Iraq's material breach of

the ceasefire agreement reached at the end of hostilities in 1991

ment obligations contained in

March

The US letter suc-

Security Council Resolution 687.

been removed and use of force

British

and the disarma-

view of Iraq's material breaches, the basis for the ceasefire has

cinctly stated: "In

The

The

is

authorized under resolution 678 (1990)." 4

legal justifications are explained

more

fully in a

memorandum from

the

Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, to Prime Minister Tony Blair on
7,

2003 and three

ions written in October,
icant differences

US Department of Justice,

Office of Legal Counsel opin-

November and December of 2002. 5 As there are no signif-

among the US,

UK and Australian legal justifications, they will be

considered as the singular coalition case.

For the coalition, the war with Iraq began on August

1990

when Iraq invaded

recommencement of hostilities in March 2003. Iraq justified
invasion of Kuwait on the basis of long-standing claims of sovereignty over

Kuwait
its

—not with

2,

the

Kuwait, and claims that Kuwait engaged in various forms of economic warfare
against Iraq. 6

However, there was

little

question that Iraq's actions violated the

requirement contained in Article 2(3) of the

UN Charter that States resolve their

means and Article 2(4)'s prohibition on the use of force against
integrity and political independence of another State. As a result,

disputes by pacific

the territorial

within a few hours of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the Security Council declared the
Iraqi action a breach of the peace in Resolution 660.

Council explicitly recognized the right of Kuwait and
force in collective self-defense in Resolution 661.

Four days
its

coalition partners to use

Throughout the

Security Council passed eleven resolutions that collectively
invasion, declared
tional withdrawal

defense,

it

a breach of the peace,

later the Security

demanded

Iraq's

fall

of 1990 the

denounced

Iraq's

immediate, uncondi-

from Kuwait, recognized the right of individual or collective self-

imposed an arms embargo and economic sanctions, and recognized Iraq's

obligation to pay reparations. 7
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Even

as a

US -led

coalition

began massing military

commenced maritime

forces,

US

interdiction operations

and

diplomats aggressively pursued a Security

Council resolution explicitly authorizing the use of military force against Iraq.

on November 27, 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678, which
authorized "all necessary means" to eject Iraq from Kuwait and "to uphold and implement ... all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace
and security to the area." 8 The resolution provided Iraq with "one final opportunity" to comply with the Security Council's previous Chapter VII resolutions by
Finally,

January 15, 1991.
Iraq failed to avail itself of this final opportunity,

and so on the evening of Janu-

commenced Operation
Desert Storm. It is worth noting here that the Security Council did not make a furary 16, 1991 a twenty-eight-nation, US-led coalition

had complied with its January 15 deaddetermination themselves and relied upon the

ther determination regarding whether Iraq

Member

made that
Security Council's November 1990 decision as authority to use force.
After six weeks of bombing and an astonishingly successful 100-hour ground
campaign Kuwait was liberated and the Iraqi army was in full retreat. As the Iraqi
army fled north, coalition aircraft continued to bomb Iraqi military targets. The
line.

States

four-lane highway from Kuwait to Basra began to clog with the charred hulks of

hundreds of military vehicles and reporters began referring to it as the "Highway of
Death." While the laws of war permitted the continued destruction of the Iraqi

army,

did not want to be seen as engaging in

at least until surrender, the coalition

"slaughter for the sake of slaughter."
ation Desert

Storm was

Schwarzkopf, the

9

And so, at 5 a.m. on February 28,

unilaterally halted.

Three days

later

1991, Oper-

General H.

Norman

commander of coalition forces, and his Iraqi counterpart negoti-

ated a ceasefire agreement that established a demarcation line and contained provisions for the repatriation of Kuwaitis

and prisoners of war held

in Iraq. 10

The ceasefire agreement was put into writing by the United States, vetted by the
Security Council and codified in Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991. 11 It was the
longest resolution and most detailed ceasefire agreement in modern time and
included extensive disarmament provisions. The Resolution stated its provisions
established the "conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security." The
Security Council predicated activation of the ceasefire upon Iraq's unconditional
acceptance, which reluctantly came in a letter delivered to the Security Council on
April 6, 1991. 12

Even before accepting the

by the Shia

in the south

ceasefire, Iraq

and the Kurds

in the north.

sponded by passing Resolution 688, which
"as a contribution to

began violentiy suppressing uprisings

called

on

The

Security Council re-

Iraq to cease such repression

removing the threat to international peace and security in the
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Security Council believed Iraq's suppression of

its

citizens,

which

was causing a destabilizing flow of refugees into neighboring countries, was a
threat to international peace

and security. The United

States

and United Kingdom

used Resolution 688's linkage between Iraq's internal unrest and international
peace and security as the basis for invoking Resolution 678's authorization of the
use of force as the enforcement authority. 14 In other words, from the outset of the

Resolution 678's authorization to use force to re-

ceasefire, the coalition believed

store international peace

and

security in the region survived the ceasefire of

Resolution 687.

On several occasions between
to

what

it

deemed

1991 and 2003, the coalition used force in response

to be Iraq's material breaches of the

Resolution 687 and justified

its

disarmament provisions of

actions under the authority of Resolution 678. 15

The Security Council never condemned these actions, nor questioned the reliance
on the continuing validity of 678. In fact, in Resolution 949 on October 4, 1994,
the Security Council explicitly reaffirmed Resolution 678.
In the

weapons

fall

and winter of 2002

as

Saddam Hussein again impeded the work of UN
which

inspectors, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441,

counting and deploring Iraq's various violations of Resolution 687

found Iraq to be

in material breach of the ceasefire

at

after re-

some length,

and afforded Iraq

a "final

opportunity" to comply.
In accordance with the customary international law governing armistices, the

United States properly provided notice on March
ceasefire

agreement to be denounced by

17,

2003 that

Iraq: just as a right

it

considered the

of self-defense

exercised unilaterally without resort to the Security Council, so too
to a ceasefire agreement, even
that the ceasefire has
hostilities

one endorsed by the Security Council, determine

with the breaching party. As a

final

commenced, leading

it is

resuming

opportunity to avoid the resump-

tion of offensive hostilities, the United States gave

Iraq

may any party

been materially breached and announce that

48 hours to leave Iraq. They

may be

Saddam Hussein and

failed to seize this final reprieve

ultimately to Hussein's capture

his sons

and the invasion of
and the

fall

of his

government.
Criticism of the Legal Basis for the 2003 Invasion

III.

The

legal basis

put forth by the coalition to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq was

hardly without criticism. The Security Council does not conduct straw polls, but

France

made no

effort to hide the fact

teenth resolution

—

it

would veto the

so-called second or eigh-

a resolution finding Iraq in violation of Resolution 1441

explicitly authorizing the use

of force to compel compliance. 16
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prognosticate the level of support in the Security Council, or in the international

community writ large, was complicated by the fact that France was quite public in
its insistence that the Security Council would not explicitly authorize force, and the
United States was equally public in

its

insistence that such authorization

was not

legally required.

Over the intervening

many international law scholars

six years,

the jus ad bellum basis for the 2003 invasion.

rized the use of force to expel Iraq

findings

have critiqued

Their criticism of the coalition's

around three concerns:

gal case generally revolves

unilateral

17

from Kuwait,

1)

le-

Resolution 678 only autho-

2) Resolution

687 does not permit

enforcement and 3) Resolution 1441 required further authorization or

by the Security Council before

force could be used.

Resolution 678 Only Authorized Expelling Iraq from Kuwait

The

coalition's legal basis

was grounded on the

rized not just the expulsion of Iraq
to restore international peace

and

belief that Resolution

678 autho-

from Kuwait, but more broadly the use of force
security to the region

and

that Iraq's material

breaches of Resolution 687 constituted a continuing threat to such peace and secu-

The plain language of Resolution 678 authorized "all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions
and to restore international peace and security in the area" (emphasis added). Resolution 687 recalled the thirteen previous resolutions on the Iraq- Kuwait conflict,
reiterated its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area, and
affirmed all thirteen previously referenced resolutions, including 678. Read as
such, Resolution 687 arguably sets the terms for what would be required to restore
international peace and security to the region.
At least two objections can be raised against this position. First, the United
States in 1991 did not believe Resolution 678 authorized anything more than expelling Iraq from Kuwait. In explaining the decision to implement a ceasefire
rather than pursue Hussein to surrender, several members of the US administration
indicated they believed the coalition's mandate was limited to freeing Kuwait. 18
rity.

However, Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor
rationale in political rather than legal terms in a

George H.W. Bush: "Going in and occupying

at the time,

couched the

book he wrote with President

Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the

United Nations' mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international
sponse to aggression that we hoped to establish

beyond

Unilaterally going significantly

we might have undermined the confidence of the United
make future grants of authority." 19 Remember the context of 1991: the

that mandate,

Nations to
fall

re-

of the Soviet Union, the Security Council's

since Korea,

and the hope

that a

first

authorization of the use of force

new world order would be ushered
73
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order that would see the Security Council finally take

its

place as the primary guar-

antor of international peace and security. Nevertheless, even
initially

viewed its mandate

as limited, that

if

the United States

view quickly evaporated with the estab-

lishment of the no-fly zones and the legal rationale put forth to justify the no-fly
zones, a rationale

grounded

in 678's authority to restore international peace

and

security in the region.

A second objection to the relevance of Resolution 678 in 2003 is that Resolution
678 only authorized those

Kuwait" to use
it

member

force. In 1991,

States "co-operating with the

Government of

Kuwait communicated to the Security Council that

requested assistance from the coalition in expelling Iraq from Kuwait. In 2003,

however, Kuwait
that

it

made

this

statement to the Security Council: "Kuwait reaffirms

has not participated and will not participate in any military operation

against Iraq

and

security, safety

that

all

measures we are undertaking are aimed

and territorial integrity."

that the 2003 coalition

20

Admittedly,

it is

at protecting

our

a bit of a stretch to argue

was "cooperating" with the government of Kuwait.

This argument weakens, however, in light of the operational reality of the inter-

vening twelve years. During that period, the coalition repeatedly took action
against Iraq, especially the establishment

extended beyond

strict

and enforcement of the no-fly zones

that

protection of and cooperation with Kuwait. Those uses of

force were consistently justified as authorized

by Resolution 678 and the Security

Council never formally objected or ruled otherwise. Thus, the argument that 678

had a very limited purpose weakens
least-tacit

in light

of subsequent State practice and the

at-

acceptance of such practice by the Security Council.

Resolution 687 Does Not Authorize Unilateral Enforcement

A second general criticism of the coalition's legal basis for the 2003 invasion is that
once the ceasefire was encapsulated in a Security Council resolution

it

became an

agreement between Iraq and the Security Council and only the Security Council
could redress violations. The belief
parties to a conflict to

comply with

is

that once the Security Council directs the

a ceasefire agreement, as

it

did here in Resolu-

tion 687, the Security Council's ceasefire directive has the force of law under Article

24 of the

UN Charter and the parties may not resume hostilities without the ex-

press permission of the Security Council. In essence, a Security Council-approved
ceasefire agreement, such as Resolution 687, extinguishes the right of self-defense

and any prior Security Council authorization
ling

norm of Article

to use force

and

revives the control-

2(4).

This argument makes the fundamental error of confusing the suspension of
hostilities

with their termination and

hostilities"

with an order to "cease

it

confuses a Security Council order to "cease

hostilities so
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terms are complied with." A ceasefire, which is synonymous with what was historically termed

an armistice, is a suspension of arms that does not end the hostile rela-

tions between the

two sides

—the

state

of war remains both de jure and de facto. 21

The customary international law governing armistices was codified in the
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. It states an armistice only "suspends" military
operations and the parties may resume hostilities after providing proper notice,
and any "serious violation" of the armistice gives the other party the right to denounce the ceasefire and resume hostilities. 22 A "serious violation" under Hague
IV

is

consistent with the "material breach" phrase that appears in Article 60(1) of

the 1969 Vienna Convention

on the Law of Treaties. 23

As the continuing nature of the Iraq conflict seems to often be forgotten, the
following briefly summarizes the ongoing nature of the conflict between 1991 and
2003. 24
•

Between April 1991 and early 2003 over 250,000

sorties

were flown by

combat and reconnaissance aircraft over Iraq in enforcement of the
ceasefire agreement and no-fly zones. Those aircraft were fired upon by Iraqi
forces thousands of times and returned fire thousands of times, dropping bombs,
firing missiles and launching hundreds of cruise missiles into Iraq. 25
coalition

•

Within two days of Iraq's acceptance of the formal

coalition (led by the United States,

United Kingdom and France) established a no-

zone in northern Iraq in response to

fly

population.

The

ceasefire agreement, the

Iraq's repression of

coalition established a second no-fly zone a few

its

Kurdish

months

later in

southern Iraq after Shiite dissidents were brutally attacked by Iraqi helicopter
gunships. 26
•

On December 27,

1992,

US aircraft shot down an Iraqi fighter plane flying in

the no- fly zone.
•

In January 1993 the President of the Security Council twice issued

statements declaring Iraq to be in material breach of Resolution 687. US, British

and French aircraft attacked several air defense targets
five
•

On June 26,

1993 the United States launched twenty- four Tomahawk cruise

Iraqi assassination

Baghdad in response
plot against former President George H.W. Bush.

On September 3,

at fifteen air

defense

sites

had survived the

to

an

1996 the United States launched forty- four cruise missiles

Fighter aircraft followed
that

and forty-

Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched at a nuclear fabrication facility.

missiles against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters in

•

in southern Iraq

located in the newly extended portion of the no-fly zone.

up these attacks the next day by bombing air defense sites

cruise-missile attacks.
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by Iraq

in

November 1998

to permit

resumption of inspections, President Clinton declared Iraq to be in material
breach of the ceasefire and ordered the execution of Operation Desert Fox, which

and involved 29,900 troops, thirty-seven ships and 348 aircraft
from the United States and additional forces from the United Kingdom. Those
forces launched nearly four hundred cruise missiles and over six hundred other

lasted four days,

bombs and

missiles at Iraqi military

Between 1999 and 2002

•

and weapons of mass destruction

Iraqi forces shot missiles

and

targets. 27

anti-aircraft fire at

on over one thousand separate occasions. In the majority of
those incidents the coalition responded by bombing the offending Iraqi site and in
the process damaged or destroyed over four hundred targets. On other occasions
US and British aircraft attacked anti-ship missile sites, command-and-control
28
sites, military communications sites, and fuel and ammunition dumps.
coalition aircraft

In February 2001 two dozen coalition aircraft attacked five Iraqi targets

•

located just outside of the southern no-fly zone.

Coalition aircraft dropped 606

•

bombs

or missiles on 391 targets in 2002

alone. 29

This

may be low-intensity conflict,

ongoing armed

conflict.

but only a lawyer could argue

it

was not an

This State practice strengthens the argument that the de-

termination of material breach of a ceasefire agreement, even one endorsed by the
Security Council, can be unilaterally
States

made by parties to the agreement. The United

and other members of the coalition determined on numerous occasions that

Iraq materially breached the 1991 ceasefire agreement

and

unilaterally

responded

Not only were those unilateral determinabreach not condemned by the Security Council, but the Council

to those violations with the use of force.

tions of material
itself

recognized in 1994 in Resolution 949 the continuing validity of Resolution

678 and

at least tacitly

To argue
suming

accepted the unilateral enforcement.

that the coalition

needed Security Council authorization before

re-

combat operations against Iraq in 2003 is to argue that the right
and the use of force authorized by the Security Council in Resolu-

offensive

of self-defense

tion 678 were extinguished
put, such a contention

is

upon acceptance of the

ceasefire agreement.

Simply

without basis in State practice and contrary to an interna-

tional public policy that should encourage utilization of the Security Council

punish resort to it.

If the right to

in Article 2(4) again

use force were extinguished and the

became controlling upon acceptance of a

—not

norm set forth

ceasefire agreement,

the law would create a perverse disincentive to enter into such agreements.

The

State

prevailing in a conflict would be disinclined to agree to a ceasefire at any time prior to
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unconditional surrender. Such a law would leave no
forts to limit the

room

for

magnanimous

ef-

horrors of war through potentially life-saving reprieves.

Resolution 1441 Required Additional Action by the Security Council

A final criticism of the coalition's legal justification for the 2003 invasion relates to the
failure to secure a

second or eighteenth (depending on your perspective) resolu-

tion explicitly authorizing the use of force in response to Iraq's continued material

breach of Resolution 687. Resolution 1441 recounted and deplored Iraq's history

of violating Resolution 687

at

some length, then found Iraq to be in material breach

of the ceasefire and afforded Iraq a "final opportunity" to comply. While France

and Russia stated publicly they did not believe the finding of "material breach" automatically authorized the use of force against Iraq, the United States

and United

Kingdom argued that "the resolution established that Iraq's violations of its obligations

had crossed the threshold

that earlier practice

forces to use force consistently with resolution 678.

had established

for coalition

30

No permanent member of the Security Council believed Iraq had complied with
Resolution 1441. While the Security Council held several sessions on this issue, the

United States and United Kingdom believed nothing in Resolution 1441 required
the Security Council to adopt another resolution to establish the continuing exis-

tence of a material breach, nor did they believe the use of force was predicated

on

any other "triggering" mechanism.

The US

State

Department Legal Advisor noted there are important

similarities

between Resolution 1441 and Resolution 678: "Using the same terminology that it
later

adopted in Resolution 1441, the Council in Resolution 678 decided to allow

comply with the obligations that the Council had esprevious resolutions." 31 There was no requirement that coalition

Iraq a 'final opportunity' to
tablished in

members return to the Security Council for a determination that Iraq had failed to
comply, nor did they do so before commencing operations. "The language of Resolution 1441 tracked the language of Resolution 678,

the

same way to authorize

obligations."

and the resolution operated in

coalition forces to bring Iraq into compliance with

its

32

Resolution 1441

is

a classic example of diplomatic finesse:

it

provided the coali-

tion with a clear finding of "material breach," while also requiring that Iraqi

non-

compliance be reported to the Security Council for "assessment." In other words,
Resolution 1441 can be fairly read as an agreement to disagree
acceptance of the operational code that existed for
cally, political differences

—or simply

more than twelve years.

as tacit

Specifi-

prevented positive action by the Security Council, which

meant that member States acting of their own volition would step into the void and
take the action they believed was necessary to restore international peace

11

and
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security; those actions,

based on the belief they were authorized by Resolution 678,

were never condemned by the Security Council.
IV. Conclusion

Today we

see a vast disparity

regulate international trade

between the sophisticated institutions established to

and the

relatively primitive

To

its

the international use of force.

Chapter VII resolutions are

legally

all

member

States, the Security

and

-judicial

powers, yet has no real enforcement powers. While the

binding on
legislative

the extent

system in place to regulate

Council exercises very limited quasi-

UN Charter envisions a standing UN military force available to enforce the Security

Council's Chapter VII authorities,

member

States declined in practice to cede

such enforcement authority to the Security Council, preferring instead to keep
those powers to themselves.

The modalities of enforcement of Security Council

resolutions will continue to

be debated, yet the normative foundation of the Charter survives the 2003 invasion
of Iraq.

Remember

Australia

went

to

the lengths to which the United States, United

couch

their legal rationale in terms of the Charter's

and the relevant Security Council Chapter VII
even

when

the Security Council

inaction forces

member

Kingdom and

States to take

The Charter lives on,
act, and even when that

resolutions.

unable or unwilling to

is

framework

enforcement action themselves.
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Introduction

US

combat operations in Iraq in 2003 began with airstrikes on March 19 and
swiftly overwhelmed the Iraqi armed forces. Within six weeks, US and co-

alition forces

were in control of almost

all

major

cities in Iraq,

and Saddam

army was considered defeated. On May 1, 2003, from the deck of the
USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush famously declared that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. His observation that "Americans, following a battle,
want nothing more than to return home [a]nd that is your direction tonight"
Hussein's

1

proved, however, to be premature. Six-and-a-half years

remain in

Iraq.

2

later,

120,000

US

troops

This article examines the legal underpinnings for US-led military

operations in Iraq following the defeat of regular Iraqi military forces.
International law reflects a

number of legal bases on which

take military operations in foreign territory.

a State

The most common

legal

may undergrounds

in-

clude a State's exercise of self-defense, the authorization of the United Nations
Security Council

and the consent of the foreign

State.

A further ground, though it

may at first glance appear to conflate issues ofjus ad helium and jus in hello, is found
in the obligations of an

*

occupying State under the laws of war. Each of these

Attorney Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser,

US Department

of

State.

legal

The views

presented in this paper are not necessarily representative of those of the State Department or the

US government.
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—often

first,

and interdependent ways

—

for

in Iraq during the past six- and-a-half years.

For purposes of this paper, the
phases:

in overlapping

US

presence in Iraq will be examined in three

during the occupation of Iraq, which formally ended on June 28, 2004;

December 31, 2008;
2009, and continues

second, the period following the end of formal occupation until

and

finally,

the current period, which began

on January

1,

today.

II.

Belligerent Occupation of Iraq

Whether a territory is occupied is

(May 2003

to

lune 28, 2004)

a question of fact, namely,

whether

"it is

actually

3

placed under the authority of the hostile army." This requirement includes both a

and an administrative component: an occupying power must both have

physical

firm physical possession of enemy territory and substitute

its

authority for that of

the local government in that area. Occupation "extends only to the territory where

such authority has been established and can be exercised." 4

may be difficult to establish from public records specific dates on which
particular areas of Iraq became occupied by US and coalition forces, contemporaWhile

it

neous documents indicate that the occupation of Iraq more or

was established by mid-May 2003. In a
Council on

letter to the

less in its entirety

President of the

UN

Security

May 8, 2003, the US and UK Permanent Representatives to the United

Nations announced the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority

(CPA) "to

exercise

tion" appears

power of government temporarily." 5 While the word "occupa-

nowhere in the letter,

it

nonetheless

made clear that the United States

and the United Kingdom, through the CPA, undertook the
ties

role

and

responsibili-

of powers belligerently occupying Iraq under the laws of war. Subsequently, on

May 22, 2003, the UN Security Council, noting the May 8 letter, "recogniz[ed]
specific authorities, responsibilities,

tional law of [the United States

der unified

command."

the

and obligations under applicable interna-

and the United Kingdom]

as

occupying powers un-

6

The insurgency emerged soon afterward, with attacks directed not only against
US and coalition forces, but against Iraqis perceived to be "collaborating" with the
coalition, emerging Iraqi political leaders, and Iraqi police and military forces. Insurgent targets included the

Rasheed

hotel,

power

UN

headquarters, the Jordanian Embassy, the Al

stations, foreign

companies and

oil installations.

The

insur-

composed of various groups, including Shia militants, foreign fighters with anti-coalition motives, Al Qaeda in Iraq and Iraqi nationalists
(most of whom were Baath Party members). With the exception of the Baathists,
none of the insurgent groups represented or was loyal to the government of
gents themselves were
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Saddam Hussein. Their
sive devices, suicide

tactics

included the use of car bombs, improvised explo-

bombs, hostage taking and indiscriminate rocket

surgents often intentionally targeted Iraqi and foreign civilians

regard for civilian casualties

when targeting military objects.

attacks. In-

and evidenced little

7

Throughout the time they were present in Iraq, US and coalition forces retained
the right of individual self-defense, that

by hostile

selves against attacks

forces.

is,

the right to use force to defend them-

US and coalition

forces also, however, un-

dertook offensive military operations to combat the insurgency. During the period
of occupation, the basis under international law for these operations derived from

two sources. The

first

ground stems from the

cupying power under laws of war to provide for
supplemental ground was conveyed in the October
authorization for coalition forces "to take

all

and obligations of the ocpublic order. A second and

rights

16,

2003

UN Security Council

necessary measures to contribute to

the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq." 8

Law of War

US invasion of Iraq remains a matter of debate, 9 it has
no bearing on the rights and obligations of the occupying US and coalition forces

While the lawfulness of the

and the occupied population once

that relationship

is

established.

The Hostages

Nuremberg 10 affirmed that whether
a jus ad bellum question separate and

Trial at the International Military Tribunal at

or not an

initial act

legally distinct

of invasion was lawful

from the jus

population's) rights

and

in hello rules

obligations.

is

concerning an occupant's (and occupied

11

Upon recognizing the United States and United Kingdom as occupying powers,
the UN Security Council, in Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003, "call[ed] upon all
concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law including
in particular the

Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907."

Of the many

rights

fundamental

is

which reads

in

and

responsibilities of

an occupying power, one of the most

the obligation reflected in Article 43 of the

its

Hague

Regulations,

common English translation:

The authority of the

legitimate

power having

in fact passed into the

hands of the

occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far
as possible, public order

and

safety,

while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the

laws in force in the country.

It

has been noted that the authoritative French text of the Regulations refers

to "Yordre et la vie publics"

i.e.,

public order and

life,

whereas the accepted Eng-

lish translation inexplicably substitutes "safety" for "life." 12
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translation not only creates a redundancy, insofar as
safety"
cial

not clear what "public

encompasses beyond "public order," but, more importantly, omits the so-

and commercial aspects

sistent

it is

related to the broader concept of "public

with the authoritative

text, this

life."

Con-

paper focuses on the obligation relating to

"public order."

The duty on the occupying power to "take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible" public order reflects both an authorization for
the occupying power and important limitations on its obligation. The duty is to
take affirmative measures to provide order for the population under
is

its

not permitted to ignore chaos and unrest affecting the public even

forces themselves can avoid these risks

—and

First,

the obligation

if

it

occupying

this obligation necessarily implies a

corresponding authority to take such measures. That duty
portant regards.

—

control

is

qualified in

two im-

on the occupying power stops short of requir-

ing a result; the caveat that measures be taken to ensure order "as far as possible"
reflects the recognition that the

order, even

upon

occupying power may not be able to achieve public

dutifully taking

all

measures in

its

power. 13 Second, measures

taken by the occupying power to these ends must respect local law "unless absolutely prevented."

relating to

human

The duty to

respect local law

rights, unless

would include domestic provisions

such provisions are displaced by specific rules of

the law of occupation, as the lex specialis, or the occupying

prevented" from implementing them.

The Fourth Geneva Convention

power

is

"absolutely

14

also addresses

an occupying power's duty and

authority to take measures to address security in occupied territories. As a general
matter, Article 27 states that parties to a conflict, whether in their own territories or
in

occupied territory, "may take such measures of control and security in regard to

protected persons as
Article 78 of the

may be

More

specifically,

Fourth Convention provides that in occupied territory,

pying power "considers
safety

necessary as a result of the war." 15

it

if an

occu-

necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take

measures concerning protected persons,

it

may,

at the

most, subject them to

assigned residence or to internment."
Article 78 acknowledges the potential threat

posed by civilians in occupied terri-

tory to the occupying power; the purpose of internment pursuant to Article 78,

much

like

detention of prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention,

preventative.

power

16

The Fourth Convention

leaves

to determine whether internment

is

is

broad discretion to the occupying

"necessary for imperative reasons of

commentary notes only that such internment should be "exceptional" and that internment must be based on individualized threat determinasecurity";

tions,

its official

not collective measures. 17 In practice, "imperative reasons" in this context

have been understood to be distinct from criminal justice standards that require,
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for example, probable cause of past criminal activity or indictment for criminal

prosecution. Article 78 also requires that internees have a right of appeal of the de-

and periodic review of that decision

cision to detain them,

at least every six

months. As discussed further below, detention operations, undertaken in reliance

on Article 78, formed a crucial part of coalition forces' counterinsurgency strategy.
In the May 8 letter to the Security Council, the United States and the United
Kingdom affirmed their commitment to provide for public order and security,
noting that they, with coalition partners and through the CPA,
shall inter alia,

provide for security in and for the provisional administration of Iraq,

including by: deterring

hostilities;

securing Iraq's borders;

.

encouraging international

.

.

maintaining the

maintaining

civil

territorial integrity

of Iraq and

law and order, including through

efforts to rebuild the capacity

of the Iraqi civilian police

and resources within Iraq and working to
18
and terrorist groups are denied safe haven

force; eliminating all terrorist infrastructure

ensure that terrorists

The

May 8 letter to

reference in the

"deterring hostilities"

—recognizes that

major onslaught of the insurgency
occupied territory.

—drafted before

hostilities

the

can re-emerge in

Armed opposition to occupation has not been viewed as negat-

ing the ongoing status of occupation so long, at least, as the opposition does not actually wrest effective control of an

occupied area. 19

Renewed combat during an occupation

requires the occupying

power to apply

concurrently two branches of the law of war: the law on the conduct of hostilities
will

apply with regard to combatants and civilians taking direct part in

hostilities,

and the law of occupation will continue to apply concerning civilians not taking direct part in hostilities. 20

tablished in the Third

Combatants who met the

criteria for prisoners

Geneva Convention continued

of war

es-

to receive the protections

and treatment due to prisoners of war under the laws of war. More prevalent in the
Iraqi insurgency, however,

were

guerillas or saboteurs

who did not qualify as pris-

oners of war and were not entitled to combatants' privileges. 21 Such insurgents

could be detained as civilians under Article 78 of the Fourth Convention and prosecuted for their hostile acts pursuant to existing local law or laws promulgated by
the occupying power.

UN Security Council Authorization
By the

fall

of 2003, insurgent attacks had become frequent and widespread. In

Resolution 151

1

in

October 2003, the Security Council expressly noted the terror-

bombings of the Jordanian and Turkish Embassies, the United Nations headquarters and the Imam Ali Mosque, and the murders of a Spanish diplomat and a
ist

member of the

Iraqi

Governing Council, Dr. Akila al-Hashimi,
85
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occurred in the preceding 10 weeks. 22 Resolution 1511 also acknowledged the
Iraqi

Governing Council's intent to convene a conference to prepare a new con-

stitution,

and called for the

CPA to cooperate with the Governing Council and "to

return governing responsibilities and authority to the people of Iraq as soon as
practicable." 23 Finding that security

and

stability

would be

essential to

accom-

plishing the political goals outlined in the Resolution, the Security Council, acting

under Chapter VII of the

UN Charter, which allows

it

to take actions necessary to

maintain or restore international peace and security, went on to "[authorize] a

command

multinational force under unified

to take

all

necessary measures to

contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq." 24 Coalition forces,
effectively already

known as

under the unified

command

of the United States, became

the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I).

The broad UN mandate for the MNF-I provided a legal basis for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations independent of the authorities in the law of
war. This authorization from the Security Council was not strictly speaking necessary, as a

matter of international law, for coalition forces

at the

time

it

was con-

upon which to
framework that would

veyed, because the coalition had pre-existing and robust bases

provide for security. Nevertheless,

become of primary importance
III.

it

at the

Authorization for MNF-I under

established the legal

end of occupation the following year.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1546 et seq.

(June 28, 2004 to December 31, 2008)

On

June 28, 2004, the belligerent occupation of Iraq by the United States and

United Kingdom ended as a matter of international law, with the formal transfer of
administrative authority and responsibility from the

ment of Iraq. While

in

CPA

to the interim govern-

popular parlance the transfer of authority was heralded as

the "transfer of sovereignty" back to Iraq, under the law of occupation, Iraqi sovereignty always remained vested in Iraq

—occupying powers

tors of the State until the period of occupation terminates.

are simply administra25

The presence and activities of the MNF-I in Iraq remained sizable and significant. During this middle period, the legal bases for US military operations were the

UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, and the consent of the government of Iraq, upon which the UN
continued authorization of the
authorization was predicated.

UN Security Council Authorization
In anticipation of the transfer of authority to the interim government of Iraq

and

the end of belligerent occupation, the Security Council passed Resolution 1546
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June

8,

2004. Acting again under Chapter VII of the

UN

Charter, the Security

Council reiterated the authorization and mandate of the MNF-I, stating that

it

have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance

shall

of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to
expressing, inter
setting

One

out

alia,

its tasks,

this resolution

the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the [MNF-I]

including

of the annexed

by preventing and

deterring terrorism.

and

26

from US Secretary of State Colin Powell, explicitly
of the MNF-I would entail combat operations, includ-

letters,

notes that the agreed tasks

ing detention operations, to address insurgent and other violent forces threatening
Iraq's internal security.

The

MNF stands ready to

continue to undertake a broad range of tasks .... These

include activities necessary to counter ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking

through violence. This will include combat
internment when necessary for

to influence Iraq's political future

operations against

members of

these groups,

imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons
27
that threaten Iraq's security.

Consent of the Government of Iraq
Unlike the original Security Council authorization for the

MNF-I

in Resolution

1511, the extension of the authorization in Resolution 1546 was premised upon the

consent of the government of Iraq. Resolution 1546 noted "the Iraqi request for the

continued presence of the multinational force" in the annexed

Prime Minister of the

Iraqi interim

letter

government, Ayad Allawi, which

from the

stated:

... to be forces in Iraq, including foreign elements, that are opposed to
our transition to peace, democracy, and security.
Until we are able to provide

There continue

.

security for ourselves ...

international

community

Multinational Force

we

.

.

ask for the support of the Security Council and the

in this endeavor.

(MNF) mandate

We

seek a

new

resolution

on

the

to contribute to maintaining security in Iraq,

including through the tasks and arrangements set out in the letter from Secretary of
State Colin Powell. 28

Resolution 1546 further established that the mandate for

MNF-I would be

re-

viewed "at the request of the Government of Iraq" or in twelve months, and declared that the Security Council "will terminate this

by the Government of Iraq."
that

US

forces

29

mandate

earlier if requested

Secretary of State Colin Powell separately affirmed

would leave Iraq

if the

interim Iraqi government so requested. 30
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The authorization of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter and the consent of the government of Iraq would each suffice independently to provide a basis in international law for the US and coalition military presence and counterinsurgency activities in Iraq. As a political matter, however, the
two grounds were mutually dependent.

It is

doubtful that the Security Council

would have continued to authorize the MNF-I without the consent of the government of Iraq. Conversely, given the nascent state of the interim Iraqi government,
it is questionable whether its consent alone would have been perceived to be fully
independent and legitimate without the imprimatur of the international community for the MNF-I and its actions. As it was, the Security Council mandate for the
MNF-I was annually reviewed and renewed, at the request of the government of
Iraq,

through December 31, 2008. 31

Consequences of the End of Belligerent Occupation
While

and sometimes

in popular

cynical terminology, the

US and coalition

pres-

ence in Iraq continued to be referred to as an "occupation" long after June 2004, as
a matter of law the consent of the Iraqi

government and the decision of the Security

Council were each independently sufficient to terminate the occupation.
Security Council decision

could

welcoming the end of occupation

First,

the

in Resolution 1546

the end of belligerent occupation, given the effect of Security

itself effect

member States of the United Nations
Council, even where such decisions may

Council decisions under Chapter VII. Because
agree to accept decisions of the Security

conflict with otherwise applicable international law, 32 the decision of the Security

Council that an occupation
international law.

will

terminate

is

sufficient to

make

it

so as a matter of

33

Second, the consent of the Iraqi government also terminated belligerent occupation,

and with it, the authorities and responsibilities that accrue to a belligerently

occupying power under the law of war. Yoram Dinstein has noted examples of
"consensual occupation," such as the Allied powers' presence in and administration

of France, Belgium and the Netherlands at the end of World

War II with the con-

sent of the sovereign governments in exile. In such "consensual" circumstances,

the established law of occupation, including Article 43 of the

was not applied.

While there have been circumstances
occupying power remained in a country
in

Hague

Regulations,

34

Germany and Japan

in

which the military forces of a formerly

after the

occupation terminated, such as

in the 1950s, in those cases, the

purpose of the continued

foreign military presence was primarily to defend the host nation against external
threats. 35

erations

The end of an occupation typically presupposes that internal military ophave ceased and, under the law of war, prisoners of war and civilian
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must be released. In the post-occupation period in Iraq, however, MNF-I
military operations continued in significant force, and security detentions not only
internees

continued but increased dramatically in volume.

Which

legal rules, then, applied to the

Iraq? Secretary of State Powell's letter

the "forces that

make up

post-occupation military operations in

annexed to Resolution 1546 affirmed that

MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act

consistently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the

Geneva Conventions." 36 This commitment to the continued application of the law
of war failed to clarify, however, which branches of humanitarian law were appropriate

—namely, whether the

situation continued to qualify as

an international

armed conflict subject to the full array of provisions under the Third and Fourth
Geneva Conventions, or whether, given the absence of any conflict between the
United States and coalition countries and the government of Iraq, it had become a
non-international armed conflict, to which Common Article 3 alone among the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions and other customary laws of war applied.
On this question there was no consensus. The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) took the view that the residual conflict between insurgent forces, on
the one hand, and the United States, coalition forces and the government of Iraq,
on the other, constituted a non- international armed conflict. 37 Others, including
Adam Roberts, suggested that given the non-Iraqi character of the MNF-I and foreign insurgent fighters, and the language of Resolution 1546, the more robust provisions of the Geneva Conventions should continue to apply. 38
While the United
conflict

States did not formally revisit

was of an international character,

status of the conflict

2003 determination that the

generally avoided characterizing the

by pointing to the authorization

lution. This response

in the Security Council reso-

can be fairly criticized for conflating jus ad helium issues

basis for the use of force,

sent of the Iraqi

it

its

i.e.,

—

the

the authorization of the Security Council and the con-

government

—with

jus in hello questions of which rules of the law

of armed conflict applied to the conduct of the MNF-I.
In practice, the

MNF-I

applicable to international
period, however,

generally continued to apply the

armed

more robust

conflicts to its operations in Iraq.

MNF-I's operations

also

began to

shift

rules

During

this

from a purely war para-

digm to a law-enforcement paradigm, which fostered cooperation with the government of Iraq and paved the way for Iraqi assumption of security responsibility.
Detention operations, in particular, incorporated law-enforcement elements
within the purview of the Iraqi government alongside the security detentions authorized under Resolution 1546.

The standards and procedures of MNF-I internment operations evolved over
time, and increasingly worked in coordination with Iraqi law and the criminal
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The day before the occupation ended, the CPA promulgated a revision to CPA Memorandum Number 3, which outlined the types of detentions
MNF-I would undertake and the procedures applicable to each type. 39 Reflective of
the US reluctance to pin down the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to post-

justice system.

occupation

activities,

the revised

memorandum was careful to avoid any implica-

tion that the Fourth Convention terms

on

Language that appeared

a matter of law.

security internees continued to apply as
in the original

memorandum,

issued in

June 2003, stating that certain provisions were undertaken "in accordance with"

Geneva Convention was omitted. Indeed, the chapeau of the Revised

the Fourth

CPA Memorandum Number 3 stated, "Determining, that the relevant and appropriate provisions of the [Fourth Convention] constitute

consistent with

its

mandate

an appropriate framework

in continuance of measures previously adopted." 40

CPA Memorandum Number

3 as revised established a review process that

would

satisfy the right

tainees

were to be held for no longer than 12 months from the date of internment,

of appeal provided in Article 78. In addition, juvenile de-

and adult internees held for 18 months were to receive review before a Joint Detention Committee, which included Iraqi participation, to authorize further in-

memorandum

ternment. The revised
individuals

who were

also gave

MNF-I

the right to apprehend

not considered security internees but

who were

suspected

of violating Iraqi law. Criminal detainees were to be "handed over to Iraqi authorities as

soon

though they could be kept

as reasonably practicable,"

in

MNF-I

custody upon Iraqi request, based on security or capacity considerations. The re-

memorandum affirmed that the ICRC would continue to have access to both
categories of detainees, and extended similar access to the Iraqi ombudsman for

vised

prisons and detainees. 41

The procedures

applicable to both security internees

and criminal detainees

continued to develop over the course of MNF-I's operations in Iraq during

this

period. For example, the review procedures for security internees were revised to

allow detainees to be present at their review board hearings. 42 Cooperation with
Iraqi authorities also increased, in particular in terms of sharing evidence to facilitate

criminal prosecutions, and

a separate

memorandum

MNF-I and

the interim Iraqi government signed

of understanding concerning arrangements for high-

value detainees held pending prosecution for war crimes or other atrocities.

IV.

In the

fall

lanuary

1,

to the

Present

of 2007, Iraq's political leaders announced that they sought to normalize

the status of Iraq in the international
States.

2009

community and

bilaterally

with the United

This entailed foremost seeking an end to the Security Council actions under

90
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Chapter VII that relied on a finding that the situation in Iraq constituted a "threat
to international peace

and

November

security." In

2007, President George

W.

Bush and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki outlined their approach to these ends:
Iraq requested a renewal of the MNF-I mandate from the Security Council for a final
year, during

which time Iraq and the United States would negotiate the
economic, diplomatic,

bilateral relationship addressing security,

tural matters.

43

The

results

that entered into force
States of

details

of a

and

cul-

political

of these negotiations were two international agreements

on January

1,

2009: the Agreement Between the United

America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United

States

Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary

Presence in Iraq (the "Security Agreement") 44 and the Strategic Framework Agree-

ment for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States
of America and the Republic of Iraq (the "Strategic Framework Agreement"). 45
The Security Agreement addresses a variety of security and military issues, including authorization from the Iraqi government for US combat and detentions
operations, and status provisions for US forces, while the Strategic Framework
Agreement covers political, economic, and cultural cooperation. 46 Since the expiration of the UN mandate for the MNF-I and the entry into force of the Security
Agreement on January 1, 2009, the legal basis for the US military presence and operations in Iraq has been the consent of the Iraqi government.
Iraqi authorization for the

US military presence and operations in Iraq need not

have been conveyed in a legally binding document
valid as a matter of law.

—or even

—

in writing

to be

There were advantages, however, to memorializing Iraqi

authorization in a public, binding instrument.

First,

reducing the terms of the ar-

rangement into such a document ensured transparency

as to the

terms under

which US forces remain in Iraq. Second, placing the authorization in a legally binding international agreement rendered

it,

under

Iraqi

domestic law, subject to the

approval of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, which enhanced the legitimacy of
the arrangement within Iraq.

Consent of the Government of Iraq
Acknowledging ongoing insurgent and

Agreement

reflects Iraqi

consent for

US

terrorist acts, Article

4 of the Security

forces' presence in Iraq

and defines the

purpose of their mission: "The Government of Iraq requests the temporary
tance of the United States Forces for the purposes of supporting Iraq in

its

assis-

efforts to

maintain security and stability in Iraq, including cooperation in the conduct of
operations against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, outiaw groups, and remnants of the former regime." 47
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This authorization departs significantly in a

number of respects from the broad

UN mandate for the MNF-I to take "all necessary measures" to provide for security
and

stability in Iraq.

The

Security

mary responsibility for security in
terms of "supporting Iraq in

ment requires

that

all

its

Agreement

reflects the Iraqi

Iraq; consequently, the

efforts."

assumption of pri-

US mission is framed in

Consistent with this approach, the agree-

such military operations are subject to the agreement of the

government of Iraq and must be coordinated with

Iraqi authorities. 48

Detention operations under the Security Agreement also

reflect a significant de-

parture from the law of war detentions the coalition undertook under the Article

Under a law of war framework,
detentions are conceived of as incident to military combat authorities; under the
Security Agreement, detentions are addressed separately from the authorization to
conduct military operations and are integrated into Iraqi law-enforcement operations. Article 22 of the Security Agreement addresses two categories of detainees:
78 framework in the earlier phases of its

activities.

US custody at the time the
agreement came into force who had been taken into custody by the MNF-I under
UN authorization, and new captures who would come into US forces' custody after
the so-called "legacy security detainees," individuals in

the entry into force of the agreement. 49
Signaling the end of law of war security internment, the agreement outlines the
three general disposition options for legacy security detainees.

the government of Iraq

is

Under the agreement,

to review the cases of all of the approximately 15,800 legacy

security detainees to determine

whom it could criminally prosecute. 50 Detainees for

whom Iraqi authorities issued a valid criminal arrest warrant and detention order
are to be transferred to Iraqi authorities for prosecution. Detainees against whom a
criminal case cannot or was not brought must be released by

US

forces "in a safe

and orderly manner, unless otherwise requested by the Government of Iraq and in
accordance with Article 4 of this Agreement." 51 Such a request by the government
of Iraq for another disposition might include repatriation to a third country. Iraqi
authorities

cution

may also

if Iraqi

request that a detainee remain in

authorities determine that they

certain criminal suspects safely

and humanely

US

custody pending prose-

do not have the capacity
in custody.

US

custody has

By December 2009,

1,441 legacy

Resolving the cases of the thousands of security detainees in

proved time-consuming and
security detainees

legacy security detainees

mained

in

politically delicate.

had been transferred

to detain

to Iraqi authorities for prosecution, 7,499

had been released and approximately 4,600 detainees

re-

US custody. US forces estimated that disposition of all detainees would

not be complete until August 20 10. 52 The Security Agreement does not specify a
timetable for the completion of this process, and the requirement that releases oc-

cur in "safe and orderly manner"

reflects

92

an understanding that

releases will

be
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implemented with care
Iraqi society.
thorities

to facilitate the safety of the individual

To mitigate security risks, US forces

and the

release detainees

stability

whom Iraqi au-

determined would not be prosecuted in order of least to greatest security

While many welcomed the end of "indefinite" MNF-I detentions, the

threat.

of

lease of these detainees

Under

was also

criticized as contributing to

the Security Agreement,

the domestic judicial system.

new captures

re-

an uptick in violence. 53

are processed in accordance with

The agreement precludes US

forces

from

arresting or

detaining individuals "except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with

law and pursuant to Article 4" of the Security Agreement, which authorizes

Iraqi

US

military operations

ence
is

is

not

and requires US

to arrest individuals pursuant to

may

feasible, individuals

forces to respect Iraqi law. 54

an Iraqi-issued

US

be taken into

arrest warrant. If a

turned over to a competent Iraqi authority within 24 hours,

As during the second phase of the
acterize the nature of US

engagement

in Iraq.

warrant

at

which point

remain about how to char-

Given the normalized bilateral

is little

remains of an international character. The

Iraqi

warranted.

conflict, questions

tionship between the two countries, there
conflict

is

prefer-

custody and must be

forces'

authorities determine whether continued detention

The

rela-

basis for the position that the

ICRC continues to view the sit-

uation in Iraq as constituting a non-international armed conflict. 55 However, the

government of Iraq has not publicly characterized the
conflict or

in

its

invoked the

state

of emergency provisions in

handling of detention operations,

While the United
activities,

it

state
its

strictly follows a

of affairs as an armed

constitution. Moreover,

law-enforcement model.

States also has declined to publicly characterize the status of

its

US forces remain at all times bound by the rules of Common Article 3

of

the Geneva Conventions and other customary rules of the law of war.
Finally,
exists

—

although the United States has not asserted

at least in

—

theory

that during

this

ground, the possibility

any of these phases the United

States could

have asserted a self-defense basis for conducting counterterrorism operations in
Iraq against Al
that

US

Qaeda and

forces depart.

its affiliates,

if

the government of Iraq requested

Such an argument would

determine that the host nation was

posed by Al Qaeda

even

itself

likely require the

United States to

unable or unwilling to address the threat

as a prerequisite to asserting that intervention

without host-

nation consent would be warranted. While the United States has not relied on this

and any such assertion during the duration of the Security Agreement
would provoke difficult questions about compliance with international legal oblitheory,

gations incurred under the Security Agreement, the self-defense basis remains a
theoretical, if highly speculative, option.
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VI
The International Humanitarian Law
Classification of Armed Conflicts in Iraq

since 2003

David Turns*
Introduction: Review of the Timeline of Events in Iraq

An

armed

conflict,

within the meaning of international humanitarian law

(IHL), began in Iraq

when

that country

was invaded by military forces of

composed primarily of the United States, the United Kingdom and
Australia in March 2003. It continues to this day, notwithstanding a certain decline
in intensity since the British withdrawal in July 2009 and the reorganization of US
forces under a new security agreement with the Iraqi government in December of
the same year. Over the course of its duration, the Iraq conflict has undergone
three definite mutations in terms of its participants, mutations which have had the
effect of altering its characterization under IHL. The four phases of the conflict
the coalition

have been as follows:
1.

the initial invasion, which saw hostilities between the coalition forces

and those of the Iraqi government of President Saddam Hussein (March
to April 2003);

Laws of Armed Conflict, Defence Academy of the United
Kingdom (Cranfield University). All opinions expressed herein are entirely personal to the author
and in no way represent any official view of the British government or Ministry of Defence.
* Senior Lecturer in International

International Humanitarian

2.

Law Classification of Armed Conflicts in Iraq

the debellatio of Iraq and

its

belligerent occupation

by the

victors,

represented by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), confronted

by an increasingly violent insurgency
3.

(April 2003 to June 2004);

the transformation of the coalition occupying forces, with broader

and

international participation

a United Nations mandate, but

still

opposed by the insurgency, into the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
(June 2004 to

4.

December 2008); and

the continuing presence of

US

forces

others having withdrawn) to

(all

help confront the insurgency, without a

UN mandate but with a security

agreement negotiated between the United States and the Iraqi govern-

ment

(since January 2009).

The question of the nature of the armed

conflict in Iraq

is

not of merely aca-

demic interest, nor can it be dismissed as an exercise in sterile semantics of no practical

importance to the troops on the ground.

On the contrary, the determination

of the nature of an armed conflict in the sense of IHL has a very real significance for
the military forces engaged in the conflict, for
itary activities as the status

it

impacts directly such practical mil-

of the participants, their consequent classification and

treatment after capture by an opposing party, the conduct of hostilities and the use

of weaponry. Above

all, it

determines the international law framework and rules

applicable to the situation.

IHL recognizes two basic types of armed

conflict: international

international (NIAC). Although, broadly speaking,

customary international law are
flict,

1

now

(IAC) and non-

many of the same principles of

considered applicable in both types of con-

the fact remains that the detailed legal regulation of conduct in

flicts is still

armed con-

contained primarily in the various treaties that have accumulated over

—

Hague Regulations of 1907, the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977. The scope of

the last one

hundred

fifty

years

principally the

application of each of these instruments

is

precisely defined, but they

were de-

signed for conflicts that were comparatively clear in nature: one State against another State or a State against insurgents, that

is,

its

own

nationals in

its

own

A salient feature of the hostilities in Iraq from an Anglo-American perspective, after the CPA was wound down in June 2004 and the coalition occupying

territory.

became a multinational force present with a mandate from the UN Security
Council and the consent of the new Iraqi government, has been the fact of State
forces

forces being engaged in foreign territory against foreign non-State actors. This

uation, not having been expressly envisaged in 1907, 1949 or 1977,

98

is

sit-

not covered as

David Turns
such in the relevant treaties and its legal characterization remains a matter of some

The United States and the United Kingdom, the two principal MNF-I
Iraq, did not agree on the legal characterization of the conflict in that

uncertainty. 2

partners in

country: the United

Kingdom considered it to be de facto non-international, while
Bush administration's insistence on

the United States, intellectually hobbled by the

viewing the use of force through the prism of the so-called Global War on Terror, 3
vacillated

between the two paradigms of armed

been correct,

at least

conflict.

They cannot both have

not simultaneously. The controversy surrounding the

classifi-

armed conflict in Iraq after the belligerent occupation phase was over,
and the tendency of governments to rely on their own assessments of such classification
which are usually determined on the basis of the government's own concation of the

—

cerns, e.g.,

unwillingness to contemplate questions surrounding the status of

its

captured "terrorists" under
siderations,

is

IHL

—

rather than

on

understandable but unfortunate:

the basis of objective legal con-

firstly

from the perspective of the

troops in theater, and secondly from the judicial perspective. As to the latter, a British

asylum and immigration tribunal has stated

(in a case

concerning the existence

of an armed conflict in Iraq for the purposes of determining whether an Iraqi
refugee qualified for admission to the United

[T]he reasons [the immigration judge at

first

Kingdom as an asylum

instance] gave for finding that Iraq

matter settled by the (assumed) fact
state. It is

was

was wrong to view it as a
that the United Kingdom government has not

not in a state of internal armed conflict were misconceived.
accepted Iraq is in such a

seeker):

It

a matter to be judicially determined by applying legal

criteria to the factual situation in that

country 4
'.

Therefore, this article considers the characterization of the

armed

conflict in

IHL in each of the four stages enumerated above. While the characterization of the conflict as an IAC in its early stages (invasion through occupation)
was clear enough, after the end of occupation it could not have been an IAC on a
Iraq under

plain reading of the scope of application provisions of the

Geneva Conventions,

but nor could it have been a NIAC by the same terms or by any application of logic.

The

British determination,

however

reticent in

its

expression, that

was a policy decision based on a mixture of expediency and a
tion of the

Geneva Conventions, but

say nothing of
light

its

desirability

—

is

its

it

was a

NIAC

literalist interpreta-

accuracy as a matter of legal doctrine

—

to

in this author's opinion highly questionable in

of the aims and objectives of the humanitarian treaties that form the kernel of

the contemporary law of armed conflict
tions of NIAC

is

(LOAC). Since the law applicable

in situa-

minimalist, vague and general in nature by comparison with that

applicable in IAC,

and the humanitarian aims and
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that the greatest possible protection should be afforded to victims in
flicts, it is

suggested that

it

would have been

armed con-

better to have treated the conflict in

would also arguably have been better for the MNF-I soldiers on the ground, as it would simultaneously have provided them with greater explicit freedom of action and legal
protection under the LOAC. As a preliminary to this discussion, however, it is necessary first to recall the typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian
Iraq post-2004 as de facto international in nature; such an approach

law, for

it is

the law's scope of application

—

different types of conflict

—the determination of

that determines

its

the existence of

substantive content.

Review of the Scope of Application oflHL

Armed Conflicts
The spectrum of conflict

in international

stages of increasing intensity,

law

is

classically said to

from the violent (but

comprise several

legally non-conflict) stage of

armed conflict, but it would be helpful first to consider as a starting question: what is an
armed conflict, generically, in international law? Strangely enough for such a detailed specialist area of the law, there is no answer to this question in the treaty texts
riots,

that

disturbances and tensions through to full-blown international

dominate the

lex lata.

Of the

principal treaty instruments that comprise the

majority of contemporary IHL, the

Hague Regulations do not

specify a notion of

armed conflict in the modern sense, referring merely to their applicability to "war"
and "belligerents [who] are parties to the Convention"; 5 the Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols do specify the types of conflicts to which they apply,
but without actually defining those types of conflict generically. The authoritative
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary to the Geneva
Conventions attempted to cast the net as wide as possible, asserting that " [a] ny difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces
7
6
is an armed conflict," but this position is not supported by State practice and, in
any event, in its State-centric approach, is of relatively limited use for contemporary conflicts, the vast majority of which are not between States. The conflict in Iraq
after the defeat
It

of Saddam's regime in April 2003

is

a case in point.

has thus been left to customary international law, through the mechanism of a

judicial decision, to

come up with a definition.

tional Criminal Tribunal for the
inter alia> that there

In the Tadic case before the Interna-

former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the defendant argued,

had been no armed

conflict in Bosnia

and Herzegovina

at the

time when he had committed the acts with which he was charged, and that therefore they could not have constituted criminal violations of IHL, because, absent an
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armed

conflict, that

body of law was not

applicable to the situation.

The ICTY

Appeals Chamber held that

whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies
from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of
an armed conflict

exists

hostilities until a general

conflicts,

conclusion of peace

a peaceful settlement

is

is

achieved.

reached; or, in the case of internal

Until that

moment,

international

humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States

or, in

the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether

or not actual combat takes place there. 8

Despite

its

—which has

generic wording, the formula suggested in Tadic
9

been reaffirmed in international and national

10

jurisprudence and has

—

regarded as expressing customary international law
cific to

since

come to be

plainly refers to criteria spe-

and non-international ("between governand organized armed groups or between such groups within a

international ("between States")

mental authorities

armed conflicts. The emphasis of the formula is also on the territorial extent of the armed conflict; with the exception of the single term "protracted armed
violence," there is no reference to other factors affecting the determination of the
State")

existence of a conflict, such as intensity, escalation, etc. However, the requirement

of a degree of organization on the parts of the actors in a conflict

—whether

as

armed conflicts or "governmental authorities and organized
armed groups" in non-international conflicts is made clear, and this has been reaffirmed in subsequent case law as the "first element" of the Tadic test. 11 The "second element" of the test, which has been developed by subsequent jurisprudence, 12
relates to the intensity of the conflict and includes such indicia as the protracted
nature of the fighting and seriousness or increase in armed clashes, 13 spread of
clashes over the territory, 14 increase in the number of governmental forces deployed to deal with the violence 15 and the type of weaponry used by both parties to
States in international

—

the conflict. 16 If a situation does not satisfy these customary law criteria for the exis-

armed conflict, then, however unpleasant it maybe and notwithstanding the deployment of armed forces to assist in the maintenance of law and order, it
will not qualify as an armed conflict under international law; instead, it will fall into
tence of an

the looser category of "banditry, criminal activity, riots, or sporadic outbreaks of

violence and acts of terrorism," 17 which are normally dealt with under national

criminal law but to which the

LOAC does not apply.
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International Armed Conflicts

Once it is accepted that an armed conflict within the meaning of IHL is taking place,
it is necessary to determine what type of armed conflict it is, so that the applicable
indeed,
rules of IHL can be identified. Classically the main type of armed conflict
was one
the only type of armed conflict regulated by international law until 1949
which took place between two or more States: international armed conflict. This

—
—

was never comprehensively defined by the LOAC prior to the adoption of the
Geneva Conventions, 18 since (a) it was obvious to one and all when two States were
at

war with each

sulted

other, a condition

which usually

from mutual declarations of war; and

war regulated by international
tional conflicts

—though not

invariably

—

re-

(b) in the absence of any other type of

law, an international legal definition of interna-

was never thought necessary. Even at the time of the adoption of the

Geneva Conventions in 1949, it was still fondly believed that the main frame of reference for armed conflicts in the modern world would continue to be international
conflicts;

hence the Conventions' strong bias in favor of their detailed regulation.

The traditional certainty surrounding the scope and ambit of international
armed conflicts is reflected in the fact that, to this day, the definition of such conflicts is essentially the scope of application provisions of the Geneva Conventions
and their first Additional Protocol. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions
provides that they "shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them." The scope of application
of the Conventions under

Common Article 2

ligerent occupation of territory,

expressly includes situations of bel-

whether violently opposed or not, which

cant for the situation in Iraq during the period of the
States can

signifi-

in 2003-4. Since only

be high contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions, 19 the interpreta-

tion of the scope of application
ever,

CPA

is

is

clear

enough. Additional Protocol I of 1977, how-

added to the definition of an international armed

conflict

by extending

its

scope to cover "armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right

of self-determination." 20 Although this would seem to be a very substantial wid-

ening of the definition of international armed conflicts,

it is

additionally neces-

sary for an authority representing a "people" engaged in a conflict of the kind

make a unilateral declaration undertaking to apply the Protocol and
Conventions in its struggle. 21 To date, no such unilateral declarations have

referred to, to

the

been successfully

registered,

and

certain States have entered reservations to the

Protocol asserting their right not to accept any such declaration unless the State
satisfied that the authority

genuinely represents the "people" concerned.

tion to these provisions of Protocol

I,

the United
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22

is

In rela-

Kingdom entered a statement on

David Turns

ratification to the effect that "the

term 'armed

denotes a situation of a kind which

is

conflict'

of itself and in

its

context

not constituted by the commission of ordi-

nary crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation/' 23 Al-

though made
point

is

and 96(3) of Protocol

specifically in relation to Articles 1(4)

of equal relevance to Article 1(2) of Protocol

In the event that an international

armed

conflict

I,

the

II.

is

taking place, States partici-

bound by the entire corpus of cus(including the Hague Regulations of

pating as belligerents in such a conflict will be

tomary international humanitarian law

24

1907) and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, along with any specifically applicable treaties regulating the use of weaponry. States that are also parties to the 1977

Additional Protocol

I

will

be bound by that instrument

also;

even certain States

that have not accepted the Protocol as a whole accept that substantial parts of it reflect

customary international law and apply its terms

25
as such.

Non-international Armed Conflicts

The other main type of conflict recognized in international law, at least since 1949,
is that of non-international armed conflict. In that year, Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions introduced, for the first time, legal regulation of the protection of victims in "armed conflicts] not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." Beyond the phrase "armed
conflict not of an international character," the article does

application.

The

authoritative

ICRC Commentary

criteria" to assist in the differentiation

character"
conflict]

(1)

from "any

act

not explain

provides a

list

its

of "convenient

of an "armed conflict not of an international

committed by force of arms [not amounting

—any form of anarchy,

scope of

rebellion, or

to

armed

even plain banditry":

That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized

military force, an authority responsible for
territory

its acts,

acting within a determinate

and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect

for

the

Convention.

(2)

That the

legal

Government

is

obliged to have recourse to the regular military

forces against insurgents organized as military

and

in possession of a part of the

national territory.

(3) (a)

That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or

(b) that
(c) that

it

has claimed for

it

itself the rights

of a belligerent; or

has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the

purposes only of the present Convention; or
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been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or

the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.

(4) (a)

That

the

an

have

insurgents

organisation

purporting

have

to

the

characteristics of a State.
(b)

That the insurgent

civil

authority exercises de facto authority over persons

within a determinate territory.

That the armed forces act under the direction of the organized
and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.
(c)

(d)

That the insurgent

Convention.

civil

authority agrees to be

civil

authority

bound by the provisions of the

26

These indicia are both non-exhaustive and non-mandatory, thereby supporting
the ICRC's desire that
ble."

27

when

Common Article 3

Arguably the logical ne plus

a plurality of the

ultra

should be applied "as widely as possi-

of this approach was achieved in 2006,

US Supreme Court

held that the "Global

War on

Terror"

being prosecuted in various locations around the world by the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001

an international character" to which
flict
its

was an "armed

Common Article 3

conflict

not of

applied because the con-

was not directed against any other State. 28 Minimalist and very general though

protections are,

Common Article 3 has indeed come to be accepted, as the Inter-

national Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in the 1980s, as "a

humanitarian protection in

all

armed

conflicts,

minimum

yardstick" of

whatever their characterization. 29

The very minimalism of Common Article 3 and its perceived ineffectiveness in
protecting the victims of non-international armed conflicts led to the adoption of
a second Additional Protocol in 1977, which is exclusively concerned with the regulation of such conflicts. At the opposite extreme from Common Article 3's allencompassing scope of application, however, Protocol II was given a scope of application so restricted as to render

Protocol

II states

it all

but unworkable in practice. Article

1(1)

that the Protocol applies to

armed conflicts which are not covered by [the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between
its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which,
all

under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol.

enable
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on to specify that the Protocol does not apply to "situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts." In practice,
Article

1

(2) goes

this is the real fault line

when considering the spectrum of conflict for the purposes

of the scope of application of IHL: once a situation in a State escalates beyond
"internal disturbances

ment of any other

and tensions,"

State) to

it

will

be considered (absent the involve-

be a non-international armed

conflict.

Whether

it is

such a conflict within the terms of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
or Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol

on

II will

then be a question of degree depend-

on the ground.
If an armed conflict is deemed non-international in nature, the question remains
as to what provisions of the LOAC would have to be applied in such a conflict apart
from the basic rules in Common Article 3 and, if applicable, Additional Protocol II.
ing

the facts

In particular, these treaty law provisions applicable in

and developed than those

detailed

NIAC are

that are applicable in

IAC and they focus

whelmingly on the protection of victims, while saying nothing

methods and means of warfare.
that comprise the

It is

true,

over-

about the
treaties

LOAC, including treaties regulating the use of specific weapons,

and therefore

Tadic, the

at all

however, that some of the other

have been extended to cover situations of NIAC 30
stances

considerably less

in

all

types of

armed

or, indeed,

conflict. 31 In its

apply in

all

circum-

seminal decision in

ICTY Appeals Chamber confirmed the generalities of this trend in

tomary international

cus-

law, stating that

elementary considerations of humanity and

common sense make it preposterous that

weapons prohibited in armed conflicts between themselves be
when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals on their own
territory. What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars,
the use by States of

allowed

cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in

civil strife.

32

Although the ICTY's comments in Tadic in respect to

this

trend were rather too

general to clarify much of the lex lata with regard to the regulation of methods

means of warfare
tarian

NIAC,

its

from

and

Humanito NIAC; 34

the ICRC's study, Customary International

Law, published in 2005, extends most of its 161 identified rules

however,
free

in

33

methodology and the evidence supporting its approach have not been

criticism. 35

"Other" Armed Conflicts
Although the essential dichotomy of international versus non-international armed
conflicts

remains securely in place as regards the basic typologies of armed conflict
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explicitly recognized in international

humanitarian law,

it

represents

what might

be termed a very classical approach to the nature of war. As the history of modern
warfare reveals, the

last

two decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of

—

the twenty- first century have seen the increasing prevalence of

—new methodologies of

types of conflict
riety

if not

new

exactly

These may be referred to by a va-

conflict. 36

of terms indicating their unorthodox nature according to traditional military

thinking: the

most widely used such terms

are "asymmetrical," "low- intensity,"

"hybrid" and "unconventional" conflicts. These notions, along with the concepts

of counterinsurgency and stability operations, belong to the realms of military and
strategic doctrine,

not to that of international law. In the contemporary

legal

discourse their counterparts are the potentially confusing and ambiguous terms
"internationalized"

and "transnational"

conflicts. Like all

armed

conflicts, these

must be subject to the LOAC, but because the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols do not prima facie take account of them in their scope of application provisions, the question has arisen with increasing urgency: for the purposes of deter-

mining the

applicability of IHL,

which provisions of the
authority there

is

LOAC

on point

what types of conflict are these under the law, and
apply to them? 37

derives

from

What comparatively

little

legal

either decided case law or scholarly

commentary.

The concept of internationalized armed conflict
of the

first

ICTY as a result of the 1992-95 Bosnian war, which was essentially a conflict

internal to Bosnia

and Herzegovina, but

in

which forces of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia intervened.

has been held to be one that
international in nature

1

arose in the jurisprudence

it

is

prima

An

internationalized conflict

facie internal, but has

been rendered

if

exceeds the boundaries of the State within which

it

was

initially

taking

place; 38 or

2.

another State intervenes directly in the conflict with
particularly if in doing so
Article 42 of the

3.

it

its

own

forces,

occupies territory within the meaning of

Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention

IV; 39 or

another State intervenes indirectly in the conflict by virtue of some of the
participants in the internal conflict acting

on behalf of that other State. 40

The third of these possibilities has been the most problematic in practice, but current international jurisprudence confirms that the correct test for determining the
internationalization of an internal conflict

by the
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State

is

a test of "overall control" under the doctrine of State responsibility in gen-

eral public international law,

whereby

by no means necessary that the controlling authorities should plan all the
operations of the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific
instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and any alleged violations
of international humanitarian law. The control required by international law may be
deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the
it

is

conflict) has

a

role in organizing, coordinating or

planning the military actions of the

military group, in addition to financing, training

operational support to that group. Acts performed

and equipping or providing

by the group or members thereof

may be regarded as acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by
41
the controlling State concerning the commission of each of those acts.

Once

it

has been determined that a particular armed conflict has been interna-

LOAC

armed conflicts comes into play because the status of the conflict effectively becomes just that:
an internationalized internal armed conflict becomes neither less nor more than an
international armed conflict. The entire corpus of the customary law of IAC, together with the Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions, and any other treaties
that the relevant State has ratified, will then govern the conduct of its armed forces.
The term "transnational conflict," as has been suggested by some commentators,
"represents an evolution of the law, more properly characterized as lexferenda than
tionalized, the entire range of the

42
It
lex lata.'"

applicable in international

has been used in the contemporary international security context to

refer principally to the

US

conflict against

Al-Qaeda since September 2001

as a

conflict that technically satisfies the scope of application requirements of neither

IAC nor NIAC but undeniably

involves military

—namely, the

features of both types of conflict

combat operations and

extraterritorial location of the fight-

ing coupled with the absence of a State-actor adversary.
as a

A concept of such conflicts

new typology of armed conflict has been "in the air"

the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in

since the displacement of

December 2001. The end of belligerent occu-

pation in Iraq in June 2004 transformed both those conflicts

unabated and, indeed, even intensified
tional in nature into

something

displays

—from ones

that

—which continued

had been

clearly interna-

else.

The premise of the theory is that an armed conflict that is not IAC is governed,
in default, by Common Article 3; but the latter is deficient inasmuch as it only provides for the general protection of victims, while saying nothing at

methods and means of warfare and the conduct of hostilities. In

new

point:

it

has been

and Jensen suggest

made

before,
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itself, this is

not a

43

Corn

by the present author among

that

all

others.
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armed conflict

—

.

.

.

may be new, the substantive impact

armed

norms of conduct
combat operations. In other words, a State cannot invoke the
authorities of armed conflict and not concurrently accept the obligations. Accordingly,
the use of the term "transnational" is really just semantic; what ... is significant is that
armed conflict must be understood as triggering the normative framework of the
of this concept

is

... a very old paradigm

with them during

all

LOAC. And that

a proposition that ...

is

is

that

forces carry

really as old as

organized warfare

itself.

44

As such, the suggested concept of transnational armed conflicts is a functional
one that finds no direct support in the letter of the law, but rather in its spirit. It

—any armed

proposes that once the "trigger" of armed conflict

generated, in respect to conflicts that are neither clearly
conflict with

principles
practice.

Al-Qaeda,

45

—has been

conflict

IAC nor NIAC, such as the

then "fundamental principles" of the

LOAC apply. Such

may be derived from customary international law, as evidenced by State

For example, one oft-cited current military manual lists "military necessity,

humanity, distinction, and proportionality." 46 Corn and Jensen refer to "targeting
principles" as part of their suggested "fundamental principles of the

suggestion which subsumes distinction and proportionality and

is

LOAC," 47

a

certainly sup-

ported by some State practice. 48 By logical extension most of the customary international humanitarian law rules identified by the
transnational

armed

conflicts since

its

ICRC would also be applicable in

study explicitly specifies in most cases that

they apply in both international and non-international armed conflicts; 49 the proof

of

this,

however, would have to be conclusively determined by future State

practice.

Application of the Typology of Armed Conflicts to Iraq since 2003

The Initial Invasion Phase
The conflict in Iraq, in its first or main invasion phase, commenced with an unsuccessful attempt to "decapitate" the Ba'athist regime by killing President Saddam
Hussein on March 19, 2003; waves of airstrikes by British and American aircraft
then went in on March 20, followed by a ground invasion conducted by coalition
forces contributed

by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland,

subsequently supported also by Spain,

Denmark and a number of other countries.

removed from power as US forces progressively
penetrated Baghdad during the first week of April, leading to the city's complete
occupation and the end of organized resistance by regular Iraqi government forces
on April 9. Large-scale looting and communal violence then erupted, however, and
fighting with irregular armed elements did not cease. On May 1, 2003, US President George W. Bush formally declared an end to major combat operations. 50
Saddam's regime was

effectively
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The period from March 19 to April 30, 2003 "clearly constituted an interna51
Shortly before the
tional armed conflict between the coalition States and Iraq."
start of invasion, the ICRC sent a "Memorandum on the Rules of International
Humanitarian Law to Be Respected by the States Involved in Military Hostilities"
to the anticipated belligerents, in which it emphasized the need to respect the de52
Iraq, the United States, the
tailed provisions of the four Geneva Conventions.
United Kingdom and Australia were all at the material time party to the Geneva
Conventions; the latter two States were also party to Additional Protocol I and
therefore were equally bound by that instrument's provisions. Although the
United States was not technically so bound, certain provisions of the Protocol

which the United

by US
tire

States believes reflect

customary international law were applied

forces as a matter of policy. 53 Finally,

all

belligerents

were bound by the en-

corpus of customary international humanitarian law, including notably the

Hague Regulations of 1907

(to

which

Iraq, for

example, was not a party). 54

The Belligerent Occupation Phase
The technical details of the law of belligerent occupation are considered elsewhere
in this volume, 55 but at the outset of this section the main point to note is that belligerent occupation of territory is considered to

be effectively an extension of inter-

armed conflict for the purposes of IHL because it is generally the territory
of another State that is being occupied consequent upon an armed conflict with
that other State. Occupation is governed specifically by 1949 Geneva Convention
IV, relative to the protection of civilian persons, and by certain provisions of the
Hague Regulations. Although there is some doctrinal controversy as to the precise
national

moment during hostilities when an occupation legally begins, 56 the application of
Geneva Convention IV
tions

57

ceases

one year

after the general close

of military opera-

(which in the case of Iraq would suggest an end date of April 30, 2004

if

58

announcement of the end of major combat operations is to be
taken at face value). The CPA was in fact established to represent the occupying
powers' administration of Iraq on May 16, 2003, 59 ten days after President Bush
had appointed Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III to head the Authority60 and more
than two weeks after the announcement of the end of major combat operations. A
transfer of power from the CPA to a transitional Iraqi administration took place on
June 28, 2004, 61 at which point the MNF-I had already been established and the law
President Bush's

of belligerent occupation technically ceased to be formally applicable in Iraq.
After

some

initial

reluctance to use the international law terminology of bellig-

erent occupation, 62 the United States
selves as occupiers

when

on May 22,

The Resolution

2003.

63

and United Kingdom recognized them-

they voted in favor of Security Council Resolution 1483
refers to the
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as

"occupying powers" in
paragraph

tive

5,

its
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preamble 64 and also

refers expressly, in its substan-

to obligations relating to belligerent occupation arising

under

Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV. Even had the United States
and United Kingdom formally declined to recognize themselves as occupying
powers, the Geneva Convention would have been applicable automatically as the
United States, United Kingdom and Iraq are all high contracting parties and the
the

Convention

all

specifies its

cases of declared

scope of application as extending to

war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or

more of the High Contracting Parties

.

.

.

[and]

... all

of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even

armed

resistance.

cases of partial or total occupation

if the

said occupation meets with

The Hague Regulations contain no such statement concerning
application, but Article 42 states that " [territory
actually placed
rity

no

65

is

their scope of

considered occupied

under the authority of the hostile army." In

when

it is

his briefing to the Secu-

Council on May 22, 2003 regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance in

Iraq,

Jakob Kellenberger, the President of the International Committee of the Red

Cross, noted:

As far as the legal framework is concerned, we are, in terms of humanitarian law ... in a
situation of occupation. The applicability of the relevant provisions of the Geneva
Conventions, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention, and of the Hague
Regulation is accepted by the occupying Power [sk].**

—

—

However at least as far as the United Kingdom is concerned significant developments in the UK domestic courts following reported abuses of Iraqi civilians by
British troops

human

have resulted in a major expansion of

rights law.

These

courts have held that where British troops have physical custody of local civilians in
certain circumstances during an occupation, the latter's rights are protected not

only by the law of armed conflict but also by the

UK Human Rights Act

plementing the 1950 European Convention on

Human

Freedoms into domestic law

in the

United Kingdom).

1998 (im-

Rights and Fundamental

67

The Post-occupation Phase
The phase of operations in Iraq which followed the termination of the CPA occupation regime in June 2004, and which has persisted, with varying degrees of intensity,

to the present time,

is

usually characterized simply as an "insurgency" in lay

language; but in terms of the scope of application of the
difficult to

LOAC,

it is

by far the most

pin down. The insurgent forces have comprised a mixture of renegade
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Ba'athist supporters of the late

Saddam regime,

Shi'a Islamists, diverse foreign fighters

tween them constitute

at least a

dozen discrete smaller groups.
tion, while others

have been
battles

alleged

Sunni

Al-Qaeda operatives, who be-

dozen major organizations and probably several

Many of these groups have fought against the coali-

have fought against each other for local control. The

at varying stages

Islamists,

hostilities

of intensity, from set-piece urban operations

like the

of Fallujah and Najaf in 2004 to isolated individual shootings and bomb

at-

on coalition troops. The coalition forces officially became the MNF-I in June

tacks

2004

and

Iraqi nationalists,

68

when the UN Security Council passed Resolution

1546. 69 Eventually a total

of thirty-seven States (excluding the United States, United Kingdom and Australia,
the original

members of the coalition at the time of the invasion) contributed mili-

MNF-I under

tary forces to the

States progressively

withdrew

the Security Council mandate. All of these other

their forces

from Iraq

until July 2009,

when

the

United Kingdom and Australia also withdrew. The Security Council mandate expired in

December 2008, leaving the remaining foreign forces present in Iraq with

the permission of the Iraqi government but without an international mandate.
forces have since

been

re- designated

2010, and their presence in Iraq

which

their

is

United States Forces-Iraq,

effective

US

January

now governed by the security agreement, under

complete withdrawal from Iraqi territory

is

provisionally required

by

70

December 201 1.
It is easy enough

to provide a factual description of counterinsurgency opera-

—which evidently what
were engaged
ward—but how do they
the typology of armed
are

tions

coalition forces

fit

(crucially)

into

conflicts

from 2004 on-

under IHL, and

what law is applicable in such military operations? In the specific case of

Iraq, the complications arose

from the following

the fact that the occupation was officially

•

in

factors:

no longer

in place but coalition

troops remained in Iraq, undertaking military operations under Security Council
authority and with the permission of a government those forces had themselves
installed;

the fact that coalition States had deployed forces to undertake military

•

operations in a foreign State and against foreign nationals; and
the fact that any

•

armed

conflict

was no longer directed against any other

State.

These salient features gave rise to the fundamental question of how to character-

IHL purposes, after the end of occupation in June 2004.
armed conflict, a non-international armed conflict or

ize the situation in Iraq, for

Was

it

an international

something

else?

The question would not have
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failure to

in

fit
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neatly into any of the categories of armed conflict that are recognized

IHL:

once the

•

state

of occupation

officially

ended, the detailed technical

provisions of the law of belligerent occupation were

no longer

armed

applicable;

on a plain
reading of the Geneva Conventions, since (from the point of view of the MNF-I) it
was not directed against any other State and, indeed, the MNF-I was present on
the situation did not constitute an international

•

conflict

the territory with host-State consent;

neither of the

•

1977 Additional Protocols could have been formally

applicable as neither Iraq nor the United States (as the

leader of the

MNF-I) was

a party to either instrument

been applicable to British and Australian

forces;

main contributor

to

and

—although they could have

and

the situation logically could not have been said to be "not of an international

•

character," since both semantically

about the use of troops to

and logically there

is

nothing non-international

fight against foreign nationals abroad.

The consequent difficulty would be the lack of any readily apparent legal framework within which the military operations of the MNF-I could be situated. As one
highly respected commentator neatly put it more than two decades before the conflict

A

in Iraq:

between the insurgents and a foreign

state that has been invited by
overcome the rebellion, gives rise to great
difficulties in determining what law is applicable. The traditional answer, which makes
the situation subject to the rules of non-international armed conflict, clashes with the
.

.

.

relationship,

the established government to help

it

undeniably international character of this type of relationship. 71

The "received opinion" concerning the nature of the conflict in Iraq after the
end of the occupation phase has been that the conflict ceased to be international,
and became non-international, in nature. This was the consistent and unambiguous position of the ICRC, 72 as noted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 73
The British government for years after 2004 assiduously resisted making any public
statement as to the classification of the conflict in Iraq; instead,

it

kept repeating the

mantra that British forces were present in Iraq as part of MNF-I with the consent of
the Iraqi government and under a mandate from the
unsatisfactory obfuscation

—

it

purported to answer ajus in

ad helium rejoinder and placed undue emphasis on

—ceased

cussed below

UN Security Council. This

to be necessary

when

hello

question with a jus

strictly political factors, as dis-

the British government conceded, in

the course of litigation about an asylum applicant's entitlement to humanitarian
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protection, that "Iraq as a

whole

is

in a state of internal

poses of IHL and [the government of Iraq]

This position
the

is

is

armed conflict for the pur-

one of the

parties to the conflict." 74

broadly consistent with the approach adopted by a plurality of

US Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld? 5 in which it was suggested that the
and Al-Qaeda should be treated

an "armed

conflict

between the United

conflict

not of an international character" within the terms of Common Article 3 of

the

Geneva Conventions.

It

States

as

should be noted, however, that this finding was not an

essential part of the decision

(i.e., it

was an

and was concerned with

obiter dictum),

the relevance of IHL exclusively for the relatively narrow purpose of ascertaining
the correct standard of treatment for detainees held in

Guantanamo Bay and

whether the military commissions created to try them were lawfully established.

The

interest

of the scope of application question in Iraq, on the other hand,

is

not

confined to the legality of a particular type of domestic tribunal established for the
trial

of criminal offenses. The view that the Iraqi conflict after the end of occupa-

became non-international in nature is based, legally, on a literalist reading of
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions and, strictly speaking, is technically
correct on the law as far as the application of the Conventions is concerned. The
main difficulty with the British government's approach, in fact, is that it gives
undue prominence to aspects that are entirely political in nature, namely the fact
of an "invitation" from the new Iraqi government at the end of the occupation
phase and the executive mandate from the Security Council (of which the United
States and the United Kingdom are conveniently permanent members). It also, in
this author's submission, takes an unduly restrictive and minimalist approach to
IHL, which is fundamentally inappropriate in light of the law's humanitarian aims
and objectives.
As regards the former point, the authority of the Security Council is clearly open
to abuse if certain permanent members who are the prime movers behind a decision then claim that such authority trumps all objections. The legal counterpart of
this approach was given judicial expression in the United Kingdom by the House of
tion

Lords when, in a legal challenge to the detention without charge of a
British forces in Iraq since

authority for the

MNF-I

"internment where

October 2004,

it

civilian

by

was held that the Security Council's

to maintain law, order

and security in Iraq by

{inter alia)
76

trumped
any inconsistent provisions of IHL or human rights law by virtue of Articles 25 and
103 of the UN Charter. 77 At the very least, such a position is politically self-serving,
this is necessary for imperative reasons

of security,"

Kingdom (along with the United States) was the principal instigator of Resolution 1546. As to the "invitation," no allowance is made either for

given that the United

the fact that the government doing the inviting was installed

(which

is

by those same

States

again a politically self-serving position) or for the linked fact that that
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government may not have been truly empowered to
eign forces because

it

issue such

for-

lacked either domestic or international legitimacy. For exam-

during the Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Afghan

ple,

an invitation to

of 1956, 1968 and

crises

Union in each case claimed to have been invited to intervene militarily; however, it was far from clear that the "governments" which had
issued those invitations were legitimately installed in power and legally competent
1979, respectively, the Soviet

to issue them. Although the position of the interim Iraqi

government

in

2004 was

some extent, in that it was installed with the imprimatur of the Security
Council (albeit without a democratic mandate), does that necessarily make the coalition action any more legitimate than that of the USSR in the earlier instances?
different to

Arguably it does not, since the change of regime was effected as a

armed intervention of dubious

legality

in the case of Iraq as in the cases of

was

inevitable that the Iraqi

under international law, something

government

MNF-I that put the government in place.
State consent

is

as true

Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

It

2004 would "consent" to the continu-

in

and actions of the MNF-I on

ing presence

result of a foreign

its

territory, since

it

was

in essence the

In these circumstances, the issue of host-

arguably meaningless.

The characterization of the situation in Iraq post-2004 as a non-international
armed conflict is not inaccurate on a literalist interpretation of Common Article 2
of the Geneva Conventions, and is arguably supported by the US Supreme Court's
decision in Hamdan. Neither Iraq nor the United States is a party to Additional
Protocol II and the United Kingdom (which is a party to that instrument) has
its

scope of application under Arti-

if this

characterization of the situation

never conceded that the Iraqi insurgents satisfy
cle
is

1 ( 1 ),

so the only clearly applicable

accepted

tarian law.

—would be Common

—

IHL

Article 3

and customary international humani-

Common Articles 2 and 3 are, of course, concerned exclusively with the

scope of application of the Geneva Conventions
just those

Conventions. There

manitarian law,

is

much of which

—and

there

is

more

to

IHL than

the large corpus of customary international hu-

is

now believed to be

of general applicability in

all

armed conflicts. 78 Which precise rules of that body of law would be applicable
would depend on the extent to which the coalition States agree with the ICRC
study's conclusions as to what are the rules. 79
It

should also be noted that the jurisprudence of the

ICTY

has extensively dis-

cussed the possibility of a non-international armed conflict becoming internationalized

through the participation of another State in the (otherwise internal)

hostilities.

80

In such cases, the normal range of IAC law

conflict, as in

becomes applicable

to the

any "normal" international armed conflict. Although prima facie this

might be of direct relevance to the situation
ited utility, since the cases all

in Iraq, actually

it is

of somewhat lim-

concerned instances of intervention by foreign States
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(principally the Republic of Croatia

and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

in the

Bosnian conflict) on the side of the insurgents, rather than that of the government.
In that situation,

more of

it is

clear that the conflict effectively became

High Contracting

the

Parties" to the

one between "two or

Geneva Conventions, within the

terms of Common Article 2 thereof. In Iraq, on the other hand, the foreign States

were fighting on the side of the government rather than that of the insurgents. Only

—

if another State

Iran, for

example

—had openly intervened on the

side of any in-

surgent groups in Iraq to the extent that it could be said to have overall control over

them would

within the terms of the

There

is

proach,
its

on

internationalized

ICTY jurisprudence.

a viable alternative approach to the characterization of the situation in

Iraq post-occupation as non- international
at least

become

the conflict vis-a-vis such groups have

a de facto basis

made

—

stalled in Iraq as a result

conflict,

as international in nature.

elsewhere in this volume,

original characterization

armed

81

throughout

and

One

that

to treat

it

rationale for this ap-

is

the argument that the conflict retains

its

duration, and that a government in-

of the invasion cannot "magically" convert the conflict

from an international to a non-international one by purporting to
alition forces to

is

"invite" the co-

be present in the territory which they had already invaded and oc-

cupied as a hostile

act. It

has further been asserted as a matter of doctrine that "a

government established by the occupying power cannot
to the presence of the occupying troops in

its

in law give

its

agreement

territory and thereby transmute occu-

pation by the armed forces of an outside state into the friendly presence of [the

same]

state." 82

as the scope

Although

this

author

is

greatly in

sympathy with these views,

as far

of application provisions of the Geneva Conventions are concerned,

they appear to be contradicted by a plain reading of

Common

Article 2, as dis-

cussed above.

On the other hand, the US Secretary of State in 2004 seemed at least implicitly to
consider that coalition forces in Iraq after the occupation would continue to apply

armed conflict when he wrote that "the forces that make up
the MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act consistently with their
obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions" 83
Why would the last phrase be expressed in the plural if it were not intended that the
obligations of IAC law were to be applied, thereby arguably implying a presumpthe law of international

tion that the conflict in Iraq continued to be international in nature?

A less dogmatic and semantic approach is to be found in the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Israel in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of
84
Israel,
where the Court held that the conflict between Israel and non-State actors in
the Palestinian Territories should be treated as international in nature, partly be-

cause of their transnational nature as evidenced by the deployment of Israeli forces
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and

outside the borders of the State of Israel,
tary capabilities of

many contemporary

mean that the

scale

and

international

armed

some support

partly because of the advanced mili-

non-State armed organizations, which

intensity of the hostilities effectively rise to the level of an

conflict.

The former proposition,

in particular, has received

in the literature since. 85

Finally, a case

—arguably

the

most powerful

case

—

for the de facto international-

ization of the conflict against Iraqi insurgents could also be
logical interpretation

international

of

IHL

in light of

its

made based on

a teleo-

aims and purposes. In relation to

armed conflicts, the LOAC is much more detailed and developed, with

a far higher degree of internationally recognized regulation of both the conduct of
hostilities

and the protection of victims, than in relation to non- international armed

To put

more law in relation to international armed
conflicts; this implies not only more precise protection for "victims," but also a
more regulated approach to the actions of soldiers on the ground, with greater consequent protections for them in the event of any accusations of wrongdoing. Writing a dozen years ago, one of America's most respected experts on IHL stated that
conflicts.

it

crudely, there

"[i]n interpreting the law,
as

much as possible and,

our goal should be to avoid paralyzing the

legal process

in the case of humanitarian conventions, to enable

to serve their protective goals."
stan, the interest

is

86

them

In relation to the Soviet intervention in Afghani-

of the State in having the conflict considered as international in

nature was summarized as follows:

[T]he Soviet Union's interests would impel

humanitarian law to the conflict
especially

concerned with having

its

[in

it

to apply the

Afghanistan].

The

whole of international

Soviet

Union would be

troops benefit from the greatest possible measure

of protection. The law on non-international armed conflicts does not provide any
special status for the combatants,

to international conflicts, specifically

the combatant

[sic]

captured.

and guarantees him favored status as a prisoner of war. Thus, the Soviet

Union should seek
authorities are

when

Only the law that is applicable
the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, protects

even

to have international

concerned with the

fate

[armed

conflict]

of their soldiers

law applied

who

the Soviet

into the insurgent's

hands. Considerations of this kind might tempt an intervening power to opt for

the extensive protection of the rules governing international
this

fall

if

would require

that

power

to abide

by the same

The fundamental reason for the insistence on

rules.

conflicts,

even

if

characterizing the conflict in Iraq

post-occupation as non-international, of course,
States to

armed

87

is

the unwillingness of coalition

put themselves in a position where they would have to apply the rules of

Geneva Convention

III

to captured insurgents

by according them the

status of

POWs. This is partly because of the long-held view that to accord such status would
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on the insurgents a legitimacy to which they should not strictly speaking be
entitled, and partly because of all the other technical provisions concerning POWs
that would then also have to be applied, with certain negative implications for the
confer

coalition States. 88 There

observing the law, relied
gents have consistently

is

also the undeniable fact that the notion of reciprocity in

upon by Gasser, simply does not obtain in Iraq: the insurshown no regard whatsoever for the observance of IHL

same author's statement of
the insurgents' interest in having the conflict considered international clearly demrules in their fight against foreign forces. Indeed, the

onstrates a compelling reason for not considering

it

as such:

would provide [insurgents] with proof of the
The insurgents would argue that the intervention
of foreign armed forces alongside government troops makes the conflict an
international one. The insurgents would have an interest in capturing members of the
[foreign] armed forces, calling them "prisoners of war," and demanding that the
89
adversaries adhere to the same rules.

The intervention of an outside

state

international nature of the struggle.

The insurgents in Iraq would do no such thing. Moreover, their struggle would
be to some extent "legitimated" in the eyes of the international community at
and that is precisely the effect the multileast in terms of the application of IHL

—

—

national forces (and, latterly, the

US

forces) in Iraq seek to avoid.

Conclusions

The
in

classification

of armed conflicts in Iraq during and after the second Gulf War

2003 presents certain

specific

problems. The

initial

invasion phase, in

March

and April 2003, and the belligerent occupation phase, from May 2003 to June 2004,

armed conflict
under the scope of application provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The internaare uncontroversial in that they clearly constituted an international

tional law applicable in those phases consisted of the corpus of customary interna-

Hague Regulations, plus the
Geneva Conventions. As far as the United Kingdom and Australia but not the
United States and Iraq were concerned, Additional Protocol I would have been

tional

humanitarian law,

specifically including the

—

—

applicable too. During the occupation phase, only certain specific provisions of the

Hague

Regulations, plus

Geneva Convention

IV, applied as the lex specialis of oc-

cupation. After the end of occupation in June 2004, the position

became substan-

tially less clear.

Although the United

States refrained

and the United Kingdom considered

it

from conclusively

classifying the conflict

to be non-international in nature because of

the absence of a State adversary, decided case law and academic
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ambivalent. If the option of creating a "new" typology of

might be known variously
are

left

conflict.

While the

Kingdom

—

it is

As such

it is

"mixed"

conflicts,

is

dismissed,

a policy determination based

ency, rather than a legal classification based
law.

which

supported by the practice of certain coalition States

latter is

principally the United

possibilities:

conflicts,

we
international or non-international armed

as "transnational" or

with the standard two

armed

on expedi-

on a proper analysis of the facts and the

undesirable. This author takes the view that the conflict

would

have been better treated as a de facto international armed conflict, notwithstanding

comply strictiy with the wording of Common Article 2 of the Geneva
Conventions. This would not necessarily have required slavish adherence to every
its

failure to

dot and

comma

announced

of every

that they

article

would

of the Conventions: coalition forces could have

treat

captured insurgents as

POWs, without

actually

according them such formal status. In light of the detainee abuse scandals at
Ghraib,

Camp Breadbasket and other such places of

the higher legal standards derived

ill

Abu

repute, public adherence to

from the law of international armed

conflict

would have

sent a powerful,

tion's values

and behavior. The I AC law of targeting was applied in any event, so no

and

positive,

message to the world about the

coali-

change in practice would have been required there. The policy reasons for adopting
this

approach were

at least as

sons against. Nevertheless,

compelling, in this author's view, as the policy rea-

it is

recognized that governments are often likely to take

—
—

armed conflict which in
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions since
nor Iraq is a party to Additional Protocol II means

the easier option. Applying the law of non-international

Iraq basically

meant

just

neither the United States

much less law to worry about,

especially in relation to detainees.

However, the emergence of human

rights

law as a body of regulation applicable

(at least for certain States) in certain post-conflict situations

analogous to occupa-

means that the advocates of increased humanitarian protection and oversight
of military forces' behavior may yet have the last laugh over those who would prefer
unfettered executive discretion. As Gasser has written:

tions

whole body of
power and the
insurgents. Nevertheless, humanitarian policy demands that some agreement be made
[I]t

would be wishful thinking

to postulate the application of the

international humanitarian law to the relations between the intervening

to give better protection for

all

actual

and

potential victims of the conflict.

Among the

top priorities must be achieving greater respect for the civilian population, treating

captured combatants similarly to prisoners of war, and guaranteeing respect for the
protective

emblem. 90
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PART IV
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT IN IRAQ

VII
Legal Considerations in Relation to

Maritime Operations against Iraq

Neil

Brown*

years since
visited the headquarters of US Naval Forces CenIttral twenty
Command (USNAVCENT) in Bahrain. have been there on many occaI first

is

I

on board visiting ships or on headquarters staffs. On my last
visit, in May 2009, to call on the UK's Maritime Component Commander
who is
also the Deputy Commander of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) under the
operational command of the Commander, Naval Forces United States Central
Command I was struck not only by the enormous physical development of the
US and CMF headquarters footprint in Bahrain, but by the pace and character of
the maritime security operations that stretch from the northern Arabian Gulf to
the Horn of Africa, the developed legal underpinning of those missions, and by the
sions since, whether

—

—

unprecedented
the US-led

levels

of genuine international cooperation, particularly between

CMF and the task groups of NATO, the European Union and the many

other nations conducting counter-piracy operations. In examining the conduct of

maritime operations by coalition forces in Iraq since 2003, and the reasons for
them,

it is first

necessary to consider what

is

a highly

complex background.

Commodore, Royal Navy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
represent those of the Royal Navy, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence or Her Majesty's
*

Government.
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Background

A

simple

list

of the major maritime operations conducted in the

area of responsibility during the last twenty years

chant shipping during the Iran-Iraq war, the

first

USNAVCENT

—from the protection of mer-

Gulf War following the

Iraqi in-

vasion of Kuwait, the use of maritime interdiction operations to enforce

UN

sanctions against Iraq, the use of maritime aviation in policing the southern Iraqi

no- fly zones, and maritime security operations in relation to international terror-

ism and weapons of mass destruction

(WMD)

proliferation after the 9/11 attacks

on the United States to the mission in Iraq since 2003

—demonstrates how

has been at the cutting edge of maritime operations,

novel and complex legal issues.

It is

many

striking, therefore, to

this area

of which generated

observe at the outset that

notwithstanding their scale and complexity, they have not generated the develop-

ment in the case of the law of armed conflict at sea that has been seen in other areas
of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) over the same period.
There are a number of reasons for this. The simplest, of course, is that with only
two exceptions, namely the Gulf wars in 1991 and 2003, maritime operations were
not a part of an international armed conflict at sea. Whether conducted under the
1

explicit authority

of the

UN

Security Council

(e.g.,

Security Council Resolution

2

665, authorizing maritime interdiction to enforce the sanctions against Iraq established

under Resolution 66

3
),

or amid the confusion that prevailed after 9/11 con-

cerning international terrorism or in the face of the increasing dangers of the
proliferation of

WMD, the laws that regulated the conduct of maritime operations

were generally not found in the

LOAC but in other areas of existing international

law and the use of force was generally consistent with domestic law enforcement.
It is

also appears that

ate aftermath

much legal debate during the Cold War and in its immedi-

was complicated by

for themselves

—or even

a reticence

to recognize in others

even the language of the law of armed conflict
coalition naval forces

on the

—

parts of some States to claim

certain belligerent rights or use

at sea. 4

When asked in

1990 whether

had established a blockade, US Secretary of State James Baker

manner that set the tone for a considerable period subit a blockade. Let's say we now have the legal basis for in-

replied accurately, but in a

sequently: "Let's not call

terdicting those kinds of shipments." 5

Against this background, the focus of debate in 1990 was thus centered on

whether boarding operations were conducted under Article 41 or 42 of the
Charter, the relationship between those

UN

UN Security Council authorizations and

the right of national self-defense under Article 5 1 of the Charter, and, of course, the
great question that

became prevalent again

128

in 2003, that of Iranian neutrality.
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Iranian Neutrality

While the mechanism in the 1990-91 Security Council resolutions
legal authorization to

conduct operations against Iraq to "those

restricting the

states

cooperating

with the Government of Kuwait" provided an effective and helpful legal limitation

on membership of the 1991 coalition, the general duty on other States to cooperate
was not so restricted and so the notion of Iranian or any other neutrality (as opposed to support) was the cause of some legal debate. If coalition forces were acting
under Article 5 1 the thinking went, Iranian territorial seas would be neutral waters
,

to be respected

by all

belligerents.

If,

however, operations were carried out under

the direct authority of Resolution 678 6 and those participating were able to use

necessary means,

how could

all

Iran, requested like all States to provide appropriate

support, claim to be neutral?

Why was this significant in 2003? Three issues stand out; each influenced consideration of maritime operations in 2003. First,

one reading of the

US position on

thejws ad bellum in 2003 suggested the 1991 Security Council authority had been
resuscitated 7

and the 1991 debate on the impact of

therefore revived, although

UN

many commentators have

on

authority

neutrality

suggested that this would

only have been a real issue had there been a so-called "second resolution" in 2003
authorizing the immediate use of force to disarm Iraq. Second, certain resolutions,

not

Resolution 665, which authorized maritime interdiction operations

least

against

were

all

still

vessels entering

in place in 2003.

and leaving Iraq

And

finally,

in order to enforce the

UN sanctions,

while the coalition operations in 1991 to

remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait were most likely welcomed by Iran and were conducted without encroaching near Iranian territory or disputed maritime zones, the

same could not be

said for operations after the invasion in 2003.

Although considerations of the law of neutrality and the question of Iran neutrality are

tional

important, their practical significance was

armed

initially limited.

conflicts involving coalition forces in 1991

relation to Iraq, Iran

and Kuwait,

particular operational

interna-

and 2003 presented,

and

in

tactical complexities

that considerably affected both the conduct of maritime operations

cation of the law that underpinned them.

The

and the

The foremost was geography:

appli-

set at the

head of the northern Arabian Gulf, Iraq has a coastiine of only thirty- five miles and

bounded by those
during the rule of Saddam

a very small territorial sea. Iraqi territorial seas are significantly

of Kuwait and Iran, and the history of all three States

Hussein was not only one of strikingly different positions in relation to the West,
but of sustained animosity toward each other due in no small part to historical

dis-

putes over their territories and over the maritime borders that subdivided a small
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and heavily congested sea area through which were accessed the great waterways of

Khor Al-Abdullah and, in particular, the Shatt Al-Arab. 8
In 1991, Iran had made its intention to "refrain from engagement in the present
armed conflict" clear in statements to the United Nations, 9 and subsequently
warned belligerents that their aircraft and vessels should not enter Iranian airspace
and territorial seas, and threatened to impound aircraft from either side. In the
the

politico-legal circumstances that

preceded the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iran did not

make formal statements at the United Nations but there
was determined to be

cast again as a neutral

expecting this to be respected. Indeed,
operations, the Iranian
to treat victims of the

Ansar al-Islam. 10

It

government

war in

Iraq,

it

set

is

evidence that in 2003

it

and was widely reported in the press as

appears that in the early stages of offensive

up

field hospitals

near the Kurdish border

but then refused admission to injured fighters of

could, of course, be speculated that this was an Iranian attempt

to be seen to be neutral in relation to Operation

Enduring Freedom,

as well as

Operation Iraqi Freedom.

While coalition forces involved

in the invasion of Iraq in

2003 took steps to

upon Iranian territory, the nature of the invasion and occupation inevitably brought them close to Iran in a way that had not occurred in 1991.
While during offensive operations in 2003 there was no Iranian interference with
coalition forces
quite possibly due in part to the decision of coalition commandavoid encroaching

—

ers

not to conduct a full-scale amphibious assault

—the disputes

in relation to the

maritime border and the status of the Treaty of Algiers created ambiguity

that,

along with Iran's questionable "neutrality" from 2004, became problematic during the occupation

and

thereafter while coalition forces

the authority of Security Council Resolution 1483

With

the regime changes in

Baghdad and Tehran

11

remained

in Iraq

and subsequent

under

resolutions.

in the intervening period, the

contradictory statements emanating from each capital and the small matter of the

1980-88 war, the status of the Treaty of Algiers 12

minimum,
(which

it

is

a matter of much debate.

the treaty agreed that the riverine border

identified),

and established

gether to track the natural

As

a

would follow the thalweg

a detailed process for the parties acting to-

movement of the thalweg and

verify the border

on

a

regular basis. Relations between the countries ensured that after the signing of the
treaty

none of these events ever occurred and this, and the

later to create a toxic situation,

notably for

UK forces

shifting river delta,

in

command

was

of Multi-

National Division South East based in Basrah, which saw Royal Navy and Royal

Marines personnel in small boats on the Shatt Al-Arab waterway captured and

due course held for short periods by the Iranian authorities in two separate
incidents in 2004 and 2007. 13 On each occasion, UK personnel were demonstrably
in

on the

Iraqi "side" of the waterway. In
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both

cases,

which occurred

after the

Neil Brown

conclusion of the international armed conflict with Iraq, Iran was not entitled to
seize the

UK personnel and under international law would only have had the au-

thority to request (and if necessary require)

immediately.

An interesting legal issue,

them

to leave Iranian territorial seas

been whether, either during the belligerent occupation or
present in Iraq under explicit

may have
subsequently when

although not tested at the time,

UN Security Council authority (and charged with

preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq), the coalition forces

may have been able to represent themselves as agents of the new Iraqi government
and

rely

vessels

on

Article 7 of the Treaty of Algiers,

which provides warships and

State

of Iran and Iraq access to the whole of the Shatt Al-Arab waterway and the

navigable channels to the territorial sea, irrespective of the line delimiting the territorial seas

of each of the two countries.

Other Aspects of Maritime Operations from 2003
Given the profile of the tortuous process of international diplomacy, including that
at the Security Council,

and the added dimension of UN weapons inspections

in

much press speculation has surrounded the political and legal controversy of
the decision to commence coalition operations against Iraq in 2003. It was clear to
Iraq,

those involved in military contingency planning during that period that any opera-

would require the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein
and would precipitate an international armed conflict between sovereign States
that comprised conventional hostilities and belligerent occupation as regulated by
tion to disarm Iraq

LOAC. 14

the

Press speculation as to possible land operations launched

where the northern no-fly zone had been policed by
documented. The subsequent

meant that Operation

Iraqi

refusal of

from Turkey (from

US and UK

aircraft) is well

Turkey to approve the northern option

Freedom would require

a massive sealift to the north-

ern Arabian Gulf, the presence there of maritime aviation and amphibious capability

and of maritime-launched

missiles, and,

forces to counter the limited naval-mine

of course, the presence of maritime

and land-launched-missile

threat

and

to

protect the oil terminals crucial to Iraq's future economic viability.

Sealift

Notwithstanding prepositioning, the requirement to

move

naval units and mas-

volumes of military equipment from the United

States

and the United King-

sive

dom

in particular to the northern Arabian

Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Strait of

Gulf saw extensive use of the

Bab al-Mandeb and the

Although predominantly conducted prior to the invasion,
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this

Strait

Strait

of

of Hormuz.

movement through
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international straits

and the Suez Canal continued during the operation and, not-

withstanding the lack of international support, no real threat was
sits

made to the tran-

nor were there protests against the nonsuspendable right of

applicable in peace
littoral State

tional law,

and war.

15

passage

While it may be stretching the point to say that every

was consciously discharging its obligations

it is

straits

as a neutral

under interna-

probably safe to assert that each acted consistently with the obliga-

tions in international law set out in the

documented attempts to

San Remo Manual. 16 Indeed, the only

interfere with coalition shipping occurred at

Military Port in the United

Kingdom where

Marchwood

anti-war protesters attempted to pre-

The protestors were
subsequently tried and convicted of trespass and criminal damage offenses, the de-

vent Royal Fleet Auxiliary and other supply ships from

fense that their action

was permitted under

sailing.

UK domestic law as necessary to avert

the crime of aggression having failed. 17

Maritime Aviation
While

significant air assets

US and UK

aircraft carriers, operating

was critical to the coalition
warning and helicopter
granted, the freedom of

Law of the

were based on land

Sea

18

to

aircraft

and

helicopters,

and strike capability, airborne early

for the invasion force.

Although

maneuver afforded by the 1982

move maritime

and to operate there with

Gulf region, the presence of

both fixed-wing

in providing fighter

lift

in the

UN

easily taken for

Convention on the

forces to the territorial sea limits of

direct access to Iraq

from the high

seas

State

and international

airspace provided a unique operating capability for maritime forces free
risk

any

from the

of outright refusal to operate from or over territories, or from restrictions and

conditions in relation to aircraft numbers and missions, by any host State.
Airstrikes

by carrier-borne aircraft were integrated into the combined and joint

coalition targeting process

and the

air tasking

order

(ATO)

cycle,

which enabled a

coherent approach to deliberate targeting to be conducted under the direct com-

mand of the coalition targeting coordination board that sat daily (and at which the
senior US and UK legal advisers were Navy lawyers). In contrast to the first Gulf
War, where the air campaign generated much debate about the application of
Additional Protocol

I, it is

probably fair to say that, although

a matter of law (because Iraq

had not signed and the United

fied), the principles codified in Article

made

This was

and the

possible

it still

did not apply as

States

had not

rati-

57 in particular were followed in practice.

by increased technology, better

fact that, in reality, high-intensity offensive

only for a short period and were successful.
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Naval Fires
While much

air targeting

was deliberate and subject

to the

ATO process, even ex-

pedited processes could not keep pace with the pace of the land maneuvers, and in

same manner close

the

air

support and

artillery

were provided, warships were also

used to provide crucial indirect fires. In these circumstances the role of legal advisers in theater

was to ensure that those authorizing the

fires

(ground commanders,

forward controllers or ship's commanding officers based on the

tactical situation)

understood their legal obligations in relation to precautions in attack.

fully

Maritime Offensive Operations

With the

Iraqi

navy

largely destroyed in 1991, conventional naval operations

against belligerent naval units were largely restricted to dealing with

what was a

very limited naval mining capability. Coalition forces having quickly established
sea control, the remaining threat
tial

was essentially an asymmetric one and the poten-

threat carried in vessels entering and, in particular, leaving Iraq.

Maritime Interdiction Operations
Although permitted under the law of armed
tional reasons there

was no

realistic

of Iraq in accordance with the rules
international

conflict, for geographical

and opera-

prospect of establishing an effective blockade
set

out in the San

Remo Manual. 19 During the

armed conflict in 2003, while it was determined by coalition partners

that their naval forces could as a matter of law have exercised belligerent rights of
visit

and search against enemy and

(in certain circumstances) neutral vessels, this

never occurred. Indeed, on this issue there was greater legal divergence in coalition
positions than in any other area, even
identical missions.

if in

practice the units themselves

While the law of armed

performed

conflict at sea permits belligerent

war-

enemy merchant vessels and those neutral vessels suspected of carcontraband to enemy territory, these powers were narrower than those

ships to board

rying

available

ment

under Resolution 665. Faced with this reality, and mindful of the require-

to prevent key personnel,

leaving Iraq (given that the

UK

weaponry and
legal basis

was

WMD or related materials from
Iraqi

disarmament), the United

Kingdom decided to rely solely upon the UN Security Council resolutions that permitted the use of all necessary means to stop and search
shipping,
Iraq.

sary

and

to seize

inward and outward

any goods breaking the comprehensive sanctions against

US naval forces, on the other hand,
mechanisms

all

sought in addition to establish the neces-

to be able to exercise the belligerent rights of visit

contraband list was produced,

and

search.

A

US courts to conduct prize court hearings and special

commissioners were identified, and a concept of operations developed. Neither the
United Kingdom nor Australia established similar processes, both noting the
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unique circumstances of the Resolution 665 authority. Neither country issued a
disavowal of the right of visit and search.

Prisoners of War

The Third Geneva Convention states that prisoners of war (PWs) maybe interned
only in premises located on land. 20 While adequate provision was made for both
UK and US prisoner of war camps in Iraq with sufficient capacity for the expected
numbers, it was clear that the invasion, and in particular the helicopter assault of
the Al Faw Peninsula by 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, would generate
PWs and casualties in the earliest stages of the operation and before the first PW
camps were in place. In these circumstances, arrangements were made by senior
UK commanders for PWs and casualties to be transported to and temporarily held
in Royal Navy warships until PW facilities were available ashore. While not an ideal
scenario for naval commanders, and not a measure to be taken lightly in view of the
existing law, this was deemed a prudent contingency to provide a realistic and reasonably safe temporary option in view of the relatively low risk to the warships in
the northern Arabian Gulf.

Casualties

Whereas the Royal Navy during the Falklands war had participated in the establish-

ment of a "Red Cross Box" along with Argentina and the International Committee
of the Red Cross, 21 no such provisions had been adopted in 1991 when, among
other factors, there were extensive facilities available ashore. Commentators have
speculated as to

why similar shore-based facilities were not available in 2003,

nota-

bly in neighboring States. In their absence a similar problem to that encountered

with prisoners of war presented
while mindful that
Fleet Auxiliary

that

it

RFA

itself to

the coalition.

The Royal Navy,

its

part,

was not protected against attack under the law, used the Royal
Argus, an aviation training ship with troop

had been extensively equipped

as a

accommodation

primary casualty reception ship, for the

treatment of both coalition and Iraqi casualties

alike, strictly

medical need. 22 Iraqi casualties were transferred to medical

Kingdom's

for

according to their

facilities

or the United

PW camp at Umm Qasr at the earliest opportunity. While Argus

is

capable of being used as an "other medical ship" within the definition of Article 23

of Additional Protocol
(in

I,

any protection afforded to

accordance with Art 23.3) given that

its

would have ceased

in

2003

wider operational tasking brought

within Article 34 of the Second Geneva Convention.
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Protection of Iraq's Oil Terminals

While Iraqi oil was not a coalition war aim, it was well understood that Iraq's future

economic viability and its

ability to recover after years

of neglect under the regime

of Saddam Hussein would require Iraq to gain early access to

oil

revenue. While

and pipelines ashore came under sporadic attack, the key facilities
were the Al Basrah and Khawr Al Amaya oil terminals in Iraqi territorial seas where
Iraqi oil facilities

almost

all

Iraqi oil

was loaded into

oil tankers.

Protection of those

facilities

was

accommodated within wider operational planning (they were seized by
US and Polish forces during the opening hours of the invasion) and on completion
of the high-intensity operations became perhaps the most significant maritime
task. When on April 24, 2004 a suicide attack by a vessel-borne improvised explosive
device killed two US Navy sailors and one Coast Guardsman, the two-nautical-mile
security zone around each terminal was replaced with a three-thousand-meter
warning zone and a two-thousand-meter exclusion zone. The greatest legal significance of this step was what the zones did not do. Neither zone, even the exclusion
zone, created a trigger or "line of death." Instead, the zones complemented a system of layered defense that permitted combat indicators of threats to be detected
and warnings given, and so inform commanders as to whether and what force was
necessary to protect the terminals and the people on them (both military and oil
workers). This took into account the density of merchant shipping in what is a confined area, the proximity of international waters and both Iranian and Kuwaiti territorial seas. It left judgment with commanders who were clear as to their mission,
therefore

who could choose not to use lethal force against fishing vessels inadvertently drifting close to the terminal, but who at the same time could be confident that if they
detected an imminent threat at a distance even beyond the outermost warning
zone, they could act decisively. In the aftermath of the April 24 attack, these proposals,

made by the USNAVCENT

advisers

Staff Judge Advocate,

and commanders, and received

were staffed by

UK legal

UK approval in a day.

Conclusion

The establishment in 2009 of Combined Task Force Iraqi Maritime, under alternate US and UK command, with a mission to train the Iraq navy to take responsibility for the policing of Iraqi territorial seas and protection of the oil terminals
brought within sight the end of a mission commenced in 2003, and perhaps engagement

in the northern

—an engagement that can be traced to the

Arabian Gulf

naval patrols that began to protect shipping during the Iran-Iraq war.

While maritime forces conducting operations in the armed

and 2003 did operate within the parameters of the law of armed
135

conflicts of 1991
conflict,

it is

clear
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that,

due to

a

unique combination of geographical,

geopolitical, historical

and

operational factors at play, elements of the law of armed conflict at sea were not utilized in full or at

all.

vant or that they are

That does not mean that those parts are necessarily

somehow

discredited; maritime

less rele-

powers must be slow to see

them removed from national manuals, doctrine and training. As recent activity in
the USNAVCENT area of responsibility, and not least off the Horn of Africa, continues to demonstrate, maritime operations have a key role to play in global security,

particularly where the maritime

security caused or exacerbated

powers are called upon to deal with threats to

by failed or failing

the existing international law framework,

States.

Dealing with these within

and understanding the implications

for

maritime operations of the growing impact of human rights legislation on operations generally,

is

an essential element in preserving freedom of maneuver for mar-

commanders. Careful consideration of high- intensity maritime operations
and those parts of the law of armed conflict that will regulate them is a critical eleitime

ment

in future-proofing that process. In operations in the northern

since 2003

some important modern

Arabian Gulf

lessons have been learned.
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Come the Revolution: A Legal Perspective on
Air Operations in Iraq since 2003

Charles

J.

Dunlap,

Jr.*

Introduction

Has

the early part of the twenty-first century shown the

armed conflict in history? Evidence suggests that it

tion in the role of law in
has.

most dramatic revolu-

1

Today, for example, allegations about civilian casualties often dominate our dis-

cussions about strategy in irregular war,

itself

a

phenomenon that, according to

the

National Defense Strategy, will preoccupy our military services for years to come. 2
Indeed, as will be discussed below in
conflict fact

more

detail,

and perception is increasingly a central,

commanders,

as well as military

adherence to law in armed

if not

and civilian leaders

defining, concern of field

at every level. It is appropriate

moment and discuss our experiences in Iraq since 2003, and to
see what lessons we should
and should not draw from them. Of course, there
are many aspects of the role of law
and lawyers but this paper will confine itself

then to pause for a

—

to

some of the

—

—

issues that arose

—

from the use of airpower.

Combat Operations
Perhaps the most dramatic change during the major combat operations
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

3

(MCO)

that impacted adherence to the law of

Major General, United States Air Force. The views and opinions expressed are those of the
author alone and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any of its components.
*
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armed conflict (LOAC) was the vast increase in precision-guided munitions
(PGMs) 4 employed by coalition air forces (even though their employment is not, per
5
se, required by LOAC). During 1991's Operation Desert Storm, just 8 percent of the
air-delivered bombs and missiles were PGMs. 6 By contrast, during the MCO phase
of OIF that percentage rose to nearly 68 percent. 7 Today, virtually

all

are

PGMs.

PGMs provided unique opportunities to minimize the risk to civilians and their
property, a central

aim of LOAC. Consider

this

2003 report from Time magazine

about the early phases of OIF:
Judging from the look of the [OIF] battlefields today, the bombing was largely surgical.
In the

open market

in

Mahmudiyah,

five

tanks were hit from the air while they were

parked in alleyways so narrow that their gun turrets could not be turned. The
storefront

windows

buildings are intact.

Besides

a few feet

away were blown

PGMs, something of a more

strategic

short, simply because a particular target

that

it

would be attacked. In

and other

fact,

facilities" as well as

were spared.

out, but otherwise the surrounding

8

mindset was

at play

during OIF. In

might lawfully be struck, that did not mean

"hundreds of bridges,

rail lines,

"communication nodes and

power

stations

a few leadership sites"

9

The targeting restraint demonstrated not only a better understanding of legal
and moral imperatives, but also the practicalities of twenty- first- century operations. For example, one aviator observed that "[a] lot of care was put into selecting
only those valid military targets that were absolutely essential to

assist in

taking

Baghdad and securing the country" because planners knew that "anything destroyed

from the

air, like Iraqi

roads, bridges,

and power-generating

to be rebuilt during the post-war period."
It

stations,

would have

10

appears that this pragmatic mindset, along with the revolutionary

new muni-

OIF air operations adhere to LOAC. Even Human Rights
December 2003 report entitled Off Target: The Conduct of the

tions technologies, helped

Watch (HRW),

War and

in

its

Civilian Casualties in Iraq, gave a largely favorable assessment to the air

campaign. 11 Although highly

critical

of leadership targeting and the use of cluster

HRW nevertheless acknowledged that coalition forces "took significant
steps to protect civilians during the air war."
In particular, HRW concluded that
munitions,

12

"air strikes

and

on preplanned

... air forces generally

Despite an

initially

fixed targets apparently caused few civilian casualties,

avoided civilian infrastructure." 13

slower pace of kinetic air operations after 2003, 14 the Air

Force continued to develop technologies to enhance the ability to apply force with
great discretion.

While the

MCO phase did feature a "far greater use of overhead
140
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imagery" than in previous conflicts, 15 the truly revolutionary improvement in intelligence, surveillance

and reconnaissance (ISR) 16

not come to

capabilities did

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) became widely available. 17
The growth in the number of drones many of which are now armed has
been mind-boggling. From a mere 167 in the military's inventory in 2001, there are
fruition until

—

—

now

over 5,500. 18 These assets have been especially important during the insur-

gency or "irregular war" phase of operations in Iraq because they can provide what

some

on enemy activities without risk to
2008 report from journalist Mark Benjamin:

are calling an "unblinking eye"

troops.

19

Consider

The Air Force

this

watched one man in Iraq for more than five weeks, carefully
where he lives, works and worships, and whom he meets
The

recently

—

recording his habits

may decide

military

friendly

to have such a

man

arrested, or to

moment they could decide to blow him to
The new technologies

smithereens.

are transforming the

way

do nothing

at

all.

Or, at any

20

twenty-first-century conflicts

Army General Barry McCaffrey the marriage of
unmanned ISR platforms like the MQ-1 Predator, 21 the MQ-9 Reaper22 and the
RQ-4 Global Hawk, 23 with PGMs such as the various Joint Direct Attack Munitions24
are fought. According to retired

constitutes a "100 year war- fighting leap-ahead" that has,

damentally changed the nature of warfare."

The

synergistic effect of persistent

was exemplified by the 2006
leader

Abu Musab

McCaffrey insists, "fun-

25

ISR with precision

strike in irregular warfare

airstrike in Iraq that killed the notorious

al-Zarqawi. In a recent

CBS 60

Al Qaeda

Minutes* interview, General

Norton Schwartz, the Air Force Chief of Staff, explained:
way it goes. You had 600 hours of Predator time over a lengthy period
And then you had maybe six minutes of F-16 time to finish the
reflects again the power of the unmanned systems to produce the kind of

Here's the

.

.

following Zarqawi.
target. It

intelligence that leads

anonymity.

When

ISR

facilitated

you to a guy like Zarqawi, who was very good at maintaining his

26

capabilities are available, the task of the legal advisor

is

greatly

because the deliberateness they allow also permits steps to be taken to

limit civilian casualties, especially with respect to preplanned targets.

The senior Air

Force judge advocate currently forward deployed notes the revolutionary impact

of ISR on

It's

LOAC compliance relative to previous conflicts:

airborne ISR that gives us the ability to actually apply

[LOAC]

principles (with

almost mathematical precision) that were originally just concepts. In
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we could merely speculate about where a bomb or an artillery round would
Frequently, we were guessing about the target at which we were aiming. Now, we

example,
land.

most often have photos of the target and often have FMV [full motion video] of the
target area before, during and after the strike, so we can know with near certainty what
27
collateral casualties or damage we are likely to cause.

Without question, the key to such "near

certainty"

both accurate ISR and the time to digest the data

of war

still

applies,

it

is,

again, the availability of

produces. The proverbial "fog" 28

and command decisions may have

to be

"incomplete" data, as was especially the case early in OIF.

29

made on

the basis of

Nevertheless, airpower

has rather unexpectedly proved vital to the counterinsurgency success the United
States has enjoyed in Iraq in recent years.
Ironically,

even the relatively recently published counterinsurgency doctrine

does not fully reflect the

Army and Marine Corps

full

potential of

contemporary airpower. In

counterinsurgency manual,

30

the

unveiled in December of

2006, sought to discourage the use of airstrikes, 31 largely because,

upon

fact,

it

appears, the

from the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, long before today's ISR and precision-strike capabilities became available. Regardless, it
is extremely noteworthy that, despite the doctrine, real success in suppressing in-

drafters relied heavily

case studies

surgent activity in Iraq did not

come

until 2007, a year that

saw

airstrikes sky-

rocket by fivefold. 32

New

technologies have served to significantly reduce

the risk to innocent civilians.

albeit

not eliminate

To the surprise of some observers, airstrikes have

been a leading cause of civilian casualties in
air attacks in civilian areas, a

—

just-published

Iraq.

33

Specifically,

although

not

critical

of

New England Journal ofMedicine study

of civilian casualties in Iraq from 2003 to 2008 found that aerial bombs and missiles

accounted for only 5 percent of the
20 percent attributed to small arms

That

said,

it is

civilian casualties (as
fire).

opposed

to, for

example,

34

a mistake to conceive of the

LOAC revolution strictly in terms of

new technologies; it also involves fresh approaches to organizing, training and employing judge advocates (JAGs).

The Legal Architecture
Although Air Force JAGs had been forward deployed for operations
the service's inception, 35 they were not typically found 36 in what
call air

and space operations centers (AOCs).

37

Just

Cause

in

JAG

presence in

AOCs

we would now

However, a 1988 Joint Chiefs of

Staff directive required legal review of operations' planning,

basis to regularize the

virtually since

and

that provided a

beginning with 1989's Operation

Panama. 38 That presence continued through various operations,
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including Operation Desert Storm as well as the enforcement of the no-fly zone

over Iraq during the 1990s. 39

The

air-oriented operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Free-

dom in 2001-2 had "heavy" JAG involvement. 40 Thus, prior to the start of MCO in
Iraq in 2003,

it

was expected that J AGs would serve

in the

AOC.

Preparation for

by the participation of several Judge Advocate General's
Corps members in Internal Look, an exercise that took place in late November and
that service

early

was

facilitated

December of 2002. According

abled JAs to gain experience

.

.

.

to

one

participant, the "rigorous exercise en-

while [also] learning the computer software appli-

would be utilized during the conflicts." 41
Mastering the computer systems used in AOCs is an essential skill for JAG advi-

cations that

sors.

Because

JAGs who

many of these systems

serve in

are unique to that environment,

AOCs must attend the Air Force Air Operations

all

Air Force

Center

Initial

Qualification Training Offensive Course conducted at Hurlburt Field, Florida. 42

This five-week course

is

standard for

all

AOC personnel, regardless of career field,

and covers doctrine, AOC organization and processes, air battle plan development,
43
44
air tasking order production and execution, operational assessment and more.
While the course is much concerned with developing a common understanding
of the concepts applicable to the
also provides

command and

control of the air component,

it

"hands on" instruction on the Theater Battle Management Core Sys-

tems and the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System. Those systems,
along with the Information

Work

Space communications process, as well as the

"mIRC" system (an Internet Relay Chat network), are critical tools for anyone working in the

AOC,

to include legal personnel.

Beyond mastering these

technologies,

damage estimation methodology. 45
Writing in a 2006 article for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Colin Kahl, now Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, 46 describes this process as one that
"uses computer software and human analysis to estimate possible civilian casual47
ties for every target studied."
In essence, Dr. Kahl says, it requires commanders
and their legal advisors to ask themselves five questions which he phrases this way:
JAGs must

also learn the applicable collateral

Can they positively identify the person or the site according to
48

of engagement

]? Is

the current

ROE

[rules

there a protected civilian facility or significant environmental

concern within the range of the weapon to be used? Can damage to that concern be
avoided by attacking the target with a different weapon or a different method?

how many

people are likely to be injured or killed in the attack?

commander be

called for permission?

Must

If not,

a higher

49

Although advanced computer and communications systems help answer such
questions and indeed have revolutionized

how JAG

143

personnel do their jobs, there
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is

no

AOC. At its height, there were twelve
AOC during OIF. 50 Some of these focused on Air

substitute for physical presence in the

JAG personnel

assigned to the

commanders and

oth-

particularly revolutionary about

JAG

Force support issues, but most were used to directly advise

on the conduct of operations. What was

ers

utilization

was how they were

distributed.

The complexity of preplanned

must be
integrated long before the plan is ready for final approval. Accordingly, JAGs had a
constant presence in the

This

is

AOC's

air

operations

is

such that

Strategy Division, as well as

legal advice

its

Plans Division. 51

a lesson, incidentally, that the Air Force learned prior to OIF. General

Ron-

who had served as the commander of NATO's AIRSOUTH, Stabilization Forces Air Component and Kosovo Forces Air Component, insisted in a 2002
ald E. Keys,

interview that "[t]he important thing

grated into the operational team.

when

the plan

is

being made."

He

is

that the legal advisor has got to be inte-

can't

be an afterthought.

This early involvement by JAGs in operational planning

AOCs. In fact, in July of 2008
all

He

has to be there

52
is

now

de rigueur in

New York Times noted that "Air Force lawyers vet

the

the airstrikes approved by the operational air commanders." 53 In this

can provide input

at the

way they

very early stages of an air tasking order's development so

that today there rarely are legal issues associated with preplanned targets.
sult,

the Air Force has, according to

As

a re-

Human Rights Watch's Marc Garlasco, "all but

eliminated civilian casualties in Afghanistan" in strikes that are a product of the deliberate

planning process. This

is

true even though

more

stringent

ROE

for Af-

ghanistan require "a significantly lower risk of civilian casualties than was
acceptable in Iraq." 54

Of course not

all

airstrikes are a

product of preplanning. Dynamic targeting, 55

such as airstrikes in response to urgent requests for close
friendly troops in contact with

enemy forces,

air

presents the

support 56 coming from

most

difficult challenge.

To the extent such targets can be vetted by JAGs, the responsibility falls to the JAG
assigned to the Combat Operations Division. During the critical, early phases of
OIF this JAG "sat at a console in the elevated platform in the center of the [AOC]
floor" next to the chief of combat operations. 57

Among other things the proximity

to senior leaders allowed "face to face" conversations that significantly

the assigned JAG's situational awareness.
Still,

geting.

challenges existed then

—and

The same New York Times

enhanced

58

persist

today

article that

—with respect

to

dynamic

tar-

noted the contribution of JAGs and

the near absence of civilian casualties in preplanned strikes also observed that

most civilian casualties occur during strikes conducted at the request of ground
commanders. 59 Likewise, a September 2008 report by Human Rights Watch about
operations in Afghanistan concluded that civilian casualties "rarely occur during
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planned

on suspected Taliban

airstrikes

curred during the

ground

targets" but rather "almost always oc-

fluid, rapid- response strikes, often carried

out in support of

troops." 60

Providing timely legal advice in these difficult situations re-emphasizes the im-

portance of physical presence and proximity. In the effort to address the civilian casualty

dilemma

AOC]

sits

journalist

through the

consult easily."

61

Anna Mulrine

shift

points out that "the

officer [in the

next to the Afghanistan duty officer, where they can

Keeping a JAG close to decisionmakers
be learned from

several lessons to

JAG

air

is

but one example of the

operations in Iraq since 2003.

Lessons Learned

Though

does not purport to be an exhaustive listing of "lessons

this article

learned," such an endeavor

would

surely begin with the importance of the

command and control pro-

institutionalization of JAGs as essential players in the
cess of combat air operations. 62 Dr. Peter Singer

comments in his new book, Wired

for War, that given "advancing technology and thorny legal questions,
that

many advise

[commanders] had better get used to the growing presence of lawyers inside

military operations." 63 Because of the importance of legal legitimacy of military

operations not just to the
warfighting

allies,

fare, attention to

US

electorate,

but also to the publics of America's

Dr. Rebecca Grant bluntly insists that in

the law of war

a strategic necessity." 64

is

Importantly, Dr. Singer also notes that the "other side

and will do everything possible to take advantage."
saries increasingly seek to

"modern coalition war-

employ the

fact

65

knows the

[legal] limits,

We live in an age where adver-

or perception of illegalities, to especially

means of offsetting not just
prowess. Law professor and veteran

include allegations of excessive civilian casualties, as a

US

airpower, but America's overall military

William Eckhardt points out that that today "our enemies carefully attack our military plans as illegal

'law of war'

This

and immoral and our execution of those plans as contrary to the

making

modern conflicts." 66
is more than simply ex-

law, in essence, a 'center of gravity' in

phenomenon

—which may be

ploiting incidents of collateral

called lawfare 67

damage;

it

—

extends to actually orchestrating events

designed to put civilians at unnecessary risk. As Anthony Cordesman puts

it

in his

2007 report about airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan, "both the Taliban and Iraqi
insurgents often located hostile forces in civilian areas
steadily increased their efforts to use

This deliberate use of
ghanistan. At a June 2009
reporters that

human

them

as

human

and compounds, and

shields." 68

shields has hardly diminished, especially in Af-

news conference, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told

"we know the Taliban

target innocent civilian Afghans, use
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them

as
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shields,

mingle with them and

abut their actions." 69

lie

principal strategic tactic of the Taliban ...
ian casualties."

is

He

recognizes that "a

either provoking or exploiting civil-

70

Addressing such challenges

with what might be called "legal preparation

starts

of the battlespace" (LPB). 71 There are

mediate access 72 to expert

many facets to LPB. Quite obviously, the imcan help avoid

legal advice

versary can exploit. However, advising

commanders

complex weaponry and the sophisticated ISR
specialized knowledge.

LOAC incidents that an ad-

in operations that involve the

capabilities available

today requires

JAG advisors must be thoroughly familiar not only with the

applicable law, but also with a myriad of technical specifics related to weapons,

platforms, strategies
It is

art.

an axiom of the practice of law that a lawyer must understand the facts of the

client's
is

and other aspects of the military

business in order to apply the law properly to issues that arise from

it.

particularly important with respect to the complexities of air warfare. For

ple,

seemingly

slight

adjustments in munitions' delivery can

in terms of limiting collateral
Specifically, "[d]elaying

bomb

how

fusing

ground before exploding." 73 Thus,

and other

technicalities of

try to help to offer alternatives that fulfill the

derstanding of the

To

reiterate,

competence

LPB

weaponeering can

to

affect blast

intent, while also limit-

of war making.

LOAC,

imposed by policy and incorporated

JAG must

do so requires an intimate un-

exist. It necessarily

forces are fully trained in the requirements of

a

Wherever possible, J AGs must

commanders'

client's "business," so to speak,

Several other dimensions of

limitations

real differences

an explosion by just a few milliseconds can mean that a

patterns and, in turn, the lives of innocent civilians.

ing collateral damage.

exam-

damage.

gets buried deeper into the

understand

make

This

includes ensuring that

as well as the additional

in the

ROE. Beyond

the basic

LOAC training all members of the US military receive, the Air Force also has developed an advanced LOAC presentation which has been integrated into the Joint Force
Component Commander Course mandated for all senior officers destined to
command AOCs. 74 This training addresses difficult topics such as targeting dual-

Air

use

facilities,

human

shields, the use

of cluster munitions and

much more.

Today, for example, commanders must be concerned about the investigation of
complaints about
via

airstrikes.

While

this

is

currently being effectively accomplished

ad hoc teams assembled for specific cases, 75

it

maybe better to establish a stand-

ing investigatory capability explicitly designed for such purposes.

should be interdisciplinary, to include JAGs, intelligence
perts, public affairs professionals

and other

specialties that

explanation of incidents that carry the potential for
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The teams

operations ex-

would enable

enemy exploitation.

a timely
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seem very conscious of the possibility that lawfare
might be waged against them. Accordingly, combat units in the 2008-9 Gaza operInterestingly, the Israelis

ation were accompanied by operational verification teams equipped with cameras,

tape recorders and other equipment to
ducted.

76

document the facts as operations were con-

Apparently this was done in anticipation of receiving various allegations

of LOAC violations. 77 Clearly, this approach to preserving evidence
further study

LPB

is

worthy of

and possible emulation.

also should involve preparing the

proper understanding of LOAC. 79 In

this

media 78 and the public generally with a
way misunderstandings and unrealistic

LOAC recognizes that the tragedy of civilian deaths inevitably occurs in war. Thus, LOAC does not prohibit attacks even
expectations can be avoided. For example,

when such losses can be anticipated; 80 rather, attacks are forbidden where the civilian casualties

would be "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military ad-

vantage anticipated." 81
Unfortunately, today the

enemy is

trying to exploit

LOAC to deter attacks not

—

—

by intermingling with civilians, but also as already indicated by affirmatively forcing civilians to remain in targeted buildings. 82 If the wrong perception

just

about
is,

LOAC requirements in such circumstances becomes accepted wisdom, that

that the

mere presence of any

haven for adversaries,
with respect to the
grotesque
Finally,

83

air

it

civilians

is

interpreted as creating a de facto safe

could result in commanders' hands being needlessly tied

weapon. 84 In essence, the enemy would be "rewarded" for a

LOAC violation of deliberately putting innocent civilians at risk.
it is

worth re-emphasizing that the fundamental responsibility of JAGs

to provide candid advice 85

—even when

it

may be unwelcome

—

is

especially im-

who com-

portant in combat operations. Lieutenant General Michael Short,

manded

the air

component during the

successful

Kosovo campaign, counsels

operational lawyers to be thoroughly familiar with the mission,
the rules that will govern

do not be afraid to tell

it.

[the

He

further observes that

if

its

challenges

and

necessary

—

commander] what he really does not want to hear

that he

has put together this exquisite plan, but his targets indeed are not valid ones or his
targets

do

may in fact violate the law of armed conflict

take enormous courage to

that in particular circumstances because you're always going to be junior to

boss

But you have got to be able to do

that.

must demonstrate
strate the physical

valor in war.

88

your

86

While military lawyers can get support from

more

It will

their

JAG

superiors, 87 they

True, JAGs are not often called

still

upon to demon-

courage so central to close combat situations; however, they

often are required to demonstrate moral courage.
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a rather melancholy
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observation of some experts that the former type of courage
forces while the latter
is

—moral courage—can often be

a lesson for the military lawyer that has

vital

emerged

is

common in armed

in short supply. 89 Yet if there

in the years since 9/1

1, it is

the

importance of moral courage.

It is

clear that the fact or perception of illegalities,

ment of detainees captured in ground operations
sive civilian casualties in

an

airstrike, are

success in twenty-first-century operations.

must involve many more

90

among
91

whether from the mistreat-

or from the infliction of excesthe greatest threats to mission

Ensuring adherence to the rule of law

actors than JAGs, but

JAGs must be ready

to provide

leadership.

As this article seeks to demonstrate, preparing to exercise such leadership is a
complex and demanding task that requires real dedication and discipline. But pre-

we must;

pare

the stakes are just too great. Listen to these words attributed to

Winston Churchill:
To

every person, there comes in their lifetime that special

moment when

they are

tapped on the shoulder and offered that chance to do a very special thing, unique to

them and fitted to their talents. What a tragedy if that moment finds them unprepared
and unqualified for the work that would be their finest hour. 92

Fortunately,

help us

it is

conferences like the one that brought us together in Newport that

—and those who look

Churchillian
lawyers in

moment

armed

to us for leadership

in this era

—

to get ready for that inevitable

of revolutionary change in the roles of law and

conflict.
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Michael L. Oates*
Introduction

a pleasure to be back in Newport and an honor to speak to you this afItternoon.
have a lot of great memories from my days as a student here at the Naval
is

I

War College; it was undoubtedly one of the most enjoyable experiences
reer,

of my ca-

both from a personal and a professional standpoint.

When

I visit

places like this,

I

am

often reminded that as military officers,

we

don't get enough opportunities during our careers to pause and think critically

about our profession. To that end,

I

think

spend time in academic environments such

it is

important for military

as this

ten to speakers, attend conferences like this one

where they can

officers to

read, write,

lis-

and interact with people who have

different experiences, different points of view.

To you military officers in the audience today who are students here at the Naval
War College, I say enjoy your time here, but make good use of it. Take some of
those ideas that have been bouncing around in your head and share them with the
rest

of us.

We have an old saying in the Army that a soldier should always improve

his foxhole.

I

believe, as leaders,

we have

a similar obligation to our profession.

That means having the courage to speak up and share ideas about

we can do

things better. Granted, that

is

not always easy. People with innovative

ideas often receive their fair share of pushback.

when one of your

how you think

But the

flip

side

is

you never know

ideas will be the catalyst for real, meaningful change.

Major General, United

States

Army.

As

The Iraq War: A Commander's Perspective
President John Quincy Adams said, "If your actions inspire others to
learn more,

do more, and become more, you are

dream more,

a leader."

Now that I have talked about the benefits of being in an academic setting, I have
to

who do this for a living. After spending the last thirmy soldiers in Iraq guys who use short sentences filled with

poke a little fun

at the folks

—

months with

teen

colorful expletives,

purpose adjective
the Naval

vide a

and

—

I

for

had

War College

whom the word

to chuckle

asked

"hooah"

when I saw the

me to address today in

is

a

noun, a verb and an

topic that the

good people

ninety minutes or

commander's perspective on the Iraq war. Discuss the principal

jectives

and problems encountered
and the occupation and

operations,

in the offensive
stability

all-

less:

at

"Pro-

military ob-

campaign, counterinsurgency

phases of the Iraq war."

knew the audience would primarily be attorneys and academics, I asked
my staff judge advocate, Mike Ryan, to explain the topic to me. Unfortunately, he
Since

I

spent thirteen months with

complex

all

when I asked for his help, he read the topic, shook
don't know what it means, but it sounds pretty hooah."

subjects because

head and
In

me in Iraq, and I think it affected his ability to deal with

said: "Sir,

I

seriousness, let

me start by saying that contrary to what you might think, I

have no special insight about the war in Iraq.
is

that in Iraq, as in every war, a person's

three things:

when

his

One thing I've learned over the years

knowledge of things

really

depends on

they were there, where they operated and their job.

A

soldier

who fought in the la Drang Valley of Vietnam in 1965, for example, would have a
much different perspective on the Vietnam War than, say, a Marine who fought in
Northern I-Corps or a Navy pilot who flew bombing missions from an aircraft carrier. In much the same way, my experiences as an Assistant Division Commander for
Operations in northern Iraq in 2006 and 2007 differed considerably from
ences as a Division

Commander in central and southern Iraq in 2008 and 2009. And,

of course, neither of those two experiences resembled the time
Staff to the

So what

my experi-

I

spent as Chief of

Chief Operations Officer, Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.
I

have to say about Iraq today should probably be qualified to some ex-

tent since, like

any other

soldier,

my remarks and opinions are based primarily on

my own

experiences during selected snapshots in time. Unlike a lot of folks

come to

Iraq, receive a briefing in the

day,

I

will

who

Green Zone, then leave the country the next

not claim to be an expert on Iraq.

The Initial Offensive Phase

March 2003 and it is still going on as we sit
here today. Given the length of the war, and the infinite number of issues we could
discuss, it should come as no surprise that in the next ninety minutes we will have

As we

all

know, the war in Iraq began

in
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on a few key issues and try to hit just the wave tops. Also, I hope this
will be more of a dialogue than a speech, so I will make a few key points on each issue and leave plenty of time for your questions and comments.
In keeping with the topics I was given, I will start by saying a few words about the
to concentrate

initial offensive

phase of the war.

I

think this

a subject worthy of discussion be-

is

number of important lessons learned.
I think the major lesson we learned during the initial phase of the war can be
summed up by the age-old military maxim "y° u fight like you train." On that
cause

it

provides us with a

would submit to you that prior to the invasion of Iraq no military in the
world trained itself and its leaders for combat better than the US military. How we
got to that level of proficiency is a remarkable story in and of itself and, as we will
point,

I

discuss later,

it is

a story that, in

my opinion, is still instructive today.

men who commanded platoons and companies in
Vietnam took a hard look at how the Vietnam War was conducted and what it did
In the post- Vietnam era, the

to the military.

As they began to occupy positions of power they drew on those bit-

ter experiences

and

said,

"Never again." Those

Kitfield called the "prodigal soldiers"

military, taking

tensions,

—

rolled

up

an institution crippled by drug

men

—the ones author James
and

their sleeves

most professional

rebuilt the

it

the best trained,

fighting force the world has ever seen.

have some personal experience with that time, having graduated from the

Military

Academy

about the Army,
a war. Using

I

in 1979.

US

use, disciplinary problems, racial

poor training and inadequate resources, and making

best equipped,
I

1

These days, when

I

US

hear younger officers complain

am quick to remind them that I joined an Army that had just lost

words that are much too colorful

for this forum,

how messed up

I

go on to

tell

them

Army was then.
But in 2003, that was certainly not the case. As I noted a moment ago, what our

that they simply cannot conceive

military did best in the years leading
bat.

Our ground forces

—

the

up

that

to the invasion of Iraq

Army in particular

centers: the National Training Center for

—did

this at

was

train for

com-

our combat training

our heavy forces and the Joint Readiness

Training Center for our light fighters.

we were so well trained, so well equipped, so well led and so well
resourced, we were able to invade Iraq in March 2003, defeat its military and topple
Because

its

government in

relatively short order using a force

with

less

combat power than

the one that liberated Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. Putting aside the
political reasons

we invaded Iraq in 2003 and looking at things from a purely mili-

tary standpoint,

I

mendously

think no fair-minded person can deny that our military was tre-

successful during the opening phase of the war.

I

believe that success

was because we fought like we trained. What we did not know then
honest with ourselves, what

we must admit now
157

—

is

that as

good

—and
as

if

we are

our combat
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we were not well trained, well resourced or well prepared for the postcombat phase. To paraphrase the now famous quote from Secretary of State Colin
Powell: we did a great job breaking Iraq, but we were not prepared for what happened once we bought it.
training was,

I

say that understanding

full

well that hindsight

stand here and critique operations after the

But part of making our military better
courage to look hard
things better
I

is,

as

tell

my subordinates,

you're not entitled to your

have to say the

facts

own

me to

my intent.

mentioned

at the outset,

having the

and where we should change things

sometimes

easy for

certainly not

That

order to identify where

at ourselves in

it is

is

fact.
I

20/20 and

is

we could have done

in the future.

"You're entitled to your

own

facts." In that vein, if we are fair

opinions, but

and

realistic,

we

with regard to the post-conflict phase speak for themselves,

and what they tell is that the US military was neither trained nor resourced to be an
occupying force in a country as large and complex as Iraq.
Even today,

after all

of the tremendous work the military has done in Iraq along

the governance, economics,

civil

capacity and rule of law lines of effort, there are

who argue that using the military for missions other than combat operations is like trying to hammer nails with a screwdriver. I have my own ideas on that
still

those

point,

some of which

I

will share

with you

later in this presentation.

Counterinsurgency Operations

Turning to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations,

it is

important to look

situation that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place.

our

initial

As

invasion of Iraq was quick and successful militarily.

dust settled

we looked around and

realized that

we were

I

at the

noted previously,

However when

the

in charge of a country

twice the size of Idaho; a country with six international borders and a population of

over twenty-two million people from different religious, ethnic, cultural and tribal

backgrounds. People who, as

we soon found

out, in

many

cases didn't like each

other very much.

As

if this

situation were not challenging enough, the country

we were

in charge

of had a long history of violence and oppression committed by a corrupt, dictatorial

central

stolen

—

government

a

government that had systematically abused, neglected,

from and murdered its own citizens.

It

was a place where, in the best of cases,

made by sheiks and tribal elders; in the worst of
cases, they were settled with kidnapping, violence and murder. To make the problem even more interesting, the country we now controlled had no functioning police force or court system, and very little in the way of essential services like water,
disputes were settled with decisions

sewer, sanitation, medical care

and

electricity.
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As someone with a background in physics, I can tell you that nature really does
abhor a vacuum, and post-invasion Iraq was no exception. Accordingly, in little to

no time, the power vacuums that existed in Iraq after the fall of the former regime
were filled by a number of very dedicated and very aggressive groups, all vying for
power and control.
Like most things in Iraq, the insurgency was split along religious, cultural and
ethnic lines. Insurgents ranged from the Shiite groups likejaish al-Mahdi (JAM) to
the Sunni-led Al Qaeda in Iraq, and everything in between. In addition to their desire for power and control, most of these groups shared an intense hatred of the coalition forces, which they saw as occupiers. In the case of some of these groups,
most notably Al Qaeda in Iraq, they were willing to commit horrific acts of violence
and terrorism not only against military forces, but against anyone not aligned with
their agenda, including Iraqi civilians.

So there we were, a

any of problems

relatively small military force

—ones

that

would eventually take

being asked to confront a

We had to deal

years to solve.

with everything from defeating a violent insurgency to meeting the basic

needs of the Iraqi civilian population and myriad problems

lit-

falling

human

between those

two extremes. The challenges inherent in defeating the insurgency are something
that could be talked about

approach to

this talk,

I

will

and debated for hours. In keeping with my "wave tops"
simply say that

it

took us a while to figure out the right

approach.

How to defeat the insurgency in Iraq was something of a "chicken and egg" dilemma: do we concentrate on solving the problems of the
tably things like essential services

—

first,

lives better?
first

—most no-

on killing and capturing
concentrate on making the Iraqis' daily

or do

the bad guys and, once things are secure,

we

Iraqi people

focus

Some, including many of our senior military leaders in Iraq during the

part of the war, advocated the former.

This "essential services

first"

school of thought argued that

if

the Iraqi people

had electricity, clean water, trash pickup and schools for their children, they would
be less likely to turn to a violent insurgency to solve their problems.
able approach,
for the first

were not
Again,

one to

tell

its face.

was a reason-

We traveled along that line of drift

few years of the war, but what we eventually found was our successes

really
I

one that makes sense on

It

widespread or sustainable.

am not saying there is no merit at all to this approach. I will be the first
you

that

you cannot

kill

your way out of a situation such

as

we had

in

enemy is undoubtedly important, but what we learned over time
success in a counterinsurgency campaign depends on more than

Iraq. Attriting the

in Iraq

was that

just killing the

enemy. There

is

a time

and

a place to

terinsurgency you have to take things a step further.
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do

that for sure, but in coun-

To put

it

simply,

you have

to
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kill

the right guys at the right places at the right times. Lethal operations have to dis-

rupt networks and take out financiers.

yond the
I

It's

graduate-level stuff that goes well be-

basic infantryman's ability to enter

and

clear a

room.

think another problem we had with defeating the insurgency relates in a way to

made

my initial

What do I
mean by that? Let me explain. The US military has always been at its best when it
goes toe-to-toe with a definable, quantifiable enemy. In fact, many of our senior
leaders during the first part of the Iraq war were guys who trained virtually all of
their professional lives to defeat Soviet and Warsaw Pact armored formations
the point

I

in

remarks about fighting

coming through the Fulda Gap. In
cally important:

have?
is

How many BMPs,

we

trained.

that kind of fighting, metrics

How many tanks am
2

like

I

up

against?

and data

How many gallons

tanks and artillery pieces do

I

have to

kill

are criti-

of fuel do

before the

I

enemy

combat ineffective? In my opinion, early in the war we often fell back on that mode

of thinking, relying on numbers and metrics as a measure of our effectiveness.
Indeed,
ings

from

if

you look back on the

first

few years of the war, our reports and

that time were filled with statistics:

ber of caches found and cleared,
indirect fire attacks.

With

brief-

number of patrols conducted, num-

number of improvised

explosive device (IED) or

respect to the "essential services first" approach dis-

moments ago, this love of numbers fit right into the template for success. We tracked the number of schools built, number of hours of electricity
provided, number of Commander's Emergency Response Program projects initiated and number of dollars spent on those projects. With so many impressive statistics, pie charts and metrics on so many colorful PowerPoint slides, how could we
cussed a few

be losing?

The problem was we were losing. To some extent, I attribute that to something
that absolutely drives me around the bend: we were constantly looking at data
without doing any analysis of what that data really means. To make matters worse,
the data were often interpreted by people farthest from the source of the data
good
people who through no fault of their own had no context whatsoever. When I think
of those days, I am reminded of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who said of
Vietnam: "Every quantitative measurement we have shows we're winning this war." 3
In my judgment, too often we relied on the raw numbers instead of thinking
about what those numbers really meant. What I think we learned over time is that

—

counterinsurgency is about people, not about data.

It's

not easy, as

I

indicated ear-

enemy during COIN operations; it's graduatelevel stuff. You have to do the hard work and take things a step further. You have to

lier

when

I

addressed killing the

and all kinds of complicated dynamics that
take place between people on the ground and, in the case of Iraq, you have to unanalyze people, relationships, networks

derstand the culture.
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I

think as a military force

we became much more

successful against the insur-

gency in Iraq when, under the leadership of General Petraeus and others
taken a hard look at counterinsurgency,
ple.

to

we

realized that this fight

People and relationships really are the center of gravity in a

who had

was about peo-

COIN fight. To get

know people, we had to get out of our forward operating bases, out of our vehi-

cles

and out of our comfort zones, and

tionships

start talking to the Iraqis,

developing

rela-

and partnering with the police and the army units we were over there

trying to help.

Once we started talking to people, one of the first things we learned was that our
"essential services first" approach was probably not the way to go. Under General
Petraeus and General Odierno, we transitioned to the alternate view and began to
secure the population.
favor.

Of course our

I

think in

success

many ways this helped us to tip the balance in our

was enabled by

a

number of other

factors, including

Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq, the JAM ceasefire and, of course, the
US troop surge. But none of those things, in my opinion, would have in and of itself
4

the

5

brought us success without the change in direction and
forced us to stop looking at

numbers and

strategy,

changes that

start talking to people.

Stability Operations

I

would like to close my formal remarks by addressing our experience with stability

operations in Iraq. In terms of recent experience, this

is

a subject

I

am very familiar

with since the Army division I commanded in Iraq for the last year had governance,

economics,
cially

civil

and

capacity building

rule of law as

its

major lines of effort, espe-

during the second half of our tour.

When our division arrived in Iraq in May 2008, a number of us on the division
staff had served in Iraq before.

One of the first things that struck us all was the im-

provement in the security situation,

especially in

compassed most of central and southern
while to get used

Iraq. It

our area of operations, which en-

was something that took us

all

a

to.

In fact, during our
quarters to assist the

month in country, we were directed by our corps headIraqi army with retaking the city of Amarah, a large city in
first

southeastern Iraq that had traditionally been a hotbed of Jaish al-Mahdi activity.

Our staff worked hard on the plan. We spent considerable time looking in great detail at

things like supporting

fires,

close air support, medical evacuation

and de-

my staff judge advocate with me to a
joint planning meeting with the Iraqis at a place called Camp Sparrow Hawk near
tainee handling

and processing.

the city of Amarah because

I

even took

we were sure we would have to discuss rules of engage-

ment, targeting and detainee issues with the Iraqi
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To make a long story short, a few days later, Iraqi security forces (ISF) entered
Amarah and retook the city without firing a single shot. For many of us who had
been to Iraq before, the Amarah operation was something of a wake-up call. It
demonstrated to us that things in Iraq
Iraq

is

a safe place to be.

It is still

really

Now this

had changed.

is

not to say

dangerous. During Task Force Mountain's tenure

we had fourteen soldiers killed and another sixty wounded. My point is that
by the time we arrived, Iraqi security forces were well on their way to becoming a
very proficient, capable force, and that, in my opinion, was one of the reasons we
were able to focus our efforts on more non-kinetic missions.
In terms of stability operations, let me say just a few words about our work with
Iraqi security forces. During our tour we partnered extensively with the Iraqi army,
in Iraq

the Iraqi police, and the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement. In fact, be-

cause

I

in Iraq,

believed so strongly that a capable ISF
I

made

is

one of the major keys to

stability

my division's main effort during the first

ISF professionalization

half of the deployment.

Similar to what
the things

human

I

addressed during the discussion on counterinsurgency, one of

we found was

level,

the better

we

that the better

we were

got to

know our

able to teach, coach

ISF counterparts on a

and mentor them, and the

—

Our approach was simple we made the ISF part of our formations. By that, I mean we did things like "shadow tracking" their supply, maintenance and personnel statistics so we could help them where they needed help the
most. Not to put too fine a point on it, but I told my commanders and many of my
better they became.

staff

from the

start that

I

would judge

their success

by the success of

their ISF

partners.
I

think the development of the ISF was the key to stability and

our ISF partners developed into a tremendously capable

force.

I

By

am proud to say
the middle part

we stopped conducting unilateral operations in our division and began performing everything by, with and through the ISF. What we
found was that as the ISF worked with us and became more professional, so did we.
For their part, the ISF know the people, speak the language and can pick up on a lot
of things we can't as Americans. For our part, we bring a wealth of knowledge on
how to man, train and equip an army, along with a number of technologically adof our tour, for example,

vanced

intelligence, surveillance

which the ISF don't have

to

Iraqi people
cal

and reconnaissance platforms and other enablers

access.

began to see them

By

letting the ISF take the lead,

as a force that

component of Iraqi culture. As a measure of that trust,

end of our tour over 90 percent of the
caches and IEDs

came from local

tips

—and

could be trusted
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trust

is

the

a criti-

you that by the
we received about things like weapons
I

will tell

nationals, usually through the ISF.

sign of real progress in the stability realm.

we found

I

see that as a

Michael L. Oates

As

I

mentioned a moment ago, governance, economics,

civil

capacity building

and rule of law were major lines of effort for us during Task Force Mountain's tour
in Iraq
so much so that during our train up, we reorganized our fires and effects

—

and devoted it almost entirely to governance, economics and reconstruction. I
added a full-time political adviser from the Department of State to my staff and dicell

rected

my Deputy Commanding General for Support to take the lead for all mat-

having to do with governance and

ters

civil

capacity building. Given the time,

we put into those missions, I could talk about any one of
them for hours, but since many of you in the audience are legal professionals, I will
touch on some of our initiatives in the rule of law line of effort that I believe you
resources and energy

will find interesting.
I

think two things combined to jump-start our rule of law efforts during the

last

The first was the improved security situation that allowed us to focus on tasks
and missions outside the security line of operation. The second was the implemen-

year.

tation of the US-Iraq security agreement. 6

For those of you unfamiliar with the security agreement, in January 2009

it

re-

7

placed United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790 as the legal authority for

US

operations in Iraq.

To my knowledge,

the US-Iraq security agreement

only status-of-forces-type agreement to which the United States
thorizes

is

is

the

a party that au-

US forces to conduct combat operations in the host nation. The caveat to

must be approved by and coordinated
with the government of Iraq, and they must be conducted with full respect for Iraqi
law and the Iraqi Constitution.
The requirement for us to conduct operations in accordance with Iraqi law has
had a profound effect on the way we do things. In fact, many of you might be surthat authorization

is

that our operations

prised to learn that the vast majority of US military operations in Iraq these days
are conducted pursuant to arrest

and search warrants issued by Iraqi judges.

By way of background, the Iraqi legal system is very similar to the US legal system with respect to criminal procedure. Before an arrest warrant can be issued, evidence must be presented to an Iraqi investigative judge. If the judge issues a
warrant and the individual is apprehended, Iraqi law mandates that the person be
brought before a judge within twenty-four hours for a detention hearing.

US forces to abide by Iraqi law, we are
In much the same way as I described how our

Because the security agreement requires

bound by the

rules

I

just described.

efforts to professionalize the ISF

were successful when we made them part of our

we work through the Iraqi
legal system helped us make great strides in the rule of law. As we started moving
actions through the Iraqi courts and dealing with Iraqi judges, we found that there
formations, the security agreement's requirement that
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was a certain amount of dysfunction

in the Iraqi legal system, especially at the pro-

vincial level.

The

police were often poorly trained, the judges

resourced, and the detention
that

we had to

facilities

had

were overworked and under-

their share of issues.

Based on the

fact

obtain warrants, our units had to develop better relationships with

the police, the prosecutors and the judges in their local areas. In doing so,
able to better identify gaps, seams

and shortcomings

in their training

we were

and

in their

we were able to address.
One thing we found initially was that the Iraqi police and judges were not familiar with forensic evidence. Their legal system has always been testimony based. To
help solve this problem we developed a number of innovative programs to train
systems that

Iraqi judges

and

Iraqi prosecutors

police training teams

tion techniques
nally,

US

worked

on

forensic evidence. In a

to train Iraqi police

on

companion effort, US

basic crime scene investiga-

and the fundamentals of actually securing forensic evidence.

explosive ordnance disposal experts have

made

Fi-

great strides in teaching

army how to collect basic forensic evidence at the sites of IED blasts and at
the points of origin and points of impact of rocket and mortar attacks.
Since the implementation of the security agreement, US commanders have become well versed in obtaining arrest warrants and detention orders from investigative judges. To accomplish this task, most US divisions and brigades have formed
law enforcement task forces made up of individuals with the relevant expertise.
The organization of each task force varies slightly; however, most include judge advocates, military police officers, intelligence analysts, and one or more US contractors known as law enforcement professionals (LEPs). The LEPs are a relatively new
addition to the fight in Iraq. Most are retired police officers from cities around the
the Iraqi

United States
related tasks

who

and

are

under contract to

training.

The

expertise

assist

US

forces with law

enforcement-

and experience the LEPs have provided

have been invaluable during the transition to warrant-based operations.

As you all know, one of the major keys to stability in any country is having a legal
system the citizens can trust and depend on. Without a system for the peaceful
olution of disputes, order breaks

hands.
ity,

I

down and

people take the law into their

res-

own

think our efforts in the rule of law arena have been a major driver of stabil-

especially in central

and southern

Iraq.

Conclusion

I

will

conclude by saying there

is still

a lot of hard work ahead of us in Iraq.

dications, Iraq will turn out to be the longest

and the

effects

war our nation has ever experienced

of the war, especially on our military, remain to be seen.
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By all in-
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For the military

officers in the

sion has accomplished in Iraq.

room today,

As

I

noted

I

say be proud of what your profes-

at the start,

never stop thinking

how to

make things better. For our friends from other branches of public service and from
the services of allied nations,

swer their country's

call

I

these

commend you. Very few citizens of any nation andays. Those of you who have should be immensely

proud. For those of you from academia and non-governmental organizations,

hope you
better.

will

keep thinking, keep writing and keep challenging us to do our jobs

Without debate and constructive

comfortable with our
It

has been

I

criticism,

we

in the military can get too

own points of view.

my pleasure to get the chance to spend time with you today. Thank

you very much.
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The a Fog of Law": The Law of Armed Conflict
in Operation Iraqi

Freedom

Marc Warren*

The

"fog of war"

is

a well-known combat experience.

It

is

also

an apt

descriptor for how ambiguity in wartime can thwart the best military plans. 1

While the "fog of law" 2
"fog of law"

is

is less

documented,

its

effects

may be just as profound. The

the ambiguity caused in wartime by the failure to clearly identify and

follow established legal principles.

It

can frustrate deliberate planning, create con-

and lead to bad decisions that imperil mission accomplishment. When coupled with poor and inadequate planning, its effect can be near catastrophic. This
fusion

article briefly explores the

fore the

Freedom (OIF) from beof the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on

"fog of law" in Operation Iraqi

war until the dissolution

June 28, 2004.
In OIF, the "fog of law" was created by positions taken at the strategic level that

put conventional military forces in Iraq

at needless disadvantage. Pejorative state-

ments about the 1949 Geneva Conventions caused some
applicability in Iraq

and gave credence

soldiers to question their

to the false notion that the

were deliberately disregarded by the military

as a whole.

Conventions

Enhanced interrogation

some special operations
small number of detainee abuse

techniques used in Afghanistan and Guantanamo, and by

and non-military forces
cases

and

in Iraq, contributed to a

to the hyperbole that abuse

* Colonel, JA,

US Army (Ret.).

was systematic. Reluctance to embrace the
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law of occupation and dedicate sufficient resources to

its

effective execution

almost

squandered a military victory.
Despite the effect of the "fog of law," conventional military forces in Iraq kept

remarkable faith to the law of armed

conflict. In general, this

occurred in spite

of,

no small measure, this was
due to the efforts of judge advocates who accompanied the forces into combat. 3
Judge advocates strove to overcome the "fog of law" in at least five areas: the application of the law of armed conflict, prisoners and detainees, interrogation policies,
rather than because of, actions at the strategic level. In

occupation and the rule of law.

The

lesson of

OIF

is

that legal ambiguity at the strategic level can imperil mis-

sion success. Conversely, legal clarity

and compliance enhance military

effective-

more rapid mission success and reduced adverse
impact on the civilian population in the combat zone. Old law is good law; the
Geneva Conventions and the law of armed conflict in general are grounded in
practicality and have retained remarkable vitality and utility. They should be embraced, not dismissed, and followed, not avoided. They must be explained to the
ness,

which

media and

in turn leads to

to the civilian population generally. Failure to take

and hold the

high ground makes taking and holding the high ground on the battlefield

more

legal

much

difficult.

The Application of the Law of Armed Conflict in Iraq

The war

in Iraq

was an international armed

conflict

between two high contracting

a state of belligerent occupation. 4

The law of armed conflict,
including the Geneva Conventions, applied as a matter of law. The law of armed
conflict and the Geneva Conventions were referenced in numerous operations
plans, orders, policies and procedures issued by United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM), the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), V
Corps and Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7). 5 In his September 6, 2003 letter
to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the CJTF-7 commander
wrote, "Coalition Forces remain committed to adherence to the spirit and letter of
the Geneva Conventions." 6 Periodically, starting in September 2003, the CJTF-7
parties, followed

by

commander would

issue

by order

specific policy

memoranda

reiterating the re-

quirement for law of armed conflict compliance.

By contrast, US

forces in Afghanistan

were to

"treat detainees

humanely, and to

the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a
tent with the principles of Geneva," a
to the Conventions.

7

manner

consis-

much less rigorous standard than adherence

Moreover, some special operations and non-military forces

engaged in the Global

War on

Terrorism
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(GWOT)

operated under relaxed rules
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and prisoner transfer that were incompatible with the
Geneva Conventions. 8 When units that had operated in Afghanistan were transferred to Iraq, some brought with them the less rigorous standards and relaxed
for detention, interrogation

rules,

unfortunately reinforced by field application and standard operating proce-

dures that they perceived had been validated in combat in Afghanistan. Countering the migration of these less rigorous standards

and relaxed

rules,

once

recognized, required constant vigilance and considerable effort. Unfortunately,

months into OIF. 9
Compounding the problem were muddled pronouncements at the operational

the scope of the problem was not understood until

and

strategic levels

not occupiers"),

10

about the characterization of the conflict ("we are

a predisposition to view OIF as part of the larger

liberators,

GWOT, a reluc-

tance to embrace the traditional and legitimate role of the military in occupation,

and a tendency to apply

policies

developed for non-international military opera-

armed conflict. 11
Governments were not solely to blame for creating an ambiguous legal environment. Human rights and special interest groups further contributed to the "fog of
law" during the occupation by declaring the illegality or immorality of the war, exaggerating and distorting breaches of discipline by coalition forces, and asserting
the co-applicability of human rights law and the law of armed conflict. 12 The assertion of co-applicability diluted both and contributed, in part, to the lack of unity of
effort between coalition forces and the CPA. While security deteriorated, the CPA
expended its efforts to mandate changes to the Iraqi legal system, advance women's
issues and influence other modest improvements to vague human rights.
Despite or perhaps because of the "fog of law," the principles of the Geneva
Conventions are the bedrock of mandatory training for all soldiers and Marines,
and they are the basis of "The Soldier's Rules" that are taught in basic training. 13 All
tions to an international

—

—

of the training emphasizes practical application of the Conventions;
tic

it is

not

realis-

to expect soldiers to follow the law of armed conflict simply because they are or-

dered to do

so.

Law of armed conflict refresher training was required as part of pre-

combat training for Iraq. Several times during OIF,
refresher training

practical

was mandated down to the platoon

level to address

areas of concern, such as overzealous detention of civilians,

of armed conflict topics were briefed and discussed

at

law of armed conflict
observed

and more nuanced law

commander's conferences

held periodically in Baghdad. 14 In 2004, the ICRC's "Rules for Behavior in
bat" were incorporated into training packages for CJTF-7 soldiers.

Com-

15

In exercises conducted before the war, considerable effort was put into training
to apply the law of armed conflict in targeting decisions

and in the

rules of engage-

ment (ROE). In January 2003, V Corps held a legal conference in Heidelberg to examine the ROE and to discuss targeting, prisoners of war and occupation. V Corps
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would be the coalition's main offensive effort in the ground campaign against Iraq.
The V Corps commander spoke to the assembled judge advocates, including the
staff judge

advocates (SJAs) of the corps' subordinate wartime divisions, about the

ROE and to the law of armed conflict.
Development of ROE extracts and pocket cards, and of ROE training vignettes,

importance of adherence to the

was a major focus of judge advocates assigned to forces staged in Kuwait before the
start

March

of the war. During February and

2003, the draft

ROE changed several

times to add higher-level approval authorities for certain categories of targets and
to require the use of

planned

targets.

The

complex

collateral

unclassified

damage methodologies (CDM)

for pre-

ROE pocket cards issued to all US coalition per-

sonnel were replete with references to the law of armed conflict (the "law of war").
In fact, the
forces

first

lists five

While the

rule authorizing the attack of

constraints.

ROE

conflict as the

enemy

military

and paramilitary

16

are not "law" per se, they

commander's standards

must comply with the law of armed

for the use of force. 17 Starting with the

ROE

November 2002, planners developed means
to try to minimize collateral damage. The control of long-range fires was a large
part of exercises in Poland in October 2002 and in Kuwait in November and Dedevelopment conference in London

in

cember 2002. Judge advocates were placed

many brigade-level)
pliance with the

fires

in

all

corps- and division-level (and

centers to assist in the clearance of fires

by ensuring com-

CDM, ROE and law of armed conflict. Within V Corps, judge ad-

vocates were placed

down

to the military police battalion level to help resolve

prisoner of war and detainee issues.

commenced, V Corps and several of its subordinate
divisions used ROE working groups composed of operators, intelligence officers
and judge advocates to assess the ROE, recommend changes in their application
and produce vignettes to train staffs and soldiers on how to apply the ROE on a dynamic battlefield. The ROE working group methodology continued at CJTF-7. Although the ROE remained unchanged until April 2004, 18 enemy tactics and other
factors did change, necessitating more sophisticated discrimination in the application of force. For example, recognizing and targeting persons, none of whom wore
Starting before hostilities

uniforms or other identifying insignia,

who were emplacing, watching over or det-

onating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became a key part of ROE training.

Throughout the war,

several targeting

and

ROE

issues

were recurrent vexing

problems. First was the concept of "positive identification" (PID) of targets. The

term "PID" had come into the ground

which

it

was

far better suited. In

ROE

vernacular from air operations, to

an environment

like Iraq,

it

implied a degree of

precision impossible to attain as a matter of course, at least for conventional
forces.

Even though PID was defined

to soldiers as a reasonable certainty that the
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target to

be engaged was a legitimate military target, 19

by commentators

it

was often mischaracterized

as requiring the pristine attack of military objects only,

mistake or collateral damage.

CDM on pre-

Second, the fixation on discrimination led to the imposition of

planned

fires,

including those supporting ground

enemy

pression of

air defenses for

concept better suited for

Not only did
available in

of

it

air

movements and

rotary-wing operations.

operations and

it

was added

it

CDM

was another

ground ROE.

by adequate modeling

require conclusions not supported

ground unit headquarters,

affording sup-

late to the

tools

contributed to the illusion that the effect

could be computed with precision. Operating forces

fires

without

20

quests to relieve fires supporting ground forces from the

between the forward line of troops and the

fire

made

repeated re-

CDM or to exclude fires

support coordination line from the

CDM requirement, but the requests were denied by USCENTCOM or higher. The
control measures to limit deliberate and shaping

ROE, although

fires in self-defense

fires

continued to masquerade as

or in support of forces in contact were

CDM burden.
Taken together, PID and CDM often required intellectual analysis in fires cen-

eventually exempted from the

ters that

presupposed that the

reality

on

the ground

comported with templates or

with electronic means of surveillance. While there was certainly a good-faith analysis

based on the best information available,

it

should not be confused with absolute

The analysis and clearance of fires are only as good as the information supporting the decision. This is particularly true with high-value and
certainty or precision.

fleeting targets,

where time is of the essence. While having judge advocates help

view the information and provide advice on the
rigor to the process,
larly

in

with indirect

it

fire

legality

of the

fire

re-

mission adds

seldom adds any degree of certainty or precision. Particufrom, and in support

of,

ground

forces, precision

is

relative

any event.

The emphasis on discrimination had an

insidious effect

proportionality. Increasingly, proportionality

was viewed

mathematical or ratio analysis of each particular
the

damage

relative to the military advantage

from a larger

an inordinate amount of command and

interpretations of

as requiring a near-

target, rather

out for the most part in preplanned strikes from fixed- wing
to Baghdad,

on

than a balancing of

perspective. This played
aircraft.

staff activity

After the

march

was expended

in

convincing the combined air operations center that a strike was appropriate and that
the

ground commander would take

responsibility for

any unintended damage

(i.e.,

"own the bomb"), even in cases where the strike was merely a bomb dropped in
desert nowhere near civilians as part of a show of force.

the

A third issue was created by the very nature of the enemy. Insurgents and terrorists

don't wear uniforms or other distinctive insignia recognizable at a distance.
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The

ROE would allow engagement of persons who were members of certain speci-

fied

groups or

was a
force

who were supporting those groups. Determining whether a person
member of a specified group and thus a member of a declared hostile

—

—

relied

on the quality of information and intelligence, particularly if the per-

son was to be targeted at a time other than while directly participating in hostilities.
Targeting a supporter could be even

more problematic, as it required a determina-

and materiality of support provided by the
again based on information and intelligence.

tion as to the degree

Conventional forces are particularly
targeting of members of specified groups

uniforms or otherwise recognizable

likely to

potential target,

have difficulty in the deliberate

and their supporters who are not wearing

at a distance. Typically, these difficulties exist

because of missions executed at too low a level of command with insufficient
ligence analysis

and inadequate decision-making

intel-

processes. Put another way, if

conventional forces are expected to conduct a raid against insurgents or terrorists,
or their supporters, they must be supported by a reasoned intelligence-based decision

made

at

an appropriately senior

level

of command. This point was not fully

understood until well into the war. For too long, decisions on raids were made
cally

and individual engagement decisions were

self-defense. This

put lower-level commanders

situational, essentially

at risk

lo-

based on

of being second-guessed and

soldiers at risk of being shot.

ROE in OIF were always a matter of frustration. As most coalition
partners deployed to Iraq, their commanders and staffs would participate in ROE conFourth, coalition

by CJTF-7 judge advocates, where they nearly uniformly expressed satisfaction with adopting the CJTF-7 ROE. However, once in country
ferences, attended

most coalition commanders were prohibited by their national leadership from employing their forces so as to fully apply the

committed
that

ROE.

in Iraq since the beginning of the war,

(British

and Australian

forces,

were exceptions and had

were compatible with the CJTF-7 ROE.) These "national red

ROE

lines" lay dor-

mant until April 2004, when Muqtada al-Sadr began attacking coalition forces and
his Mahdi Army was designated as a declared hostile force. 21 Some coalition forces
commanders simply refused to participate in offensive operations or even to maneuver their units in a way that might require them to use force in self-defense. 22
Prisoners

In 2002

and

and Detainees

early 2003, planning for Iraqi prisoners of war occurred mostly at the

USCENTCOM and CFLCC levels. At V Corps, enemy prisoners of war were generally viewed as a

CFLCC responsibility, but there was detailed planning for handling

capitulated forces. Although the assumption that Iraqi forces
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Marc Warren
en masse never became a

reality,

a key point in the planning was that these forces

would enjoy the legal status of prisoners of war. Accordingly, the intricacies of the
Third Geneva Convention were a frequently briefed and well-understood topic in
the headquarters.

There was no meaningful planning at higher headquarters concerning prisoners
other than

enemy prisoners of war.

In the absence of guidance,

ders unilaterally. At the start of the war, one of the

(FRAGO)
ees.

23

It

issued by

first

V Corps issued or-

fragmentary orders

V Corps, Order Number 007, dealt with prisoners and detain-

cited the Third

and Fourth Geneva Conventions and established

a review

and release mechanism for detainees that exceeded the requirements of the Fourth
Convention, and adopted best practices from Haiti and Kosovo, including a review

by a judge advocate of all detentions of civilians. 24 Of course, this was the first largescale implementation by the United States of the Fourth Geneva Convention, new
in 1949, and the sheer number of detainees would overwhelm the process. Regardless, in frequent interaction with the ICRC, there was never any dispute over
the legal applicability of the Geneva Conventions, only in the ability of US forces to

implement them completely.

Soon after closing on Baghdad in April 2003, one of the first organizational tasks
was to separate common law criminals, prisoners of war and persons who had attacked coalition forces. In the crush of combat, prisoners had been commingled.
Incredibly, coalition forces had not anticipated the impact of Saddam's general
amnesty in November 2002 that had emptied the prisons and jails. 25 Thousands of
criminals had been freed to prey upon the civilian population, and prisons and jails
had been systematically looted. This caused countless problems as coalition troops
not only captured prisoners of war and what were later called insurgents, but also
detained thousands of common criminals. Some were detained in the act of committing violent crimes, some were turned in after the acts by local civilians, some
were convicted criminals who had been granted amnesty, some were probably innocent of any wrongdoing and unjustly accused by a person holding a grudge; the
result was a huge influx of prisoners, later termed criminal detainees, with precious
few places to hold them, soldiers to guard them or courts to try them. The problem
was compounded by soldiers using prisoner of war capture tags to document the
apprehension of these persons; there were tags with "murderer" or "rapist" written

on them and no more information.
In May 2003, US forces implemented CPA apprehension forms that required
sworn statements from soldiers and witnesses on the circumstances of capture.
This was met with some pushback from commanders and soldiers, but it helped
ameliorate the situation and set conditions for future prosecutions. Using the
model of the Fourth Geneva Convention, prisoners were classified into two
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and criminal detainee. The former were those who
had engaged in hostilities and who would be held until the conclusion of hostilities
categories: security internee

or otherwise earlier released, perhaps through a parole or release guarantor agree-

ment; 26 the

latter

were criminals who were held for trial or other disposition by the

emerging Iraqi criminal
Iraq to recognize the

justice system.

The ICRC modified

its

capture cards in

two categories of prisoner.

For those whose status was in doubt, V Corps conducted tribunals under Article
5 of the Third

held for

all

Geneva Convention. 27 Commencing

in June 2003, tribunals

were

of the high-value detainees (HVDs), people like Deputy Prime Minister

Tariq Aziz. The tribunals consisted of three judge advocates and determined

whether the prisoners were prisoners of war, security internees or innocent
ians.

civil-

None of the HVDs were deemed innocent civilians, but some were accorded

prisoner of war status.

Despite these efforts, and the release of thousands of prisoners of war, the

ber of criminal detainees and security internees rose precipitously.
2003, judge advocates from

commands

all

num-

On August 24,

over the country came to Baghdad for

Operation Clean Sweep. Joined by a former Iraqi judge, judge advocates reviewed
every single criminal detainee's

file

to determine

turned over to the emerging Iraqi courts for
ertheless, the

number of criminal

who could be released outright or

at least

an investigative hearing. Nev-

detainees continued to grow. Iraqi courts were

slow to open and Iraqi judges were reluctant to release prisoners once detained by

from US detention

coalition forces. Transporting prisoners

courthouses was a security,

logistics,

facilities to

Iraqi

resource and accountability nightmare. CJTF-7

began holding criminal detainee review and release boards and simply released

hundreds of prisoners, but most were bound over for disposition by the Iraqi criminal justice system.

In August 2003, CJTF-7 issued an order,

nicknamed "The Mother of

All

FRAGOs" because of its size and sophistication, which established a review and appeal board as required
cess

was

by Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 28 The pro-

initiated unilaterally,

above the

level

without orders or guidance from any headquarters

of CJTF-7 in Iraq. The

new

Article 78 review

could not keep pace with the volume of prisoners.

and soon expanded

in size, eventually to

It

and appeal board

began to meet more frequently

be composed of permanent members

whose full-time duty was board service.
The board struggled with commanders' opposition to release decisions, particularly

from 4th Infantry Division, and with

its

own uncertainty over the meaning of

the "imperative reasons of security" standard for internment under Article 78. 29

Over the year of OIF, the standard became more refined and the board required

more detailed information concerning the threat posed by the prisoner.
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imperative threat was presumed

if the

prisoner had been identified in post-capture

screening as possessing intelligence information of value to coalition forces, which

under the

CFLCC ROE was a basis for detention. The shortage of skilled interroga-

meant that the prisoner could remain under "intelligence hold" for weeks or
months awaiting meaningful interrogation. 30 Later, the "intelligence hold" was
prohibited as a means to establish the "imperative reasons of security" standard.
Nevertheless, pressure from commanders not to release prisoners continued, despite briefings to the contrary at commander's conferences. On the other hand, the
tors

CPA frequently demanded the release of prisoners for political or public relations
on anecdotal (and often inaccurate) humanitarian bases. The en78 review and appeal process was under constant tension.

reasons, or based
tire Article

Faced with the reality of continued detention of thousands of criminal detainees

CJTF-7 SJA established and chaired the Detention
Working Group in July 2003, which brought together legal, military police, military intelligence, medical, engineering and CPA assets in order to try to bring fu-

and

security internees, the

sion

and order

to the chaotic situation.

The

first

"Detainee Summit," held in

August 2003 and chaired by the CJTF-7 SJA, identified serious
tion operations expertise

experts

shortfalls in deten-

and recommended requesting additional subject matter

and the establishment of a Detention and Interrogations Task Force, com-

manded by

a brigadier general. These requests were transmitted to

CFLCC and

USCENTCOM in August 2003, but were not fully addressed until the creation of
Task Force 134 in the spring of 2004. 31 Recognizing that the
to be

command was

about

overwhelmed by detainee operations, CJTF-7 requested additional legal sup-

port for the detention and interrogation mission in the

summer of 2003, 32 as well as

changes to the headquarters structure to provide judge advocates to the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center at the

Abu Ghraib

Central Detention Facility. 33

These requirements were not met until the formation of Multinational ForcesIraq

May 2004. 34
support cell at Abu

(MNF-I) and Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)

In the interim, CJTF-7 created an additional legal

in

Ghraib,

using attorneys and paralegals cobbled together from various sources. This

cell

provided general legal support to the detention mission and specific support to the

internment process, including serving internment orders. Instead of sending the
experts requested

by CJTF-7,

USCENTCOM sent an assessment team headed by

the Provost Marshal General of the

Army to

study the situation. 35 The team

ulti-

mately produced a report in November 2003 that essentially corroborated and restated the issues

Also in the

fall

and

shortfalls previously identified

by CJTF-7 months

earlier. 36

of 2003, a team led by Major General Geoffrey Miller, former com-

mander of the Guantanamo detention facility, came to Iraq to assess interrogation
activities. The team recommended that military police soldiers take a more active
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role in setting conditions for interrogations

and

from Guantanamo

Abu

train the interrogators at

inexperienced reservists.

that experienced interrogators

Ghraib,

many

In September 2003, judge advocates in Iraq envisioned and
tion Wolverine,

of

whom

were

37

which proposed the

trial

championed Opera-

of captured Iraqi insurgents by military

commission. 38 In October 2003, the proposal was modified to recommend a twotiered approach, using the

forum

for

against

most

newly established Central Criminal Court of Iraq

and general courts-martial where the cases involved attacks
The proposal was not endorsed by USCENTCOM; the Secre-

cases

US victims.

39

tary of Defense nevertheless approved the concept, but directed that

be held in the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.
jurisdiction
tailed

as the

Department of Justice attorneys reviewed case

Many

ble to prosecution.

files

were

Judge advocates and de-

files

to identify cases

classified or incomplete.

difficulty in turning classified intelligence

would

A CPA order expanded the Court's

referral procedures. 40

and established case

all trials

amena-

There was

real

information into prosecutable evidence,

and there was often a paucity of significant information in the first place. However,
by November 2003 the process had begun and convictions were eventually obtained for the

murder of coalition

soldiers

and

Iraqi civilians. 41

This great demonstration of the law of armed conflict has been misrepresented

by some

"beyond the confines" of the Geneva Conventions, because,

as operating

they claim, CJTF-7 characterized those prosecuted as "unlawful combatants" in

manner of the Guantanamo prisoners. 42 Nothing could be more wrong. CJTF7 never classified anyone in the manner of the Guantanamo prisoners. It developed
and fielded a means to hold insurgents criminally accountable for their warlike acts

the

CPA

violating Iraqi law or

ordinances committed without benefit of combatant

immunity. Those insurgents prosecuted were

still

"protected persons" under the

Fourth Geneva Convention, but they could be prosecuted because they had committed criminal offenses and were not lawful or privileged combatants. They did

not meet the

of Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. 43 This result

criteria

not only clearly contemplated by the law of armed
only by

conflict,

is

but a result reached

adherence to the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and with

strict

the approval of the

Despite the

US Department of Defense and the CPA.

trials,

significant

problems with detention continued. Military police

support was limited and military police leadership in Iraq was junior and sporadic.
Until several

months

into the occupation, the senior military police officer

on the

V Corps and CJTF-7 staff was a major. Even when the position of provost marshal
was

filled

In the

by a reserve

colonel, his staff was inadequate.

summer and

fall

of 2003, troops dedicated to the detention and intern-

ment task were simply overwhelmed. The CJTF-7 SJA chaired a weekly meeting of
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military police, military intelligence, engineer, medical, legal
tives that

attempted to synchronize and improve detention

power

cates did everything in their

to ensure that

all

and CPA representa-

activities.

Judge advo-

prisoners were treated

humanely and in accordance with the law. In many cases, judge advocates personally

intervened to ensure that military authorities provided prisoners with ade-

quate food, water, hygiene and shelter. 44
Accountability of prisoners and transparency of the detention and internment

system were continuing
with the

issues,

even with assistance from the CPA. In cooperation

CPA senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, CJTF-7 provided lists in

Arabic of detainees and internees to civil-military operations centers and, in Baghdad, to courts

and

police stations. 45

Names of detainees and

internees were pro-

vided to the ICRC through capture cards. However, routine delivery of the cards, as
well as frequent interaction with the
its

ICRC moved
stemming from the bomb-

ICRC, was suspended

operations to Jordan in response to safety concerns

after the

ing of the United Nations headquarters building in Baghdad

Also in the
unit trained

on August

19, 2003.

summer of 2003, the 800th Military Police Brigade, an Army reserve

and validated

commanded by

to

perform the detention and internment mission, and

a brigadier general, deployed into Iraq

and slowly established

its

headquarters in Baghdad. The unit was placed under the tactical control of CJTF-7,

but remained under the

command of CFLCC. 46 Initially viewed as the salvation of

CJTF-7 in the areas of detention and internment,

it

quickly proved to be a disap-

pointment. With few exceptions, the unit seemed unable to actually perform

its

mission, and breaches in accountability, discipline and standards were frequent.

In part, this was due to the status and composition of the unit.

component

soldiers reached the

When its reserve

end of their two-year mobilization commitment,

Soon after arriving in
Baghdad, the experienced deputy commander of the brigade went home without a
successor. The brigade command sergeant major, responsible for setting and enforcing soldier standards, was relieved and never replaced. This left the brigade
they

left

the theater for deactivation and were not replaced.

without key senior leaders.
Assigned responsibility to run

all

larger detention facilities, including

Ghraib, and to provide support to the

CPA

in reestablishing prisons

and

Abu
jails

throughout the country, the brigade was also assigned the mission to guard and
administer
zation

Camp Ashraf, the cantonment area for the Mujahedin-e Khalq organi-

(MEK). The

MEK was

a military force of several thousand Iranians

had operated against Iran from bases

—and

in Iraq.

The

who

MEK was the only large-scale

members weren't even

They were, however, on the US list of designated foreign terrorist organizations 47 and CJTF-7 was
directed not to process them under the Article 78 review and appeal process. After
capitulation of the

war

its
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a year of interagency

wrangling and debate,

it

in

Operation Iraqi Freedom

was decided

that they

were simply

"protected persons" under the Fourth Convention. During this year, the

members were kept under

the control of the military police for screening,

and protection,

accountability

a task that

would have

tested the capability of the

800th Military Police Brigade (or any other brigade) had that been

The brigade struggled
ees, to

ally

its

only mission.

to maintain basic accountability of detainees

and

intern-

transport criminal detainees to court hearings and to guard prisoners gener-

without incident. Brigade soldiers shot several prisoners

them

MEK

crowded temporary detention

in

Ghraib was chosen as a detention

Saddam regime was

that

it

facilities.

In

fact,

who had

threatened

the major reason

Abu

awful history under the

facility despite its

offered the only location in the

Baghdad area

to safely

house prisoners. Judge advocates had been instrumental in locating and assessing
the

Abu Ghraib

prison,

and advocating

its

use for humanitarian reasons. 48

The impact of special operations and non-military
tions

was neither

largely

the record-keeping

on detention operaIn hindsight, some of

forces

known nor understood at the time.

and accountability problems experienced by the 800th Military

Police Brigade were probably caused

by special operations and non-military forces

requesting that their prisoners held in conventional forces detention

facilities

be

kept "off the books" and not reported to the ICRC. This problem was discovered

by CJTF-7 during preparations

for

an

ICRC visit to Abu Ghraib

in January 2004.

who were not recorded, the CTJF-7 SJA went to the
Brigade commander, who immediately directed that

After discovering prisoners

205th Military Intelligence
the prisoners be released
the ICRC. This was

deemed HVDs

from

his custody, or properly

recorded and reported to

done the next day. The prisoners remaining

custody were

through the lim-

in a critical phase of interrogation. Accordingly,

ited partial invocation

in

of that portion of Article 143 of the Fourth Geneva Conven-

tion pertaining to imperative military necessity, the

ICRC was

precluded from

conducting private interviews of the internees, but was given their names and

lowed to observe them and the conditions of their

ICRC was informed
the internees

that

its

would be

delegates

on any future

visit,

captivity.

free to

Additionally, the

visit.

50

Incredibly, even

right of coalition forces to temporarily limit

private interviews, this approach has been recklessly characterized

"new plan

Some
had

to restrict"

ICRC

access to

special operations forces not

their

own long-term

detention

Abu

Ghraib.

52

all

areas,

control of CJTF-7

USCENTCOM

remained respon-

of some special opera-

CJTF-7 personnel, including judge

advocates, were not even "read on" to their activities.
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as a

command and

under the

facilities.

by some

51

sible for technical supervision, including legal supervision,

tions activities in Iraq. In almost

al-

hold private meetings with

including a surprise

though the ICRC acknowledged the

49
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In at least

two meetings with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representatives,

including visiting
ity

CIA

CJTF-7 SJA informed them of the

attorneys, the

of the Geneva Conventions in Iraq ("this

is

applicabil-

not Afghanistan") and of the CJTF-7

order establishing the detention and internment process. 53 The representatives
agreed to abide by the rules. The CJTF-7 legal staff strove to meet with
special operations legal advisors
in order to brief them

on the

who

rotated frequently in

all

of the

and out of the country,

Geneva Conventions and CJTF-7

applicability of the

orders in Iraq.

Removal of prisoners from Iraq to other countries was an occasional, but significant, point

of friction with the CIA. CJTF-7's insistence that Article 49 of the

Fourth Geneva Convention generally prohibited removing prisoners from Iraq

On at least two occasions, USCENTCOM
issued orders directing CJTF-7 to turn over non-Iraqi HVDs for transport to loca-

was met with derision and skepticism. 54

tions outside Iraq; the written orders were insisted

judge advocates identified the

issue.

Despite

its

the

command

after

inapplicability in a belligerent oc-

cupation regulated by the Geneva Conventions,

voke the

upon by

USCENTCOM

continued to in-

GWOT "global screening criteria" as authority to classify prisoners and to

remove them from

Iraq. 55 Direct requests

from CIA representatives

in Iraq

were

CPA. On May 2, 2004,
CJTF-7 SJA was summoned to the CIA station in Baghdad and shown a cable
recounting standing interagency concurrence with transfers from Iraq as derogations under Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 56 CJTF-7 nevertheless refused to alter its position that it would have to be ordered by USCENTCOM to turn
over any prisoner for removal from Iraq.
When Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, 2003, CJTF-7 took the
position that he was a prisoner of war, which meant, among other things, that the
repeatedly declined by CJTF-7, but then renewed with the

the

command was
visit

obligated to report his capture to the

ICRC and allow the ICRC to

him. This characterization was met with reluctance,

levels, at least in

if not resistance, at

higher

part because of the mistaken notion that his status as a prisoner of

war might accord him immunity from prosecution for his pre- capture criminal offenses. Ultimately,

CJTF-7 prevailed

in

its

position.

of war was publicly acknowledged and the
elaborate security precautions

Judge advocates helped the

ICRC

on numerous

command

Saddam's

status as a prisoner

him

in accordance with

visited

occasions, as did judge advocates.

reconcile the juxtaposition of Saddam's

status as a prisoner of war with his status as the war's

most high-profile captive. He
was segregated for his own safety and security (as were other HVDs), but information about his capture, physical condition and demeanor was released to the public. As had been done with the bodies of his sons Uday and Qusay on July 24, 2003,
a small

number of Iraqi

political leaders

were allowed to observe Saddam under
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controlled circumstances in order to corroborate his identity.

The public and mili-

from the observation was weighed against the general

tary advantage to be gained

admonition of Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention not to expose prisoners
of war to public curiosity. 57 The balance tipped in favor of the observation;

if

Saddam's identity had not been confirmed to the satisfaction of the Iraqi people, he

would have continued to be a shadow rallying point for the insurgency and his capture would have been dismissed as a hoax. Conversely, the CPA's insistence that
"foreign fighters" should be placed on public display was rebuffed as a violation of
the principles of Article 13. 58

Not all significant prisoner issues were satisfactorily resolved. For example, a prisoner code-named "XXX" was held incommunicado on orders from USCENTCOM
and he was neither reported to the ICRC nor subject to its observation. Judge advocates raised the issue of "XXX" early on and CJTF-7 demanded written orders from
USCENTCOM to hold him in the specified manner. Periodically, CJTF-7 would
request reissuance of the USCENTCOM order. The CJTF-7 SJA requested and
received

from the

Joint Staff and the

the authority and rationale for the

Department of Defense General Counsel's Office

USCENTCOM order: invocation of the deroga-

tion clause in Article 5 of the Fourth Convention concerning forfeiture of the rights

of communication. 59 Although attorneys could disagree on the propriety of applying the derogation clause in this case, CJTF-7 had raised the issue and

determined

it

had been

at the highest level.

Interrogation Policies

A great deal of criticism
tional forces in Iraq. 60

sertions

that

is

has been leveled at the interrogation policies of conven-

Some

interrogation policies.

is

most

justified;

promulgated

CJTF-7
61

of it

Here are the

many

facts: in

developed in September 2003 in response to
eral Miller's

is

not.

One

confusing

of the persistent as-

and

inconsistent

62

The first was
recommendations from Major Gen2003 there were two.

assessment team, as well as to regulate the interrogation approaches

and techniques flowing

in

from Afghanistan and Guantanamo, and from non-

Many of these techniques appeared to be of the type used to teach

military forces.

63

interrogation

resistance

in

survival,

evasion,

resistance

and escape (SERE)

programs.

The

policy was transmitted to the

USCENTCOM commander by memorandum

stating that, unless otherwise directed, the

CJTF-7 commander's intent was to imple-

USCENTCOM did not direct
otherwise. Rather, the judge advocates at USCENTCOM and CJTF-7 engaged in
a legal technical channel discourse, during which USCENTCOM (and CJTF-7)
ment it immediately.

64

Contrary to published reports,

65
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judge advocates raised concerns about the policy. This resulted in CJTF-7's rescission of the policy less than a
great

month

after

it

was

issued. 66 This coordination

was a

example of legal technical channel coordination concerning an extraordi-

amid the stress of combat by judge advocates
working with inadequate rest under enormous pressure. In less than a month,
judge advocates at USCENTCOM and CJTF-7 had worked through and resolved
and the US government for several
issues that continued to plague the military
more years, at least until the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act 67 and publication of the new Army field manual on intelligence interrogations. 68
On October 12, 2003, CJTF-7 implemented a second interrogation policy, 69
which essentially mirrored the interrogation approaches in Army Field Manual 3452 70 and added additional safeguards, approvals and oversight mechanisms. The
narily difficult issue, accomplished

—

—

made the CJTF-7 interrogation policy more restrictive than that set forth
the Field Manual, which left much more to the judgment and discretion of the

additions
in

The October 12 policy actually authorized two fewer techniques than
did the Field Manual, although it did allow segregation in some instances. 71
The facts have not prevented the media from exaggerated reporting and essentially blurring Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo, and merging the actions of military and non-military forces. Conventional forces in general, and CJTF-7 in
particular, have become, in the words of the old Iraqi saying, "the coat-hanger on
which all the dirty laundry is hung." For example, a Washington Post editorial
interrogator.

claimed that General Sanchez issued policies authorizing interrogation techniques
"violating the

Geneva Conventions, including painful shackling, sleep deprivation,

72

The CJTF-7 policies authorized none of those techniques and did not violate the Geneva Conventions when used with the safeguards
and oversight required by the policies. 73
That said, the September policy, in effect for less than a month, was overbroad
and made naive assumptions about some techniques based on assurances from the
intelligence community. 74 These deficiencies were corrected in the October policy.
Regardless, none of the CJTF-7 interrogation policies ever authorized, and would
and nudity."

This

is false.

not allow, the use of shackling, sleep deprivation or nudity (or water boarding or
the use of dogs 75 for that matter) as interrogation techniques. In fact, as

was con-

cluded by the Army's Chief Trial Judge in her exhaustive analysis of legal support to

CJTF-7, had the CJTF-7 interrogation policies been followed, there would have

been no abuses

As an

at

Abu

Ghraib. 76

aside, while the entire

Abu Ghraib

incident

is

shameful and reprehensi-

commonly appreciated is that the individuals depicted being
abused in the Abu Ghraib photographs were not security internees; they were
criminal detainees
common criminals who were not being (and would not be)

ble, a

point not

—

—
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interrogated in any event. Nevertheless, the
in the late spring of 2004, diluting the

Abu Ghraib

scandal engulfed CJTF-7

command's focus and sapping

its

strength.

This happened at the same time that al-Sadr's Shia militia attacked coalition
forces; the

Sunni insurgency exploded; Al Qaeda in Iraq emerged; Iranian adven-

turism increased; and key actions had to be taken to end the occupation, disestablish the

CPA and enable the interim Iraqi government.

The scandal was

a catastrophe. 77

fueled propaganda for the

It

enemy and was

used to give credence to the myth of ambiguity about the applicability of the

Geneva Conventions

in Iraq.

The myth was advanced by

soldiers

who, facing

courts- martial for detainee abuse, asserted that they were confused over the rules
(or, for that matter,

who tried to

policy to justify their actions).

78

of superior orders or

raise the defense

command

Their assertions have been extensively covered and

amplified in the media; they are the stuff of books and movies. 79 That the assertions

have been spectacularly unsuccessful, despite the opportunity of extensive
discovery to uncover any supporting evidence, has been

But in fairness there

is

sion at the soldiers' level.
rules

and

much less widely reported.

made concerning the possibility of confuThere were soldiers who served in Afghanistan, where

a point to be

principles were relaxed,

Conventions

pretrial

fully applied.

80

and then redeployed to

There were also soldiers

Iraq,

who

where the Geneva

interacted with special

operations and non-military forces which operated under relaxed rules and principles,

even in

Iraq. So,

it is

possible that

some soldiers at the junior level might have

been confused about the applicability of the Geneva Conventions,

at least until

they received the refresher training on the law of armed conflict that was mandated

by CJTF-7. But none of those soldiers should have reasonably believed that detainee abuse was ever authorized, and any who had questions should have sought
clarification

from

a responsible leader.

Unfortunately, incidents of detainee abuse fueled inaccurate perceptions that

US forces were ill disciplined and that the abuse of detainees was systematic or the
norm. 81 The truth is that US forces were disciplined and detainee abuse cases were
few. 82 Abu Ghraib was an awful and aberrant exception. It demonstrated the power
of pictures 83 and the negative impact of the "strategic corporal." 84 Most detainee

abuse cases occurred

at

an IED detonation or a

point of capture, where tempers run high, frequently after

The thresholds for classifying, reporting and documenting cases as detainee abuse were for a significant time very low in Iraq. 85 This
firefight.

led to an exaggeration of numbers.

Detainee abuse in Iraq, including the abuse at

and

certainly not because of, military

command

Abu

Ghraib, occurred despite,

policies

and

orders. There

were

huge problems caused by the sheer numbers of detainees and the unexpected crush
of common law criminals. But the

real root causes
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relevant doctrine

and training afforded to military

intelligence interrogators; the

absence of sufficient capable military police corps detention and correction exper-

during the

tise

first

year in Iraq; the failure of

USCENTCOM to plan for, resource,

and execute detention and interrogation operations in Iraq, even after previous experience in Afghanistan portended many of the same problems that were later repeated in Iraq; 86 and the broad interrogation authorities granted to non-military

some special operations forces not under the command and control
of CJTF-7, some of which were adopted by conventional forces in spite of orders
and

forces

and

to

policies to the contrary.

Occupation

Worse than the inadequate planning and mixed messages on detention and interrogation was the utter confusion caused by the "fog of law" in the occupation of
Iraq. The occupation was anticipated at the level of the operating forces. However,
higher-level planning

was inadequate or did not occur,

strategic policy decisions

were not made in a timely fashion and the requirements for occupation were not
adequately resourced. The problem was not in failing to forecast the occupation as

governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention;
for

its

it

was

in failing to set the conditions

meaningful execution. The situation was analogous to the dog chasing the

—the

comes when he catches it.
In January 2003, US Army, Europe hosted a legal conference in Heidelberg, at
which an Israeli judge advocate who had experience in the administration of occupied territory talked about problems likely to face occupation forces. The confercar

real difficulty

ence augmented research on occupation law, including the study of materials from

US Army War College and the Center for Military History on US experiences
after World War II. Also in early 2003, V Corps conducted an exercise named Vic-

the

tory

Scrimmage

in Grafenwohr,

Germany. In the

exercise

and

Corps war gamed what were termed "transitional occupation"

follow-on,

issues,

V

problems

criminal misconduct, looting, humanitarian relief requirements and

such as

riots,

civilian

population

forces

its

movement that would impede offensive operations as coalition

moved through Iraqi territory. These issues so concerned the V Corps com-

mander, General Scott Wallace, that he directed an immediate follow-on exercise
in

Grafenwohr to

The

result

try to develop responses to the problems.

was stunning

in several respects. First,

it

was

clear that transitional

occupation issues could appreciably slow offensive forces and potentially require
substantial additional forces to deal with them. Unfortunately,

these additional forces did not exist.

it

was also clear that

V Corps had developed a time-phased force

deployment list (TPFDL) over the past year of exercises and mission
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TPFDL identified the amount and flow of forces necessary to accomplish the mission. In Grafenwohr, V Corps learned that the corps TPFDL had been scrapped
and replaced by a much smaller force. The V Corps commander was deeply concerned

V Corps com-

about the reduction in combat power. The reduction meant that the

mander had to do a "rolling start" of the ground offensive with forces available and
with the expectation that additional divisions would arrive over time, instead of
being able to mass all of his forces at once. The V Corps commander was also concerned about the cuts in combat support and combat service support forces, particularly military police units.

Second, Victory Scrimmage and

planning and capability

its

follow-on demonstrated a potentially huge

deficit if the

assumptions concerning what was called

Phase IV, the phase of the operation
invalid.

forces

after decisive

combat operations, proved to be

These assumptions were premised on the belief that

would

capitulate

—

that

is,

would remain

intact;

and

encountered problems

like

—and would

force; that Iraqi physical

that a capable interim Iraqi

probably under Ahmed Chalabi, would quickly emerge.
invalid (and, of course, every

Iraqi military

surrender en masse without a fight

be available to serve as a constabulary or security
infrastructure

many

one of them proved to be

If these

and social

government,

assumptions were

invalid),

and

if

US

forces

those identified in Victory Scrimmage (as they did),

it

was clear that there had to be a plan and resources for a sustained occupation. With
regard to assumptions,
ties

and intentions

as to

it

seems that the worst was assumed about

in deciding

Iraq's capabili-

whether to go to war, and the best case was assumed

what would happen once

coalition forces crossed the Iraqi border.

V

numerous

Accordingly,

Corps

dutifully identified

issues

and requirements

them up to higher headquarters. Some of V Corps'
particularly 3d Infantry Division, did the same. In the legal

pertaining to occupation, and sent

subordinate divisions,

on the content of the occupation proclamation
and ordinances, whether some Iraqi judges should be removed from the bench, 87
whether occupation courts with military judges could be convened by commandarena, these included questions

ers

and whether

level,

parts of the Iraqi Penal

Code were

to be suspended. 88

On

a basic

V Corps asked for an Iraq country law study and a translated copy of the Iraqi

Penal Code. These questions and requests were received sympathetically by
in Kuwait,

and the

CFLCC

CFLCC SJA vigorously raised similar issues and questions, and

joined in the requests until the war began. Unfortunately, the answer was that there

were dedicated Phase IV planning
Washington, D.C., and that

all

cells at

CFLCC and USCENTCOM, and

in

of these matters were being addressed at "the na-

and coalition level."
The V Corps commander became so concerned about what was or wasn't
being done at the Washington level that he sent the V Corps civilian political
tional

—
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Her report was that interagency
planning for Phase IV was under way, but that it would not be called an "occupation." We would not be occupiers but "liberators," and "the 'O' word" was not to
be used at all. Of course, this was ludicrous, as occupation is a fact, and the Fourth
Geneva Convention and the older Hague Regulations establish the rights and obligations of an occupier as a matter of law. 89 This fact cannot be wished away or
dismissed by using the euphemism of "liberator."
To make matters worse, the Corps' G-5, the civil affairs officer, had a heart
advisor to Washington to

attack in

sit

in

on

the meetings.

Grafenwohr and could neither continue in the exercise nor deploy to Kuwait

He was not replaced by a civil affairs officer. The position of G-5 was
instead filled by the G-l, the personnel officer, who was a very competent officer,
or on to Iraq.

but a personnel

As

specialist

unschooled and inexperienced in

civil affairs.

coalition forces staged in Kuwait, planning for the occupation continued, albeit

in a vacuum. In February 2003, the

a lengthy briefing

on the

rights

V Corps SJA section gave the corps commander

and

responsibilities

of an occupier. The briefing

concluded with the identification of numerous issues about which the operating

The V Corps commander directed the
staff to coordinate with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA), which had recently established an element in Kuwait city. ORHA was the
predecessor to the CPA.
The coordination revealed that ORHA had done little analysis and had devoted
few resources to the effort. Not only did the organization not have any answers for
V Corps, its staff had little awareness of many of the questions. In fairness, ORHA
was designed for consequence management, not for the administration of occupied territory. ORHA assumed that the policy decisions so desperately needed
would be issued from Washington.
At the start of combat operations and in the absence of guidance, but based on
war-gaming and exercise experience, V Corps issued orders during the march to
Baghdad regarding procedures and warnings at checkpoints (after a tragic incident
early on in which an entire family had been killed as their van approached a checkpoint without slowing down, despite warning shots); 90 cordon and search operations; curfews; weapons, explosives and fuel possession controls; and the use of
force against looters. The problem was that these were all issued as necessary at the
tactical level and not as part of any cohesive plan. Efforts to try to address the problem in a comprehensive way were thwarted by a lack of fundamental policy decisions at a higher level. For example, an occupation proclamation and orders to
civilians had been staffed, drafted, printed and prepositioned, but no order was
forces required information

and

decisions.

ever given to release them. 91
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In Baghdad, there was inadequate troop strength to effectively control the

city.

The 3d Infantry Division had reached its culminating point. It had fought all the
way to Baghdad and was exhausted; it just had little energy left to detain looters or
guard key infrastructure. Orders were issued to protect museums, courthouses,
police stations, power and water plants, and public records holding areas, but there
were simply not enough troops to go around. 92 Even when troops were available,
they frankly did not always follow through with their assigned tasks. 93

For the

first

few weeks in Baghdad,

thority, although

it

was

clear that only the military

fective control. Despite its lack

had two

attributes:

it

ORHA was looked to as the occupation auhad the potential to

exercise ef-

of a clear charter and sufficient resources,

did not interfere with the military and

it

ORHA

trusted the judg-

ment of military commanders. During the few weeks of ORHA's existence, the
corps and division commanders were afforded freedom of action to engage the
civilian population and restore security. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault),

commanded by then-major general David Petraeus, was among the most successful
in

its initiatives

to reestablish order

and

a semblance of

normalcy

in

its

assigned

area of operations. Significant challenges continued in Baghdad, however.

The military recognized the importance of quickly addressing the issue of Ba'ath
Party membership, which included most government workers, as well as teachers.
V Corps suggested to ORHA that adopting a status-based policy that would disqualify Ba'ath Party members from government (and coalition forces) employment would cause massive practical problems and be counterproductive to efforts
to quickly get the policeman back on the beat, the teacher back in the classroom and
the municipal worker back on the street. Instead, V Corps advocated a conductbased policy that would not prohibit employment of persons solely based on their
membership in the Ba'ath Party, but would bar those persons who were suspected
of crimes or other misconduct.

The policy required Iraqi government workers to sign an agreement renouncing
and denouncing the Ba'ath Party, Saddam Hussein and his regime; promise to
obey Iraqi law and military and CPA orders; and get back to work. Vetting of emwould take place over time. Judge advocates authored the conduct-based
policy, implemented through an "Agreement to Disavow Party Affiliation." 94 General Wallace discussed it with retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner at ORHA, and
the conduct-based approach with implementing renunciation agreement was approved. Thousands of agreements were printed and distributed, and the policy was
ployees

implemented.

CPA announced its de-Ba'athification policy, which
took exactly the opposite tack. The CPA policy was purely status-based and took
Less than ten days later, the

95

thousands of people out of the work force, leaving them essentially unemployable
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and

disaffected. Like the

CPA

order dissolving the Iraqi military,

it

was imple-

mented with absolutely no coordination with the commanders on the ground and
no consideration of what was already being done by the military, despite the fact
that this decision would have a huge impact on law and order, security and stability,

and

reconciliation. 96

The obligations of an occupier exist as a matter of law regardless of what the situation is called or what instrument is used to administer the territory. In this regard, the utility of the CPA is questionable as a matter of fact and suspect as a
matter of law (at least until its authority was ratified by the UN Security Council). 97
Occupation is a military duty and the military has historical competence in occupation. The law of occupation is focused on the activities of the military and military government, and on the responsibilities of commanders. This law has
developed for good reason.
When the CPA was established as a civilian entity, military commanders suffered a diminution of their authority to administer and exercise the rights of occupation, with no reduction in their legal responsibilities. As a practical matter,
placing CJTF-7 in direct support of the CPA violated the military maxims of unity
of command and unity of effort. 98 It was not clear who was in charge in Iraq, nor
were the relative roles and responsibilities of the CPA and CJTF-7 clear. 99 What was
obvious was that there was a diffusion of effort and the squandering of several
golden months after a decisive military victory within which time most of the Iraqi
population craved firm direction and before any insurgency could meaningfully
develop.

The

CPA concentrated on transformation outside the historical bounds of oc-

cupation: economic reform, developing the Iraqi stock market, reestablishing sym-

phony orchestras and arts programs, judicial reform, building a criminal defense
bar and promoting women's rights. 100 Many of these were nice things to do, but
most did not contribute to stability and security. At best, many of the CPA's activities, even if successful, were irrelevant; many were setbacks. The CPA's effort to rebuild the Iraqi police force and army was haphazard and handicapped by its earlier
dissolution of the Iraqi military. CJTF-7 had to bolster the CPA effort and establish
parallel training programs and organizations, such as the Iraqi Civil Defense
Corps, in order to field Iraqi security forces. 101

Worse, some of the CPA's directives were a blatant interference with the military's warfighting mission.

These included orders to release dangerous internees

because of political considerations and extensive involvement in events in Fallujah
in April 2004, including

mandating peace talks, which culminated

in

CPA Admin-

Bremer directing the CJTF-7 commander and the USCENTCOM commander, who was then present in Baghdad, to call off the attack on the city. 102 From
istrator
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the beginning, the

CPA took an active role in military matters. On the day Admin-

Bremer arrived in Iraq, he announced that US forces would shoot to kill all
looters. This announcement was made without any coordination with the military
istrator

and no consideration of the ROE. Of course, the ROE rightly would not
allow this and considerable time and effort had to be expended to issue clarifying
orders and guidance to put this genie back in the bottle. 103
The end of the CPA was as confused as its beginning. Its "transfer of sovereignty" to the interim Iraqi government was a complete mischaracterization of the
in Iraq

CPA held during the occupation.

authority the

and there was no sovereignty, only possession,

eignty

government.

it

Iraq. In

to transfer back to the Iraqi

(its legal staff

was brilliant). In general, how-

was a policy- and politics-laden bureaucracy that was

tion to the

affect sover-

104

There were bright spots in the CPA
ever,

Occupation does not

war effort.

sum, the

It

a drain

and

distrac-

contributed to both the "fog of law" and the "fog of war" in

CPA was more hurtful than helpful.
Rule of Law

Although these were not termed rule of law activities at first, judge advocates began
almost as soon as coalition forces entered

efforts to restore Iraqi judicial capability

the country. Judge advocates assigned to

civil affairs

units assessed courthouses in

Basra and southern Iraq and assessments continued as the war progressed north-

ward.

Many court buildings had been

other court personnel had

literally

looted. In

some

cases,

however, judges and

(and physically) protected their courthouses by

remaining in the structures continuously.
In Baghdad, judge advocates unilaterally "deputized" court personnel as

court police to guard

many buildings and

records.

Not

all

armed

buildings could be pro-

main public records repository building in Baghdad where property
and other records were stored, fires had been set in the document storage stacks.
Courthouses, public records repositories and police stations were prime targets for
tected. In the

arsonists.

Prior to the arrival of the
there

was no cohesive plan

establishment of the

first

CPA

senior advisor to the Ministry of Justice,

for interaction with the Iraqi judicial system. Until the

CPA, no questions about

had been answered. One of the CPA's

first

Iraqi

decisions

application of the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code, with

law or the Iraqi

on the

legal

system

topic was to direct the

some suspended

provisions. 105

The

CPA also set priorities by directing that US forces were not to convene occupation
courts, but would instead concentrate on revitalizing the Iraqi judicial system. On
the topic of the Iraqi Penal Code,

V Corps did not obtain an official version until it
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was in

Iraq,

and

that thanks to the Center for

Law and Military Operations at The

Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School in Charlottesville, Virginia. In
the interim, one of

V

who happened

Corps' judge advocates,

to have

been an

Arabic linguist, had checked out a copy from the Kuwait city public library and be-

gan the tedious task of translating the code into English.

Without guidance, immediate actions were taken

in accordance with the

com-

mander's intent using the Fourth Geneva Convention as a guide. The V Corps SJA

went on the radio

Baghdad

in

to order judges

work. Maneuver unit judge advocates and

and court personnel to return

civil affairs soldiers

went

all

to

over the

country to meet with judges, coax them to the bench and reestablish regular court
sessions. This effort, a

rudimentary rule of law program, was enthusiastically sup-

ported by commanders

who saw the reopening of the

courts as an essential aspect

of restoring security, stability and public confidence.

Judge advocates and civilian attorneys working for the
Iraqi courts,

and even arranged

for

and executed

payroll

CPA routinely went to

payments for judges and

on a number of occasions
as they did so. Later, judge advocates at the corps, division and brigade levels created and staffed Judicial Reconstruction Assistance Teams (called JRATs) and
Ministry of Justice Offices (called MOJOs), and for almost a year managed the
Baghdad and Mosul court dockets.
other Ministry of Justice personnel; they were under

Despite these

initiatives, rule

of law

with responsibility shared by the CPA,

fire

activities in general
civil affairs

units

remained disjointed,

and judge advocates

signed to maneuver units. Locally, rule of law efforts focused

on opening

as-

Iraqi

courthouses and increasing the pace of cases moving through them. Higher-level
efforts

concentrated on combating judicial corruption and improving the criminal

justice system. 106

made

The

CPA and military attorneys expended Herculean efforts and

progress, but synchronization of their efforts

was uneven and

law performance measures and objectives were not defined.
for overall rule of law activities

107

clear rule

of

Directive authority

was not fixed, and SJAs and CPA attorneys engaged

commanded no assets. In the first year in Iraq, there were four CPA
senior advisors to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, not counting acting advisors who
filled the gaps. This meant new philosophies, new approaches and redevelopment
of personal bonds among all involved parties, including Iraqi ministers and
in the activities

judges. 108

The

lack of a coherent plan for rule of law activities

rival in the

summer of 2003 of a

is

demonstrated by the

ar-

distinguished team of judicial mentors from the

United States. The team traveled around Iraq at great personal risk and presented a
security and logistical

judges

who were

burden

to the military. Frequently unable to

meet with Iraqi

in hiding, or to travel to locations because of security concerns,
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the team returned to the United States having been frustrated in
sion.

its

mentoring mis-

Fundamentally, the team should not have been in Iraq while security condi-

tions were unstable

and when Iraqi judges needed to hear one clear message from a

single firm voice: return to the

nuanced

activities

bench and move

cases.

Mentoring and other

caused a confusion of message, complicated relationships and

did not contribute to the most important task at hand, restoring security.

Conclusion

The "fog of law" is a needless and largely avoidable phenomenon. Soldiers deserve
a clear and unambiguous legal framework. While their training and values will in
most cases lead to soldiers doing the right thing at the tactical level of combat, they
can be negatively impacted by the "fog of law" created at the operational and strategic levels. Its effects can undermine public support, provide propaganda to the enemy, create distractions, and contribute to false assumptions and bad decisions.
The "fog of law" can be lifted by applying these principles:
1.

Follow the law. The law of armed

conflict,

including the Geneva

Conventions, has developed over time for reasons of humanity and
necessity

and

is

grounded

Geneva Conventions

in

pragmatism. Old law

are neither quaint nor obsolete.

they can serve as guiding principles even

of law.

When

is still

109

good

law; the

At a minimum,

when not applicable as a matter

they do apply as a matter of law, as in Iraq, they have

demonstrated their utility and ability to be meaningfully implemented in
the

2.

new millennium.

The

viability

of the law of armed conflict must be demonstrated and

explained to the media and to the civilian population generally. This
necessitates public education programs, as well as timely

public briefings and reports

when

and informed

incidents occur. In this regard, the

military has a practice of thorough investigation while striving to

safeguard classified information, with the result being that the
well as the military's perspective, are not

made

available to the public

until long after the incident's notoriety has disappeared

attention. In the interim, the

facts, as

from public

enemy and special interest groups have had

unimpeded freedom to manipulate the incident and control the public
debate. The military simply must respond more quickly, definitively and
publicly to suspected violations of the law of armed conflict or ROE, and
to alleged breaches of discipline. There

190

is

a stable of pseudo- experts

who

Marc Warren
are immediately available to provide

commentary

—often wrong—on

such matters. Distinguished outside experts should also be available to
explain the law and principles at issue, and the military's perspective, to

the media

and

public. 110 In appropriate cases, those experts should

participate in investigations of high-profile incidents.

3.

Disregard history at your

peril.

Decision makers would have benefited

from a thorough study of occupation history, particularly the history of
occupation in Germany and the Far East after World War II. It would
have informed them greatly and potentially led them to avoid missteps

about de-Ba'athification, restoration of law and order, and the resources

and decisions necessary to implement an effective occupation. They
would have also benefited from an analysis of past counterinsurgency
and "nation-building" operations, such
Philippines after the Spanish-American

operations in Malaya,

America in the

US

as the

War,

US

occupation of the

British counterinsurgency

military operations generally in Central

century and British operations in Northern Ireland.

last

Study of Israeli warfighting and occupation experience would have been
particularly helpful.

Among the things they would have discovered is that

patience and adaptability are essential, and that missteps and mistakes
are inevitable but recoverable.

4.

Attempts to conflate the law of armed
belligerent occupation, with
dilute

both and erode the

human

clarity

conflict, particularly the

rights

law of

law are misguided, as they

of the well-developed law of armed

on which commanders and soldiers are trained. The interjection
of human rights law into the wartime legal mix as a separate body of law
conflict

causes confusion. However,

it is

equally misguided to completely dismiss

the existence of overlaps between
conflict, especially

when

human rights law and the law of armed

including the aspects of Additional Protocol

I

that are customary international law. 111

The overlaps include those nonderogable human rights that are germane to wartime. 112 In those unusual
cases where there are conflicts between overlapping human rights law
and the law of armed conflict, the latter must prevail under the lex
specialis rule. 113 In even rarer and more sophisticated cases, there may be
gaps between human rights law and the law of armed conflict to which

human rights law might apply. However, the application of human rights
law in wartime should be a clear exception and occur only where justice
necessitates that

it

address a gap such as when, for example, "the
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governing belligerent occupation are
applying

human

rights

silent

or incomplete." 114 Otherwise,

law in wartime creates friction and confusion,

while adding little except affording a means to obtain pecuniary damages

and

publicity. Nations

well to concentrate

on

—and

legal theorists

efforts to

and

among non-State actors,
applicability of human rights law in wartime.
The

principles of

—would do

advance adherence to the law of armed

conflict, particularly

5.

politicians

before advocating the co-

war and command, military doctrine, force

ratios,

troop-to-task ratios, and the military decision-making and orders
processes

all exist

for a reason. Put another way, ignoring these things,

whether done by senior military or civilian

officials, is

asking for trouble.

In the legal arena, the long-developed concept of legal technical channels
is

important. Every SJA needs an SJA, and no attorney involved in

military operations should be a solo practitioner.

6.

The

must be responsible

military

for occupation and, if necessary,

administer occupied territory through a military government. The three

most important
security, security

legal,

moral and military objectives

and security.

there should have been
year. This

is

wrong; in

115

in occupation are

Conventional wisdom

more interagency involvement
fact,

presence in Iraq in the

now accepts that

in Iraq in the first

there should have been less non-military

first

year.

There should have been more

interagency planning before the war and a

more responsive and cohesive

interagency decision-making process before and during the war. But in

would have been drastically better had the military
simply established a military government in order to stabilize the
Iraq the situation

country, restore security, and reestablish infrastructure and institutions,

and allow for the infusion of civilian experts and the re-emergence of an
Iraqi

government

as conditions permitted. If

it

existed at

all,

the

CPA

should have been in support of the military, not vice versa, and the
overall coalition occupation authority in Iraq should have

been a

commander, perhaps with a civilian deputy or civilian senior
advisor. Coalition forces would have had to endure the propaganda that
they were occupiers, but how was this avoided by virtue of the CPA?
military

7.

Modest

rule of law activities are

an

essential

and immediate instrument

for the military to use to help reestablish security, order

confidence.

116

Rule of law

is

a vague

192

and

relative

and public

term that requires

clear

Marc Warren
definition,

assignment of responsibility and resources, and estab-

no simple
template for rule of law activities; the objectives and performance measures must be relative to the history, culture and reality on the ground. 117
The focus must be on the "Three Ps": police, prisons and prosecutors
(courts). In an occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention properly
limits the scope of rule of law activities. More transformative and
lishment of objectives and performance measures. There

is

sophisticated rule of law activities, such as judicial mentoring, building
a public defender system or helping to

improve substantive law and

procedure, should be delayed until security, legal and practical conditions permit. 118

8.

You play as you practice. For the military, this means that exercises must
not end with the defeat of the enemy's military forces and intelligence
preparation of the battlefield must include an analysis of the capability of
the systems of government and public administration, as well as the

enemy's order of
planning for

planning for
doctrine

As much

battle.

intellectual effort

There

is

combat operations as is put into
and maneuver. This would include updating military

fires

and expanding the resources and

a

into

activities after decisive

administration, military government and

9.

must go

random

misjudgments

of war" in battle

is

real,

for

civil

civil affairs in general.

of accountability for mistakes and

spotlight

—whether

capabilities

exaggerated or even fabricated. The "fog

nothing compared to the fog of politics on Capitol

and

Hill.

This

who

are political agnostics. In the legal arena, there has developed an

is

unfair

capricious, particularly to professional soldiers

unforeseen dark underbelly to operational law, and that
that the

SJA in the

field is the

is

the notion

"Guarantor General," the one person in the

command who is somehow expected to have total awareness and perfect
knowledge, to be read in to
resolve

and report

all

all activities,

problems.

119

and to have the duty to

identify,

In general, conventional forces will

continue to be held to account for the misconduct of special operations

and non-military forces.
10.

There cannot be different
forces,

legal standards for soldiers

and non-military

or even for soldiers operating in different operations or

campaigns.

It is

too easy for the standards to be blurred and, as was the
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case with interrogation policies between Afghanistan

migrate (perhaps a better term

11.

Some

unified

command

is

and

to metastasize).

SJAs should be general or flag

selected judge advocate general

Iraq, to

and

officers,

and

flag officers assigned to posts in

the United States should be reassigned as legal advisors to

commands in

and Afghanistan. Most unified command SJA offices should be
substantially larger and more capable. Despite some simply wrong
Iraq

assertions to the contrary, 120 judge advocates are a respected

source for legal and policy advice at

all levels,

and proper

and their presence and role

with the operating forces sends a powerful message about a nation's

commitment
12.

to the law of armed conflict. 121

National leaders
field.

Whether

set a

tone that can reach the individual soldier in the

in the executive or legislative branch, leaders should

consider the impact of their words.

It is

as reckless for a politician to

armed conflict is no longer relevant as it is to
and detainee abuse were pervasive in Iraq. Those

suggest that the law of
suggest that torture

responsible for setting national legal policies and tone

hold themselves to the standard

would do

well to

set for all coalition forces

personnel in

humane treatment of

persons not

Iraq in 2003: "Respect for others,

taking part in hostilities, and adherence to the law of war and rules of

engagement

is

a matter of discipline

from our enemies.

I

expect

all

and

values.

It is

what separates us

leaders to reinforce this message." 122

Notes
"The great uncertainty of all data in war is a particular difficulty, because all action must, to
mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently like the effect
of a fog or moonshine gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance."
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON War (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., Princeton Uni1

—

a certain extent, be planned in a

—

versity Press 1989) (1832).

The "fog of law" has been identified in other contexts, but application of the term to Iraq,
by Professor Yoram Dinstein at the US Naval
War College's 2009 International Law Conference, from which this "Blue Book" derives.
3. In November 2003, 154 officers (mostly judge advocates) and 180 paralegal noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers of the US Army's Judge Advocate General's Corps
alone served in Iraq. Forty-one of the judge advocates and fifteen of the paralegal NCOs and
soldiers were reservists. Briefing to The Judge Advocate General, US Army, CJTF-7 Legal Opera2.

and

its

corrosive effect in combat, was also noted

tions (Nov. 5, 2003).
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4. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003), reprinted in 42 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1016; see also YORAM DlNSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT

OCCUPATION 12 (2009).
5. The law of armed

conflict, including the Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations,
was cited in the legal annexes or appendices to the base operations plans and orders (Cobra II,
most prominently), as well as in fragmentary orders that instructed soldiers to comply with the
law of armed conflict. Representative of the orders were
(1) Fragmentary Order 946 (S) to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036, dated 080425 OCT 03, which
distributed the CJTF-7 Policy Memorandum to All Coalition Forces Personnel, Proper
Treatment of the Iraqi People During Combat Operations (Oct. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Proper

Treatment of the Iraqi People]. The order reemphasized adherence to the law of armed conflict
("the law of war"), directed that all coalition forces personnel would treat persons under their
control with dignity and respect,

platoon
(2)

and required dissemination of the memorandum down

to the

level.

(S) to CJTF-7 OPORD 04-01, dated 160205 JAN 04, which
memorandum and directed that all leaders reinforce its message.

Fragmentary Order 70

reissued the October 5

Fragmentary Order 388 (S) to CJTF-7 OPORD 04-01, dated 062325 MAR 04, which
issued the "Rules for Proper Conduct During Combat Operations," reemphasized the
responsibility of all coalition forces personnel to treat all persons with dignity and respect,
reiterated the obligation of all coalition forces personnel to follow the law of armed conflict ("the
(3)

law of war"), and directed that commanders and leaders use published training vignettes to train
all

personnel on these topics.

from CJTF-7 Commander to Mr. Jean-Daniel Tauxe, Head of Delegation, ICRC
Baghdad (Sept. 6, 2003) [hereinafter CJTF-7 Letter].
7. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al., Humane
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/
6.

Letter

files/assets/02072002_biishmemo_l.pdf.
8.

Report of Senate Committee on

ees in U.S. Custody,

The

1

Armed Services,

Inquiry into the Treatment of Detain-

10th Cong., 2d Sess. (Nov. 20, 2008).

from Alpha Company, 519th Military
were similar to those used in
US survival, evasion, resistance and escape training. They were subsequently discovered to have
been used by that unit with higher command approval in Afghanistan. The second indication
was reporting from the ICRC which, unfortunately and for a number of reasons, was not given
9.

first

indication was an August 2003 request

Intelligence Battalion for a review of interrogation techniques that

sufficient credence or attention.
10.

See, e.g.,

General

Tommy Franks, Freedom Message to the Iraqi People

("Coalition Forces in Iraq have

come as liberators, not as conquerors

(Apr. 16, 2003)

...").

US Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Global Screening Criteria for Detainees

11.

(Feb. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Global Screening Criteria].

Co-applicability of human rights law

12.

limited to legal activists.
tional

It is

and the law of armed

conflict

is

not an assertion

a conclusion that has been reached by courts, including the Interna-

Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. See DlNSTEIN, supra note 4,

at

69-71.
13.

"The

Soldier's Rules" are restated in Headquarters,

Army Training and Leader Development para. G-21
( 1

Soldiers fight only

(2) Soldiers

Department of the Army,

AR 350-1,

(2009):

enemy combatants.

do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them

over to their superior.
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(3) Soldiers

do not

(4) Soldiers collect

(5) Soldiers

kill

or torture any personnel in their custody.

and care

for the

wounded, whether friend or

do not attack medical personnel,

(6) Soldiers destroy

facilities,

no more than the mission

(7) Soldiers treat civilians

foe.

or equipment.

requires.

humanely.

(8) Soldiers

do not

(9) Soldiers

should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.

(10) Soldiers report

steal.

all

Soldiers respect private property

and possessions.

violations of the law of war to their superior.

The law of armed conflict was an express or implied topic at all V Corps and CJTF-7
commander's conferences in Iraq during OIF, starting with the first one at Camp Victory in
Baghdad in May 2004. All division and separate brigade commanders attended the conferences,
along with the V Corps, then CJTF-7, senior staff. The March 27, 2004 conference, for example,
included a presentation and discussion on "proper conduct during combat operations."
15. The training package was informally coordinated with the ICRC in Baghdad and issued
by Fragmentary Order 388 to CJTF-7 OPORD 04-01, dated 062325 Mar 04. The order redistributed CJTF-7 Policy Memorandum Number 18, Proper Conduct During Combat Operations
(Mar. 4, 2004), and added mandatory vignette-driven training on specific rules, including
14.

( 1

Follow the law of war.

(2)

Use

discipline in the use of force.

(3) Treat all

persons with humanity, dignity and respect.

(4)

Use judgment and discretion

(5)

Respect private property.

(6) Treat journalists

in detaining civilians.

with dignity and respect.

CFLCC ROE Pocket Card, 252030 Nov 03. The pocket card, required to be carried at all
US coalition forces personnel, states the following general rules:

16.

times by

(1) Treat all persons

with respect and dignity.

(2)

Conduct yourself with dignity and honor.

(3)

Comply with
Marc

17.

L.

the law of war. If you see a violation, report

Warren, Operational Law:

A

it.

Concept Matures, 152 MILITARY

LAW REVIEW 33,

52(1996).

The change in April 2004 was to make the Mahdi Army a declared hostile force. Hownew CFLCC pocket cards were not issued, since the unclassified cards referred generically
to "enemy military and paramilitary forces." (On April 29, 2003, USCENTCOM issued Supple18.

ever,

mental

ROE;

ROE Measures that changed the combat ROE to the Phase IV (Civil-Military Operations)

the order was rescinded the

same

day.)

19.

CFLCC ROE Pocket Card, supra note

20.

Consider,

e.g.,

16.

the case of the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad, where two civilian camera-

men were killed in an explosion caused by a round from the main gun of a US Abrams tank on
The

was

had been engaged in significant urban
fighting, including repulsing an enemy counterattack on the day of the incident, and had received reports of enemy forward observers in high-rise buildings on the east side of the Tigris
River. As the tank crossed the Al Jumhuriya Bridge, its crew spotted, and fired one round at, what
appeared to be an enemy forward observer, but was in fact a civilian cameraman. The explosion
killed Spanish cameraman Jose Couso and Reuters cameraman Taras Protsyuk, and wounded
April

8,

2003.

unit of which the tank

a part
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three other journalists.

US forces conducted an investigation and determined that the Palestine

Hotel had been fortified by the enemy and was occupied by the enemy. The cameraman had been

enemy forward observer, which was a reasonable mistake under the circumround that killed the cameraman was thus fired with a reasonable certainty
that the target was a legitimate military target, satisfying the requirements of the ROE, PID, and
law of armed conflict. Nevertheless, the incident garnered criticism (see, e.g.. Committee to
misidentified as an

stances.

The

single

Protect Journalists, Five years after deadly Palestine Hotel and Al-Jazeera

strikes,

unanswered ques-

tions linger (Apr. 7, 2008), http://cpj.org/2008/04/five-years-after-deadly-palestine-hotel-and

and led to criminal action by Spanish authorities seeking to hold the tank crew crimof the Spanish cameraman.
21. The Mahdi Army was declared a hostile force on April 6, 2004. DONALD P. WRIGHT &
Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign, The United States
ARMY IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM MAY 2003-JANUARY 2005, at 324 (2008), available at
-aljaze.php)

inally accountable for the death

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/onpoint/index.html [hereinafter

POINT

ON

II].

The US Army's history of OIF deals with the issue deftly and diplomatically: "The multithe Spanish, Salvadorans, and
Ukrainians were few and not prepared to act quickly against the uprising." Id.
22.

national units that had responsibility for the southern Shia cities

—

—

23. Id. at 249.
24.

Initially a five-day standard,

review of detentions by a judge advocate magistrate was ac-

celerated to seventy-two hours in the

summer of 2003. Neither standard was required bylaw and

both exceeded the standards imposed by Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which
quires only that decisions regarding internment shall be

re-

made according to a regular procedure

that affords a right of appeal, to be decided with the least possible delay and,

if denied,

to be sub-

months by a competent body. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 301 (Adam Roberts &
Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter GC]. US forces should have stressed that the reviews were neither required by law nor intended to be viewed as a right or as customary. The requirements of Article 78 were satisfied by the process specified in the "Mother of All FRAGOs."
ON POINT II, supra note 21, at 249.
25. ON POINT II, supra note 21, at 248.
26. Parole agreements and guarantor agreements were used with mixed success as a means to
release internees who were thought to present a continuing, but manageable, threat. The former
would be signed by the internee at release; the latter would be signed by a person who was willing
ject to periodic

review conducted,

if

possible, every six

assume responsibility for the released internee, usually a tribal elder. Significantly, while many
prominent Iraqis would advocate for an internee's release, few would be willing to serve as a
to

guarantor.
27. Article 5 states, in pertinent part:

Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in
Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present

Convention

until

such

time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in

5,

Aug.

12, 1949,

6 U.S.T. 33 16, 75

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 24, at 244

[hereinafter

GPW].
28.

The

FRAGO was issued on August 25, 2003 and
ON POINT II, supra note 21, at 248, 249.

June 28, 2003.
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The "imperative reasons of security" standard is not elaborated upon or defined in the
commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention. COMMENTARY TO
Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
29.

article itself or in the official

WAR 367 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
note

4, at

30.

1958) [hereinafter

ICRC COMMENTARY].

See also DlNSTEIN, supra

172-76.

The "intelligence hold" was not a category of detainee, but a descriptive term

often used

to satisfy the Article 78 "imperative reasons of security" requirement. Because of the accelerated

pace of detentions and the shortage of interrogators, the number of detainees on intelligence

hold grew from fewer than one hundred in July 2003 to more than twelve hundred in January
2004.

ON POINT II, supra note 21, at 208.
265.

31.

Id. at

32.

In the

summer of 2003,

USCENTCOM denied requests for additional judge advocates.

Meanwhile, mobilized reservists and CFLCC

legal assets

need for legal support. The CJTF-7 headquarters
at

flowed out of Iraq, despite a burgeoning

in general

was chronically under-resourced.

Id.

157-61.

2003 proposal to make judge advocates part of the JIDC Joint Manning Document was not addressed until the spring of 2004.
33.

The

34.

ON POINT II, supra note 21, at

35.

Major General Donald Ryder, Assessment of Corrections and Detention Operations

fall

176.
in

Iraq (Nov. 6, 2003).

"A report that merely documents the problem will not be helpful." Memorandum from
CJTF-7 Commander to Commander, USCENTCOM, Detention and Corrections Operations,
36.

Request for Assistance (Aug.
37.
38.

11, 2003).

ON POINT II, supra note 21, at 209, 210.
The genesis was an incident in which two soldiers of the US Army's 4th Infantry Division
their bodies

dumped by the

flew to the scene with Lieutenant General Sanchez

and there con-

had been captured by insurgents at a checkpoint and then executed,
side of the road.

cluded that the

The author

command had to develop a legal process that could hold the perpetrators crimi-

nally accountable.
39.

Memorandum from CJTF-7 SJA

through Commander, CJTF-7, to Commander,

USCENTCOM, on Prosecuting Iraqis for Security Offenses Against Coalition (Oct. 21, 2003).
40. CPA Order Number 13 (Revised) (Amended), The Central Criminal Court of Iraq,
CPA/ORD/X2004/13 (Apr. 22, 2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/ (then
The Central Criminal Court of Iraq (Revised) (Amended) hyperlink). The revised amended order
contains the following language at section 19(1 ): "Prior to
the authority to refer cases to the

CCCI

1

July 2004, the Administrator retains

[Central Criminal Court of Iraq]

Cases referred by

the Administrator will have priority."

Court sessions began in the late fall of 2003, but were hampered by a shortage of resources available to review and process cases. The pace quickened with the arrival of attorneys,
paralegals and investigators of the Joint Services Law Enforcement Team in the spring of 2004.
By July 2004, the CCCI had held thirty-seven trials for fifty-five defendants. ON POINT II, supra
41.

note 21, at 265.
42.

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW

DETENTION OPERATIONS

DOD

The report confused
by CJTF-7 with the term "enemy combatant" used at
Guantanamo. It is simply wrong when it states that "CJTF-7 concluded it had individuals in custody who met the criteria for unlawful combatants set out by the President and extended it in
82, 83 (2004) [hereinafter Schlesinger Report].

the term "unlawful combatant" used
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Iraq to those

who were

not protected as combatants under the Geneva Conventions, based on

[Office of Legal Counsel] opinions." Id. at 83.

Third Geneva Convention establishes the criteria for prisoner of war staThe portion of Article 4A relevant to operations in Iraq after May 2003 states that prisoners
of war include
43. Article 4 of the

tus.

[m] embers of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those

(2)

of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating
in or outside their

own

territory,

even

militias or volunteer corps, including

if this territory is

occupied, provided that such

such organized resistance movements,

fulfill

the

following conditions:
that of being

(a)

commanded by a person

responsible for his subordinates;

(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

that of carrying

(c)

arms openly;

(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws

and customs of

war.

GPW, supra note 27, art.
44.

4A(2).

ON POINT II, supra note 21, at 244. Judge advocates led the efforts to improve the Camp

Cropper detention facility at the Baghdad International Airport and wrote orders to get tents,
generators and other equipment for detention facilities throughout Iraq.
45. CJTF-7 Letter, supra note 6. By February 2004, the CPA had fielded an English and
Arabic website, available to the public, that listed names and other key information pertaining to
internees and detainees. ON POINT II, supra note 21, at 204.
46.
47.

ON POINT II, supra note 21, at 243.
The MEK remains on the list six years later. US Department of State, List of Designated

Foreign Terrorist Organizations, July

7,

2009, http://www.state.gOv/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085

.htm.
48.

Abu Ghraib was the only sizeable prison in the Baghdad area that remained largely intact,

the rest having been looted to their bare foundations.
49. Article 143 of the Fourth

Geneva Convention provides

of the protecting powers "shall have access to

all

that representatives or delegates

premises occupied by protected persons and

shall

be able to interview the latter without witnesses, personally or through an interpreter. Such

visits

may not be prohibited except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as

an exceptional and temporary measure." GC, supra note 24,

art. 143.

The ICRC delegates accepted these conditions and made a return surprise visit in March
2004, when they were allowed to conduct private interviews with all of the detainees, except for
50.

one individual to whom access was erroneously denied. After the ICRC rightfully complained to
ICRC be given unimpeded private access to the
detainee. Department of the Army, Preliminary Screening Inquiry Report, Investigation of Legal
the CJTF-7 SJA, the CJTF-7 C-2 directed that the

Operations in CJTF-7, at 8 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Preliminary Screening Inquiry Report].
51. Attachment A, paragraph (u) to congressional subpoena proposed by Senators Leahy
and Feinstein, "Memorandum for MP and MI Personnel at Abu Ghraib from Colonel Marc
Warren, the top legal advisor to Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, New Plan to Restrict Access to Abu
Ghraib (Jan. 2, 2004)." (The subpoena was defeated by the Senate Judiciary Committee on June
17, 2004.) There was no such document. In fact, every effort was being made in January 2004 to
support and enable the ICRC's pending visit to Abu Ghraib after the disastrous visit in November 2003 (at which no judge advocates were present).
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52.

In

December 2003, Colonel

(retired) Stuart

Herrington visited Iraq

at the request

of the

US Department of Defense and gave a report to CJTF-7 that contained firsthand observations of
CJTF-7 sent the report to
USCENTCOM, with the reminder that neither the command nor the facility at issue was under
the command and control of CJTF-7. After some delay, USCENTCOM directed that CJTF-7
investigate the matter. This was done over protest. CJTF-7 had no superior command authority
and its investigating officer was neither "read on" to the activities nor given full access to the facilities. The predictable (and predicted) result was that the investigation was inconclusive. The
facility merited investigation and oversight. See Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, Task Force 626: Before and After Abu Ghraib, a U.S. Unit Abused Detainees, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006,
abuse of detainees in a special operations detention

facility.

atAl.
53.

These meetings took place in August 2003 and on January 21, 2004.

54.

The

first

paragraph of Article 49

states:

"Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as

deportations ofprotected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power
or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of motive" (emphasis

added). This appears to be a total prohibition. This conclusion

is

reinforced in the official

com-

mentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention: "The prohibition is absolute and allows of no excep" ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, at 279. However, persons may leave voluntarily
tions
or may be excluded. Exclusions occur most prominently in the case of infiltrators, such as persons who had entered Iraq unlawfully to take part in a jihad against coalition forces. "Infiltrators
are simply not shielded by the Convention as protected persons." DlNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 167.
Exclusion could also be argued for persons such as the Palestinian terrorist Abu Abbas, who hijacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro and murdered US citizen Leon Klinghoffer in 1985. Abbas
had been given sanctuary by Saddam Hussein and was living in Baghdad when captured by US
forces. Had he not died of a heart attack while in custody in Iraq, he should have been amenable
to removal from Iraq to face trial in the United States. A strong argument can be made that Article 49 could not have been intended to insulate criminals from the process of law in the manner
of an extradition, especially where the crime occurred outside of the occupied territory and before the occupation. For a discussion of deportations and exclusions generally and the Israeli
practice specifically, see

id.

at 160-68.

55.

Global Screening Criteria, supra note

56.

Reliance in this circumstance

on

of Article 5 appears to be misplaced. The
to the conflict

.

.

.

."

1 1

the broad derogation contained in the
first

The next paragraph

first

paragraph

paragraph reads, "Where in the territory of a Party

begins,

"Where

in

occupied territory

.

.

.

."

paragraph thus refers to the territory of the occupying power, the second to occupied

The

first

territory.

Accordingly, the broad derogation resulting in the forfeiture of rights does not apply in occu-

pied territory. Rather, only the

more limited forfeiture of the "rights of communication under the

present Convention" applies in occupied territory, and then only to "spies and saboteurs" and

persons "under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power."
in Iraq. Even still, the limited forfeiture
was used sparingly by US coalition forces, and is still subject to the admonitions and requirements of the third paragraph of Article 5. GC, supra note 24, art. 5. See also DlNSTEIN, supra note
4, at 63. A more accurate position would have been that the removal was the exclusion of a person not protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention, rather than of a protected person subject
to derogation under Article 5. See supra note 54.

These categories certainly include insurgents captured

57.

GPW, supra note 27, art.

13.
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58.

But see DlNSTEIN, supra note 4,

at 167: "Infiltrators are

simply not shielded by the Con-

vention as protected persons." Moreover, the foreign fighters were not accorded prisoner of war
status.

59.

The derogation

Where

is

in the second paragraph of Article 5,

in occupied territory

which

an individual protected person

is

states:

detained as a spy or

saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the

Occupying Power, such person

shall, in

those cases where absolute military security so

requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of

communication under the present

Convention.

GC, supra note
60.
61.

24, art. 5.

See, e.g., Schlesinger

Report, supra note 42, at 61.

Major General George Fay & Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones, Article 15-6 InvestiAbu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (2004), available at

gation of the

http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf.

There was a third CJTF-7 memorandum on interrogation and counter-resistance policy
on May 13, 2004. That memorandum remains classified as of the date of this writing.
63. Memorandum from Commander, CJTF-7, on Interrogation and Counter-Resistance
Policy to Commander, US Central Command (Sept. 14, 2003), available at http://cup.columbia
62.

issued

.edu/media/3738/jaffer-blog.pdf.
64. Id.

65.

See, e.g., Schlesinger

Report, supra note 42, at 37; Senate Armed Services Committee Re-

port, supra note 8.
66.

Preliminary Screening Inquiry Report, supra note 50, at Tab 43 (Statement of Major

Ricci-Smith).
67.

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.

L.

No. 109-148,

1

19 Stat. 2739 (2005).

The Act is

no panacea, however, as it continues to sanction "a parallel U.S. standard of detainee treatment
and interrogation." David E. Graham, The Dual U.S. Standard for the Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees: Unlawful and Unworkable, 48 WASHBURN LAW JOURNAL 325, 346 (2009).
68. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations (2006), available at http://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/civ_liberties/Field_Manual_Sept06.pdf.
69.

Memorandum from Commander,

CJTF-7, on CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-

Resistance Policy to CJTF-7, C-2 et al. (Oct. 12, 2003), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/

OathBetrayed/Taguba%20Annex%2028-A.pdf.
70. Headquarters, Department of the Army,

FM

34-52, Intelligence Interrogation (1992),

available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf.

Although the 1992 version of the

manual was in effect in 2003, judge advocates in Iraq used the 1987 version that was furnished to
them by the CJTF-7 C-2 (Military Intelligence) section. Headquarters, Department of the Army,

FM

34-52, Intelligence Interrogation (1987), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/fird/Military

_Law/pdf/intel_interrogation_may- 1987.pdf.

It

was that version that was posted

at the

time on

the official US Army publications website. Some investigators have concluded that the difference
between the two versions was significant because the 1987 manual advised interrogators to "appear to be the one who controls all aspects of an interrogation, to include the lighting, heating

and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as food, shelter, and clothing" given to detainees. Id. at 3-5. This language was omitted from the 1992 version and its inclusion in the
CJTF-7 interrogation policy "clearly led to confusion on what practices were acceptable."
Schlesinger Report, supra note 42, at 38. The conclusion is highly debatable, however, for at least
two reasons. First, to assume that interrogators would study the text of a referenced manual
presupposes an unlikely level of research and scholarship on their part. Second, since the 1987
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manual applied to prisoner of war interrogations fully regulated by the Geneva Conventions, eiwas legally objectionable when promulgated (which is unlikely) or it refers

ther the language

only to the perception of the person being interrogated ("the interrogator should appear to be
the one who controls

and it applies only to the control of aspects
Geneva Conventions.
required
of
30
days
the
approval
of the CJTF-7 commander, after
in
excess
Segregation
71.
concurrence by the C-2 and legal review by the SJA. Legal Advisor to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Interrogation Techniques Comparison Chart, May 2004.
all

aspects of the interrogation")

of the interrogation above those required

A

General's Dishonor,

to satisfy the

WASHINGTON

POST, Jan.

15, 2006, at B6.

72.

Editorial,

73

"Neither the 1 4 September nor the 1 2 October C JTF- 7 interrogation policies violated the

Geneva Conventions." Preliminary Screening Inquiry Report, supra note 50, at 5.
74. The September (and subsequent) policies were staffed in the headquarters and with subordinate commands. In the staffing process, the term "stress positions" was discussed and was
understood to have a different meaning in Iraq than elsewhere because of the application of the
Geneva Conventions. Specifically, the example cited for the term was ordering a detainee to
stand at attention or to remain sitting during an interrogation. During one staff discussion, a
judge advocate asked a senior interrogator what would happen if a detainee refused the order.
The interrogator answered, "Nothing. We can't touch a detainee." In fact, the September policy
limited a "stress position" to one hour in duration and mandated that any technique must be
"always applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained investigators
or interrogators."
75.

Military working dogs were authorized to provide security only, and

and under the

positive control of a

snarling at a kneeling detainee at

dog handler

at all times.

had

to be

muzzled

The infamous photographs of dogs

Abu Ghraib depicted military working dogs being used to quell

a prison riot, not being used in an interrogation session.
76.

"The CJTF-7 written interrogation

policies did not cause or contribute to the abuse of

detainees at Abu Ghraib. Had the policies been followed, the abuse would not have occurred.
Abuse occurred in spite of the policies." Preliminary Screening Inquiry Report, supra note 50, at 6.
77. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-century Conflicts?, 54 JOINT
FORCE QUARTERLY, 3d Quarter 2009, at 34.
78. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Iraq Abuse Trial Is Again Limited to Lower Ranks, NEW YORK
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at Al.
79. See, e.g., GHOSTS OF ABU GHRAIB (Roxie Firecracker Film, HBO Documentary Film,
2007); and PHILIP GOUREVITCH & ERROL MORRIS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (2008).
80. Ian Fishback, Editorial, A Matter of Honor, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 28, 2005, at A21.
8 1 Although there was much exaggeration about detainee abuse, there were confirmed incidents and one case is too many. Perhaps the most disturbing and extreme
case was the death
of Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush during interrogation in November 2003, for
which a US Army warrant officer was later convicted of negligent homicide. Josh White, U.S.
Army Officer Convicted in Death of Iraqi Detainee, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at A2.
82. Through the first year of OIF, there were ninety-four "confirmed or possible" cases of
prisoner abuse out of more than fifty thousand prisoners; 48 percent had occurred at point of
capture. Inspector General, Department of the Army, Detainee Operations Inspection, at iv (July

—

—

21, 2004), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20040721
.pdf. In all

operations throughout the world, for calendar years 2002 through 2005, a total of 223

US Army soldiers had

received adverse action (court-martial, non-judicial punishment, repri-

mand, separation or relief) for misconduct related to prisoner abuse. Department of the Army,
Briefing, Detainee Abuse Disposition by Year Abuse Reported (2006).
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83.

In January 2004, after the

Abu Ghraib photographs were turned over to the command,

and before they were publicly known, the author informed ICRC delegates in Baghdad of the existence of the photographs, that the circumstances would be investigated and those responsible
would be prosecuted, and that the command would tell the media about the abuse and about the
existence of the photographs. (CJTF-7 informed the media in Baghdad about the abuse and the
photographs in January 2004, some three months before the media frenzy ignited by the airing of
the photographs on CBS's 60 Minutes II.)
84. The term "strategic corporal" refers to "the devolution of command responsibility to
lower rank levels in an era of instant communications and pervasive media images." Lynda
Liddy, The Strategic Corporal - Some Requirements in Training and Education, AUSTRALIAN ARMY
JOURNAL, Autumn 2005, at 139, 139, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/
liddy.pdf.

Of course,

this responsibility

may be exercised in

a positive or negative fashion, each

with magnified implications.
85.

For a time, the reporting included

all

reported and suspected cases of detainee abuse,

which meant that any complaint by a detainee was entered into the database, without regard to
any legal or law enforcement threshold. During the period when the author participated in the
weekly briefing to the Secretary of the Army concerning the topic of "detainee abuse," this low
standard meant that cases tracked included complaints by detainees that the air conditioning
had broken on a bus transporting them from Camp Bucca in southern Iraq to Baghdad. Moreover,

some special interest groups would often jump to the conclusion that all detainee deaths in

US custody were attributable to abuse or that all cases listed as "homicide" on criminal case reports were murders by US forces. (In fact, a "homicide" could be murder by another detainee or
justifiable self-defense by a US soldier.)
86. After two detainees died in US forces custody at the Bagram, Afghanistan detention facility in December 2002, an investigation was conducted that found, among other problems, that
the relationship between military intelligence interrogators
blurred, that

command and

that interrogation

and

and military

police guards

control of detention operations was not adequately defined,

was
and

disciplinary rules were not clear. These were exactly the problems re-

peated a year later in Iraq. Although the report of the investigation was known at USCENTCOM,

was not passed on to CJTF-7 and apparently no steps were taken to guard against recurrence in
it documented.
87. Removal of judges is a prickly area, governed by Article 54 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which affords special protection to public officials and judges by prohibiting the imposition of sanctions or other coercive measures against judges who "abstain from fulfilling their
functions for reasons of conscience." GC, supra note 24, art. 54. However, Article 54 is tempered
by its second paragraph reserving the right of the occupying power to remove public officials
from their posts and by its explicit reference to Article 51, which accords the occupying power
the right to order adult public servants to return to work. That the term "public officials" in Article 54 includes judges is clearly stated in the official commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convenit

Iraq of the problems

tion.

ICRC COMMENTARY,

88. Article
shall take

supra note 29, at 308.

43 of the Hague Regulations

states, in

pertinent part, that the occupying

power

measures to restore and ensure public order and safety, "while respecting, unless abso-

lutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Regulations Respecting the

of War on Land, Annexed to Convention No.

Land, July 29, 1899, 32

Stat. 1803;

II

Laws and Customs

with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on

and Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on

Land, annex to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, reprinted in
rule

is

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra

note 24, at 69. This

repeated in Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: "The penal laws of the occupied
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remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the
Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention." GC, supra note 24, art. 64. In June 2003, the CPA suspended certerritory shall

tain provisions of the 1969 Iraqi Penal

Code "that the former regime used ... as a tool of repression
human rights standards" and suspended capital pun-

in violation of internationally recognized

ishment.

CPA Order Number 7,

Penal Code,

CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/07

(June 10, 2003), avail-

Code hyperlink).
27-10, The Law of Land Warfare para. 355

able ar http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/ (then Penal

Headquarters, Department of the Army,

89.

(1956) ("Occupation

is

FM

a question of fact").

Checkpoint shootings plagued coalition forces. Judge advocates worked hard to find innovative ways to compensate civilians who had been inadvertently injured by US troops. The US
90.

Foreign Claims Act would not allow the payment of claims arising from broadly construed combat activities, such as most checkpoint shootings. Judge advocates convinced
reverse

its

position prohibiting solatia or gratuitous payments,

USCENTCOM to

and helped draft the enabling lan-

guage for the newly created Commanders' Emergency Response Program so as to allow pay-

unintended combat damage. Judge advocates also established a meaningful foreign
claims program after advocating that the Army, not the Air Force with its limited resources in

ments

for

country, should have single-service claims responsibility for Iraq.
91.

note

An occupation proclamation is declaratory only and not legally necessary. DlNSTEIN, supra
CPA Regulation 1 the CPA announced that it "shall exercise powers of government

4, at 48. In

CPA is vested with all executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary to
achieve its objectives." CPA Regulation 1, The Coalition Provisional Authority, CP A/REG/ 16 May
temporarily

2003/01

(May

The

16, 2003), available at

http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/ (then

The Coalition

Provisional Authority hyperlink).
92. The commanding general of the US Army's 3d Infantry Division reported to the CFLCC
deputy commander that he had too few troops to guard the specified facilities that he had been
ordered to protect from looters. ON POINT II, supra note 21, at 148.
93. In April and May 2003, the author would often travel into central Baghdad to key facilities,

particularly courthouses

and police stations. There would often be no

soldiers there, despite

orders having been issued to secure the buildings.
94.

ON POINT II, swpra note 21, at 93.

95.

CPA Order Number

May

16

2003/01 (May

1

,

De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society and Government,

CPA/ORD/

16, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/ (then

Ba'athification of Iraqi Society

De-

and Government hyperlink).

When combined with the order dissolving the Iraqi military (CPA Order Number 2, Dissolution of Entities, CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02 (May 23, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq
96.

of Entities hyperlink)), the CPA's de-Ba'athification policy
hundreds of thousands of Sunni Arabs unemployed, while decapitating Iraq's governmental,

.org/ regulations/ (then Dissolution
left

security
97.
in

and education

infrastructure.

In the case of the CPA, by S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June

8,

2004), reprinted

43 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1459, which followed S.C. Res. 1483, supra note

4,

which had recognized the United States and United Kingdom as occupying powers in Iraq.
98. The CJTF-7 mission statement read, in pertinent part: "Conduct offensive operations
in direct support of the Coalition Provisional Authority." ON POINT II, supra note 21, at 30.
99. An example of the chafing between CJTF-7 and the CPA was the inability to agree that
USCENTCOM General Order Number 1, which among other things banned alcohol use and
.
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CPA. This seems like a small issue, but it is a symptom of the
and confusion over, the chain of command. The CPA took the consistent position that the General Order was not applicable to either its civilian employees or its military personnel because it was effectively an embassy. Of course, it was not. The CPA was established as an
instrument of the US Department of Defense (DoD), although its chain of command did switch
from DoD to the National Security Council in November 2003. Id. at 181.
100. See K.H. Kaikobad, Problems of Belligerent Occupation: The Scope of Powers Exercised by
the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, April/May 2003-June 2004, 54 INTERNATIONAL AND
possession in Iraq, applied to the

lack of unity of,

Comparative Law Quarterly 253 (2005).
101. ON POINT II, supra note 2 1 ch. 1 1
,

102. Id. at 39.

There was

103.

much

US forces should have shot and killed civilian
US troopers simply would not shoot an unarmed civilian
the ROE would not allow it. The CFLCC ROE allowed soldiers

debate about whether

Aside from the fact that most

looters.

who was not threatening them,
and Marines

to use deadly force to accomplish the mission against lawful targets (combatants),

to protect themselves

walking

down

—but not to shoot a

and others, and to protect designated property

the street carrying a

TV set. CFLCC ROE Pocket Card, supra note

civilian

16.

104. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 49.
105.

CPA Order Number 7, supra note 88.

1 06.

For an excellent primer on the CPA's rule of law activities, see Daniel L. Rubini, Justice in

Waiting: Developing Rule of Law in Iraq,
107.

THE OFFICER,

July-Aug. 2009, at 45.

Preliminary Screening Inquiry Report, supra note 50, at Tab 60 (End of Mission Report

of Clint Williamson to the Administrator, CPA).
108. Also contributing was the secure video-teleconference, or SVTC. This technology allowed for personal communication between Iraq and Washington. The unfortunate reality was
that it did not contribute much to common situational awareness or informed decision making;
rather, it led to confusion as it sometimes trumped the military orders process and led to decisions that were not analyzed or thought through, and not coordinated with the military units
that would have to implement them. The SVTC enabled policy from within the Beltway to be instantaneously injected into a theater of war and that is normally not a good thing.
109. Memorandum to the President from Alberto R. Gonzales, Decision Re Application of
the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan.

—

25, 2002), available at http://www.slate.com/features/whatistorture/LegalMemos.html. In fair-

ness to Mr. Gonzales, his references to the

and obsolete were made

Geneva Conventions having been rendered quaint
"new paradigm" of the war against terrorism and

in the context of the

applied only to certain aspects of the Conventions, not to the Conventions as a whole.
1

10.

on the

This would also be in furtherance of the admonition to educate the civilian population
principles of the

Geneva Conventions.

The High Contracting

Parties undertake, in time of peace

and

in time of war, to

disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective
countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their

military and,

known

to

all

if

programmes of
may become

possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof

their

armed

GPW, supra note 27, art.

forces

and

to the entire population.

127.

111. Protocol Additional to the

Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection

Armed
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,

of Victims of International

Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in

supra note 24, at 422 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
While the United States is not a party to Protocol I, it regards many of its provisions as customary

205

The "Fog of Law": The Law ofArmed Conflict in Operation Iraqi Freedom
and binding international law. See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 419, 425 (1987).
113.

DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 81, 82.
Lex specialis derogate lex generali ("The Lex

114.

Mat

115.

The point was made by Professor Yoram Dinstein

1

12.

the occupier are security, security and security"
lege's

Specialis Rule"). Id. at 85.

84.

—

—"the

in his closing

three

most important duties of

remarks

at the

Naval

War Col-

June 2009 conference.

116.

Rebuilding the rule of law

is

a task too enthusiastically

embraced

surgency field manual. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (2006).

in the

US counterin-

A more realistic view of

rule of law activities is found in CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE
Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Rule of Law Handbook, a
Practitioner's Guide for Judge Advocates (2009).

Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of
LAW REVIEW 2275 (2003).
118. See Dan E. Stigall, Comparative Law and State-Building: The "Organic Minimalist" Approach to Legal Reconstruction, 29 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE
LAW REVIEW 1, 30-31 (2007).
117. See

Law," 101 MICHIGAN

119.

The term "Guarantor General"

to describe the unrealistic expectations for the

coined by Major General Mike Marchand

Army, from 2001
120.

See John

Choice Approach
121.

SJA was

when he was the Deputy Judge Advocate General, US

to 2005.

Yoo

& Glenn Sulmasy, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational
War on Terror, 54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1815 (2007).

to the

Article 82, Legal advisers in

armed

forces,

of Additional Protocol

I

states:

The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in time of
armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise
military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions
and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on
this subject.

Additional Protocol
122.

I,

supra note 111,

art. 82.

Proper Treatment of the Iraqi People, supra note
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XI
The Occupation of Iraq

Clyde J. Tate

This

article addresses legal issues arising

II

*

during occupation, specifically dur-

ing the author's tenure as Staff Judge Advocate (SJA),

National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). In doing

from days gone by on the

and at times tactical

—

legal issues

level

so,

Corps and Multi-

personal thoughts will be recalled

which were

of war during the

III

dealt with at the operational

US occupation of Iraq, as well as dur-

ing the key transitional period after occupation.

It is

hoped that these thoughts will

inform future discussions by legal advisors facing similar challenges.

At the June 2009 conference from which
tation

was

billed as a retrospective.

this

"Blue Book" derives, this presen-

Such presentations can either be a travelogue

with pictures of judge advocates (JAs) posed under the infamous Swords of

Hands of Victory,

Qadisiyah, or
vignettes.

A

identifies

key

explains

retrospective
legal issues,

is

in

Baghdad, or a

shows

how our

how

the

work

during Operation Iraqi Freedom

operations

that

was done led to

many of the issues

'Brigadier General, JA, U.S.

was

in Iraq"

Army.

if it

and

Finally, this article tries to

did lessons learned from our experiII

commanders in
follow that path, then show

(OIF

accomplishing their mission? This author attempts to

how

I

institutions addressed those issues

what was learned from wrestling with them.

MNC-I

of "when

of most value to a legal practitioner, however,

answer the most important question:
ences at

series

II)

aid

significant changes that mitigated for future

confronted

at

MNC-I. The hope

is

that

what

is

said

The Occupation of Iraq

will

inform future discussions and encourage study,

writings,

all

as enablers

critical analysis

and scholarly

of change for the benefit of operational forces.

Putting the observations in context

is

important when you consider that the

nature of the conflict and the issues confronted varied with each rotation of forces
and, often, at different locales in theater during a single rotation. This author was
the SJA for

III

Corps and MNC-I, and deployed to Iraq

as part

of OIF

II,

from May

2004 to February 2005. This author was preceded both in garrison and in theater by

Army

Colonel Karl Goetzke, who, despite very short notice, expertly trained,

equipped and organized the
while at Fort

III

Hood and then

Corps Office of the

Staff Judge

Advocate (OS J A)

deployed, serving as the SJA in theater from January

2004 to May 2004. Colonel Goetzke augmented both his garrison and theater team
with mobilized

US Army

Reserve (USAR) judge advocates and paralegals; the

mission could not have been accomplished without them. Remaining

Hood, and serving as the Fort Hood

installation SJA,

was a mobilized

at Fort

USAR judge

advocate.

The

Armored Corps

III

Hood, Texas, an expansive inas "The Great Place." Ill Corps was activated in 1918
our Army's history, activated and deactivated many

stallation fondly referred to

and, like so

many

headquartered

is

corps in

times over the years. As a corps,
training platform for

armor

it

units

last

at

Fort

saw combat

and was often

in 1945.

in jest,

It

largely served as a

but hardly to the liking of

those serving near-entire careers at "The Great Place," referred to as America's

most non-deployable
All that

corps. 1

changed in September 2003 when the corps was notified of its upcoming

deployment to Iraq

in January

2004

—only four months away!

Its

mission was to

assume the tactical fight so that Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) could focus
its

efforts

on the

strategic fight. 2

The initial role of III Corps in Iraq was to replace its V Corps counterparts across
the CJTF-7 staff in anticipation of the activation of Multi-National Force-Iraq

(MNF-I). The

III

Corps commander saw

his role as a resource provider.

ated with a decentralized style enabling subordinate
fights in their areas

to fight their

of operations. 3 The corps had seven major subordinate com-

mands, each with organic
•

commanders

He oper-

legal support:

Multi-National Division

(MND)-South (United Kingdom-led with one

JA),
•

MND-Central South

(Polish-led with

•

MND-Baghdad

by the US Army's

staffed

(led

OSJA),

210

one coalition JA and one
1st

USAR JA),

Cavalry Division with a fully

Clyde J. Tate II

•

MND-North

fully staffed
•

I

Central (led by the

US Army's

1st Infantry

Division with a

OSJA),

Marine Expeditionary Force

MEF)

(I

in the west (with the

I

MEF OSJA

team),
•

MND-Northeast (Korean-led with

•

Multi-National Brigade-Northwest (led by a

augmented

to

a fully staffed legal section)

form Task Force Olympia with

US Army

and

Stryker brigade

a thinly staffed but talented

SJA

section).

There were numerous geographically dispersed separate brigades in
each with

its

own judge

advocate and paralegals.

Defense Service, Region IX, also were present and
providing defense support. The

III

III

Corps,

Members of the US Army Trial
fully

engaged across the theater

Corps OSJA deployed with

thirty-five officers

and formed the nucleus of the MNC-I OSJA. The office was complemented with one judge advocate from the Australian Defence
Force, one judge advocate from the UK Directorate of Legal Services, one US Air
and

fifteen enlisted soldiers,

US Marine Corps judge advocate.

Force judge advocate and one

Within that broad context, several of the key events arising during OIF II will be
highlighted.

Each of these events adds to the context in which judge advocates pro-

vided legal support and presented unique issues that impacted our delivery of that
support.
ter

Many of these key events overlapped major offensive operations, the lat-

of which are not the topic of this

legal issues.

but understandably presented separate

These include
2004: Transfer of authority from

•

February

•

March 2004-May 2005:

related to the
•

article

1,

misconduct

at

III

V Corps to III Corps.

Corps and MNC-I conducted the courts-martial

Abu Ghraib,

a topic discussed later.

April 2004-June 2004: This period was described in

when the "caldron boils over."

4

Before

this,

On

Point II as a time

there was relative calm after Saddam's

2003 capture. Also during this time, there was a significant transition of the units
that
•

would ultimately comprise OIF

May

15, 2004:

The

II.

activation of

MNC-I and MNF-I. The

latter

command

had a strategic focus, providing much needed interface with the Iraqi government
ministries, the interim Iraqi

government, and the Iraqi Governing Council.

MNF-

was separately staffed with an OSJA. Also standing up at about that time was the
Multi-National Security Transition Command and Joint Task Force 134, both
I

with their

own legal teams.
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June 28, 2004: The interim Iraqi government was established and the

•

Transitional Administrative
assess for the

Law (TAL) 5

A

issued.

key task for the lawyers was to

commanders how the TAL would impact ongoing combat

•

January 30, 2005: National elections held.

•

February

10, 2005:

Transfer of authority of

MNC-I from

operations.

III

Corps to

XVIIIth Airborne Corps.

The

legal issues faced

generally under the

during

this

period are addressed by aligning those issues

Army Judge Advocate

General's Corps' core competencies.

Administrative and Civil Law

We

quickly learned

upon

leaving garrison at Fort

Hood

that the

deployment to

mean administrative law issues were left behind. The most consuming
of these tasks were investigations conducted under the provisions of Army RegulaIraq did not

JAGMAN

tion 15-6 6 (generally similar to the Navy's

(Manual of the Judge Advo-

The high number of these investigations was quite
surprising, but anecdotally every rotation from Operation Iraqi Freedom I through
present operations has had the same realization. The investigation of incidents,
though resource intensive, proved valuable to commanders, brought closure to
soldiers involved in incidents, enhanced the safety of non-combat operations and
demonstrated coalition forces' commitment to the rule of law.
Also in this core competency, we dealt with issues of unit historical property, including whether captured weapons could be preserved as part of the unit's history;
war souvenirs; logistical support to the Army Air Force Exchange Service; so-called
"friendly fire" incidents; joint and coalition investigations; Freedom of Information Act requests; and what were then known as Reports of Survey for lost or damcate General) investigations).

aged

US

military property.

Military Justice

As with every rotation before and after, several high-profile military justice matters

Most notably, the author served as the legal advisor to the convening authority for courts-martial related to Abu Ghraib. Those courts-martial taught numerarose.

ous lessons. Fortunately,

this article

comments

at the

are thus

aimed

is

not about those courts-martial; these

macro-level lessons. The

onstrated that the military justice system

is

theater of operations as Congress intended

end, military judges, counsel

—including

it

fully exportable

to be, even for

trial
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counsel,

cases

from garrison

demto the

complex cases. To that

and military and

civilian
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defense counsel

team support

—and

effort,

witnesses were brought into theater. This was a total JA-

beginning with the support

we

received

from the OSJA, US

Army Central in Kuwait. Other more fundamental adjustments were made to accommodate these trials, including equipping the renovated courtroom at Camp
Victory on very short notice with the necessary technology to support expert wit-

and detainee depositions and testimonies, as well as cobbling together a consolidated team of trial personnel with the necessary workspace and support. Two
cases were held at the Baghdad convention center, with its attendant security,
ness

transportation and logistics challenges. This was a massive logistical undertaking,

but the convening authority allocated sufficient resources to ensure mission

accomplishment.
Exportability is not without its limits, admittedly.

uled or likely scheduled to be tried at times

Some of the cases were sched-

when units were in major transition, or

while key strategic events (such as upcoming January 2005 elections) were occurring.

This meant that logistical support for the

trials

would have adversely impacted

members were otherwise operationally
engaged in those key events. Consequently, some cases were returned to the United
States for trial and occurred both while the III Corps OSJA-Main was still deployed
strategic operations or potential panel

and

after its return to Fort

cases returned to Fort

Hood. The consolidated

Hood

trial

team and the pending

The Abu Ghraib cases also
resources for complex and for Abu

to continue their work.

taught the importance of dedicated

—

Ghraib, strategically significant

—

trial

cases. It

is

naive to think that such litigation does

not need to be viewed and resourced differently;

far

too

much time was

spent ex-

plaining in Army legal technical channels the need for additional personnel to sup-

port these

trials.

The OSJA
thirst for

also dealt with, as has every rotation since,

information on high-profile incidents. That desire for information will

not diminish, so SJA offices have to consider
thirst

Washington's insatiable

how best

to organize to satisfy that

without adversely impacting other, equally pressing matters.

Contract and Fiscal Law Issues
Contract and fiscal law was the subject area the OSJA was least equipped to address.

There were simply insufficient numbers of experienced personnel to address the

on
trained and

volume, magnitude and complexity of issues. This capability gap was not
those

who

followed on future rotations; they were

resourced to deal with the issues.

One

much

better

lost

solution that has paid great dividends has

been the Contract and Fiscal Law Reachback Group, nested within the Contract and
Fiscal

Law

Division of the

US Army Legal
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additional duty,

means the

ability to

and

contract

ficult

by uniformed and

civilian subject

reach back to Washington,
fiscal

law

issues.

matter experts. "Reachback"

DC and consult with experts on dif-

This has ensured that both timely and correct

advice was received.

Providing advice on the uses of Commanders' Emergency Response Program

(CERP) funds proved challenging, 7 especially at a time of transition from seized
CERP (with fewer restrictions on its expenditure) to appropriated CERP and its
authorized uses. This transition prompted

on how

to adapt to the new,

Numerous

though more

many

efforts to

restrictive, uses

educate commanders

of CERP.

issues arose involving contractors, contracted security

and personal

on the battlefield. One issue with which commanders at all
mightily was accountability for those persons, including these im-

security details (PSDs)
levels struggled

Who were these contractors? For whom did they work? Who was
training them on rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for the use offeree? A related
portant questions:

question was what legal authority the civilians in these

who,

if anyone,

followed.

had authorized them to have and carry firearms? Despite procedures

weapons permits,

to require

it

was never easy to determine

The procedures were an

issue for

contractors failing to follow procedures
for

PSDs had to possess weapons:
if those

procedures were

MNF-I and higher command levels, but

and training on the

rules

became a challenge

commanders.

An

issue dealt with daily

was the proper

role

and use of contractors.

We drew a

firm and consistent line on questions regarding the use of contractors to provide

forward operating base security, ensuring that commanders and contracting
cers

to

offi-

were "sensitive to the international law issues surrounding hiring a contractor

perform certain missions during military operations." 8

A frequent challenge was the

issue of weapons

buyback and awards programs.

There was a single awards program under the auspices of US Central

(CENTCOM)
friction point

but not every turned-in weapon qualified. This was sometimes a
with commanders

not qualify for the

who were unhappy when a particular weapon did

CENTCOM awards program, since they perceived the effective-

ness of such programs in pulling

all

weapons

off the street.

here on the merit of weapons buyback programs, the
situations
Finally,

Command

was consistent with the

Without commenting

OSJA legal opinion

in these

CENTCOM program.

any uncertainty about the authority to pay

solatia

payments was

clari-

November 2004 when the Department of Defense's Deputy General Counsel issued a "no-objection" opinion to work done by CJTF-7 lawyers that had
concluded that solatia payments could be made. 9 The authority to make such payments was widely welcomed by commanders who looked to offset injury and property damage caused to the local population.
fied in
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Operational Law

Only a few of the many operational law issues confronted will be addressed. The
ROE were virtually unchanged since the start of combat operations, yet there were
numerous orders and messages related to the ROE that required even the most diligent ofjudge advocates and operators to look long and hard to ensure they had the
latest

guidance. The orders, numbering around thirty, addressed

enemy

tactics,

known as TTPs); indirect fires; troops in contact;
and close air support. These orders were confusing, potentially contradictory when
read in light of the ROE, and, in any event, simply not user friendly. Consequently,
the 1st Cavalry Division OSJA led an effort to develop a consolidated ROE to entechniques and procedures (also

sure clarity, ease of use

scrub the

and relevance by bringing together key stakeholders

to

ROE and orders.

After June 28, 2004, the operational law team was fully engaged in drafting guid-

ance for commanders to issue on

how the TAL would impact ongoing operations.

A balance was struck between conducting combat operations and demonstrating
respect for the
situation as

Key

it

TAL, a balance which

started to tip the scales in the direction of the

currentiy exists under the US-Iraq security agreement. 10

to training the

ROE, and how

the

ROE applied to

changing enemy TTPs,

was the creation of ROE training vignettes. As TTPs changed, so did our vignettes,

which were crafted to be immediately useful at the squad level, with or without the
presence of a lawyer or paralegal to aid in the training.
Coalition
sues

ROE presented other challenges to the operational law team. Those is-

and limitations were addressed primarily by understanding

ROE

and respecting coalition ROE that could impact the
forces could be employed in operations.

coalition partner

roles in

which those

At the conclusion of the occupation, coalition forces had to address how best
to handle reports of abuse of detainees
off"

approach was

by

clearly unacceptable

Iraqi security forces (ISF).

but the

US

role

had

authority of the ISF in dealing with matters under their purview
sue of Iraqi sovereignty as a matter of international law.

A "hands-

to recognize the

—and the

larger

is-

The command took

a

"stop-report-investigate" posture with regard to allegations of detainee abuse:

stop the abuse, report it up the chain of command and investigate abuse allegations
(if

appropriate). That posture served

commanders and

soldiers well.

Operational law attorneys were engaged in these and
full

all

other issues across the

spectrum of legal support to operations, to include advice on interrogations,

information operations, "friendly fire" incidents, foreign fighters, detainee operations, rule

of law missions, application of the interim Iraqi government emer-

gency measures to complement operations, synchronizing the
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multinational coalition and ISF

ROE,

all

topics

worthy of their own conference

and separate discussion.
Conclusion

As alluded to at the outset of this survey of issues, the real value comes in assessing
what was learned and what was done, across all our institutions, in response. This
author

is

proud of how our

institutions, aided

by academic debate held

in confer-

ences and ensuing scholarly publications, responded to the challenges faced.

OIF II, Congress broadened the application of the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act, and the Department of Defense (DoD) issued policy and procedures related to its implementation. 11 Congress also amended Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, broadening jurisdiction over DoD contractors and
Since

DoD

civilians

accompanying the

the roles of contractors

on the

battlefield,

sion of weapons by contractors.

New

tracting, fiscal

support to contractors and the posses-

13

Command-Iraq and Afghanistan, which

earlier, solatia

result, at least in part,
its

is

fully staffed

by con-

law and acquisition experts.

As discussed
rewrote

guidance was issued regarding

organizations were established to support commanders, including the

Joint Contracting

As a

force. 12 Greater

provisions were clarified. 14

of the Army's experiences

Interrogation Field Manual, which

is

at

now the

Abu

Ghraib, the

standard for

Army

DoD. 15

Training also has improved to better equip legal professionals. The Army imple-

mented the Pre-deployment Preparation Program; the Brigade Judge Advocate
Mission Primer, a three-day course held at the Pentagon; the Contract and Fiscal
Law Reachback Group, which has proved invaluable; and a much larger contracting personnel "bench" as a result of the Gansler Commission. 16

These changes are the result of our institutions adapting to the evolving require-

ments of the force and have,

it is

hoped, equipped current and future deployers

with additional tools to address the challenges that will

changes also

illustrate the

2009 conference

—with

abling substantial

come

value of conferences like the Naval

their ensuing debate

their way.

War

These

College's June

and scholarly publications

—

in en-

and meaningful change.
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XII
Occupation in Iraq: Issues on the Periphery

and for the Future:

A Rubik's Cube Problem?

George K. Walker*

Prior articles address occupation issues in 2003-9 coalition operations in Iraq
from an international law perspective and

legal

and

practical issues con-

and their lawyers.
comments on legal issues at the periphery of the occupation, and

fronting coalition forces

This article

problems that may arise in future occupations, whether governed by the UN Charter, special

agreement or the law of armed conflict (LOAC). These include Charter-

based law,;ws cogens norms and other law

(e.g.,

human

rights law), international

governmental organization (IGO) standards, the law of treaties and private law
(e.g.,

admiralty law,

problems in
tions,

torts, contracts) that

single- State occupations,

can be vexing and complicated,

may

apply during occupations. These

and even more so
like the solving

in multi- State occupa-

of a Rubik's Cube puzzle. 1

Geneva and Hague Law

The Fourth Convention, 2 one of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 3 bears upon the
LOAC governing occupations. Nearly all States are parties to them, 4 some with
* Professor of Law,

Wake Forest University School of Law.
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reservations or declarations. 5

some or all of the
Fourth Convention recites customary law. This has been so for 1907 Hague Convention IV 7 since the Nuremberg Judgment, 8 although one commentator says
Hague IV has lost its normative value in the wake of post-World War II occupaCommentators and

States say that

6

tions. 9

However, unlike the other 1949 Conventions, the Fourth Convention de-

clares that

its

rules

supplement Hague IV and 1899 Hague Convention

not Hague IV parties

10

first

and military authority over hostile

for hostilities (Section II)
11

State territory (Section III).

The

for States

II

paragraph of Hague IV's Regulations, Article 23(h), part of Section

II

of that Convention, provides: "In addition to the prohibitions provided by special

Conventions,

it is

especially forbidden ... [t]o declare abolished, suspended, or in-

admissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile
party" during hostilities. 12
rights guaranteed in

Thus even during armed conflict enemy nationals have
court proceedings. The Regulations also protect courthouses

and

similar facilities that are public buildings. 13

in a

commonly used

The authority of
occupant, the

English translation,

the legitimate

latter shall take all

as possible, public order

and

laws in force in the country.

Hague

II,

is

Hague

also pertinent to the analysis:

power having

power to

restore,

while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the

14

Regulations, Article 43, in an English translation,

The authority of
occupant, the

the legitimate

latter shall take all

possible, public order

and

is

similar:

power having actually passed into the hands of the
steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as

safety,

laws in force in the country.

hands of the
and ensure, as far

in fact passed into the

the measures in his

safety,

IV, Regulations, Article 43,

while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the

15

an apparent mistranslation from the authentic French text 16 of Tordre

There

is

la vie

publics" in

"public order and

community,"

17

Hague
life,"

IV, Regulations, Article 43,

translate as

implying "also the entire social and commercial

"public law and

of the occupied region."
phrase, "public order

which should

19

and

Since

Hague

safety," in

should also apply to Hague

The meaning of "laws

civil life,"

II.

18

II,

et

life

of the

or "the entire social and economic

life

same
comments on Hague IV

Regulations, Article 43 uses the

an English version,

20

in force"

is

also critical. 21

State to preserving the status quo, or has recent

meaning? 22

220

Can this phrase limit an occupier
practice given it a more dynamic
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There are other differences. Hague IV's translation "in

compared with
Hague IV seems to

fact,"

Hague II, seems a minor distinction; "restore" in
mean the same as "re-establish" in Hague II. 23 Whatever the correct translations,
Article 43, seen by Benvenisti "as a sort of miniconstitution for the occupation administration," is important. Brussels Declaration Articles 2 and 3 were the origins
of Article 43, but since 1874, and certainly since 1899 and 1907, central govern"actually" in

ment's societal role has changed. 24

Whether both treaties have the same language and practice under them is more
than an academic issue. For example, among the States not party to Hague IV,
fourteen are NATO Treaty25 members and twelve are Rio Pact 26 members. 27 Those
numbers are reduced to ten NATO members and three Rio Pact members who are
not party to Hague II. 28 The result is that some of the members of the two alliances
are, like the United States, party to both Hague II and Hague IV, others are party to
one or the other, and still others are party to neither. All of the NATO States were or
might be involved in collective self-defense responses in Afghanistan 29 and all
members of both treaties could have participated in Iraqi coalition operations.
A message for future occupations is that participating States must consult their
indexes of treaties in force, 30 particularly in multilateral operations, but even if one
State is bound by Hague IV and the other by Hague II to compare differences in
language, interpretation and application in practice. To be sure, Hague IV's Regulations are customary law, 31 and Hague II's and Hague IV's language is the same for
this analysis, 32

but textual differences between the

treaties

or interpretation of

them invite issues between occupier and occupied States or among occupier States,
or if more than one State has been occupied. 33 This underscores customary law's
importance but suggests diplomacy to persuade States to ratify Hague IV and eliminate the issue. 34 Moreover, if a State would emphasize treaty-based rules over
custom-based norms, there is the possibility of a conflict on this score.
The narrow questions for this article are the meaning of "laws in force" 35 in an
occupied State and how the exemption "unless absolutely prevented" fits into in-

May an occupier apply a "progressive developintroducing, e.g., international human rights

ternational law in the Charter era.

ment"

principle,

standards

37

36

including

not previously in force in an occupied

ing law as an occupier found

it?

If an

State,

or must

it

occupier State can introduce

maintain

exist-

new measures, 38

how far can it go? After the 2003 invasion the Coalition Provisional Authority promulgated measures designed to reform domestic governance in
permitted under Article 43?

Iraq. 39

Were these

When is an occupier "absolutely prevented" from ap-

plying an occupied State's law or using the exception clause to introduce
sures?

40

If

human

rights

law would apply, whose perception of

occupier or occupied State's? 41 Dinstein proposes a "litmus

221

new mea-

it

counts, the

test": if

an occupier
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new

State wishes to enact

legislation for the

occupied

State, "the decisive factor

should be the existence of a parallel statute back home[,]" citing an example of requiring car seat belts where none had been required before occupation. 42
ful test,

but

is it

always appropriate? Take,

e.g.,

It is

another hypothetical from

a usetraffic

must be driven on the
right side of a road. In the United Kingdom, the other major occupier, the opposite
United

laws. In the

is

States,

true. In a desert country,

had been no
force?

rule?

Which

Should neighboring

an occupier State in

does

it

make

Iraq, cars

sense to require either

rule should

be an "improvement"

States' laws

be taken into account?

if the

if

previous rule

one must go into

Other commentators seem to take a different view, advocating abrogating occu-

human rights law and promulgating progressive
standards reflecting established human rights law norms and the like. 43 One military manual declares certain "human rights": "Respect for human rights
Family
pied State laws incompatible with

—

honour and

rights, the lives

of persons, and private property, as well as religious

convictions and practices, must be respected." 44 For countries with similar military

manual provisions

labeling Hague-girded guarantees like this as

human rights, an

may be fleshed out through applying the current law
of human rights. A more far-reaching issue is whether other human rights norms
that do not fit under the Hague rubric may or must also be enforced. 45
issue

is

whether the guarantee

Commentators have
fined.

46

Is it

an occupier

raised the issue of self-determination,

is

it is

de-

promote self-determination or the op-

State's business to

posite during an occupation? Iraq

however

an amalgam of three former Ottoman Empire

provinces: one that governed Kurds, a distinct ethnic group; another, with a Shiite

Muslim population; and

the third, a Sunni

should the occupiers have taken

had

arisen?

By

contrast, the

if claims

UN

Muslim population. What

positions

for separate States for these three

governance of Kosovo before

concerned Kosovar self-determination. The

its

groups

independence

UN interregnum had (and independ-

ent Kosovo today has) a Serb minority problem within Kosovo. Should Kosovo be
a paradigm for future occupations?

Is it

an occupier's duty today, particularly in

lengthy occupations, to promote self-determination?

An

issue related to applying

principles, "usages

.

.

.

among

human

rights

civilized peoples,

dictates of the public conscience."

Fourth Convention and Protocol

47

I,

What

this

haps the same as

.

.

the place of Martens clause

the laws of humanity

are these principles,
it,

48

and the

which under the

may be

further excep-

Are the clauses a statement of a general

principle of international humanitarian law? 49
is

.

is

for States party to

tions to applying an occupied State's laws?

rights law, or

law

Are they a gate

for applying

human

another lex specialis situation demanding different norms, per-

human

rights principles,
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but maybe different standards?

1

George K. Walker

Might there be differing views of these issues between an occupier and an occupied State, which during an occupation would have little voice in the matter, but
which might revert to

earlier

law

after

an occupier departs? Presumably the

coali-

tion reached consensus before initiating changes, but might there be issues within a
are appropriate? 50 If States leave or join a coalition dur-

on what changes

coalition

how

ing an occupation,

should consensus be maintained or achieved?

under control of one or more occupier

States are

divided into administrative zones

among

States, or if an

If several

occupied State

is

occupier States, should the changes be

same throughout the occupied States, e.g., like Germany and Austria after
World War II? 51 How would countries that are not occupier States view these matters, particularly if the occupier(s) proceed(s) as the coalition did during 2003-4
the

with wholesale changes, 52 but without benefit of
then

53

the case? There

is

also

UN law or similar support as was

an issue of post-occupation law.

impose beneficial changes, might an occupied State revert to

If

its

an occupier can

old ways after oc-

cupation ends by legislative changes, judicial construction or applying
principles

on

denial of precedent for prior cases

54

civil

law

with resulting confusion (or

worse) for the population? These are questions that should be asked and resolved
in occupation situations.

The United Nations Charter
Before the 1949 Conventions went into force, States had begun ratifying the
Charter.

Its

Article 103 declares that it trumps

all treaties.

Mandatory actions under

the Charter have priority over treaty-based rules. Articles 25, 48
for Charter

lawmaking;

UN members.

if

the

UN

and 94

are sources 55

UN Security Council issues a "decision,"

it

binds

56

Article 51, preserving States' "inherent right" to exercise individual
tive self-defense until the

peace and security,

is

and

collec-

Council acts on a situation threatening international

another important

rule.

57

An occupier must defend an occu-

pied State from aggression as a Charter-based obligation under Articles 2(4) and 5
to preserve that State's territorial integrity

the future.

and projected political independence

in

A correlative to this is to assure, under a reasonableness standard, that

an occupier does not compromise an occupied State's future by actions that leave it
defenseless with insufficient security forces to protect
pied.

An

occupied

State's future territorial integrity

must be assured. Occupiers should also be sure
have the same
try into a

—

effect

weak

e.g.,

it

once

and

it is

no longer occu-

political

independence

that municipal law changes

do not

transforming a formerly financially self-sufficient coun-

State that cannot

meet economic
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might reduce
through

armed

its

inability to

where self-defense would be impossible

forces to a level

fund

sufficient defense forces

from

taxes

and other

Other issues related to self-defense include applicable standards
small-unit self-defense situations arise.

if

sources.

personal or

An easy case is a response by occupier State

units or individuals in circumstances like State v. State confrontations; international standards apply. 58

An example might

be an occupier State soldier(s) con-

fronted with State-sponsored border raiders from other countries invading an

occupied

State.

Other

relatively easy cases

members under its national military law,
in that State's courts;

in the first

trying occupier State service

trying an occupier State's citizen for of-

60

or trying an occupier State citizen tried

fenses against occupier State security law
61

would be

59

and third cases the accused's national law would

apply if that State's legislation so provides. 62 Problems of perceptions of procedural
justice

might arise

if the

More troublesome

two

issues

might come

occupier State forces where

of whom participate in the
ing

mob members

tional

—and

States' self-defense

"mixed"

in

some mob members

mob attack on

situations, e.g., a

are occupied State citizens,

mob action and others are human shields

still

others are,

e.g., terrorists

—

i.e.,

some

unwill-

perhaps subject to interna-

standards because they are outside-State-sponsored or operatives of

organizations like

al

Qaeda. 64

occupied State citizens are tried in occupied State

If

would seem

courts, their national standards

sored,

standards are different, however. 63

to apply; 65 terrorists,

would be subject to international law standards.

Qaeda members, occupier
sions Act of 2006
fense to the

67

same

66

if

State-spon-

If the terrorists are, e.g., al

State national standards like the

US

Military

Commis-

might apply. The problem of perceptions (equal justice for a dealleged offense) here

might be the

greatest, particularly if

one

group mounts a successful self-defense claim and another does not. Yet another issue could arise

if

the confronted forces are

services. 68 If a State or States operate(s)

rules

may arise.

rights

69

Finally, there

is

members of different

under UN auspices,

States' military

issues of Charter-based

an issue of compliance with international human

law standards, even for cases involving occupier nationals such as members

of the occupier's armed forces,
personal rights. 70

What

if

human

rights standards are

has been said about self-defense

is,

more

protective of

of course, a paradigm

for other issues of law to be applied during occupations.

Other actions under Charter law
situations,

olutions.

71

may also

articulate standards for occupation

by Council resolutions or General Assembly resWhether these result in binding rules has been debated, most saying

i.e.,

"calls" for action

that the resolutions themselves

do not bind members. 72 However,

accept a resolution as practice required by law,

norm,

e.g.,

the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

content recites general principles of law,

74
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73

To

e.g.,

it

if

many States

can evolve into a customary

the extent that these resolutions'

of humanity in Martens clauses, 75
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they

may strengthen

vention.

these norms, particularly

if

Geneva con-

How custom with genesis in ipso facto non-binding UN resolutions must

be considered alongside mandatory Charter law
is

a resolution cites a

is

an open question. 76 The same

so for customary rules with a parallel, binding Charter rule,

right of self-defense alongside Article 51,

that such a customary rule can develop

77

although in the

and might be

e.g.,

a customary

latter case the logic is

different

from the

Article

51-supported norm.
After the 2003 invasion the Security Council approved Resolutions 1483 78 and
1546, 79 decisions 80 binding

US-led coalition

(i.e.,

members. Resolution 1483,

United Kingdom, United

States)

inter alia, declared that the

was the occupying power;

Resolution 1546 welcomed the end of the occupation by June 30, 2004; then the

LOAC applying to

occupation ended, and governance of Iraq under the Interim

Government began. 81 In the

future, in other invasion

and occupation

situations,

might there be non-binding resolutions, particularly as occupiers prepare to leave
an occupied country? Since these non-binding resolutions can generate custom or
restate general principles

of law, do they as a sort of "super custom" thereby trump

Fourth Convention treaty terms?

If it

is

different

from the letter of or practice under

Hague Regulations, Article 43, does Charter-based law trump the practice? Probably so, but answers to these questions are far from clear.

Law of Other International Organizations
Another

issue that can arise in the future

is

the impact of binding or non-binding

agreements, resolutions or regulations of other IGOs, notably

and these documents' relationship with the
The place of the work of IGOs is a related issue.

agencies,
tions.

For example, the World Health Organization

LOAC

(WHO)

UN

specialized

governing occupa-

Health Assembly, analo-

gous to the UN General Assembly in that it has voting members from all States parties,

has authority to adopt conventions or agreements within WHO's competence

by a two-thirds vote. These conventions or agreements come into force for a member when accepted by the

member in accordance with its constitutional processes.

The Assembly can also adopt regulations for, e.g., sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease. These regulations are in force for
members after the Assembly gives
82
due notice, except those notifying the
Director-General of their rejection

WHO
WHO

of or reservation to the regulation within the time stated in the notice. 83
If these

WHO conventions, agreements or regulations are in force for an occu-

pier State but not for

an occupied country, or the other way around,

they be applied in occupation situations under Article 43? Put
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if an
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occupier

a

is

member of other IGOs, but an occupied State is not, or the other way

around, what law governs under Article 43? Health issues are likely to arise during

armed

and an ensuing occupation. Other IGOs may have

conflict

similar proce-

dures for declaring binding rules.

A further issue is whether these IGO regulations

bind States not party to them,

that they represent

84

general principles,

i.e.,

customary norms or perhaps

or by law of treaties principles binding third States. 85

And

if

86

them as progressive development under
Article 43, so that an occupied State will be more forward-leaning in its international obligations and rights and national law when occupation ends? Or are these
not, should an occupier State introduce

soft

law87 until an occupied State or an occupier chooses to accept the norms?

There

of course, a possibility that otherwise-binding IGO-sponsored con-

is,

ventions, agreements or regulations

may vary from

UN law, e.g., self-defense un-

der Charter Article 5 1 or the parallel customary right of self-defense, 88 or other

binding

IGO

UN

law,

Security Council decisions, 89 during an occupation. Here

give way. 90

must

rules

e.g.,

A related issue is applying rules or principles from IGOs, i.e., soft law, 91 particularly if an

occupied State and an occupier would

occupation.

differ

on

their application during

To the extent that an IGO publishes rules purporting to restate custom

or general principles acceptable under both States' laws, they should continue in
force during occupation. 92 If they are not consistent, these standards

secondary sources,

research of scholars, in a source matrix.

and these

sues are at stake
for

i.e.,

rules differ

from IGO standards,

93

may enter as

If Charter

law

is-

analysis similar to that

IGO-based standards should apply. 94

The Spectral Issue of Jus Cogens
Jus cogens,

i.e.,

fundamental norms trumping treaty and customary law norms,

and perhaps contrary general

World War

II.

principles, has

Authorities differ

on jus

been a spectral source of law since

cogens' scope, ranging

from

cogens does not exist to a Soviet author's position that the whole
states jus cogens.

95

Be that divergence

as

it

and

political integrity,

which declares

the right of self-defense also has jws cogens status.

treaties.

98

97

status; 96

declares rules for jus cogens in the law of

Perhaps not an issue related generally to occupation law today, jus

cogens could create problems in the future, especially

countries

States entitled to their

some argue that
The Vienna Convention on the

"approaches" jus cogens

Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention)

UN Charter re-

may, the International Court of Justice

(ICJ) has twice said that Charter Article 2(4),
territorial

a view thatjws

would claim

a jus cogens violation
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and an occupier would

not, or vice
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versa, or if a claimant argues that jus cogens supports

its

action

when another

claimant asserts a right under a treaty, customary law or general principles.

Law of Treaties Issues
Other law of treaties

law of jus cogens

issues besides the

may apply in

occupation

situations.

Treaty succession principles have again become important as

emerged, sometimes

after centuries (e.g., Belarus

new

States

have divided

(e.g.,

do

involving applying

States

new

emerging from the USSR's

Czechoslovakia) or merged

States' declarations recite

inference, those that

some

e.g.,

have

and Ukraine with the USSR's

1991 collapse) from the sovereignty of other countries. In other cases,

have declared independence,

States

Germany).

(e.g.,

99

States

collapse.

Sometimes

what treaties of a former sovereign apply and, perhaps by

not. 100 This can be relevant for occupation situations,

Hague

II

or

Hague IV or Protocol

I.

e.g.,

101

Vienna Convention Article 60(5) excludes application of its Convention material
breach provisions to

treaties

providing for

over applying Article 60(5) to

LOAC standards. Commentators argue

human rights treaties; most say it does not apply. 102

However, during occupations treaty breach
concerned with the
ties to

that

LOAC may arise;

103

issues for

agreements other than those

these could range

from human

rights trea-

those governing trade and the like. Recent ICJ decisions would say, however,

human rights law applies during armed conflict, 104 thus blunting the effect of

Article 60(5) if construed to limit

its

application to

vantages and disadvantages for applying the

human rights law.

LOAC treaties.

There are ad-

LOAC, customary or treaty-based,

or

105

Impossibility of performance

and fundamental change of circumstances

narrow exceptions for treaty non-performance. 106 This
Vienna Convention

is

particularly so in view of

Article 26's recitation of pacta sunt servanda,

fundamental rule of the law of treaties.

107

are

which

Nevertheless, these claims

restates a

may arise

in

contexts of compliance with treaties governing occupations, as well as other agree-

ments binding occupier and/or occupied States. Are the exceptions in Hague II and

Hague IV

Regulations, Article 43, "unless absolutely prevented," or

Hague

IV,

Regulations, Article 23(h)'s "especially forbidden" non-compliance statement, lex
specialis rules to

be used in place of general standards for impossibility and funda-

Do

on successive treaties apply? 108 Or are
Vienna Convention standards the same as Geneva and Hague law? A commonmental change of circumstances?
sense answer

is

rules

that they should be the same, or that lex specialis principles for

applying Geneva/Hague law should govern, but the issue remains.
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A

similar issue

the relationship between rules for impossibility and funda-

is

mental change under the law of
clauses. 109

ening the

War, or armed
life

conflict,

is

may choose

rights. 111 )

not to assert the derogation. 110

Are these derogation clauses

mental change of circumstances? Like the
that the answer should be yes. But

such that

later in

do

LOAC exception clauses, it would seem

rules

on

successive treaties

time standards govern?

112

on the same sub-

Human rights treaties have

contemporaneous with the Vienna Convention; sometimes one pre-

cedes the other to bind a particular country, and sometimes States
ratified the

Convention.

Some human

the customary law of treaties

during armed conflict
peace and war.
treaty

is

lex

over general law of treaties rules for impossibility and funda-

specialise prevailing

a history

rights treaties' derogation

the prototype of a public emergency threat-

of a State, but that State

(There are certain non-derogable

ject apply,

and human

treaties

114

—

—

them

applies to

Or does

it?

rights treaties lack derogation clauses; 113

is

treaties

unless these agreements apply during

human

For custom-based

in force), the analysis

suspend or terminate

States' rights to

i.e.,

may not have

rights

law

(e.g., if

no

problematic. By analogy to other customary

LOAC as a custom and
treaty-based lex specialis should apply if human rights law and the LOAC squarely
norms now stated

in treaties, e.g., the

law of the

sea,

115

the

conflict. 116

Suppose, during an occupation, armed conflict
State

by a third

State)

State, erupts. 117

Do

rules for

suspending or ending

under customary law 118 or treaty provision 119 enter an occupier's decision

matrix? Geneva and
conflict,

120

but the

treaties lacking

Hague law and

fate

the

LOAC in general apply to States in armed

of other treaties

derogation clauses)

(e.g.,

may be

trade agreements or

human

rights

suspension or termination. In armed

conflict situations, does the conflict provide another

human

invasion of an occupied

between an occupied State and another country, or between

an occupier State and a third
treaties

(e.g.,

rights treaties with derogation clauses?

121

ground

for suspending those

Other bases for suspending or

terminating treaty obligations during conflict might be impossibility of perfor-

mance or fundamental change of circumstances. 122 The answers to these questions
are not clear, but an

derogation clauses

argument

is

for suspending or terminating agreements without

that negotiators could have inserted

them and

for whatever

reason chose not to include them, in view of similar agreements that have them or

have clauses applying their terms in peace and war. 123 A rebuttal

is

that these agree-

ments at least in part represent jus cogens and thus some rights under them are nonsuspendable. 124
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Other Derogations from Applicable International Law
There are other derogations from applicable international law, sometimes treatybased and sometimes grounded in custom, sometimes in both: state of necessity;
reprisals; retorsions; reservations

or understandings, interpretive statements and

declarations under the law of treaties; treaty desuetude or obsolescence;

and the

persistent objector principle.

The

Law Commission's

International

Draft Articles

on

adopted in General Assembly Resolution 56/83 (2002), 125

State Responsibility,

restates the state

of ne-

cessity doctrine in Article 25:

1.

may

Necessity

not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the

wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that
State unless the act:
(a)

the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave

is

and imminent
(b) does

peril;

and

not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards

which the obligation

2.

In any case, necessity

wrongfulness

exists,

or of the international

may not be

community as

a whole.

invoked by a State as a ground for precluding

if:

(a) the international obligation in

question excludes the possibility of invoking

necessity; or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.

commentary emphasizes the principle's narrow scope; it attempts to
restate the rules of reprisal and declares that anticipatory self-defense is another example of justifiable rule-breaking under extraordinary circumstances. 126 Might
Article 25

necessity,

under the extraordinary circumstances of the doctrine, justify breach of

—customary or treaty-based—

occupation law

nent peril")

arises? Is "grave

if an

and imminent peril" the same as the Hague Article 43

"unless absolutely prevented" exception? 127 The
it

as the language in Draft Article 25.

derogation clauses

129

emergency ("grave and immi-

128

same construction should apply to

But what about the relationship between

and the necessity doctrine?

Reprisal rules say that prior notice of a breach of international law must be given

an accused lawbreaker State with opportunity for
with the law. If there

is

it

to bring

non-compliance, an aggrieved State

proportional to the circumstances but not necessarily in kind
sures to force

human

its

conduct into

may
(e.g.,

line

take measures,

economic mea-

rights compliance), to bring a lawbreaker into line with the
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law. 130

Although

reprisal situations

could occur between a third State and an occu-

pier or an occupied State, issues could arise
State. Besides a

problem of whose view of the law counts, there

whether an occupier can act in
sponse to both questions
e.g.,

between an occupier and the occupied

is

its

behalf or on behalf of an occupied State. The re-

Occupation law

yes.

a question of

is

limits reprisals in

some

forbidding reprisals against protected persons and their property.

question

imposed

is

whether

reprisals

131

respects,

A further

not prohibited by the Fourth Convention can be

in light of human rights law.

comFourth Conven-

Retorsions, an aggrieved State's unfriendly but proportional lawful acts to

may be invoked under general law and the
proportional among States involved (occupier, occupied
132

pel law compliance,
tion.

133

States)

What is
may arise, however.

or third

Treaty reservations rules 134 must be consulted; States have reserved to the
for example. 135

Some treaties forbid reservations, e.g., the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 136 and there is a current
debate on whether reservations to human rights treaties may be interposed, alGeneva Conventions,

though they do not have no- reservations

ments forbidding

that a treaty

is

them,

their nature to bar

may be

138

Occupier and occupied States
i.e.,

by

reservations, or considered

over interpretive statements.

cence,

clauses. 137 Future legal battles over agree-

may have different views on desuetude or obsoles-

no longer in force because of longstanding non-observance

of its terms. 139

A correlative to treaty reservations

rules

the persistent objector principle for

is

customary law. Reports of its demise are premature; some, perhaps
are active persistent objectors.

pier State has views

140

on custom

This principle

different

cupier States have different views

all,

countries

may affect occupation law if an occu-

from those of an occupied

State, or if oc-

on custom.

Law Standards for the Same General Body of Law,
the Law of Armed Conflict among Occupier States

Different International
e.g.,

Prior analysis mostly considered

LOAC occupation

single occupier State, following the
in the singular. If more

be more complex.
tion of alliance
situation
alliance)
tions.

—

Fourth Convention format of addressing issues

than one State

If occupiers are part

and

law issues in the context of a

is

an occupier for a country, 141 analysis can

of a coalition or an

coalition partners, 143 there

is

alliance,

142

or a combina-

a further complexity.

The

reverse

more than one State, or a group of States (coalition or
occupies more than one State after a conflict presents more complicaif a

State occupies

—

Peoples within occupied territory may travel, perhaps subject to checkpoints,
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from one occupation zone

to another.

Even

if

they do not, local law, 144 public 145

and private, 146 of a subdivision (province or state
federal republics) of an occupied State

as in the

United States and other

may differ significantly.

Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions apply to nearly
their principles are considered

the 1977 Protocols

I

and

not parties to one or both

customary law.

149

II

147

148

Protocol

all States,

and most of

customary law, the same may or may not be true for
to them.

The United

States

and other countries

are

and do not recognize all Protocol I and II provisions as
supplements the Fourth Convention 150 and some-

I

The same issues may arise if Fourth Convention States interpret the Convention or custom differently.
times supersedes

it.

151

Lack of universality is
although

its

also true for other treaties, e.g., the Torture

rules prohibiting torture are considered at least

Convention, 152

customary law,

if

not

jus cogens. 153
If Charter

some

law is involved, a problem may be interpreting or applying Article 51;

States involved in

restrictive

an occupation

(typically occupier States)

view of the valid scope of self-defense

(i.e.,

may adhere to

reactive self-defense)

a

and oth-

may say anticipatory self-defense is lawful under the Charter and general international law. There may be differing views of what is lawful under either view, or
ers

what is valid when unit or individual

self-defense

is

involved. 154 If the occupier (s)

or occupied State(s) operate(s) under Security Council decisions or other
other

IGO

resolutions,

155

the

same kind of definition and scope

issues

UN and

can

arise.

Possible Solutions for These Problems

Today

military forces operate under peacetime

and war

rules of

engagement

They have acted under ROE in the Iraq and Afghanistan occupations. 157
UN and other coalition and alliance operations have joint ROE and have used
them in occupations. 158 ROE are used in law enforcement situations, 159 a major as(ROE).

156

pect of occupation law.
flict,

ROE are not law but are options given commanders in con-

potential conflict situations or similar circumstances like law enforcement,

with a paramount right of self-defense.

and law.

160

ROE are a confluence of diplomacy, policy

ROE analysis suggests an analogous method to be considered for resolv-

ing questions raised for multiple levels of law, multiple sources of law within the

same

level

of law and multi-State occupations. 161

This author has suggested a factorial analysis, based on the Restatement of the

Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States 162 (Restatement (Third)) and
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 163 (Restatement (Second)) for these kinds
of situations. 164 This analysis
ternational law, as

is

based on choice of law or conflict of laws (private in-

non-US commentators
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it)

165

theories, although options

—
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are within a public international law context. 166 This

choice of law and conflict of laws

what with

day,

—

albeit

is

the kind of problem

more complicated,

in occupation

a hierarchy of sources atop traditional sources

of many State actors, whether acting under the

LOAC,

167

and

law to-

a possibility

UN law or general interna-

tional law.

The author's Restatement-based analysis has not escaped criticism, 168 any more
than the Restatements' use in US courts has met with universal approval and acceptance. 169

It is

not useful for

all

occupation choice of law

or fast-moving situations like self-defense

occupation

after

ations,

it is

criteria

have been

time-intensive

style analysis

and the
Even

like?
if it

Like planning for major military oper-

be considered for "law planning"

self-defense, Security

e.g.,

or operationally immediate decisions

and can be cumbersome

i.e.,

notably ad hoc

171

satisfied.

perhaps with "law" options emerging,

issues,

170

to use. But might a Restatement-

at

an operational planning

stage,

those for action below mandatory rules,

Council decisions where standards

may be

spelled out

172

does not apply for public law

laws questions

issues, factorial analysis for conflict

may be an issue if courts consider private law issues,

173

e.g.,

of

maritime

law claims arising from shipping to and from Iraqi docks on the Shatt al-Arab, 174

WHO regulations for Afghanistan or
States concerned had adopted different WHO agreements or regulations.

or medical supply contract issues involving
Iraq

if

175

Private law issues will arise in occupied State courts, 176

laws questions before them.
State

177

If

which may have

conflict of

an occupier State can modify existing occupied

law on public law and private law 178

issues,

can

it

or should

it

modify occu-

pied State conflicts principles, perhaps through legislation, as has been the recent

method

for other countries, including those with

common-law traditions? 179

How the Restatement Analysis Works (Very Briefly)
After a decade of analysis in the American

Law

Institute, 180

Restatement (Second)

appeared in 1971 and was partly revised in 1988. The Restatement (Third) appeared

The first step is to inquire whether there is a conflict
is the law the same in both jurisdictions? If so, there is no con-

in 1987 after a similar process.

of laws problem,

i.e.,

common

standard applies. 181 This might be the circumstance where,

flict

and the

e.g.,

human rights law and LOAC/occupation law standards are the same.

If that is

no need to analyze further; apply the common standard.
Each issue must be scrutinized (i.e., depecage) for possible conflicts, however. 182
The Restatement (Second) recites a major exclusion; if a jurisdiction has a statute
governing conflict of laws, it must be used. If there is no legislation on point, a
so, there is

multifactor general analysis

is

interfaced with factors specific to an area of law,
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torts or contracts, or

perhaps particular forms of torts or contracts. 183 There

is little

consideration of the international, or transnational, aspects of situations. Nevertheless, the

Restatement (Second)' s explicit recognition of a higher rule, under con-

US law, is analogous to the command of the UN Charter on
184
treaty law or a jus cogens mandate that may apply to an international situation.
The Restatement (Third) does not list Charter law among its sources for public
struction principles in

international law, but
ble use of jus cogens

comments note Charter supremacy in Chapter 1. Possialso mentioned. 185 The Restatement recites non-exclusive

its

is

factors for applying particular

law in Chapter

4, similar to

the Restatement (Second)

methodology. 186
Besides

US courts, 187 other institutions and countries have adopted similar fac-

torial analyses for transnational conflict

these principles, as

of laws. The European Union recognizes

do other States, among them US

allies.

188

The US National En-

vironmental Policy Act imposes factorial analysis for environmental impact
ments.

189

The US Navy and other armed

planning analysis.

190

What

this

state-

forces have used multifactor operational

author advocates

is

multifactor operational law

planning analysis.
Is factorial analysis

always necessary or useful? The answer is no;

in rapid-response situations, like self-defense, although
self-defense. It
first

not necessary in situations

is

requirement;

go through the

if

it

it

will

not work

might be used to plan for

competing laws are the same

—the

no conflict among competing laws, it is not necessary to
Factorial analysis will not work for some law issues, e.g.,

if there is

analysis.

191

treaty reservations or persistent objector situations; 192 the reservation or objection

applies or

tions

193

utility,

it

to

does not.

It

might help,

e.g.,

with necessity, reprisal or retorsion situa-

promote thought on whether invoking

kind and severity of action under necessity,

necessity

peated, similar situations that began with factorial analysis

with

new

conflicts

this

appropriate, or the

reprisal or retorsion situations.

As experience through planning and execution proceeds,
Applying

is

rules derived

may be appropriate. 194

kind of analysis can lead to problems with a need to

rules,

195

but for military planning, might

it

clarify the

State's citizens

and

law

be useful to think through

problems before issuing black-letter recommendations for the

and an occupied

from re-

command

institutions?

Conclusion: Analyzing Occupation Issues Thoroughly through

"Operational Law Planning"

The relatively recent addition of operational law-trained attorneys to battle staffs
and other commands has helped keep military operations within international
and national law. As others have written, "lawfare" 196 is very much a part of those
233
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operations, particularly given the communications

and media revolutions involv-

ing the Internet, television including 24-hour battlespace newscasting, radio
197

If John

broadcasting, e-mail, texting, facsimile,

etc.

he would say that international law

part of a

is

tion."

198

ble to

do so under the circumstances. Put more

Paul Jones were alive today,

commander's

"tolerable Educa-

But he might add: Consult your lawyer in planning or acting

if it is feasi-

prosaically, look before

you

leap.

Perceptions of law compliance are part of today's battle problem.

A further problem, particularly for operations involving multilateral forces that
may be involved in occupations of or involvement with more than one country, is a
need to perceive conflict of laws issues that may arise. These maybe "vertical" conflicts, e.g.,

between the

LOAC and Charter-based law, 199 or "horizontal" law issues,

among States involved in an occupation or, more subtly, a conflict between the
law of the occupied State(s) as it stood when occupation began and the progress
e.g.,

—of the law

or lack of it

as occupiers

and others believe it ought to be, or, at another

the everyday rules of private orderings (torts, contracts,

level,

issues,

etc.).

200

For these

developing a factorial decision matrix, perhaps a general checklist for the

"shelf long before need arises or a campaign-specific one for particular military
operations, perhaps based

on

conflict of laws (private international law) concepts 201

will help. If military staffs 202

plan for and solve complex occupation problems,

whether in one-on-one situations or those with a number of States on either or
both

sides, operational

law attorneys serving commanders can solve the complex,

multilateral, multilayer legal

problems involved. Using

conflict of laws analysis

may point toward clearer thinking about concrete solutions if multiple sets or layers
of laws are or can be involved. 203 The proposed analytical method will not produce
a black-letter "answer" or rule, but

it

should point toward more comprehensive,

well-thought-out rules.
Like Rubik's Cube, the law puzzle for occupations

is

capable of solution, per-

haps through factorial analysis in other than urgent situations
for

sometimes multilayer, multidimensional choice of law

Regulations, Article 43.

(e.g.,

issues

self-defense),

under Hague IV,
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Notes
1.

Rubik's

Cube

is

a three-dimensional puzzle Erno Rubik invented; a cube's six faces are

covered by six colors (white, red, blue, orange, green, yellow) with nine smaller squares on the

The challenge is to manipulate the cube pivot mechanism until all nine squares are
same color on each of the cube's six faces.
2. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 575 (Dietrich
cube's sides.

the

Schindler

& Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed.

2004) [hereinafter Fourth Convention].

234

George K. Walker

3.

The others are Convention

for the Amelioration of the Condition of the

Wounded and

Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,6U.S.T.3114,75U.N.T.S.31 [hereinafter First

Convention]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-

wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Convention]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Convention]; all reprinted in THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 459, 485, 507, respectively.
4.

International

Committee of the Red Cross,

State Parties to the Following International

Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 14-Oct-2009, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/
(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf [hereinafter State Parties],
lists

194 parties to the 1949 Conventions.
5.

note

See

2, at
6.

id.,

supra note 4; for a printed source, see

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,

supra

635-88.

YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION 59-64

(2009) (progression of

Fourth Convention, supra note 2, from aspirational standards to mostly customary law); YORAM
Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation 6-7 (2009) (possibility
that some States may not see the 1949 Geneva Conventions as customary law or may not apply
them as municipal law). International custom is general State practice accepted as law. Statute of
art. 38(l)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereIAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-12 (7th ed.
2009); DINSTEIN, supra at 4; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 9-10 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 102, 103(2)(d) & cmt. c (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
7. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 55 [hereinafter

the International Court of Justice
inafter ICJ Statute];

Hague

IV].

8. Judgment, 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military TribuNuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, at 253-54 (1947). The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment, 15 1.L.R. 356, 346-66 (1948) [hereinafter Tokyo trials]
made the same holding. Two months after the Nuremberg trials ended, Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95,
1 U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.l, at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946) [hereinafter Resolution
95], unanimously reaffirmed Nuremberg and Tokyo trials principles. Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 256 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear
Weapons]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 19, 70 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter 2005 Congo Case]; Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 172 (July 9)
[hereinafter Wall Case] adopted Nuremberg principles; see also ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6,

nal,

at 55, 57;

DINSTEIN, supra note

6, at 5;

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S

Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations u 5.4.2 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds.,
1999) (Vol. 73, US Naval War College International Law Studies) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED] (Hague general principles reflect customary law); UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE
MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 1f 1.25 (2005) [hereinafter UK MANUAL]; Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 1, 24 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1999) (Hague IV Regulations remain of "utmost importance"). These cases

and the

resolution, although secondary

sources and not binding themselves, restate customary law. See ICJ Statute, supra note
38(1 )(d), 59;

BROWNLIE, supra note

6,

at 15, 19-22; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
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6, arts.

LAW, supra

Occupation in Iraq: A Rubik's Cube Problem?
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 102, 103(2) (d) 8c cmt. c. Although the list of
is small compared with UN membership today, see THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 85, and the treaty has an inter se clause, Hague IV, supra note 7, art. 2,
treaty succession rules may apply Hague IV to other States. See generally Committee on Aspects
note

§§

13, 16;

Hague IV

parties

6,

of the

Law of State

Succession, Final Report, in International

Law Association, Report of the

Seventy-Third Conference Held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August 17-21, 2008, at 250, 360-62
(2008) [hereinafter Final Report]

(UN succession conventions' general acceptance; recent prac-

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL Law, supra note 6, § 62, at 211-13; Symposium, State Succession in the Former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, 33 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 (1993); George K. Walker, Integration and Disintegration in Europe:
tice);

Reordering the Treaty Map of the Continent, 6

THE TRANSNATIONAL LAWYER 1 (1993).
Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation 96-98, 190 (2d prtg.
2004). This claim must be evaluated in the light of Fourth Convention drafters' and negotiators'
decisions to insert language in Article 154 that supplements Hague Convention (II) with Respect to
Laws & Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 55 [hereinafter Hague II], and Hague IV, supra note 7, unlike language in analogous First, Second and Third Convention provisions. Another interpretation is
that the Fourth Convention affirms Hague law. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
10. Hague II, supra note 9. Many States parties to Hague II are also Hague IV parties; eighteen are not. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 55. Compare Convention of 1907,
id. at 85, with Convention of 1899: Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions, id. at 83. For States parties to both, Hague IV, Aricles 2 and 4 declare that it is substituted for Hague II, if all belligerents
9.

are parties. Treaty succession rules

may bind many

1899. See Final Report, supra note 8;

Symposium, supra note

1899 and 1907 Conventions recite the same terms

countries achieving independence since
8;

Walker, supra note

8.

Since the

at issue in this analysis in nearly identical lan-

Hague IV's status as custom, see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text, applies to Hague
II parties except persistent objectors. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. Hague II was not
the first statement of occupation law. U.S. department of War, Instructions for the Government
guage,

of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,

1-47, Apr. 24, 1863, re-

arts.

4-9 [hereinafter Lieber Code];
Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War arts. 1-11, 3642, Aug. 24, 1874, reprinted in id. at 21, 23-24, 27 [hereinafter Brussels Declaration]; INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND arts. 41-60 (1880), reprinted in id. at 29,
35-37 [hereinafter OXFORD MANUAL], were its precursors. DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 8-9.

printed in

11.

supra note

2, at 3,

The others say they supersede or are "complementary to" parts of prior treaties. Compare

Fourth Convention, supra note

2, art.

154 with First Convention, supra note

3, art.

59 (replacing

Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22,
1864, 22 Stat. 940, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 365; Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, July 6, 1906,
35 Stat. 1885; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, reprinted in id. at 421 [hereinafter 1929 PW Convention] ); Second Convention, supra note
3, art. 58, replacing Hague Convention No. X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
Principles of the

Geneva Convention

[of 1906], Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, reprinted in

397; Third Convention, supra note 3, arts. 134-35 (replacing 1929

7,

Regulations for

id.

ch.

ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 1 15-16; DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 6-7; 1
Pictet, I Convention Commentary 407-8 (1952); 2 Jean S. Pictet, II Convention

II [spies]);

S.

at

PW Convention, supra, com-

plementary to Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations; Hague IV, supra note

Jean

id.

see also

236

George K. Walker

Commentary 277-78

(i960); 3

Jean

Pictet,

S.

Convention Commentary 636-40

COMMENTARY

IV CONVENTION

(I960); 4 JEAN S. PICTET,

III

(1958).

Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 23(h), for which there is no comparable Hague
II, supra note 9, provision. The id., Regulations, art. 44 prohibition appears in the first paragraph
of Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 23(h) and is not relevant to this analysis. See United
States, Department of the Army, FM 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare If 372 (July 1956, Change
12.

No.

1,

1975) [hereinafter

40, 108, 176

FM 27-10]; DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 53,

and accompanying

public defenders

would extend

and

to offices,

etc.

Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, art.

56;

Regulations, arts. 55, 56; see also Brussels Declaration, supra note 10,

note 12, f 400;

e.g.,

of prosecutors,

poverty assistance attorneys in courthouses or similar buildings, as well as

data centers, clerks' offices,
7,

text.

In today's world, presumably protection

13.

195-96; see also infra notes

OXFORD MANUAL, supra note 10,

1f

C(a)

& art.

Hague IV, supra note

FM 27-10, supra

art. 7;

52; ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6,

Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, art. 55,
does not refer to municipal property, unless its "communes" exception would apply, the French
version of "municipalities," in Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 55, which would treat
at 196-98, 206;

DlNSTEIN, supra note

6, at

213, 220.

such assets as private property; see also Brussels Declaration, supra,
assets as private property. See also

DlNSTEIN, supra note

OXFORD MANUAL,

art. 53,

supra note 10,

Lieber Code, supra note 10,

art.

6, at

art. 8,

referring to municipal

220 n.1188.

On

the other hand,

declares that municipal property cannot be seized.

31, declared that title to occupied State-owned real property re-

from such property would go to the occupier; id. said nothing
about public buildings, e.g., courthouses. Id. art. 39 would continue judges' salaries, to be paid
from occupied state funds. Privately owned law offices and other law-related facilities or property, e.g., a privately operated poverty law center, are covered under Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, arts. 52, 56; Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, arts. 52, 56 and maybe requisitioned,
but owners must be compensated; see also FM 27-10, supra note 1 2, \ 406; OXFORD MANUAL, su-

mained

in that State; revenues

pra, arts. 54, 56, 60; Lieber Code, supra, arts. 37-38; DlNSTEIN, supra at 224-32.

neutral-country nationals (ships, other means of transport)

Some property of

may be subject to angary, although

Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, art. 53; Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 53 protect
most property of neutrals' nationals, e.g., lawyers' property caught in an occupation situation.
DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 236-37.

If a

courthouse

is,

or

is in,

a historic building or a structure of

some US courthouses, it would be protected during occupation as culProtocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating

cultural significance like
tural property.

Armed Conflicts art. 53, June 8, 1977, 1125
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 71 1 [hereinafter ProConvention for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict arts.

to the Protection of Victims of International

U.N.T.S.
tocol

I];

3, reprinted in

1(a), 4-5,

May

14, 1954,

249 U.N.T.S. 240, reprinted

Convention]; Treaty on Protection of Artistic
art. 1,

Apr. 15, 1935, 49

Stat.

Regulations, arts. 27, 56;
art. 53;

1

999 [hereinafter Cultural Property

Scientific Institutions

3267, 67 L.N.T.S. 290, reprinted in

Hague

II,

supra note

Brussels Declaration, supra, art. 8;

MANUAL, supra note 8, K

&

in id. at

1.87.1; Lieber

9,

FM

Regulations,

id.

at 991;

art. 56;

Hague IV, supra note

7,

OXFORD MANUAL, supra,

27-10, supra note 12,

Code, supra,

& Historic Monuments,

ffif

art. 34; see generally

45-46, 57, 405;

ARAI-TAKAHASHI,

UK
su-

Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 8, at 209, 262-63; JIRI TOMAN, THE

pra note

6, ch. 10;

PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT (1996); Karl Josef
Partsch, Protection of Cultural Property, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note
14.

Hague

8, at

377-97.

IV, supra note

7,

Regulations,

art. 43.
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Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, art. 43.

15.

Earlier international authorities

were similar

promulgating new laws was forbidden unless "necessary." OXFORD MANUAL, supra note
44; Brussels Declaration, supra note 10, art. 3. Lieber Code, supra note 10, art. 32, allowed

in tone;
10, art.

occupiers to "suspend, change, or abolish, as far as the martial power extends
State's laws,

thentic Text].
single

.

an occupied

without the "necessity" limitation.

Authentic Text, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note

16.

."
.

The

final

copy of the authentic

text

17.

DINSTEIN, supra note

18.

BENVENISTI, supra note

19.

Myres

S.

2, at

56 [hereinafter Au-

paragraph of Hague IV, supra note 7 ("Done in The Hague
is

filed

.

.

.

"), says a

with the Netherlands government.

6, at 89.
9, at 7; see also

ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note

6, at

91 n.2, 96.

McDougal & Florentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum Public Order

746(1961).

DINSTEIN, supra note 6, analyzes Hague IV, supra note 7, and cites Hague II, supra note 9,

20.

comment on
ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note

occasionally, DINSTEIN, supra at 4-6, 9, 53, 90, 231, 233, 287, but does not

Hague

pect of

II,

supra note

BENVENISTI, supra note
12. Like

Hague

9,

9,

Regulations,

concentrate on

art. 43.

Hague

IV, supra note 7, as does

IV, supra note 7, the authentic language of Hague

II,

paragraph of Hague

II,

Authentic Text, supra note

16, at 56; the final

this as6,

and

FM 27-10, supra note

supra note

9, is

French, see

supra note 9 ("Done at The

"), says a single copy of the authentic text is in Netherlands archives. Schindler &
Hague
Toman, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 56, rely on THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS
AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at 100-32 (James Brown Scott ed., 3d ed. 1918), that reproduced the US Department of State Convention translations in 22 Stat. 1803 and 36 Stat. 2227.
The International Committee of the Red Cross website has had the erroneous version, as do
ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 91 and the long-influential 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 169 n.4 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1952). FM 27-10, supra note 12, Foreword recognizes that French is the Hague treaties' official language. Id. ^ 363 recites the erroneous English-language Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 43 version. UK MANUAL, supra
note 8, K 1 1.25 seems to rely on the erroneous translation.
.

US
(

.

courts apply treaties' authentic language. Eastern Airlines

1991 ).

from

.

The Executive and the Congress

either. See, e.g.,

supra note

Hamdan

3, arts. 2, 3);

interpret treaties; courts

v.

Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534-37

may interpret them differently

Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 625-33 (2006) (Third Convention,
see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 326. It is the Supreme Court's
v.

interpretation of the laws that counts. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-5 (1974)

(executive action review);

Marbury v. Madison,

review). International court decisions,

e.g.,

entitled to great respect, but they do not bind

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)

(US

statute

of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), are

US courts. Medellin v. Texas,

128 S.Ct. 1346, 1358—

60 (2008).
21.

See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note

DINSTEIN, supra note

6, at

97-98; BENVENISTI, supra note

9, at

12-18;

6, at 108-9.

See generally ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 98-1 1 3.
The French version is the same in both treaties; compare Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, art. 43, 22 Stat. 1821, with Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2227. Since
French is the authentic language of both treaties, it is not clear which is the more accurate English
translation, or if a third and more precise English wording should be used. See supra notes 14-22
and accompanying text. I am not sufficiently fluent in French to offer comment.
24. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 93-96; BENVENISTI, supra note 9, at 9, 26-29, 182-83
22.
23.

if an occupied State's public at large supports it), 209-10. See also
9-14 for the Brussels Declaration and Hague IV, supra notes 7, 10, negotiations. Change in the

(advocating change in the law
id.
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George K. Walker
law based on public support can raise an issue of differences among groups within a State, e.g.,
different ethnic or religious groups that do not command a majority but are a vocal minority.
25.

North Atlantic Treaty, Apr.

4,

1949, 61 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter

NATO

Treaty].
26.

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), Sept.

2,

1947, 62 Stat. 1681,

21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Pact].

Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey are the NATO non-party States. Argentina, Bahamas,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela are the Rio Pact non-party States. United States Department of State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of
America on January 1, 2009, at 410, 343-44, 438-40 (2009) [hereinafter TIF].
28. Id. at 438-40 (NATO: Albania, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; Rio Pact: Bahamas, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago).
29. George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom's Self-Defense Responses, 37 Valparaiso Law Review 489, 498-500 (2003).
30. For the United States, TIF, supra note 27, printed annually but also on the Department of
27. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,

State website.
31.

See supra notes 7-9

32.

See supra notes 7-9, 14-15

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.

The last scenario could have arisen in World War II; Bulgaria and Italy were Hague II,
supra note 9, parties and not Hague IV, supra note 7, parties and were subject to occupation law
33.

for a while.

When the Allies invaded and occupied Sicily and southern Italy, Italy was German's

and a new Italian government declared
war on Germany, the rest of northern Italy controlled by Germany became subject to occupation
law under Germany and, as the Allies moved north into Italy, Allied occupation law under various sovereigns applied. BENVENISTI, supra note 9, at 84-91; DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 37. As the
Allies moved into Europe from the east (USSR forces) and the west (primarily UK, US forces),
parts of Belgium, Denmark (Greenland), France until esparts of other States allied with them
ally;

when the Benito Mussolini government fell in

Italy

—

tablishment of the Charles de Gaulle government, Greece, Iceland

(first as

a Denmark possession

and later after its declaration of independence during World War II), Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Poland, etc. were subject to occupation by consent of governments in exile; belligerent occupation rules did not apply. The same applied to colonial areas Japan conquered that the Allies liberated in the Pacific theater; after annexing Manchuria, Japan established puppet governments
for its conquests. The Allies restored colonies to their European sovereigns. BENVENISTI, supra
note 9, at 60-66; DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 37, 46-47. Italy's colonies and conquests were sub-

—

jected to occupation. BENVENISTI, supra note 9, at 72-81.
34. Another issue is the scope of custom the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments stated.
Nuremberg was decided under Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; parties were France, Great Britain, the USSR and the
United States. The International Tribunal tried high-ranking Nazi officials; other accuseds went
before military commissions. For Japan, accuseds went before military commissions in Tokyo
and elsewhere in Asia and territories Japan occupied during World War II. The US Navy conducted some. George E. Erickson, Jr., United States Navy War Crimes Trials, 5 WASHBURN LAW
JOURNAL 89 (1965). Although it might be argued that only those States and their nationals involved in the trials were thereafter governed by customary rules the trials declared, Resolution
95, supra note 8, unanimously reaffirmed the Nuremberg and Tokyo principles. The Nuclear
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8, shut the door on claims of lack of a customNuremberg standards but do not erase issues of divergence, if any, between custom and Hague II and Hague IV and later interpretations of them. The three ICJ cases

Weapons, 2005 Congo and Wall Cases, supra note

ary

norm

or a variant on

closed the gap,

if it

ever existed.

See DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 90, 108-9,

35.

lations, art. 43. Since the

Hague II, supra note 9,

commenting on Hague

Regulations,

art.

IV, supra note 7, Regu-

43 phrase

is

the same, the

same

construction should apply.
Progressive development

36.

is

a term in the law of treaties;

IAN SINCLAIR, THE
1984) (comment on Vienna
see, e.g.,

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 17-18 (2d ed.
Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53, 64, 71, May 23, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331

[hereinafter

Vienna Convention] status of standards for applying jus cogens). Progressive development, perhaps termed "innovative," can also be seen in secondary sources. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA ^ 136(g) & cmt. 136.1
(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]. De lege ferenda, sometimes
styled lex ferenda, relates to the law as it should be; its antonym is lex lata, law as it presently is.
Vienna Convention, supra, is in force for 109 States. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Between States & International Organizations or Between International Organizations arts. 53,
64, 71, 73, 85, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIALS 543, is not in force but recites
similar rules on this point and is subject to the Vienna Convention, supra. UN-related IGOs have
ratified it, suggesting that it too must be considered if dealing with one of these IGOs. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status of Treaties XXXIII- 1, 3,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=23&subid=A&lang=en

(last visited Sept. 20,

2009)

[hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].

Through Hague

37.

II

and Hague

IV, supra notes 7, 9, Regulations, art. 43's "laws" rules; see

A debate, now maybe settled by ICJ judgments, conon whether and under what circumstances human rights law applies during armed conflict, or whether the LOAC is lex specialise i.e., in LOAC-governed situations, human rights law
does not apply. See infra notes 104, 116 and accompanying text.
38. DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 108-9 says that an occupied State's government can continue
supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
tinues

An

to legislate for occupied territory even after occupation begins.

occupied

State's views,

but the occupier has a

39.

BENVENISTI, supra note

40.

DlNSTEIN, supra note

note

2, art. 64, to

at stake,

DlNSTEIN, supra note

must be met

Hague IV, supra note

7,

is

the territory.

6, at 12.

90-91, 110-16, advocates reading Fourth Convention, supra

allow amending existing law, criminal or

occupied State law

tion needs

9, at ix-x;

6, at

occupier can concur with an

full right to legislate for

civil, if

occupier security interests are

inconsistent with Fourth Convention obligations, civilian popula-

("Article 64's orderly government"), or

Regulations,

art.

maybe other changes under

43 "unless absolutely prevented" exception.

the

FM 27-10,

supra note 12, fj 369-70 recite Article 64 and say that " [i]n restoring public order and safety, the
occupant will continue the ordinary civil and penal (criminal) laws of the occupied territory except to the extent

note

7,

it

Regulations,

supra note

7,

43]

Regulations,

alter, repeal,
a.

may be authorized by
art.

...

art.

[Fourth Convention, supra,

art.

64;

Hague IV, supra
Hague IV,

to alter, suspend, or repeal such laws," referring also to

23(h).

FM 27-10, supra note

12,

*\

371 declares an occupier

may

or suspend laws of the following types:

Legislation constituting a threat to

its

security,

such as laws relating to

recruitment and the bearing of arms.
b.

Legislation dealing with political process, such as laws regarding the suffrage

and of assembly.
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c.

Legislation the enforcement of which

would be

inconsistent with the duties of

the occupant, such as laws establishing racial discrimination.

This seems to go further than Dinstein's interpretation and seems consistent with a view that
occupiers may, by suppressing such laws, in effect promote human rights standards. See, e.g.,
ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 116-36; BENVENISTI, supra note 9, at 187-89, 210-11;
MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 19, at 767-71; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, §§ 172-72b.
UK MANUAL, supra note 8, ffif 11.19, 11.25.1 and 11.60, read together, seem to conclude
similarly. Gasser, supra

note

13, at

254-56, also citing Fourth Convention, supra,

art.

64, says

occupiers must keep national laws in force but that laws serving the purpose of warfare in the

occupied territory or that are a threat to security or an obstacle to applying humanitarian law

may

be repealed or suspended, noting differing views. Gasser's view seems contradicted at
Gasser, supra note 13, at 247-48 when he declares, following Protocol I, Article 75, that
discrimination against civilians for reasons of race, nationality, language, religious convictions

and

An

practices, political opinion, social origin or position or similar considerations

occupier violates this rule

inflict

unlawful.

is

keeps national laws of an occupied State in force that would

if it

these kinds of discrimination.

41. See DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 80-81.
42. Id. at 121.

(human rights standards may be
guide for occupation law); see also supra note 40 (others seem to allow more progressive approach).
44. FM 27-10, supra note 12, ^ 380, quoting Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 46; compare Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, art. 46; see also FM 27-10, supra note 12, ^ 406. It must
be noted, however, that citing Hague IV, supra note 7, and Fourth Convention, supra note 2,
provisions in FM 27-10, supra note 12, ffif 381-87 suggests that the drafters had a more restrictive
view in 1956, i.e., what they meant was humanitarian law and not today's human rights law.
45. E.g., FM 27-10, supra note 12, f 377, declares an occupier's broad right to impose media
censorship, without citing authority. International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights art. 19,
43.

BENVENISTI, supra note

9, at

14-15, 187-89, 210-11

Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], declares a right to expression of opinion in
writing or in print, subject to "certain restrictions
sary." Id., art. 4 allows derogations

ens the
strictly

life

from

.

.

of the nation and the existence of which

required by the exigencies of the situation

treaties. See infra

.

provided by law and [which] are necestime of public emergency which threat-

this right "[i]n

.

.

is officially

,"

a derogation provision in

.

notes 109-21 and accompanying text.

ship in the light of human rights law? Are the rules the
rights law?

human rights

How should an occupier apply censor-

same under occupation law and human

A further problem, upon which authorities divide, is whether human rights law ap-

plies extraterritorially,

such that occupier State personnel carry with them

tions of their country into an occupied State.

(they do); DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 70 (they
46.

proclaimed ... to the extent

ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note

6,

human rights obliga-

Compare ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note
do not).
65-67; BENVENISTI, supra note

at

9,

6, ch.

21

at 184-87;

6, at 51-52; see also U.N. Charter arts. 1(2), 55-56; LELAND F. GOODRICH
ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 29-34, 371-82 (3d rev. ed. 1969); Rudiger Wolfrum,
Self-Determination, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 47-63 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed.

DINSTEIN, supra note

2002).
47.

Fourth Convention, supra note 2,

Second Convention, supra note 3,
supra note

1 1,

at 413;

art.

art. 1 58; see also First

Convention, supra note

62; Third Convention, supra note 3, art. 142.

2 PlCTET, supra note

1 1,

at 283; 3

PlCTET, supra note

1 1,

As

at 47,

3, art.
1

63;

PlCTET,

648 and 4

PlCTET, supra note 11, at 625, explain, Martens clauses bind Convention parties, even though
they denounce the Convention(s), by the principles in them insofar as they express inalienable
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rules. See also Hague II, supra note 9, pmbl.; Hague IV, supra
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 36, U 2; INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
Application of International Humanitarian Law and Fundamental Human Rights
in Armed Conflicts in Which Non-state Entities Are Parties u 4 (Aug. 25, 1999), reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflicts, supra note 2, at 1205, 1207; institute for Human
Rights, Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards pmbl. (Nov. 30-Dec. 2,

and universal international law
note

7,

pmbl.;

1990), reprinted in

at

id.

1

199, 1200;

ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note

68-71 (ICJ cases support

6, at

view that clauses restate customary international law); MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR
Victims of Armed Conflict 44 (1982); Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of

ARMED CONFLICT

17-18, 34, 349 (2d ed. 2000); Greenwood, supra note

pact difficult to assess).

8,

§ 129(2) (clauses' im-

A preamble is not part of a treaty's binding language but may explicate its

and purpose. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 31(2); see also ANTHONY AUST,
Modern Treaty Law and Practice 235-38 (2d ed. 2007); Sinclair, supra note 36, at 127-28,
object

130.
48.

Protocol

Parties, supra

ventions;

I,

note

many

supra note 13,
4, lists

are or were

DlNSTEIN, supra note

art. 1(2)

6, at 7

US

under
51
ter

Cf.
its

parties

compared with 194

Con-

for the 1949

alliance or coalition partners in Afghanistan or Iraq. See also

UK MANUAL, supra note 8, ^

effective control in Iraq

If each

I

("determined minority" of non-ratifying States for Protocol

pra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
49. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at
50.

(customary law, Martens clause protection). State

168 States as Protocol

1

71,

657-60 thinks

1.3.3.

The

I);

su-

so.

coalition

had

joint responsibility for areas

during 2003-4. DlNSTEIN, supra note

occupying power has a separate zone to administer, as

in

World War II, each power is responsible under occupation law for

6, at 48.

Germany and Austria af-

its

zone. Id. at 48-49. This

does not respond to the issue of different interpretations and applications of the laws, including

new

legal

regimes to replace what

may have been

laws like those in force in Nazi Germany. In

zonal occupations, as in coalition occupations, the occupying powers should reach consensus on

new legal

regimes, looking to

when an occupied

State regains full sovereignty.

and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 69, 78-81 and accompanying text.
54. Although precedent {stare decisis) is an entrenched common law principle, States, including NATO and Rio Pact, supra notes 25, 26, countries, may adhere to a civil law standard like
ICJ Statute, supra note 6, art. 59, declaring that a judgment only binds States before the Court
and only for the particular case.
55. There are others, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 17(1) (General Assembly must approve UN budget); see also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 46, at 148-67; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 46, at 334-36.
56. U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48, 94(2), 103; see also DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 273; GOODRICH
52.

See supra note 39

ET AL., supra note 46,

at

207-1 1, 334-37, 555-59, 614-17; SAN

REMO MANUAL, supra note 36,

fflf

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 46, at 454-62, 776-80, 1 174-79, 12921302; W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AMERICAN

7-9;

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, 87 (1993)
25, 48, 103 are treaty law binding
57.

U.N. Charter

(principles

from Council decisions under arts.

UN members, overriding other treaty obligations).

arts. 51, 103; see also

GOODRICH ET

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 46,

at

AL., supra

note 46, at 342-53;

778-806. U.N. Charter

art.

THE

2(1) recognizes

mean that in the absence of govGOODRICH ET AL., supra note 46, at 36-40;

the principle of State sovereignty, traditionally interpreted to

erning law, States may act in their interest. See also
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 46, at 68-91.
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In the case of self-defense,

it

George K. Walker
more than self-interest; it is an inherent right the Charter enshrines under Articles 51 and 103.
Debate continues on whether the right of self-defense includes a right of anticipatory self-defense
and, more recently, claims of a right to take preemptive action. See generally George K. Walker,
Filling Some of the Gaps: The International Law Association (American Branch) Law of the Sea
Definitions Project, 32 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1336, 1355-56 nn. 102-3
is

(2009).

National sovereignty, sometimes diminished or eroded, has been a fundamental principle
since the Peace of Westphalia. Treaty of Peace of Minister, Fr.-Holy
24, 1648,

1

Rom. Empire,

art. 64,

Consol. T.S. 198, 319; Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Swed.-Holy Rom. Empire,

Oct.

art. 9,

CHRISTIAN L. WlKTOR, MULTILATERAL TREATY CALENDAR
1648-1995, at 3 (1998). The Peace of Westphalia began the modern State system. Leo Gross, The
Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1948).
Treaties besides the U.N. Charter art. 2(1) ("sovereign equality" of UN members) and decisions
invoking the sovereignty principle include the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 157(3),
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter LOS Convention]; Vienna Convention, supra note
36, pmbl; S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 10, at 4, 18; S.S. Wimbledon (U.K.
v. Ger.), 1923 id., No. 1, at 15, 25; see also Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations 8c Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, Principle 6, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970); Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States
& Protection of Their Independence 8c Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131 (1965); the Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, If 29, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2004) (States accepting UN Charter benefit of "privileges of
[must] also accept its responsibilities"); the Secretary-General, An Agenda for
sovereignty
Peace: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. Doc. A/49/277, S/
241 1 1 (1992); MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 2123 (Brian Chapman ed., 3d ed. 1977); JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 45-49
(Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 287-89; GOODRICH ET AL.,
supra note 46, at 36-40; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, §§ 37, 107; LORD
MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 754-66 (1961); RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, Part I, ch. 1,
Introductory Note, 16 8c 1 7; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra at 70-9 1 R.P. Anand,
Sovereign Equality of States in International Law, 197 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 9, 22-51 (1986); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the
United Nations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1992, at 89, 98-99; Jonathan I. Charney, Universal
International Law, 87 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 529, 539 (1993); Gerald
Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the
Rule ofLaw, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 1, 49Oct. 24, 1648,

.

.

id.

at

1

19, 198; see also

.

;

50 (1957); Louis Henkin, International Law:

Politics,

Values and Functions, 216,

(1989); Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178,

Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106,

id.

at 1,

id.

at 9,

id.

at 9, 46,

130

32 (1982); C.H.M.

156-72 ( 1962). Sovereignty is

HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? TOWARD
A DIPLOMACY FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY 21-22, 235-37 (2001) declared that the sovereignty
a debatable issue today.

concept was in trouble; Henkin, supra, had earlier recognized sovereignty's force, but in LOUIS

HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8-10 (1995) denounced it.
58. There are differences among countries on the law of self-defense. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text. Even this "easy" case might raise perceptions of equal justice. There are also
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possibilities

of renewed

essarily self-defense,

is

or outbreak of new

hostilities,

involved. See generally

hostilities, where the LOAC, and not necARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, ch. 12.

Cf Fourth Convention, supra note 2, arts. 64, 66; Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, art.
Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 43; FM 27-10, supra note 12, ^ 374; ARAI-

59.

43;

TAKAHASHI, swpra note

157-62; DlNSTEIN, supra note

6, at

334-37, 339-41; Gasser, supra note

273-77. For

13, at

US

6, at 137;

forces

4 PlCTET, supra note

and others subject to

1 1,

it, it is

at

the

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2009) [hereinafter UCMJ].
60. Fourth Convention, supra note 2, arts. 64, 66; Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, art.
43; Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 43; ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 162-84;
DlNSTEIN, supra note
61.

Hague
note

Cf.

2, art. 64;

UCMJ, supra

note 59,

art. 2,

§ 802,

is

at

334-37, 339-41.
Regulations,

art.

43;

premised on the nationality jurisdiction prin-

Code covers wherever they

go.

BROWNLIE,

300-304; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note

6,

§§ 137-38;

a State's criminal laws follow those the

i.e.,

supra note

6,

at

Restatement, supra note

6,

§§ 402(1), 402(2).

To be sure, the differences can be erased in terms of law on the books if an occupier State

promulgates changes to local law in conformity with
sist

1 1,

Hague II, supra note 9,

supra note 13, at 271-72.

at 337; Gasser,

62. E.g.,

63.

136-37; 4 PlCTET, supra note

IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 43; DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 132-34; 4 PlCTET, swpra

1 1,

ciple,

6, at

Fourth Convention, supra note

among an occupied

State's legal

community and

its

its

standards, but a perception might perconstituents, particularly

if

the differ-

ences are great. Local law refers to a jurisdiction's law exclusive of its conflict of laws, or private

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4(1) (1971,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF
2004). Lieber Code, supra note 10, art. 43, declared prize money would be

international law, principles.

1988

rev.)

LAWS

[hereinafter

§ 2.1 (4th ed.

paid according to "local law," presumably the captor's law. See also infra note 144 and accompa-

nying

text.

64.

DlNSTEIN, supra note 6,

73, protected persons but

an attacking

force,

at

99-107

(civilians

become combatants

can be Fourth Convention, supra note

subject to the

then revert to protected status as

2, art.

LOAC if they participate as part of

civilians).

65. This is subject to Fourth Convention authority to try them in special military courts and
under lawful changes an occupier State might make in occupied State law. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
66. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res. 60/288,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006); Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51(2); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of

Armed Conflicts arts. 4(2)(d), 13(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, reTHE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 775 [hereinafter Protocol II];

Non-International
printed in

INSTITUTE FOR

HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, art. 6; Commission of Jurists, Hague Rules Con-

cerning Air Warfare

note

2, at

art. 22,

Feb. 17, 1923, reprinted in

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra

315, 317; International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Declaration

on the Rules of In-

ternational Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International
Armed Conflicts art. A2, Apr. 7, 1990, in id. at 1 195, 1 196; see also BOTHE ET AL., supra note 47, at

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 8, ft 8.5.1.2, 1 1.3; RESTATEMENT,

300-301, 677-78; BROWNLIE, supra note
note

6,

§ 122, at 401-3;

NWP

6, at

745;

may be a universal crime); COMMENTARY ON
the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, at 618,
1375, 1453 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmerman eds., 1987). A caveat is
supra note

6,

§ 404 (State-sponsored terrorism
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that terrorists' trials

might be in special military courts or local courts

in

an occupied State under

occupier or occupied State law, which might differ from international standards. See supra notes

67 and accompanying text.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, inter alia codified as 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w (2009).
68. The problem can be largely eliminated in coalition or alliance operations if coalition or
allied forces operate in defined areas, e.g., the UK and US sectors in Iraq and zones in occupied
Germany and Austria after World War II, or if one country is the occupier State, as was the situation in Japan after World War II. There are no reported issues of this nature involving other
States that sent forces to Iraq as part of the coalition. Agreements among occupier States, like status of forces agreements with rules on primary jurisdiction, might resolve issues among States,
but a problem of occupied State and international perceptions might remain.
60, 65, infra note
67.

Pub.

69.

For the 2003 Iraq coalition,

L.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1483, S.C. Res. 1483, U.N.

Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); 1511, S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003);
and 1546, S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004), were the chartering documents,

commentary on
Andrea Carcano, End of the Occupation in 2004? The

recognizing the Coalition Provisional Authority and the occupation's end. For
Iraq after occupation ended, see generally

Status of the Multinational Force in Iraq After the Transfer of Sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Gov-

ernment,

1 1

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 41

(2006), then (in 2005) arguing that the

Interim Government did not meet sovereignty standards and that the coalition continued as oc-

and accompanying text.
70. Cf BENVENISTI, supra note 9, at 20-21. An example is a criminal trial penalty phase
where occupier State law allows the death penalty, perhaps under the LOAC, human rights law
and occupied State law would not, following conviction for violating the law of war. Cf FM 2710, supra note 12, Tf 508 (death penalty possible for grave breaches); but see also Fourth Convencupiers. See also infra notes 78-81

tion, supra

note

FM 27-10, supra note 12, ^ 445; 4
1, at 361-63; Gasser, supra note 13, at 274. A similar issue is if occupier State

2, art. 75;

PlCTET, supra note

1

Protocol

I,

supra note 13,

art.

75(4);

human rights law does not, and occupier State law prescribes an
from occupier State law. A common execution method under US
other States might use methods not compatible with, e.g., U.S. CONST,

law allows capital punishment,
execution

law

is

method

different

lethal injection;

amend.

VIII.

U.N. Charter arts. 10-11, 13-14 (provisions for Assembly recommendations), 33, 36-37
(Chapter VI provisions for possible Council action), 39-51 (Chapter VII provisions for situa71.

tions involving breaches of the peace or threats to international peace

and

and security and the inher-

and possible Council action).
Sydney D. Bailey & Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council 1821, 236-37 (3d ed. 1998); BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 14; JORGE CASTENADA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF
United Nations Resolutions 78-79 (Alba Amoia trans., 1969); Goodrich et al., supra note
46, at 111-29, 133-44, 257-65, 277-87, 290-314; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 6, § 16; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 103(2)(d) & r.n.2; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
ent right of individual

collective self-defense

72.

NATIONS, supra note 46, at 257-87, 298-326, 583-94, 616-43, 717-49.
73. See W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: Preventing and Arresting
Mass Murder, 40 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 72-73 (20072008), citing Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377, f 1, U.N. Doc. A.1775 (Nov. 3, 1950),
employed during the Korean War to continue UN operations; Wall Case, supra note 8, 2004
I.C.J, at 148-51 (adv. op.); Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1952 I.C.J. 151, 163-71 (adv.
op.); compare Joseph Isanga, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Emergence of a Rule of
Customary International Law from U.N. Resolutions, 32 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW & POLICY 233, 238-49 (2009), also citing 2005 Congo Case, supra note 8, 2005 I.C.J, at 53-54;
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Nuclear Weapons, supra note

8,

1996

I.C.J, at

254-55; Military

&

Paramilitary Activities in

&

99-108 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua
Case]. See also GEORGE K. WALKER, THE TANKER WAR, 1980-88: LAW AND POLICY 175-77
(2000) (Vol. 74, US Naval War College International Law Studies). Otherwise-non-binding
Council resolutions, e.g., calls for action under Chapter VII, supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text, could evolve into a customary norm. Isanga, supra at 240, citing 2005 Congo Case, supra
note 8, at 53-54; Wall Case, supra at 171.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held differently on another important General
Assembly resolution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 734 n.12 (2004), declined to accept the Declaration as part of US customary
international law because the US UN Permanent Representative, Eleanor Roosevelt, had
declared the Declaration was not a binding standard. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887
(2d Cir. 1980), reached a different conclusion on State-sponsored torture. DlNSTEIN, supra note
6, at 68 and Committee on the Enforcement of Human Rights Law, International Law
Association, Final Report on the Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National
and International Law, Report of the 66th Conference 523, 544 (1994) say many Declaration
provisions reflect customary international law. This illustrates dilemmas for US and other
national decisionmakers; choices made in conformity with national law standards may not be
the same as public international law norms or as the law as perceived by allied States. A related
issue has been the growth of "soft law," i.e., standards, perhaps coming from an IGO, a nonbinding agreement or a non-governmental organization (NGO), that deserve consideration,
even if they may not have source of law status. AUST, supra note 47, at 52-53.
74. General principles of law are another primary international law source. ICJ Statute,
Against Nicaragua (Nicar.

supra note

6, art.

38( l)(c);

LAW, supra note 6, §

12;

v. U.S.),

1986

I.C.J.

14,

BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at

19,

15-27; OPPENHEIM'S

but see RESTATEMENT, supra note

6,

INTERNATIONAL

§§ 102(1 )(c), 102(4)

& cmt.

/

(gen-

eral principles a subsidiary source).

75.

See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.

76.

Vienna Convention, supra note

36, art. 31(3)(b)

may

give an answer.

It

provides that

subsequent practice under a treaty, and presumably an ipso facto binding UN resolution emanating from the Charter (which
treaty.

is

a treaty), establishes the parties' agreement

A longstanding view has been, however, that treaties and custom are coequal in status; see
6, art. 38( ); RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 102. A custom coming later in

ICJ Statute, supra note

time might trump an
note 47, at

14;

1

earlier, inconsistent treaty, particularly if

BROWNLIE, supra note

6, at 5;

in desuetude.

it is

RESTATEMENT, supra note

these construction principles apply to Charter law situations

there

on application of the

is

not

clear.

6,

AUST, supra

§ 102 r.n.4.

Whether

A reconciliation is that

may be a clear difference between the newer custom and the older treaty, such that Article

31(3)(b) does not apply.
77.

Cf Nicaragua Case, supra note

78.

S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 69.

79.

S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 69; for questions related to self-defense issues possibly arising

73, 1986 I.C.J, at 94.

during an occupation, see supra notes 57-70 and accompanying
80.

U.N. Charter

81.

DlNSTEIN, supra note

arts. 25, 48, 103; see also
6, at

273.

text.

supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.

What began

in

2004 was another kind of occupation

occupation by consent of the government of Iraq and not belligerent occupation under the

LOAC,

subject to Security Council Resolution 1546, supra note 69, standards. DlNSTEIN, supra

36 (citing pre-Charter examples), 273. The Fourth Convention/Hague IV, supra notes

note

6, at

2, 7,

regime ended June 30, 2004. There can be

UN forces occupation with host country consent
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or in a kind of trusteeship; these are not belligerent occupations unless there

is

UN enforcement

from peacekeeping operations. DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 38; Michael
Bothe, Peace-Keeping, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 46, at 648, 683.
These operations, often governed by Council decision but perhaps other UN resolutions, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text, may draw from the LOAC of belligerent occupation for
action, as distinguished

their

governance standards.

82. For analysis of "due notice" in the law of the sea (LOS) context, see LAW OF THE SEA
Committee, Report, in Proceedings of the American Branch of the International Law
ASSOCIATION 2007-2008, at 217-20 (2008) [hereinafter LOS Committee Report].
83. The Executive Board is WHO's executive arm, very roughly analogous to the UN Security Council. Constitution of the World Health Organization arts. 10, 19, 21-22, 24-37, 59-60,
July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185. E.g., Iraq, the United Kingdom and the United

States are

WHO members, but there may not be a common matrix of conventions, agreements

or regulations

among these countries.

TIF, supra note 27, at 370-72.

84. Cf. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 691-92; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
6, § 16; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 102, 103(2) (c), cmt. c & r.n. 1; supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
85. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, arts. 34-38; AUST, supra note 47, ch. 14; BROWNLIE,
supra note 6, at 627-29; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, §§ 626-27; McNAIR,
supra note 57, ch. 16; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 323.
86. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
87.

See supra note 73.

U.N. Charter arts. 51, 103; see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. This is not
as far-fetched as it might seem. In 1805 as part of Third Coalition actions against Napoleon
Bonaparte, the commander of Austrian forces in the Italian peninsula established a cordon, "ostensibly" to protect against spread of yellow fever behind his defense lines. FREDERICK W.
KAGAN, THE END OF THE OLD ORDER 501 (2006). Although this was a mask for Austrian troop
88.

buildup to await enemy attack if it came, suppose an occupier uses forces in self-defense in ways

under the circumstances. The right of self-defense would trump
rules. However, an occupier might use a
factorial approach like that suggested infra notes 156-95 and accompanying text to implement
that have an incidental effect of violating health regulations but are reasonable

WHO

self-defense to give partial or total effect to
89.

See supra notes 55-57

90.

U.N. Charter

91.

See supra note 73.

WHO rules.

and accompanying

art. 103; see also

text.

supra notes 55-57, 71-73 and accompanying

text.

An example from the law of naval warfare is the difference, sometimes subtle, between
the SAN REMO MANUAL and NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra notes 8, 36. Although both deal
92.

with LOAC rules for conflicts

which had some resonance in the 2003-4 Iraq situation, anmore of these issues.
93. ICJ Statute, supra note 6, art. 38( 1 ) (d) (writings of scholars); BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at
691-92; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, § 16; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§
at sea,

other occupation might raise

102, 103(2)(c), cmt. c
94.
95.

Elias,

& r.n.

1,2.

See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying

text.

BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 510-12 (Jus cogens' content uncertain); T.O.
The Modern Law of Treaties 177-87 (1974) (same); Oppenheim's International
See generally

LAW, supra note 6, §§ 2, 642, 653 (same); McNAIR, supra note 57, at 214-15 (same);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 102 r.n. 6,323 cmt. b, 331(2), 338(2) (same); SHABTAI ROSENNE,
Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986, at 281-88 (1989); The Charter of the
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UNITED NATIONS, supra note 46, at 62 (dispute over self-determination as jus cogens); GRIGORII
I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF International Law 98 (William E. Butler trans., 1974) (all of the CharLevan Alexidze, Legal Nature o/Jus Cogens

Contemporary Law, 172 RECUEIL
DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.L] 219, 262-63 (1981); John N.
Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking, 7 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
& POLICY 9, 25-29 (1977); Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Last Third ofa Century,
159 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.L] 9, 64-67 (1978);
ter isjws cogens);

in

Georg Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens?, 43 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 455 (1978) (jus
cogens non-existent for self-defense, any other purpose); Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in
International Law, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 291 (2006) (current analysis); Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, As Illustrated by the War in
Bosnia- Herzegovina, 17 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1995) (criticizing the
concept). An International Law Commission (ILC) study acknowledged primacy of UN Charter
Article 103-based law and jus cogens but declined to list ^'ws cogens norms. International Law
Commission, Report on Its Fifty-Seventh Session (May 2-June 3 and July 11-August 5, 2005),
U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 221-25, U.N. Doc. A/60/10 (2005) (2005 ILC Rep.); see
also Michael J. Matheson, The Fifty-Seventh Session of the International Law Commission, 100
American Journal of International Law 416, 422 (2006).
96. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 8, 1996 I.C.J, at 245 Nicaragua Case, supra note 73, 1986
I.C.J, at 100-10 1 see also Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third
Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 50 and Commentary fflf 1-5 at 247-49, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts], reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 288-89 (2002) ("fundamental substantive obligations");
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, § 2 (Art. 2(4) a fundamental norm);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 102, cmts. h, k; 905(2) & cmt. g (same). The Court is bound by
;

;

its

6, arts. 38, 59; maybe that is why it did not adopt jus
on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of Congo v.

sources rules, ICJ Statute, supra note

cogens for the issue.

Armed

Activities

Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 3, 29-30, 49-50 (Feb. 3) (jurisdiction, admissibility of application) [hereinafter 2006 Congo Case] held a jus cogens violation allegation was not enough to deprive the Court
of jurisdiction, preliminarily stating that Convention on Prevention

& Punishment of Crime of

9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] represented erga
omnes obligations; see also Application of Convention on Prevention & Punishment of Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 191, f 161 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Genocide
Case], citing 2006 Congo Case, supra. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 53 (declaring jus
cogens standards), was among other treaties 2006 Congo Case, supra, cited. While also citing Nicaragua and Nuclear Weapons cases, supra notes 8, 73, Shelton, supra note 95, at 305-306 says the
2006 Congo Case is the first ICJ case to recognize jus cogens, but its holding seems not quite the
same as ruling on an issue and applying jus cogens. The case compromis included the Vienna
Convention, supra note 36, which raises jus cogens issues that the Court could have decided under that law as well as traditional sources. ICJ Statute, supra note 6, arts. 36, 38, 59. Thus the issue
technically remains whether the Court will apply jus cogens as a separate trumping norm, or
whether it will apply jus cogens as stronger custom among competing primary sources treaties,
custom, general principles under id., art. 38(1). If the Court is true to its treaty-based rules, it
should opt for the latter analysis. However, it is clear that a case will find the issue before the
Court and it is reasonably clear that an appropriate case will find the Court declaring for jus
cogens, perhaps as trumping custom under id.

Genocide, Dec.

—

—
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97.

Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right

INTERNATIONAL

to Self-Defense, 3

& COMPARATIVE LAW 767, 823-27 (1997)

(U.N. Charter

cogens norm); hut see Schwarzenberger, supra note 95. Draft Articles
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 96, art. 21

on

ILSA JOURNAL OF

art.

51 represents jus

Responsibility of States

& Commentary, at 177-80, reprinted in

CRAWFORD, supra note 96, at 166, resolves conflict between UN Charter Articles 2(4) and 51,
saying that no Article 2(4) issues arise if there is a lawful self-defense claim, appearing to give Arsame status as Article 2(4). If Article 2(4) has jws cogens status, and Article 5 1 does not,
would be that a self-defense response, otherwise lawful under Charter or customary
law, would violate ajws cogens norm in id. art. 2(4).
98. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, pmbl., arts. 53, 64, 71; see also AUST, supra note 47, at
319-20; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 331(2)(b) & cmts. e, f; 338(2) & cmt. c; SINCLAIR, supra
ticle

5 1 the

the result

note 36, at 17-18, 218-26 (Vienna Convention, supra, principles considered progressive devel-

opment
99.

in 1984).

See generally Final Report, supra note

100. TIF, supra note 27,

is

valuable

if the

8;

Symposium, supra note 8; Walker, supra note 8.

United States

is

a party; Multilateral Treaties, supra

may help if the UN Secretary-General is the depository; other treaties list other sites, and
still others may be found on unofficial websites, e.g., State Parties, supra note 4. Contacting the
US Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser (for US researchers) or a State's foreign ministry may also be useful, particularly if there are ongoing negotiations on what treaties are in
note 36,

force.

See supra notes 12-34, 48 and accompanying text.
Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 60(5). See generally Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 96, art. 40 & Commentary ^ 8, at
333, 336, reprinted in CRAWFORD, supra note 96, at 288, 290; AUST, supra note 47, at 295 (although negotiators had 1949 Conventions, supra notes 2, 3, in mind, Article 60[5] "would apply
equally to other conventions of a humanitarian character, or to human rights treaties, since they
create rights intended to protect individuals irrespective of the conduct of the parties to each
other"); BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 622-23; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, §
649, at 1302; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 335, cmt. c; SINCLAIR, supra note 36, at 190; Louise
Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 293
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 94 (1993); Crawford, Introduction, in CRAWFORD,
supra note 96, at 41 (State cannot disregard human rights obligations because of another State's
breach; no Vienna Convention, supra note 36, citation for the point); David Weissbrodt & Peggy
L. Hicks, Implementation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Situations of Armed
Conflict, 293 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 120 (1993). AUST, supra, seems to be the only commentator
applying Article 60(5) to human rights treaties; see also Crawford, supra. Preparatory works
discussing other sources, supra, and Article 60(5)'s text ("treaties of a humanitarian character"), as distinguished from "treaties of a human rights character," which is not the Article
60(5) language, suggest a misstating of the law if distinctions between humanitarian and human rights law remain.
103. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 60; Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39, 64 (Sept. 25) (Article 60 customary law) [hereinafter Project Case]; Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 47
(June 21) (Article 60(3) customary law); Article 25 of Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of
Treaties 27, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 657, 662, 1077-96 (Supp. 1935)
[hereinafter Harvard Convention]; Draft Articles on Responsibility on States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, supra note 96, art. 42 & Commentary, at 294-30 1 reprinted in CRAWFORD, supra
101.

102.

,
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note 96, at 255-60; AUST, supra note 47, at 293-96; BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 622-23;
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, § 649; MCNAIR, supra note 57, ch. 36;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 335; SINCLAIR, supra note 36, at 188-90; Jimenez de Arechaga, supra

note 95, at 79-85.
104.

2005 Congo Case, supra note 8, 2005 I.C.J, at 60 (occupied territory); Wall Case, supra
2004 I.C.J, at 173-77 (occupied territory) (adv. op.); Nuclear Weapons, supra note 8,

note

8,

1996

I.C.J, at

239 (armed

conflict) (adv. op); see also

rights apply to persons within a State's territory

DlNSTEIN, supra note

and subject

to

its

6, at

69-71 (human

authority). Id. 85-88 adds,

however, that if the LOAC and human rights law conflict, LOAC as lex specialis governs. See also
Wall Case, supra note 8, 2004 I.C.J, at 177-81 (human rights law also applies to areas subject to a
State's jurisdiction but outside its sovereign territory, but possibility remains for applying LOAC
as lex specialis); ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 414-25; BENVENISTI, supra note 9, at 187-89.

UK MANUAL, supra note 8,
graph in

4,

1.8 states that the

must enforce applicable human rights law and that if an
Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention], party the Convention as
is

a

European Convention

for Protection of

amended may apply in occupied territories.
sal

LOAC applies during occupations, but in para-

1.19 declares that an occupier

1

occupier

Nov.

1

If

Human

Declaration of

tion, supra note 2, Article

UK MANUAL, supra note 8, 1

1 1

adds that Univer-

.60

must also apply during Fourth Conven64-governed proceedings. The Declaration may fare differently in US
Rights, supra note 73, rules

courts. See supra note 73.

81-85.

105.

DlNSTEIN, supra note

106.

Vienna Convention, supra note 36, arts. 61-62; see also Project Case, supra note 103,
39 (Articles 61, 62 customary norms); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973

1997

I.C.J, at

I.C.J. 3,

6, at

6, at

18 (Feb. 2)

623-25; ARIE

(

same for Article 62 );AUST, supra note 47, at 296-300; BROWNLIE, supra note
DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION ch. 1 (1975); ELIAS, supra

E.

note 95, at 119-30; Harvard Convention, supra note 103,
stantibus);

note

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note

6,

art. 28, at

1096-1126 (rebus

§§ 650-51; RESTATEMENT, supra

6, § 336; SINCLAIR, supra note 36, at 190-96; Report of the International

on the Work of Its Eighteenth
(1966), reprinted in 2 (1966)

Session, 21 U.N.

GAOR,

sic

Supp. No.

9,

Law Commission

U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.

YEAR BOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

1

211, U.N.

255-58 [hereinafter 1966 ILC Rep.]; Gyorgy Haraszti,
Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 1 (1975); Robert D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The
Treaty on Treaties, 64 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 535, 541-44 (1970) (Vienna
Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A7 1966/ Add.

1,

at 169,

Convention, supra note 36, drafting negotiations); Oliver

J.

Lissitzyn, Treaties

cumstances, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 895

and Changed Cir-

(1967); Walker, supra note 8, at

65-68 (1993). MCNAIR, supra note 57, at 685 does not recognize a separate impossibility
some of his examples are impossibility situations and might be cited as such.

rule;

pacta sunt servanda rule [is] universally
Vienna Convention, supra note 36, pmbl. (".
recognized"), art. 26; see also U.N. Charter pmbl. ("respect for obligations arising from treaties"); Project Case, supra note 103, ICJ at 78-79 ("What is required in the present case by
107.

.

.

.

pacta sunt servanda, as reflected in Article 26 of the [Vienna Convention, supra]

is

.

that the Parties

AUST, supra note 47, at
144-45, 187; BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 591-92 (general principle of law); Harvard Convention,
supra note 103, art. 20, at 977 (rule of law); 1966 ILC Rep., supra note 106, at 211 (pacta sunt
servanda a rule of law); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, §§ 12, at 38, 584 (pacta
sunt servanda a customary rule); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 214-17 (Max Knight
find an agreed solution within the cooperative context of the Treaty.");

trans.,

2d

rev. ed.

1967) (pacta sunt servanda comes from custom);
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MCNAIR, supra note

57, at

George K. Walker
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 321 & cmt. a (pacta sunt servanda at core of law of interand is "perhaps the most important principle of international law"); THE
Charter of the United Nations, supra note 46, at 35-36, 92-93, 96-97; Sinclair, supra note
465, 493;

national agreements

36, at 83-84, 119 (no suggestion pacta sunt servanda a

supra note 106, at 516-17 (Vienna Convention, supra

fundamental norm); Kearney
art.

& Dalton,

26 negotiations analysis).

Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 30; AUST, supra note 47, ch. 12; BROWNLIE, supra
at 629-30; Harvard Convention, supra note 103, art. 22, at 661-62, 1009-29;
Restatement, supra note 6, § 323.
109. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 4; see also Nuclear Weapons, supra note 8, 1996 I.C.J, at
239 (adv. op.); INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 47, art. 4; INSTITUTE FOR
Human Rights, supra note 47, art. 18; Subatara Roy Chowdhury, Rule of Law in a State
OF EMERGENCY 12-13, 22-29, 59, 121-25, 210-1 1 (1989), analyzing International Law Association Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency, 1984; Joan
Fitzpatrick, Protection Against Abuse of the Concept of "Emergency," in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 203 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994);
Louis Henkin, International Human Rights as "Rights," 1 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 446-47 (1979).
Some human rights treaties apply in peace and war, e.g., Convention Against Torture & Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2(2), Dec. 18, 1984, 1468 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter Torture Convention]; Genocide Convention, supra note 96, art. 1, whose terms
are at least customary law. Reservations to Convention on Prevention & Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28); DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 147; supra
note 96 and accompanying text. Treaties can provide for armed conflict, e.g., Convention on
Rights of the Child arts. 38-39, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Others have no derogation
clauses, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3. Here law of treaties rules for armed conflict may apply. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
110. DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 71-74 (two regional human rights treaties, e.g., European
108.

note

6,

Convention, supra note 104, exclude application during armed
111.

ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 4(2), listing Articles 6

(right to

conflict).
life,

death penalty standards), 7

(prohibition against torture), 8(1) (prohibition against slavery), 8(2) (prohibition against servi-

(imprisonment for contract breach barred), 15 (ex post facto criminal laws barred), 16
(recognition as a person before the law), 18 (freedom of thought, conscience, religion); see also

tude),

1 1

ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6,

ch. 19

("expanding catalogue of human rights of non-derogable

nature"); DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 74-79 (other explicit, implicit
112. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.

limitations).

113. See supra note 109.
1 14.

This is so for the Genocide and Torture Conventions, supra notes 96, 109. There are oth-

ers that lack derogation clauses. See supra

note 109.

The LOS treaties except the LOAC from its rules through its "other rules" clauses. Before
these treaties went into force, custom governed the LOS; alongside this custom, the LOAC in
treaties, custom and general principles applied during armed conflict. See infra notes 118-19 and
115.

accompanying

text.

at 85-88; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text. George
The 2006 Conflict in Lebanon, or What Are the Armed Conflict Rules When Legal Principles Collide?, ch. 15, in Enemy Combatants, Terrorism, and Armed Conflict Law (David
K. Linnan ed., 2008) proposes a factorial analysis for LOAC-human rights law and similar
clashes based on private international law (conflict of laws) analysis; see also ARAI-TAKAHASHI,
supra note 6, chs. 17-18, 24 for similar analysis; FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN

116.

DlNSTEIN, supra note 6,

K. Walker,

251

Occupation in Iraq: A Rubik's Cube Problem?
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997); John Norton Moore, Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in MOORE, LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN
THE MODERN WORLD ch. 1 (1974) and sources cited in George K. Walker, Principles for Collective
Humanitarian Intervention to Succor Other Countries' Imperiled Indigenous Nationals, 18
American University International Law Review 35, 56 n.l 1 1 (2002) (Kosovo), published
in part as Walker, Application of the Law ofArmed Conflict During Operation Allied Force: Maritime Interdiction and Prisoner of War Issues, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO'S
KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 85 (Andru E. Wall ed., 2002) (Vol. 78, US Naval War College International

Law Studies) (factorial approaches for intervention).
117. Under the LOAC occupation begins when enemy territory is placed under hostile forces'
authority. Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, art. 42; Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art.
Occupation ends a year after military operations end under Fourth Convention, supra note 2,
Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 3 declares that occupation law standards continue until occupation ends, which could be more than a year. See also ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 16-

42.

art. 6.

24; Bothe, supra note 81, at 59;
11, at

62-63;

DlNSTEIN, supra note

6, at

42-45, 270-73; 4 PlCTET, supra note

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS,

Nazi Germany disappeared as a sovereign State at World War

supra note 66, at 68. Although

end, States like Japan and Italy
and continued in occupation status after the war. The debellatio doctrine,
i.e., where a State disappears due to total subjugation in war, has been criticized as a principle of
contemporary international law. Compare BENVENISTI, supra note 9, at 92-96, 183 (debellatio
has no place in current international law) and ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra at 34-40 (German sovereignty survived; argument against applying debellatio) with DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 2, 32-33
II's

retained sovereignty

(debellatio doctrine

remains viable).

118. 5 Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law § 513, at 383-84 (1943);
Harvard Convention, supra note 103, art. 35(a), at 664, 1183-1204; Institut de Droit International, The Effects ofArmed Conflicts on Treaties (Resolution of the 1985 Helsinki Session) arts. 34, 61 (2) ANNUAIRE 278, 280 (1986); Institut de Droit International, Regulations Regarding the Effect of War on Treaties (Approved at the 1912 Christiania Session) art. 5, reprinted in 7 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 154 (1913); AUST, supra note 47, at 308-1 1 (ILC's "ostrichlike" approach that a provision was unnecessary for Vienna Convention, supra note 36);
BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 620-21 (ongoing ILC work on the subject); OPPENHEIM'S

INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, § 655; MCNAIR, supra note 57,
note

6, § 335, cmt.

c;

ch. 43;

G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Judicial Clauses of the Peace

RESTATEMENT, supra
73 RECUEILDES

Treaties,

COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 255, 312 (1948); Cecil
The Effect of War on Treaties, 2 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37, 42
also

Hurst,

(1921); see

36, art. 60(5); supra notes 102-5

and accompanying text.
The LOS conventions' "other rules of international law" clauses are an example. See LOS

Vienna Convention, supra note

119.

J.B.

Convention, supra note 57, pmbl.,

arts.

2(3) (territorial sea); 19, 21, 31 (territorial sea innocent

by
economic zone, or EEZ); 78 (continental

passage); 34(2) (straits transit passage); 52(1) (archipelagic sea lanes passage; incorporation

reference of Articles 19,21, 31); 58(1), 58(3) (exclusive
shelf; coastal State rights

do not

affect superjacent waters,

i.e.,

State cannot infringe or unjustifiably interfere with "navigation

territorial

or high seas; coastal

and other rights and freedoms of

other States as provided in this Convention"); 87( 1 ) (high seas); 138 (the Area); 293 (court or tri-

bunal having jurisdiction for

must apply LOS Convention and "other rules of
LOS Convention); 303(4) (archeological, historical

settling disputes

international law" not incompatible with the

found at sea, "other international agreements and rules of international law regarding the
and historical nature"); Annex III, Article 21(1); Convention on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 28, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 92 [hereinafter High
objects

protection of objects of an archeological
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Seas Convention]; Convention

on the

Territorial Sea

and Contiguous Zone

arts. 1(2),

22(2),

Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention]. Al-

though the other 1958 LOS treaties do not have other-rules clauses, they declare that waters
within their competence are high seas areas; the High Seas Convention, supra, art. 2 "other rules"
clause applies. See Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 3, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing & Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas
arts. 1,2, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. The same is true for the contiguous zone
next to the territorial sea; beyond the territorial sea, the contiguous zone is a high seas area. LOS
Convention, supra,
Convention, supra,
torial sea

art.

33(1); Territorial Sea Convention, supra, art. 24(1). See also

art. 1,

defining "high seas" as all parts of the sea not included in a State's terri-

or internal waters. Like the territorial sea, airspace above

sovereign territory.

High Seas

Convention on International

Civil Aviation

it is

part of a coastal State's

arts. 1, 2,

Dec.

7,

1944, 61 Stat.

1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.

The longstanding consensus has been that these clauses mean that LOAC rules apply during
armed conflict as between belligerents; neutrals' rights may also be affected, and as to neutrals'
rights among themselves, the LOS, perhaps conditioned by the law of neutrality, prevails. There
has been a minor trend toward citing the clauses for other than LOAC situations. LOS
Committee Report, supra note 82, at 300-07.
The other- rules clauses confirm statements on applying belligerent occupation law beyond
an occupied

LOS have an exclusion for LOACLOAC, the result is that occupation law

State's lands. Since all areas subject to the

governed situations, and occupation law

is

part of the

extends seaward to an occupied State's territorial sea and to
its

its claims under other sea areas, e.g.,
EEZ, and fishing zones in addition to inland waters and
sovereign territory. DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 47-48; INSTITUTE OF

contiguous zone, continental

airspace above

its

shelf,

INTERNATIONAL LAW, OXFORD MANUAL OF NAVAL WAR art. 88 ( 1913), reprinted in THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 1 123, 1 135; see also Fourth Convention, supra note 2, art.
2 (applies to total or partial occupation of Convention party's territory); 4 PlCTET, supra note 11,
at 21.

and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 45, 109-16 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 1 10 and accompanying text.
1 24. Not all customary human rights norms have jus cogens status. RESTATEMENT, supra note
6, § 702, cmt. 1 1. The important point is that law of treaties rules do not apply to custom-based
rules. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW
120. See supra notes 102-5

3-10,

1

14-35 (1989). Custom also has limiting doctrines,

See infra note 140

and accompanying

125. G.A. Res. 56/83,

e.g.,

the persistent objector principle.

text.

U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83

(Jan. 28, 2002).

on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note
art.
25
8c
Commentary,
at 194-206, reprinted in CRAWFORD, supra note 96, at 178-86. State of
96,
necessity is not the same as necessity as a qualification for invoking the right of self-defense or as a
qualification of standards for ordering an attack under the LOAC. States and commentators differ if anticipatory self-defense is lawful in the Charter era. See supra note 57; see also Thomas M.
Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 715, 719-37 (2008) (noting distinction between proportionality in selfdefense and LOAC situations, and four other circumstances, including reprisals). See also supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 14-15, 35-42, 108 and accompanying text.
126.

Draft Articles
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128.

That seems to be the

36, although these

note

do not

on Responsibility of
8c notes 398, 435-

drafters' intent for Article 25. Draft Articles

States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 96,
refer to

Hague

Commentary^ 2, 21

IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 43. DlNSTEIN, supra

seems to agree, although he does not cite Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
he does note that Brussels Declaration,

6, at 109,

for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 96, art. 25;

supra note 10,

art. 3

uses "necessary."

129.

See supra notes 35-42

130.

See generally Franck, supra note 126, at 719-37.

131.

Fourth Convention, supra note

(stateless persons);

and accompanying

compare Hague

II,

text.

2, art. 33; see also

supra note

9,

Protocol

Regulations,

arts.

I,

supra note 13,

44-45 (occupied

art.

73

territory

Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, arts. 44-45 (occupied territory "inhabitants"). See also ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 285; BOTHE ET AL., supra note 47, at 446-50;
DlNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 61-63; FM 27-10, supra note 12,
272, 495(e), 497; NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 8, f 6.2.3.2 n.48; 4 PlCTET, supra note 11, at 45-52, 227-29;
Commentary on the Additional Protocols, supra note 66, at 845-55; Gasser, supra note
13, at 219-20, 248-49. The United States did not reserve to Article 33, see THE LAWS OF ARMED
"population") with

ffij

CONFLICTS, supra note 2,

at

680-8 1, but the United States says it does not consider a comparable

provision prohibiting reprisals against civilians in Protocol

tomary law insofar

ANNOTATED,
the

as

it

I,

supra note 13,

art.

51(6), as cus-

armed conflict. NWP 1-14M
ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 285-89 (also noting
supra note 13, art. 51(6)); Frits Kalshoven, Noncombatant Per-

prohibits reprisals against civilians during

supra, % 6.2.3 n.36; but see

UK reservation to Protocol

I,

The LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 300, 306 (Horace B. Robertson Jr. ed., 1991) (Vol. 64,
US Naval War College International Law Studies); Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat,
in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, supra note 8, at 105, 204-7.

sons, in

Protocol
tocol

I,

I's

provision applies during armed conflict, not during occupations;

supra note 13,

arts.

tion, supra note 2. Article 4

conflict as those persons

it is

recited in Pro-

48-71, and not in Articles 72-79, which apply to the Fourth Conven-

of the Fourth Convention defines protected persons during armed

who find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of

a party to the conflict or an occupier State of which they are not nationals,

i.e.,

the Convention

bound by the Convention or of a
neutral State without normal diplomatic representation with a State in whose hands they are, are
covers persons not parties to a conflict. Nationals of States not

Second and Third Conventions, supra note 3,
The upshot is
33 does not cover reprisals against civilians of an opposing belligerent during armed

not regarded as protected persons. Those the

First,

cover are also considered not to be protected persons. 4 PlCTET, supra at 45-51.
that Article

conflict. Cultural

Property Convention, supra note

tural property; see also

ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note

13, art. 4(4) prohibits reprisals against cul6, at

253-54;

TOMAN,

supra note 13, at 71.

132. BRIERLY, supra note 57, at 399; FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 27 ( 1971); 2
Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
UNITED STATES § 588 (3d ed. 1945-47); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, § 135; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 6, § 905 8c r.n. 8; JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 288-89
(1959 rev.). Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 96, Part 3, ch. 1, at 324-54, reprinted in CRAWFORD, supra note 96, at 281-302, charts a course
apart from traditional reprisal and retorsion law, substituting a new term, countermeasures.
133.

Although Fourth Convention, supra note

sons or property,

it

2, art. 33,

bars reprisals against protected per-

does not prohibit retorsions. 4 PlCTET, supra note

1 1

,

at

224-29; see also supra

notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
134. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, arts. 19-23; see also AUST, supra note 47, ch. 8;
BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 612-15; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, §§614-19;
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MCNAIR, supra note 57,

ch. 9;

RESTATEMENT, supra note

6,

§§ 313-14; SINCLAIR, supra note 36,

ch. 3.

650-88.

It is

THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at
I, supra note 13. Reservations and Declarations, in THE LAWS

and Declarations,

135. See Reservations

also true for Protocol

of Armed Conflicts, supra note

2, at

in

792-818.

1 36. LOS Convention, supra note 57, art. 309. For possible application of this treaty, see supra
note 1 19. It may also govern other occupation contexts as codified custom.

137.

Compare the ILC

reservations study, Text of Draft Guidelines on Reservations to Treaties

Provisionally Adopted So Far by the Commission, in Report of the International

Law Commission

on the Work of its Fifty-fifth Session, 58 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10 at 50, U.N. Doc. A/58/10
(2003) and Preliminary Conclusions of the International Law Commission on Reservations to Normative Multilateral Treaties Including Human Rights Treaties, in Report of the International

Commission on the Work of its Forty-Ninth Session, 52 U.N.

GAOR Supp. No.

Law

10 at tH 65-157,

U.N. Doc. A/52/10 (1997), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/
A_52_10.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2009), which so far follows the Vienna Convention, supra
note 36, approach, for Articles 19-23, with Human Rights Committee, General Comment

Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Addendum: Comment No. 24(52), General Comment
on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the
Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (Nov. 2, 1994), reprinted in 34 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 839, 840, 842. This approach was criticized by United Kingdom, Observations of
Franklin Berman, U.K. Foreign & Colonial Office Legal Adviser, to UN Human Rights Committee, July 20, 1995, in United Kingdom Materials on International Law, 66 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 584, 655 (Gregory Marston ed., 1995); and Human Rights: 2001 Digest
305. Commentators differ on whether the Committee approach was beyond its competence.
AUST, supra note 47, at 150-51; BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 615; FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS
AND INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 153-60 (1988); LlESBETH
Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human rights Treaties: Ratify and Ruin? ch. 3 (1995);
Francesco Parisi & Catherine Sevcenko, Treaty Reservations and the Economics ofArticle 21 (1) of
the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1, 20-22 (2003); Edward T.
Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 307, 321-22 (2006). The ILC has
been at work on the law of treaties related to multilateral reservations after receiving UN General
Assembly endorsement for the project. G.A. Res. 48/31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/31 (Jan. 24, 1994);
G.A. Res. 49/51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/51 (Feb. 17, 1995). For a short analysis through its 2005
session, see generally Matheson, supra note 95, 418-19; Swaine, supra. For counterpoint on
Swaine's analysis, see Laurence R. Heifer, Response: Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and
Treaty Design, 31 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 367 (2006). The Commission continues its work. See generally Main Pellet, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, Eleventh report on reservations to treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/574 (Aug. 10, 2006).

Human

rights

law

is

relevant for occupations. See supra notes 43-49, 104-5, infra note 152

and accompanying text.
138. The law on these

is

vague. George K. Walker, Professionals' Definitions

and States' Inter-

pretative Declarations (Understandings, Statements or Declarations) for the 1982

Convention, 21
139.
ers

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 461

Vienna Convention, supra note
id., art.

54(b).

of the Sea

36, does not cover desuetude or obsolescence;

considered these exceptions to performance

don a treaty,

Law

(2007) offers solutions.

fell

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note

255

its

draft-

under principles of parties' conduct to aban6,

§ 646, at 1247; see

Occupation in Iraq: A Rubik's Cube Problem?
also AUST, supra

163-64

note 47, at 306-7; McNAIR, supra note 57, at 516-18; SINCLAIR, supra note 36, at

not entirely satisfactory); Richard Plender, The Role of Consent in
57 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133, 138-45 (1986).

(drafters' explanation

the Termination of Treaties,

Desuetude claimants must take into account the pacta sunt servanda principle. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 26; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text. Some LOAC treaties

maybe in desuetude. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 36, % 136 cmt. 136.2 (Convention
Relating to Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at Outbreak of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 205
Consol. T.S. 305, in desuetude).
140.

See

Committee on Formation of Customary (General)

Statement of Principles Applicable

to the

International Law, Final Report:
Formation of General Customary International Law, in

BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 11; OPPENHEIM'S
International Law, supra note 6, § 10, at 29; NWP 1-14M Annotated, supra note 8, u 5.4.1;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 102, cmts. b, d; Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of Law, 47
British Yearbook of International Law l, 23-27; Waldock, supra note 57, at 49-52; 1
Customary International Humanitarian Law xxxi-xlii (Marie Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (no view on persistent objector doctrine, citing the doubts of Maurice
H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 RECUEIL DES COURS
D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 227-44 [1998]); but see also Charney, supra note 57, at 538-41 (persistent objector rule's existence open to serious doubt). J. ASHLEY
ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (2d
ed. 1996), an exhaustive study of LOS claims protests, demonstrate that the rule is alive and well
Final Report, supra note 8, at 712, 738-40;

LOS issues. Problems with studies of States' objections are that many lie buried in chancellery
files because they seem to have little public research value when filed; they may be subject to national security concerns, cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 312 r.n.5; there may be time delay
rules barring publication until after a period of years; or States may have selective or non-publifor

cation policies like courts' unpublished opinion rules.

Germany after World War II; these countries were
divided into four occupation zones. Germany had annexed Austria in 1938; the Third Reich
ceased to exist as a State with surrender of German armed forces in May 1945.
141.

This was the situation in Austria and

142.

Except perhaps Kuwait, which

may have signed a bilateral self-defense agreement (up to

now not published) with the United States, countries involved in the 1 990-9 1 and 2003 Iraq conflicts

were coalition partners. George K. Walker, The

1991,1991

Crisis

Over Kuwait, August 1990-February

Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 25,

30.

been the Afghanistan situation after 9/11; these have been NATO operations
with separate US zones, although there has been no formal occupation. See generally Carcano,
supra note 69, at 58; Walker, supra note 29, at 498-500 (participation under NATO Treaty, supra
143. This has

note 25; Rio Pact, supra note 26; Security Agreement

(ANZUS Pact), Sept.

131 U.N.T.S. 83; bilateral agreements like Treaty of Mutual Cooperation

Minute

& Exchange of Notes,

144.

conflict.

1951, 3 U.S.T. 3420,

& Security, with Agreed

By
had become a non- international armed conflict or remained
ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 6, at 23-24.
Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632, 373 U.N.T.S. 179.

2009 there was debate on whether
an international

1,

it

Local law refers to a jurisdiction's law exclusive of its conflict of laws, or private interna-

tional law, principles. See supra note 63.
145. This can range

from general criminal law and different punishments
government traffic laws and the like.

for crime

among

these subdivisions to local

family law, contracts, torts, property.

146.

E.g.,

147.

Protocol

for

I,

supra note 13; Protocol

II,

supra note 66, governing conflicts like

which the law of belligerent occupation does not apply unless a
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wars,

State fighting insurgents
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recognizes their belligerency.

Then the Fourth Convention, supra note

Article 3, applies. If a State

a party to Protocol

is

DINSTEIN, supra note

conflicts.

6, at 34; see also

148. State Parties, supra note 4,

Protocol

note

I,

supra note 13, parties;

4, lists

149. See,

lists

I its

2,

through

its

Common

Article 1(4) applies to self-determination

4 PlCTET, supra note

164 States as Protocol

II,

11, at

25-44.

supra note 66, parties, and 168 as

many are US alliance or coalition partners. State Parties, supra

194 States as 1949 Geneva Conventions parties.
supra note 48 and accompanying

e.g.,

150. Protocol

I,

supra note 13,

text.

arts. 1, 3, 49(4), 68, 72; see also

37-52, 57-60, 291, 428-29, 441-45;

BOTHE ET AL., supra note 47, at

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS,

supra

note 66, at 34-56, 66-69, 606-8, 809-10, 841-44.
151. Protocol

I,

supra note 13,

arts. 3

(extending Fourth Convention, supra note

2, art. 6,

protections from a year after general close of military operations until occupation ends); 5(4)
(parties to conflict must approve Protecting Power, amending Fourth Convention, supra note 2,
art. 11); 43-44 (altering Contracting Parties in Third Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(A)(2));
45(3) (greater protections for those taking part in hostilities not entitled to prisoner of war status,
unless accused of espionage, extension of Fourth Convention, supra note 2,
refugees,
7,

amending Fourth Convention, supra note

64-65, 96, 182, 281; 4 PlCTET, supra note
1

52.

1 1,

2, art. 4); see also

art. 5);

73 (prewar

DINSTEIN, supra note

6, at

at 45-64, 99-1 13.

Torture Convention, supra note 109. As Multilateral Treaties, supra note 36, at IV-9 sug-

gests for this treaty in listing 146 parties, all States are not parties to every human rights treaty; the

issue

web

is

lie

whether custom or general principles bind non-party States. Beneath
regional

human

States alike) are parties.

rights treaties that

The

must be consulted

issue here, like general treaties,

is

if

this general treaty

States (occupier

and occupied

whether a regional treaty applies

under law of treaties rules for territorial application. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 29;
AUST, supra note 47, at 202-5, 439-40; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, § 621;

MCNAIR, supra note

57, at 116-17;

36, at 87-92. If territorial rules

RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 322(b); SINCLAIR, supra note

do not apply, a question

is

whether a treaty applies to the person

of one accused of a violation, under a treaty to which his/her country is a party, customary law,

ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 2; DINSTEIN,
147; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, § 622; RESTATEMENT,

general principles of law or jus cogens standards. See,

supra note 6, at 82,
supra note

6,

e.g.,

§ 322 r.n.3. Treaty succession principles

may also

govern territory

rules; see Final

8; Symposium, supra note 8; Walker, supra note 8.
The same is true for the Genocide Convention, supra note 96. RESTATEMENT, supra note
6, §§ 702(a), 702(d) & cmts. a-b, d, g, o, r.n.1-3, 5; see also supra notes 95-98 and accompanying

Report, supra note
153.

text.

154. See supra note 57

and accompanying

text.

There may be similar issues under other Charter law or the law of IGOs and perhaps soft
law norms derived from them or NGOs. See supra notes 55-57, 71-77, 82-94 and accompanying
1

55.

text.
e.g., NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 8,
3.1 1.5.1, 4.3.2.2, 5.5; see also BRADD C.
Naval Rules of Engagement: Management Tools for Crisis (1989); D.P.
O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 169-80 (1975); Christopher Craig, Fighting by the Rules, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, May-June 1984, at 23 (UK Wartime ROE, 1982

156.

Cf,

ffif

Hayes,

Falklands/Malvinas War); James C. Duncan, The Commander's Role in Developing Rules of En-

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer

Grunawalt, The
JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate's Primer, 42 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 245
(1997); J. Ashley Roach, Rules of Engagement, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Jan.-Feb. 1983,
gagement,

at 46, reprinted in 14

1999, at 76; Richard

J.

SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE 865
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(1988);

Occupation in Iraq: A Rubik's Cube Problem?
Ivan A. Shearer, Rules of Engagement and the Implementation of the Law of Naval Warfare,

id.

at 767.

Neil Brown, Issues Arising from Coalition Operations:

157.

An

Operational Lawyer's Perspec-

International Law and Military Operations 225, 228-31, 233 (Michael D. Carsten
ed., 2008) (Vol. 84, Naval War College International Law Studies); Vickie McConachie, Coalition Operations: A Compromise or an Accommodation, in id., ch. 12; Dale G. Stephens, Coalition
Warfare: Challenges and Opportunities, in THE LAW OF WAR IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY: WEAPONRY
AND THE USE OF FORCE 245 (Anthony M. Helm ed., 2006) (Vol. 82, Naval War College Internative, in

Law Studies).

tional
158.

OF

Charles Dunlap, Legal Issues in Coalition Warfare: A

See, e.g.,

WAR IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY, supra note

US Perspective,

in

THE LAW

224 (possibility of different interpretations by coalition partners); McConachie, supra note 157, at 242-43 (East Timor); Stephen A.
Rose, Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS: LIBER
157, at 221,

AMICORUM PROFESSOR JACK GRUNAWALT 225 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 1998) (Vol. 72, Naval
War College International Law Studies). The International Institute of Humanitarian Law will
publish draft multinational
159.

ROE in the near future.

Cf NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 8, % 3.1 1.5.1

(US Coast Guard, Department of

Defense units performing law enforcement duties).
160.

Roach, supra note 156.

161.

See supra notes 14-34, 50-54, 71-77, 82-98, 134-55 and accompanying text.

162.

Restatement, supra note

163.

Restatement (Second), supra note 63.
WALKER, supra note 73, ch. 6 (environmental issues during armed conflict); Walker, The

164.

2006 Conflict
supra note

1

in

Lebanon, supra note

1

16 (Israel- Lebanon-Hezbollah, 2006); Walker, Principles,

16 (Kosovo).

"Conflict of laws" in

165.

6.

US law instead of private international law or transnational law, ICJ

Judge Philip C. Jessup's phrase for transactions and situations crossing national borders, results
from the scholarship of US Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story. See PHILIP C. JESSUP,

Transnational Law

(1956); Joseph Story,

Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws

(1834).

"Public international law," as contrasted with private international law or conflict of

166.

laws,

is

much

a term used throughout

of the world; in

title

to

BROWNLIE, supra note

LAW, supra note

6,

representing older

law. Cf. the

courts before the end of the
167.

last

6;

US law the field is known as international

but see the

title

to

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL

UK usage. Conflict of laws issues seldom arose in English

century. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 63, §§

1.1, 2.1.

Some UN law and jws cogens if the latter applies. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63,
common-law factorial analysis,

§ 6(1) gives primacy to statutes governing conflict of laws over

an analogy to supremacy of Charter Articles 103 and 51 (the right of self-defense) and Security
Council decisions under Articles 25, 48 and 94 over treaties. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying

text. In

US

courts state statutory or

common-law

and

conflict of laws rules

must

satisfy the

Constitution's due process and

full faith

U.S. 797, 816-23 (1985). This

another higher law analogy for Charter law supremacy on self-de-

fense

and Council decisions

is

credit provisions. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts,

472

in public international law.

Law and Policy, 96
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 278 (2002) (book review).
169. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 73 1 F.2d 909, 948-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
168.

E.g.,

Jane G. Dalton, George K. Walker's The Tanker War, 1980-88:

Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 853-56 (N.C. 1988); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 63, §§
2. 19-2.24; WALKER, supra note 73, at 542. Other multifactor analyses have been criticized. See, e.g.,
Boudreau

v.

258

—
George K. Walker
John Norton Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence ofMyres S. McDougal and Harold Lasswell,
54 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 662 (1968), supporting the law-science-policy (LSP) decision-making
approach Myres McDougal advocated but noting criticisms. LSP LOAC analysis, MCDOUGAL &
FELICIANO, supra note 19, is still helpful. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND
World Public Order (1980) uses the analysis.
1 70. No one expects commanders, or an individual sailor, airman, soldier, Marine, or civilian

on what to do in anticipatory or many reactive self-defense situations; here ROE give basic rules and declare the fundamental law of self-defense, and that is
enough, if commanders act or acted on facts they know, or reasonably should have known. See,
supervisor, to seek legal advice

e.g.,

Walker, The 2006 Conflict

171.
56;

in

Lebanon, supra note

Fourth Convention, supra note

Hague

2, arts. 2, 6;

1

IV, supra note 7, Regulations, arts. 42-56;

BENVENISTI, supra note

9, ch. 2;

61; 4 PICTET, supra note

1 1,

16, at

258-59, 269.

Hague II, supra note 9, Regulations, arts. 42-

DlNSTEIN, supra note

ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note

6, ch. 2;

at 17-25, 58-64; Gasser, supra

6, at 16;

FM 27-10, supra note 12,

Iflj

351-

note 13, at 240-46.

55-57 and accompanying text.
173. LSP analysis has been concerned with public order, i.e., public international law, issues,
as titles to MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO and MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra notes 19, 169, suggest. See
also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
174. If cargo loss claims come from voyages to or from US ports, US courts must apply US
law, i.e., the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (2006), modifying International
Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat.
233, 1 20 L.N.T.S. 1 55 [hereinafter Brussels Convention] Since the United States is not a party to,
e.g., Protocols, Feb. 23, 1968, 1412 U.N.T.S. 121, andDec. 21, 1979, 1412 U.N.T.S. 121, to amend
the Brussels Convention or the superseding United Nations Convention on Carriage of Goods
by Sea, Mar. 31, 1978, 1695 U.N.T.S. 3, shipments to and from US ports are not governed by their
terms. US courts might apply other treaty standards if litigants are nationals of States that are
172. See supra notes

.

parties to these treaties, however.
175.

See supra notes 82-87

176.

Fourth Convention, supra note

and accompanying
2, art. 64;

text.

Hague

II,

supra note

Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 43; see also 4 PICTET, supra note
thrust of the Fourth Convention, supra note 2,
arts.

64-78

—DlNSTEIN, supra note

is

6, at 128-29;

9,
1 1,

Regulations,
at 335.

at

335-69;

43;

Although the

protecting accuseds in penal legislation

4 PICTET, supra

art.

see id.

UK MANUAL, supra

note 8, fflf 1 1.56-1 1.74 say Article 64 applies equally to private law claims. Even if Articles 64-78
would be held to apply only to criminal law, the first paragraph of Hague IV, supra note 7, Regulations, art. 23(h) declares that

it is

"especially forbidden

.

.

.

[t]o declare abolished,

suspended, or

and actions of the nationals of the hostile party." Article
23(h) applies during occupations. DlNSTEIN, supra at 135. The Article 23(h) prohibition is a customary norm. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. There is no comparable Hague II, supra
note 9, provision; see supra notes 12-13, 40 and accompanying text.
1 77. Conflict of laws, or private international law, is governed by lex fori, the law of the forum;
it is "procedural" in nature, as distinguished from the "substantive" law of, e.g., contracts or
inadmissible in a court of law the rights

torts.

and accompanying text.
179. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
180. The American Law Institute (ALI) is a non-profit corporation in Philadelphia. It elects
US state and federal judges, academics and lawyers as members; there are ex officio members, e.g.,
US law school deans. The Institute works with the American Bar Association and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on law-improvement projects. None of
178.

See supra note 173
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these organizations

is

government-affiliated or sponsored.

No government

or court in the

United States must accept and apply any standard these organizations publish unless, of course,
higher authority,
181.

Phillips,

for this analysis
if

e.g., legislation,

declares a restatement provision

is

the rule to be followed.

An analogy
US national law and an international standard are the same. This occurs

supra note 167, 472 U.S. at 816; SCOLES ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.23.

is, e.g., if

US statutes implement a treaty without modifying treaty standards, e.g., Hamdan, supra

note

627-33 (UCMJ, supra note 59, art. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821 [2006] incorporates Third
Convention, supra note 3, art. 3, rules without modification). It can also happen if courts agree
that US judge-made law is the same as customary international law, e.g., The Pacquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 686-700 (1900), whose rules for wartime capture of inshore fishing boats are the
20,

548 U.S.

at

same in international law, Convention No. XI
Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval

Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the

War art. 3, Oct.

18, 1907,

36

Stat.

2396.

Habana general

customary international law and scholarly research rules also remain the same for

US

Compare Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 with Sosa, supra note 73, 542 U.S. at 734.
182. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, §§ 6(1), 145, 187;

SCOLES ET

AL., supra

note 63, §§ 2.14, 17.24, 18.8.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, §§ 6,

183.

see also

courts.

tended that the section 6 policies would be

examine the

145, 187-88.

initially applied;

some

The Restatements drafters inif no statute is involved,

courts,

(e.g., id. §§ 145, 187-88) first, with review of section 6 factors
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 63, §§ 2.14, 2.19. The Restatements' black-letter sec-

special provisions

next, or not at

all.

and Comment materials represent the ALI's official position. Reporters' notes after sections
are not the ALI position but explain and amplify sections and Comments. See also supra note 180
and accompanying text.
184. U.N. Charter art. 103; see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
185. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 102 & cmts. g, h, k; see also supra notes 55-57, 71-77, 95tion

98 and accompanying
186.
i.e.,

text.

The RESTATEMENT, supra note

6, also

distinguishes between jurisdiction to prescribe,

authority to legislate; jurisdiction to adjudicate,

i.e.,

authority to subject people or things to

court process; and jurisdiction to enforce, or executive authority to compel or induce compli-

ance with law.

It

then gives factors for asserting kinds of jurisdiction, and for universal crimes,

authority to prescribe rules and adjudicate issues connected with them.

Compare

id.

§§ 102

&

401-4, 421, 423, 431-32 with RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, § 6. Similar
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, has special factorial standards for selected transnational
transactions, taxation and anti-competitive (i.e., anti-trust) activities; the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 63, purports to cover all areas of US law. Compare RESTATEMENT, supra
note 6, §§ 411-16 with, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, §§ 145, 187-88.
cmts.
to

g, h, k;

id.,

187. Many US jurisdictions apply RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, methodologies.
Some do analysis differently, e.g., examining a factor list (e.g., for torts), before considering
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 63, § 6, the opposite of what the drafters intended. See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 63, § 2.19. US federal courts follow the RESTATEMENT

(SECOND), supra note 63,
ris v.

if there is

no

statute, treaty or contrary precedent.

e.g.,

Har-

Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003-4 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying Restatement [Sec-

ond] in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-governed case) with Oviessi
Iran,

Compare,

v.

Islamic Repub. of

573 F.3d 835, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (applying state law in case under the Act to effectuate
may cite RESTATEMENT, supra note

Congressional intent). Transnational or maritime law cases

Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163-67 (2004) (anti-trust);
Club Med Mgt. Serv., 63 F.3d 166, 183-98 (3d Cir. 1995) (maritime personal injury).

6, e.g., F.

Neely v.
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188.

Changes have come through

CONFLICT OF LAWS 538-45 (13th

legislation or treaties. See generally

PETER HAY ET

AL.,

ed. 2009).

4332 (2006). U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 20-22 (1995),
Reprinted in 34 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1080, 1 102-4, uses similar factorial analysis.
190. Cf. Frank M. Snyder, Introduction, in US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, SOUND MILITARY
189. 42 U.S.C. §

DECISION (1992).
191. See supra note 181
192.

and accompanying

text.

A State can decline to invoke a reservation, inviting a claim of later practice inimical to

the reservation. If a State has previously objected but does not do so in a particular situation, that

could weaken an objection's "persistency." See supra note 140 and accompanying text. However,
might a State recite, in publicly declining to invoke a reservation or objection, that its action in a
particular occupation situation

law on

is

subject to

its

prior reservation or objection in

all

other cases?

Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 30(2) (treaty
clause that it is subject to earlier treaty); see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
194. This has been the New York state experience, where its conflict of laws rules evolved
from traditional vested rights rules to a factorial approach (contacts, interest analysis) for each
issue in a case, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 280-85 (N.Y. 1963) (which jurisdiction's
guest passenger law should apply), to rules for variants on the issue, Neumeier v. Kuehner, 268
N.E.2d 454, 457-59 (N.Y. 1972), to applying these rules in other cases, e.g., Cooney v. Osgood
Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 279-84 (N.Y. 1993) (work-related injury), which also recognized
the supremacy of the US Constitution's full faith and credit and due process principles, analogous to the UN Charter's primacy for public international law issues; see supra notes 55-57 and
accompanying text. Less-than-critical analysis can cause results that many would think wrong,
e.g., Shultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
195. See generally Neumeier, supra note 194.
196. Dunlap, supra note 158, at 227-28.
197. These means of swift communications apply as well to coalition planning; indeed, one
issue may be too many communications. It is a far cry from the courier system of two hundred
years ago. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 88, at 280-81 (communications difficulties for Third Coalition facing Napoleon, 1804-5).
198. Letter from John Paul Jones to Joseph Hewes (May 19, 1778), in SAMUEL ELIOT MORIThere seems to be

son,

little

this,

but

cf.

John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography

199. This can also occur

between the LOAC and law derived from other IGOs or NGO claims.

See supra notes 55-57, 71-77, 82-90
200.

Hague

IV, supra note

134-55 and accompanying

7,

KAGAN, supra note

and accompanying

Regulations,

text.

art. 43; see also

supra notes 14-34, 50-54, 82-98,

text.

201. See supra notes 156-93
202.

55, 56 (1959).

and accompanying

text.

88, at 279-80, discusses

problems of staffing, planning and coordi-

nating large-scale armies during the Napoleonic Wars, and separation of overall priorities and

war planning in World War II. Might a similar division of tasks be appropriate for lawyers who
serve commanders, particularly in occupation situations? E.g., US occupation planning spanned
years before plans were put into effect after surrenders in Europe. See generally HARRY L. COLES
& Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors ch. l (1964).
203. Having this analysis committed to records, electronic or otherwise and perhaps classified,

may help justify ultimate actions commanders take, particularly if there are claims of legal liability,

or

if there

are questions raised during later litigation, diplomacy or legislative investigations.
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White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez's unfortunate reference to the 1949 Geneva Conventions as "quaint" is a negative example of how these memoranda can hurt an author and those
who supervise him or her as well as subordinates relying on them. The other side of the coin is

memoranda can be a positive support for action taken, even if the
LOAC situations, and occupations as well, a commander
member is bound by what he or she knew, or reasonably should have

that well-reasoned, thoughtful
result

is

untoward. In self-defense and

or individual service

known, before

acting. See supra note 170. Part of this reasonableness rule

is

advice

on the

law;

how a choice of law was derived is critical to a record of that advice, even
from action taken may not be seen as good in the eyes of some.

solid analysis justifying

though
204.

results

A peripheral issue is correctly translated treaties for clarity of interpretation and applica-

Some treaties have plurilingual texts, all of which are authentic, see, e.g., U.N. Charter art.
and for which Vienna Convention, supra note 36, Article 33 rules apply. Others, like Hague
and IV, supra notes 7, 9, have one official language. Might it be appropriate for foreign or de-

tion.

Ill,
II

fense ministries to review treaties, particularly those in
tion

and note the problem

between,

e.g.,

common use, to be sure of proper transla-

military manuals? For

in, e.g.,

the official French text of Regulations, Article 43

Hague

II

and

IV, the difference

and unofficial translations maybe

There seem to be other translation issues. See supra notes 14-34 and
See also AUST, supra note 47, at 253-55 (Article 33 recites custom); McNAIR,

significant in occupations.

accompanying text.

supra note 57, at 30-31, ch. 25; RESTATEMENT, supra note

6,

§ 325, cmt. f &

r.n. 2,

§ 326; SINCLAIR,

The more difficult problem is how to correct
the problem. If over one hundred years have passed, and some States still adhere to Hague II, supra note 9, what chance is there for general acceptance of amending protocols? Might it be arsupra note 36, at 147-53 (Article 33 recites custom).

gued that

parallel

that practice

custom,

under the

cf.

ICJ Statute, supra note

treaties, see

6, art. 38(1),

supersedes the treaty rule, or

Vienna Convention, supra note

36, art. 31(3)(b), cures the

today a customary rule. See generally Genocide Case, supra note 96,
2007 I.C.J. H 160; AUST, supra at 241; SINCLAIR, supra note 36, at 135-40. Another issue is considering review of national military manuals, e.g., FM 27-10, supra note 12, for correct translations

problem? Article 3 1 (3)(b)

is

and applying them. It is unlikely that States will negotiate amending protocols to correct
mistranslations; manuals might note the problem and declare customary rules that have developed, either as superseding law or as practice under the treaties. Third, manuals should recognize developing principles that

developed

rules, jus cogens

cannot be discounted,

may

apply to future occupations,

norms and human

rights law.

either.
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e.g.,

influence of

Charter law, IGO-

NGOs

and

soft

law

XIII
The Occupation of Iraq: A Reassessment

Eyal Benvenisti and
I.

The

Guy Keinan*

Introduction

invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq in 2003 provided a rare oppor-

tunity to examine the viability in the twenty-first century of a legal doctrine

rooted in the military and political circumstances of the nineteenth century. 1 The rarity of this

opportunity is not a result of paucity of occupations, but of the prevalent dis-

inclination of occupants to recognize their status as such. 2 This article reflects
several

on

key questions concerning the occupation of Iraq, not in an attempt to evaluate

the occupants for their compliance with the law, but rather to study contemporary
challenges to the law
article

and possibilities

addresses the beginning

and post-occupation
the occupants

and end of the occupation

responsibilities (Part II),

and of the

II,

for adaptations in the twenty-first century.

in Iraq

and

The

potential pre-

and examines the scope of authority of

UN Security Council in Iraq (Part III). Part IV concludes.

The Time Frame of the Occupation

in Iraq

The Beginning: When Was Iraq Occupied?
Background:

When Does

Occupation Begin?

This seemingly straightforward question has proven to be quite complex.

It

has

al-

ways been complex, but for different reasons. In the nineteenth century, the

Anny and Paul Yanowicz Professor of Human Rights,
Faculty of Law, and Guy Keinan, LL.B. candidate, Tel Aviv University.
* Eyal Benvenisti,

Tel Aviv University,

The Occupation of Iraq: A Reassessment
concern was that eager invaders would declare an area occupied prematurely. Because the law of occupation granted occupants control over key strategic resources,

such as public property, invaders might be tempted to assert authority without actually controlling the area. 3

But over the years, and most notably since the adoption

of Geneva Convention IV, which imposed on occupants extended obligations over
civilians in

occupied

to those obligations, occupants

several

human

rights conventions that

found little interest in asserting their status

as

added
occu-

The derogatory connotation that the term "occupation" has gained, particu-

pants.
larly

and

territories,

during the second half of the twentieth century, added to this reluctance.

Moreover, the asymmetric nature of many of the recent conflicts has provided another incentive for the occupant to act through intermediaries or otherwise mini-

mize

contact with particularly violent indigenous communities. Therefore,

its

while the drafters of the original text on occupation law were concerned about
overly assertive occupants, today's interpreters have to deal with occupants

who try

With contemporary technology and weaponry that encontrol an area from a distance, a new challenge to the defi-

to evade this designation.

ables certain armies to

nition emerges.

Given the occupants' increasing ability and prevailing interest to control an area
but not

its

population,

it is

important to note that the governing

legal definitions

on the protection of individuals. The Hague
Regulations emphasize the territorial test, 4 implying that whoever controls the ter-

seek to preclude this option and insist

ritory has responsibility over the population, while

not attempt a

territorial definition, instead

occupant and the "protected persons"
occupying power 5 as the relevant

Some

Geneva Convention IV does

emphasizing the relations between the

who "find themselves ... in the hands" of an

test.

confusion, however, arises from the second sentence of Article 42 of the

Hague Regulations, which stipulates that " [t] he occupation extends only to the territory

where such authority has been established and can be exercised." This addi-

tion can at

first

sight

be interpreted as suggesting that an occupant that manages to

control only the land, but does not actually exercise authority over the civilian population,

is

freed

from

wrong because the

text

responsibility

toward

was intended

to exclude premature occupations, rather than

it.

This reading

to allow occupants to evade their responsibilities. 6

the reference in "such authority"

is

to the

first

It is

wrong

sentence of the

is

plainly wrong.

also literally, because

article,

which discusses

authority over territory, not over the population in the territory. 7 Finally,

because

it

lets

It is

occupants off the hook of responsibility toward the

wrong
population. The
it is

better interpretation of the test for occupation therefore stipulates that occupation

begins

when

the foreign

position to establish,

if it

army

is

in actual control over

so wishes, an authority of its
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enemy

territory,

and

is

in

a

own over the population. It is

Eyal Benvenisti and

irrelevant

Guy Keinan

whether or not the army actually does

so.

By assuming

control over the

land the occupant assumes responsibility over the population situated on that land. 8

The same confusion is reflected in some States' military manuals. Whereas the
German military manual accurately requires merely a potential to actually exercise
authority, 9 the US military manual insists that the test for occupation is that the
"invader has successfully substituted

its

government

10

in the territory invaded."

own

To add

parently contains an internal contradiction, as
the one hand,
stitute its

later

it

it

stipulates that "the

authority for that of the legitimate

it

confusion, the British

appears to support both views.

occupying power [must be]

own authority for that of the former government"

indicates that occupation "depends

exercised over the civilian population."

11

case.

Except for one

district,

On

a position to sub-

in

(paragraph 13.3), but

on whether authority

is

actually being

In this confusing mist, the International

Court of Justice (ICJ) adopted the "actual authority"
12

manual ap-

test in

the

Armed Activities

where actual authority had been established and

hence was regarded by the Court as occupied, the ICJ accepted Uganda's argument
that in other areas

cupy" them.

13

amounts

tion

controlled only land, not people,

it

and therefore did not "oc-

In other words, in the ICJ's view, only direct authority over a populato occupation. This

an unfortunate outcome. 14

is

It is

unfortunate

from the perspective of the local population, which is left with no accountable government

in charge.

States that are

An

It is

also unfortunate

weaiy of geographical areas left without responsible State authority.

invader that

is

unaccountable for what transpires in an area

likely not to internalize the
result, that area

it

dominates

is

dangers emanating from the invaded territory, and, as a

may become a source of regional,

The Occupation of Iraq by the United
It is

from the perspective of neighboring

States

and

if

not global,

the United

instability.

Kingdom

quite obvious that the initial planning for the invasion of Iraq did not include

whose authority would derive from the
law of occupation. Months before the invasion, which began on March 20, 2003,
officials in the US administration had been divided on the applicability of the law
plans to establish military administration

some of them believed it was appropriate, others viewed the
situation not as occupation, but as mere "liberation." 15 Even after parts of Iraq had
of occupation. While

already been occupied
Blair

emphasized

and Baghdad was

this liberating role

falling,

President Bush and Prime Minister

of their coalition and envisioned "the forma-

tion of an Iraqi Interim Authority, a transitional administration, run
til

a

permanent government

officials still

sense,

is

established

by the people of

by Iraqis, un-

Iraq." 16 Military

refused to speak of occupation in the legal, rather than colloquial,

and maintained that "occupation"

area "with the intent to run the

in the legal sense required taking over

government
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in that area," 17 which, at the time,

an

was
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not the case for the coalition forces in Iraq. But British

from the

start.

In a secret

memorandum from

late

jurists

had

March, the

a different view

British Attorney

General, Lord Goldsmith, wrote that the United States and the United

Kingdom

would be bound by the law of occupation, unless the Security Council passed a specific resolution.

18

These differences of opinion were reflected in a gradually changing attitude on

The initial institution entrusted with administering occupied Iraqi territory was the US Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA), established two months before the ground invasion. 19 During the initial
phase of the occupation, despite a late March Security Council resolution that had
the ground.

reminded

coalition forces of an occupying power's responsibilities, 20 the coalition

forces

made efforts to set up an indigenous Iraqi regime. On April

ficials

held a meeting with Iraqi representatives in Nasiriyah, in which a thirteen-

15, Coalition of-

point statement on the political future of Iraq was adopted. 21 Together with a sub-

sequent meeting, which took place on April 28 in Baghdad, these were part of "ini-

moves towards the establishment of a national conference, which could set up
an interim authority and make progress towards constitutional change and the
election of a new government." 22 But on April 16, only one day after the Nasiriyah
meeting, without an explanation or a formal document setting it up, 23 the head of
the ORHA announced the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA). Another three weeks passed until on May 8 the UK and US representatives
to the UN sent a letter recognizing their obligations under the Hague Regulations
and Geneva Convention IV. 24 L. Paul Bremer was appointed the US presidential
envoy to Iraq on May 6 and the CPA Administrator on May 13.
The legal situation crystallized during the month of May as the occupying powers
began seeking to establish their own government instead of setting up an interim
Iraqi government. To do so they had to rely on authority under international law.
While they did not explicitly acknowledge their status as occupants, they impliedly
acknowledged the applicability of the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention
IV to their actions in Iraq. Explicit recognition of occupation law came later, when
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office relied on it expressly, 25 as did
American legal advisors stationed in Iraq. 26
tial

Security Council Resolution 1483, of May 23, 2003, clarified the legal status of
Iraq at the time.
sentatives,

The Resolution "noted" the May 8

letter

of the

but continued to "recogniz[e] the specific authorities, responsibilities,

and obligations under applicable international law of these
powers under unified
"[c]all[ed]

UK and US repre-

upon

all

command"

(emphasis added).

concerned to comply
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fully

27

States as occupying

The Resolution

further

with their obligations under

—
Eyal Benvenisti and

international law including in particular the

Guy Keinan

Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the

Hague Regulations of 1907." 28
But this was not meant to be a casebook example of occupation, because the occupants sought a broad Security Council mandate that went beyond the scope of
authority recognized by international law. 29 The UN's role was meant to widen the
authority of the CPA, while being instrumental but without formal authority
in offering humanitarian relief and assistance to the CPA in the reconstruction of
Iraq and the establishment of institutions for representative governance. 30

—

Pre-occupation Responsibilities?

The

traditional reading of the laws of

hostilities

and the

armed

conflict distinguishes

post-hostilities phases. This distinction

different sections of the

Hague

is

between the

also reflected in the

Regulations. However, such a neat distinction can

be questioned. As Dinstein notes,

"[i]t is

impossible to pinpoint an instant mark-

ing transition from an extended foray to a fledgling belligerent occupation." 31 Instead,

it is

possible to recognize the simultaneous applicability of both in hello

post helium

norms with respect to the

local population.

32

question in depth,

it

enemy army has toward the

beyond the scope of this article to explore this
can be noted that the obligations toward the population in

Although

33

obligations an

and

enemy territory arise even

it is

before the establishment of firm control over territory

and population. Given contemporary technology and weaponry, on the one hand,
and the proliferation of weak or
allocation of responsibilities

failing

indigenous regimes, on the other, the neat

between occupant and occupied based on physical

on the ground") does not serve humanitarian and
It is necessary to impose legal restraints on any foreign power that

control of territory ("boots
global interests.

effectively controls activity in a foreign area,

in the territory in the ancient

even without having actual presence

form of full-fledged military administration. There is

thus a need to redefine the rules of allocating responsibilities.

The most

sensible

one would seem to be a rule that interprets authority as "power" (rather than "control"

on the consequences of the actual exerthat exercises its power in a foreign un-

or "jurisdiction"), to be determined based
cise

of power in a given territory.

A State

governed or partly governed land will thus be regarded as bearing
obligations borne

at least the basic

by an occupant.

This implies that pre-occupation obligations toward the local population need
to be recognized,

and they can

derive, inter alia>

from the obligations under

Geneva Convention IV toward people who "find themselves

... in the

hands" of

would be ridiculous to suggest, for example, that Article 49
Convention, which proscribes deportations of enemy civilians, would be

the invading army.

of that

34

It

inapplicable unless the area has been occupied. 35 Similarly senseless
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would be the

The Occupation of Iraq: A Reassessment
interpretation that only armies that actually substitute for the ousted
in a foreign territory are required to provide food

by Geneva Convention

government

and shelter to persons protected

IV.

In the context of Iraq such questions were pertinent also to the failure to protect

As

against looting.

Panama

in previous situations of invasions (e.g.,

widespread looting followed the invasion and occupation of
2003, only one day after the
in progress.

37

cheological

April 10,

and important arinstance, lost around

art treasures

The National Museum in Baghdad, for
Note that the Hague Convention on Cultural Property (1954) 39

artifacts.

15,000 artifacts.

On

of Baghdad to coalition forces, looting was already

fall

But in Iraq the looting affected also
38

Iraq.

in 1989), 36

obliges State parties 40 "to respect cultural property situated within their

own terri-

41

The Con-

tory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties."

vention formally amplifies these duties during occupation, but they arguably

apply also before the occupation stage. 42

The End of Occupation

When Does

Occupation Cease?

The occupation ends whenever the conditions of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations are no longer fulfilled. 43 Under the test of actual control, an occupation ends
when the occupant no longer exercises its authority in the occupied territory. Under the test of potential control, the occupation ends when the occupant is no longer capable of exercising

its

authority.

It is

generally accepted that occupation

continues as long as the occupying force can, within a reasonable time, send de-

tachments of troops to make

its

authority

felt

within the occupied area.

In other words, an occupation ends as a result of the

armed return of

the

ousted government, an indigenous uprising or a unilateral occupant withdrawal
or as part of a peace agreement. The "legal oddity" 44 that

Convention IV does not

affect the

is

Article 6(3) of Geneva

end of occupation. Although

it

stipulates that

"the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general
close of military operations,"

considers the occupant as
well as the

Hague

it

does not regard the area as no longer occupied, and

bound by

significant portions of the

Convention, 45 as

Regulations. 46

A rather problematic question arises when the occupant transfers authority to
an indigenous government that has no link to the ousted government. The law
looks at such transfers with suspicion, because the concern

is

that the indigenous

government might not be representative of the indigenous population and might
be nothing but a puppet regime of the occupant. It is also worried about the

commitment of

the indigenous regime to respect the rights of the occupied
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population. 47 This
tions,"

is
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the challenge of what Roberts calls "transformative occupa-

namely "occupations

aim

[that]

the principle of self-government."

48

at establishing a political

order based on

In such occupations,

determining at what point one can say that the transformation has been achieved, and
the

government of the occupied

sovereignty,

is

genuinely

difficult.

territory
.

.

.

is

in a position to exercise the

Where what

is

involved

is

powers of

a gradual transfer of

powers to the indigenous authorities as their capacity to govern is built up, there is
bound to be an arbitrary element in fixing on a single date as the symbolic ending of the
occupation. 49

Based on policy reasons and State practice,
for the legality of a regime installed
ally

monitored general

it

can be said that "[t]he ultimate

by an occupant,

elections, carried

The End of Occupation in Iraq
Although occupation is a matter of fact,

is its

test

approval in internation-

out without undue delay." 50

its

legal status

can be subject to the de-

termination of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter as
the ultimate arbiter of the law. Therefore, since Security Council Resolution 1546
stipulated that "by 30 June 2004, the occupation will
sional Authority will cease to exist,
in the eyes of the

and that Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty," 51

law the occupation formally came to a close by June 30 despite the

fact that the coalition forces

areas of Iraq.

end and the Coalition Provi-

were

still

exercising administrative authority in certain

52

The discrepancy between the UN declaration on the reassertion of full Iraqi sovereignty and the actual state of affairs derives from the fact that at that point in time
the fledgling Iraqi government was the construct of the occupation authority and
was yet to be endorsed by a valid act of self-determination. Such an endorsement,
which ended the occupation not only from the formal perspective, occurred only
after the interim government of Iraq assumed full authority. 53
Post-occupation Responsibilities?
If occupants

may have pre-occupation responsibilities, they may be equally subject

to post-occupation responsibilities to the extent that they continue to exert au-

thority in the foreign territory.

ameliorating conditions

it

The previous occupant could also be responsible for

created in the previously occupied territory. 54

when former occupants were remaintain some authority, such au-

Traditionally, in post-occupation situations,

quested by the newly installed governments to
thority

was deemed to derive from the sovereigns' authorization, and hence was

beyond the scope of the law of occupation. But
269

this traditional

view could be
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revisited.

thority

may be

There

sufficient

ground to argue

that even while exercising au-

on the behest of an indigenous government, the

entity that acts

must

comply with the international obligations to which it is bound. This is likely to be the
case

under international

individuals

human

rights

who are under its control.

law when the actor exercises authority over
This

is

also the case

under international hu-

manitarian law that stipulates minimal standards of treatment 55 under the national

law of several countries. 56

Such a view seems to find support
ish

in

two recent judgments,

related to the Brit-

occupation and post-occupation practices in Iraq. In the Al-Jedda case, the

House of Lords ruled that even if the United Kingdom had been operating in Iraq
on the UN's behalf (i.e., not as an occupant), it was still subject to its human rights
obligations to the extent possible. As Lord Bingham noted, the United Kingdom
could detain persons as authorized by the Security Council, "but must ensure that
such detention."
ent in Iraq.

57

More

are not infringed to any greater extent than

is

inherent in

The same logic could apply to the post-occupation

forces pres-

the detainee's rights

.

.

.

recently, the

formal occupation, the British
Iraqi courts. Since prisoners

United Kingdom maintained that

Army was

after the

end of

merely an "executor" of decisions of

were detained and transferred by the United King-

dom at the request of the Iraqi courts, the United Kingdom argued it did not exer58
The European Court of Human
cise "any recognised extra-territorial authority."
Rights (ECtHR), however, refused to regard that relationship between the British

and the

Iraqi

government

Convention on
the idea

is

Human

as

one

Rights

that excludes the applicability of the

(ECHR) and

the Court's jurisdiction.

European

The

gist

of

simple and convincing: acting under instructions of others cannot and

does not relieve one of one's international obligations.

HI.

The Authority of the Occupants

in Iraq

The Transformative Nature of the Occupation
Aiming to create a market-based democratic Iraq, the occupying powers introduced major administrative and legislative changes. These changes related not
only to public order and security, to the "de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society," the
overhauling of Iraqi criminal law and the judicial system, but also to areas often
untouched during occupation, such as trade law, 59 company law, 60 securities law, 61
bankruptcy law, 62 and even intellectual property63 and copyright laws. 64 The reasons usually given for these reforms were the need to promote
ciency, modernization

human

rights, effi-

and compliance with international standards. Because

these reasons sometimes deviate

from the

traditional law of occupation, scholars

referred to the occupation as "transformative." 65 This section reviews
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some of the
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more

controversial changes introduced
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by the CPA. The subsequent section

eval-

uates their compatibility with international law.

Among the many reforms taken by the occupants, it was the economic legislation that attracted the most criticism. Was it lawful, appropriate and needed to replace "all existing foreign investment law," 66 to rewrite securities law almost

completely, 67 to suspend

corporation law in a

all

way

customs duties and tariffs, 68 and to profoundly change

membership in
explain the motivation of these and other sweep-

that allows foreign citizens to acquire

The CPA sought to
ing economic reforms by emphasizing indigenous endorsement.
companies?

69

A key player in

indigenous participation was the Iraqi Governing Council, a "principal bod[y]

this

of the Iraqi interim administration" established by the

CPA on July 13, 2003. 70 The

CPA emphasized that it "worked closely with the Governing Council to ensure that
economic change occurs in a manner acceptable to the people of Iraq," 71 and reiterated that the change was

made " [i] n close consultation with and acting in coordi-

nation with the Governing Council." 72 In

investment

initiative to "the

fact,

CPA

the

attributed the foreign

Governing Council's desire to bring about significant

change to the Iraqi economic system." 73

The CPA

also relied

on

the

UN authorization as an independent source of au-

thority. Practically all orders issued

by the CPA contained a preambular paragraph

stressing their consistency with the laws

vant Security Council resolutions. The
Secretary- General,
transition

and usages of war,

with the

rele-

CPA additionally relied on the report of the

which concerned "the need

from a non-transparent

as well as

centrally

for the

development of Iraq and

its

planned economy to a market econ-

omy characterized by sustainable economic growth," 74 and often emphasized that
it

in

had "coordinated with the international
.

.

.

financial institutions, as referenced

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483." 75

Moreover, great efforts were made to show how the reforms would benefit Iraqi
society.

For example, the goal of foreign investment reforms was to "improve the

conditions of life, technical

skills,

and opportunities

for all Iraqis

and

to fight un-

employment with its associated deleterious effect on public security." 76 The CPA
saw itself obligated to "ensure the well being of the Iraqi people and to enable the
social functions and normal transactions of every day [sic] life." 77
The CPA didn't stop there. Economic modernity, fairness, efficiency, transparency, predictability and independence were invoked as justifications for
several reforms. 78 Long-term policies were also mentioned: at one point, the CPA
noted "the demonstrated interest of the Iraqi Governing Council for Iraq to be-

come a full member in the international trading system, known as the World Trade
Organization." 79
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The Lawfulness of the CPA Measures under International Law
The transformation of Iraq from a centralized dictatorship into a market-based democracy

raised questions about the scope of authority of the

CPA under interna-

Some in the CPA really thought that the law of occupation allowed such
wide-ranging reforms. 80 But British officials differed. 81 More generally, the British
tional law.

government distinguished "between
facilitation

of plans and

efforts

development of governmental

direct positive acts of government

and

.

.

.

the

of the nationals of the occupied territory for the
institutions," 82 with only the latter being

permissible under occupation law.

83

To make reforms

deemed

beyond the law of

that go

occupation, they maintained, "further authority in the form of a Security Council
resolution

would be required." 84 According

to this view, with Security Council

Resolution 1483 as the additional basis for the reforms, "the question of the UK's
responsibilities in respect of political

of occupation."

85

reform is no longer governed solely by the law

Later the British discovered that they were expected to

also with their international

and European human

rights obligations.

comply

As a conse-

—occupation

quence, in the occupation of Iraq there were three bodies of law

human

law and

rights

Authority under the

We

law,

UN law—at play. This section analyzes the outcome.

Law of Occupation

begin with a succinct analysis of the scope of authority under the law of

occupation. The request for authorization from the Security Council implies an

acknowledgment of the limited authority granted
occupation law.

under traditional

A textual reading of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations easily sup-

ports the conclusion that the occupant

conservationist principle."
is

to occupants

reflected in the

86

The

is

call for

bound by what Gregory Fox named

"the

conservation of the status quo ante helium

admonition that the occupant has but de facto authority (whereas

the ousted government
thority "to restore,

is still

the "legitimate power") in the restricted scope of au-

and ensure" public order and

civil life,

and

in the obligation to

respect the laws in force in the country "unless absolutely prevented." 87

The term "unless

absolutely prevented" was inserted during the First Peace

Conference in 1899 to replace the term "unless necessary"

at the insistence

of the

potentially occupied States to emphasize the occupant's obligation to also preserve

the status

quo

in the legal sphere. 88

Whether this

insertion

on the occupant's authority

was prudent

ent question.

The

sion with

authority and obligation to ensure public order and

restraint

its

was

restraint

significantly diluted

by

Article

is

a differ-

necessarily creates a tencivil life.

This

64 of Geneva Convention IV, which

replaced the negative test of "unless absolutely prevented" with a positive authorization for the occupant, which

"may subject the population of the occupied terri-

tory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying
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Power

to

fulfill its
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obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly

the territory,

and

to ensure the security of the

government of

Occupying Power." The duties of the

occupant under Geneva Convention IV are far more numerous than those stipulated

The Geneva text envisions the occupant no longer as the disinwatch guard, but instead as a very involved regulator and provider. 89

Hague

in the

terested

text.

Scholars in the post-World

War II period readily conceded legitimate subjects for

the occupant's lawmaking other than military necessity.
tion

The welfare of the popula-

was deemed a worthy goal for the occupant to pursue. 90 Such an expansive view

seems to be consonant with the prevalent view that the occupant is bound also by hu-

man rights obligations, and that in general it must "take measures to ensure respect
for human rights and international humanitarian law in the occupied territories." 91
The

human

parallel applicability

rights

law

of international and, for the British troops, European

raises additional questions regarding the authority

pants and the adequacy of the conservationist principle.
this article to explore the

and European human
tribunals,
rights

tion

92

beyond the scope of

questions concerning the applicability of international

rights

tween occupation law and

It is

of the occu-

law to occupied

human

rights law.

as well as the majority

territories,
Still,

of scholars,

93

and the

relationships be-

international treaty bodies
are of the opinion that

and

human

law applies to occupied territories. The consequences of this parallel applica-

would seem

to support a modification of the conservationist principle

when

changes are necessary to ensure the enjoyment of human rights by the occupied
population. 94
Reflecting

on

the occupation of Iraq as a "transformative occupation,"

Adam

Roberts noted that "occupying powers can justify certain transformative policies

on the

basis that these are the best

way

to

shrined in international human rights law."

meet

certain goals

and

principles en-

95

More generally, Roberts believes human rights conventions "can play an important role" in occupations, as they "may
impose formal obligations on parties; be instrumental in political debate,
for assessing the actions of external

powers and

as a basis

local actors; provide legal proce-

dures for taking action; or serve as one basis for pursuing transformative goals." 96

Other scholars accept

this

view with some insignificant nuances.

A particularly strong case can be made for extensive authorization to introduce
significant changes in

an occupied territory that had been governed by an unrep-

resentative regime that enjoyed

little

or no domestic support after being ousted

by the occupant. The underlying premise of the law of occupation
that the legitimate

is,

as

was seen,

power in the country retains the right to revert to its ante helium

when

power has already
taken its last breath, or when its source of authority is contested by the indigenous
population exercising its right to self-determination, the only legitimate power
position, unless

it

agrees to territorial changes. But
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and not the ousted regime. This is a situation where the "reversioner" is the people, and the occupant must take its interests
that seems relevant

is

the people

itself

and wishes, rather than those of the ousted regime,

ment can support
CPA's
But

into account. 97

the dismantling of the Ba'athist regime, which

first-ever legislative act, aptly titled "De-Ba'athification

it is

is

evident in the

of Iraqi Society." 98

important to keep in mind that even in such instances, reforms intro-

—

duced by the occupant

as beneficial to the local

population as they

subject to the principle of self-determination. This principle

by

for the post-occupation society" only

temic changes."

99

There

is,

therefore,

refraining

ground

law, gave the occupants in Iraq a wide

may be

—

are

may be "meaningful

from making "overbroad

sys-

to argue that the law of occupation,

whether alone or together with the law on self-determination and

It is

Such an argu-

margin of discretion.

human

rights

100

noteworthy that the two occupants of Iraq did not wish to found

their

on their human rights obligations. In fact, they both rejected the applicability of human rights law in Iraq. 101 The US government has
claimed that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 102 does not
apply outside its territory or during an international armed conflict. 103 In the midst
transformative occupation

of the Iraq

law

is

man

conflict, the

United States expressed

its

"firm belief that humanitarian

a "well- developed area of law conceptually distinct

rights law,"

Kingdom,

ECHR's

and

that the

'

from international hu-

two cannot apply simultaneously. 104 The United

ECHR, had to face numerous petitions in relation to the
Iraq, and offered several reasons why it was not bound by

as a party to the

applicability in

that treaty 105

—reasons

that did not impress the British courts 106 or the

ECtHR. 107

Authority under Security Council Resolution 1483
Security Council Resolution 1483 provided the
tions in Iraq.
ple,

framework

for the coalition's ac-

On the one hand, it endorsed its authority over Iraq and the Iraqi peo-

and, on the other hand,

this authority

it

delineated the legal constraints and guidelines that

was bound by, namely "the Charter of the United Nations and other

relevant international law," 108

and other "obligations under international law

cluding in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the

in-

Hague Regulations

1907." 109

The President of the Security Council emphasized that the powers delegated by the Resolution "are not open-ended or unqualified," and should be exercised "in conformity with the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations." 110
of

Concurrently, however, the Resolution clearly endorsed the transformative course

of action that the

CPA embarked upon immediately. The occupants, referred to as

the "Authority" in the Resolution, are
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consistent with the Charter of the United Nations

international law, to

promote the welfare of the

Iraqi people

and other relevant

through the

effective

administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration

of conditions of security and

stability

people can freely determine their

and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi

new position, the

Furthermore, Resolution 1483 created a
for Iraq,"

m

own political future

"Special Representative

which would be independent of the occupying power and whose

tasks

would include assisting the people of Iraq, coordinating the activities of the United
Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and with international agencies engaged
in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and promoting
the protection of human rights. 112

How should one read this Resolution? Does it endorse an expansive view of the
law of occupation, or does

it

form an independent source of authority on the

strength of Chapter VII law? Indeed, there are three possible interpretations of Res-

olution 1483. According to the

first

reading, the Resolution endorses an expansive

reading, influenced by human rights law, of the occupant's authority under the law

of occupation.

A slightly different interpretation of the Resolution would suggest

that the expansive reading of the occupant's powers applies only to the unique cir-

cumstances of Iraq as opposed to
pretation of the Resolution

all

other occupations. The third possible inter-

would be

that the Resolution gave the occupants

additional authority to transform Iraq that they would not have

mentioned above,

had otherwise. As

on the latter interpretation, having
such stopped short of granting them ex-

at least British officials relied

concluded that the law of occupation as
tensive authority.

In these authors' view, Resolution 1483 relates, of course, only to the specific
situation in Iraq, but at the

that regards

same time

modern occupants

it

signals

as subject to

an endorsement of a general view

enhanced duties toward the occu-

pied population and therefore also having the authority to

"The

call to

administer the occupied area

'effectively'

fulfill

such duties.

acknowledges the several

must perform to protect the occupied population. It
precludes the occupant from hiding behind the limits imposed on its powers as a
duties that the occupants

pretext for inaction." 113 Indeed, an evolutionary reading of the law of occupation
in

an era heavily informed by

conclusion.

human

This interpretation

is

cannot reach a different

based not only on the Resolution or the evolutionary

terpretation of the law of occupation.
rity

rights concerns

114

It is

also based

Council when acting under Chapter VII of the

on the authority of the Secu-

UN Charter. This authority

not limitless but subject at least to compliance withjws cogens.
jus cogens

norms

is

115

is

One of the central

the right of peoples to self-determination.
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in-

116

The law of
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occupation internalizes a delicate balance between conflicting interests of occu-

pant and occupied, and

is

heavily influenced by the effort not to alienate the indig-

enous people's right to continue to exercise

its

right to self-determination. 117

The

law of occupation has always been intimately linked to the concept of national sovereignty. "Indeed, the evolution of the concept of occupation can be seen as the

mirror-image of the development of the concept of sovereignty. >>118 Therefore,
authorizing an occupant to derogate from

its

responsibilities

under the law of oc-

cupation and thereby limit and shape the political choices of an occupied sovereign
people carries the danger of effectively infringing the right to self-determination,

which might be beyond the authority of the Council. 119
Obviously, not every limitation of the right to self-determination
missible infringement of a jus cogens right. There

is

an imper-

may be solid reasons to interfere

in the exercise of the right to self-determination to ensure that the process
cal,

and

inclusive

fair. It is

more trustworthy than
and therefore

it

may be

is

practi-

also reasonable to argue that the Security Council

the occupant to be entrusted with such a

complex matter,

granted the authority to limit or influence the exercise of

the right to self-determination to a greater extent than the occupant would, as
case in territories directly administered
clearly less

tion

is

by the UN.

prone to bias than the occupant,

and lack of immediate

interest.

121

It

if only

therefore

120

The

is

the

Security Council

is

because of its diverse composi-

makes eminent sense

to recog-

would have the authority under Chapter VII of the
Charter to authorize the transformation of a regime under occupation beyond
what the law of occupation would otherwise allow, but this could not be an
nize that the Security Council

unfettered discretion delegated to interested parties without monitoring them. If
the Security Council wished to extend such an authorization to the occupant,

would have
effectively

to

it

remain closely involved, through ample supervisory mechanisms,

approving and reviewing the actual transformation process. Because

such mechanisms were not employed in the case of Iraq, the CPA having acted with
limited monitoring by the Council, 122 one could understand
carelessness that bordered
flection of

its

on infringement of its jus cogens

its

attitude either as

obligations or as a re-

general attitude toward the occupants powers under the law of

occupation.

IV, Conclusion:

The Legacy of the Occupation of Iraq

The occupation of Iraq raises a host of questions beyond the scope of a single article.
In addition to questions regarding the timing of the occupation, pre- and postoccupation responsibilities, and the scope of authority of the occupant in
transformative occupation, the occupation of Iraq gave rise to queries regarding the
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.

.

Eyal Benvenisti and

definition of protected persons 123

Fourth Geneva Convention,

124

Guy Keinan

and the proper

interpretation of Article 49 of the

in addition to the proper treatment of detainees

and

The management by the occupants of
public property, including natural resources such as oil and freshwater, was also subthe responsibility for their shameful abuse.

125
Overall
ject to legal analyses.

it is

almost astounding to observe

how a nineteenth-

century doctrine that during the last half century almost reached the stage of desuetude

due to lack of adherence was suddenly revived
Critics

could argue that

sort of "Plan

and

invocation was nothing

B" that was put in motion

digenous regime
flexible

its

failed.

in unanticipated circumstances.

more than an

afterthought, a

after the effort to install a

"genuine" in-

Nevertheless, the doctrine was there ready to be applied,

enough to be adapted to twenty- first-century contemporary circumstances

challenges, as well as current legal

Resolution 1483 marks the

first

and

political perceptions.

time the Security Council resorted to the con-

and delimit the authority of foreign

cept of occupation to describe, authorize

troops in control of enemy territory. The recognition of the applicability of the law

on occupations refuted the claim that occupation, as such, is illegal, and revived the
neutral connotation of the doctrine, at least from a legal perspective. At the same
time, the broad mandate recognized by the Security Council as pertaining to the
occupants to transform Iraq into a market-based democracy, although
able

and probably lawful under UN Charter law,

occupation and the Security Council's

own

commend-

also tested the limits of the

authority to shape the

way

law of

the Iraqi

people exercised their inalienable right to self-determination.
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PART VI
STABILITY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

XIV
Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations:

A New Approach to Legal Interpretation

Dale Stephens*
Introduction

We

live in the

conflict

ceived of war

is

postmodern era of warfare, where
1

increasingly

and warfighting

as

becoming the norm. While the modern era cona large-scale, inter-State conflict waged between

massed professional armies, 2 the postmodern era perceives
the people" 3

"war among

little

in the struggle for ascendancy. 4

It

turns out that such

can be as deadly and as strategically significant as conventional warfare.

The US
fectively

military in

its

recent reconceptualization of how such wars are to be ef-

engaged (and how victory is to be meaningfully measured) has embraced

the realities of the emergent
U.S.

conflict as

where technological advantage, massive firepower and physical ma-

neuver can count for
conflict

small-scale, intra-State

postmodern

style

of warfare. The recently published

Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual5 and its companion vol-

ume, The

U.S.

Army

counterintuitive

Stability Operations Field

model for prevailing in

these

Manual, 6 portray a somewhat

postmodern

conflicts. Significantly,

the methodologies these manuals espouse are written against the background of
bitter experience
cessity, these

* Captain,

of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, partially through ne-

doctrines emerged from reflection about these conflicts and took

CSM, Royal Australian Navy. All views expressed in this article are solely those of the

author and do not necessarily

reflect the

Defence or Royal Australian Navy.

views of the Australian government, Department of

COIN and Stability Operations: A New Approach
account of "counterinsurgency best practice." 7 The
in these

manuals worked to stave off near

operations during the 2007 "surge."

Legal Interpretation

and doctrine

tactics

defeat, especially in the Iraq theater of

managed a self-conscious leap

means and methods of warfare,

ing literature.

mitment

A

formalist

in per-

there has been a correlative lack

of innovation within established mainstream legal thinking,
9

reflected

8

Paradoxically, while military doctrine has
spective regarding

to

at least in the prevail-

methodology of interpretation and a continued com-

to the attritional focus of the law of

armed

conflict

(LOAC) remain

the

prevalent orthodoxy, notwithstanding that such binary thinking has proven to

have had limited
tions.

utility within

There is plainly a need for renewed thinking, or at least an appreciation of the

direction warfare

may

counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilization opera-

is

going, so that interpretative techniques

employed

LOAC

in

be reimagined and recalibrated in order to remain relevant to operational
This paper seeks to

realities.

Part

of the paper will survey the themes contained in the counterinsurgency/

I

stability

facilitate that process.

operations manuals and will contrast these to the prevailing intellectual

framework which underpins LOAC. Part
tinction"

II

examines the key principles of "dis-

LOAC

and "proportionality" under

and argues

that a reconceptualized

A particular

interpretative

approach to implementing these principles

emphasis

be placed on the rules/standards dichotomy in order to better reveal

will

the limits of formalist thinking. Finally, Part

III will

choices available to an operational legal advisor
stability

is

required.

canvass the challenges and

when

operating during

COIN/

operations consistently with revised doctrine.

Part I.

COIN and Stability Operations: A New Doctrinal Paradigm

Counterinsurgency Doctrine

The

strategic-political realities

of the Cold

scale, inter-State "industrial" warfare.

were key elements in designing

10

effective

War prompted

preparation for large-

Technology, firepower and maneuver

and

efficient

combat

for

massed profes-

sional armies. Rationalist strategizing provided the necessary gestalt

of modernity"

11

and the

"tools

were expected to deliver operational success. According to Lieu-

tenant General Sir John Kiszely,

it

was a model that

relied

upon "more advanced

technology, firepower, lethality, speed, stealth, digitization, logistics, networkcentric warfare [and] hi-tech 'shock

and awe/" 12 These

features

still

underpin the

requirements of fighting conventional warfare. Indeed, conventional warfare
occurs, but

is

not the

still

likely anticipated scenario for future warfighting.

The reality of postmodern warfare is what has been occurring in "post-conflict"
Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years. Such conflicts are mostly non-international
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in character

and

are typically manifested as small internecine warfare

where non-

employ asymmetric means against State military forces. The environment in which this warfare is undertaken is one of mixed peace and war. The
deployment of armed State forces within such conflicts has been difficult to reconcile with "first order" conventional warfare training and preparation. Such conflict
State actors

has been variously described

as, inter alia,

"military operations other than war"

(MOOTW), peacekeeping, peace enforcement, "wider peacekeeping," low intensity
and "gray area operations." 13 These terms are not interchangeable, as they
differ according to legal and doctrinal authority and the nature of the deployment,
conflict

but they

all

share

common

elements which separate them from conceptions of

conventional warfare. These operations have required different and more nuanced
skills,

though

it

was thought that conventional warfare training could be "ratcheted

down" to apply to such operations. 14 Such assumptions were not well placed.
The US COIN Manual grapples with the new realities of postmodern war and
recommends decisive change. Indeed, the introduction to the manual makes it
very clear that

it is

intended to be "paradigm shattering." 15 Within the

graph of the introduction, the point

is

forcefully made that "[t]hose

first

para-

who fail to see

manual as radical probably don't understand it, or at least understand what it's
up against." 16 The manual provides that while all insurgencies are sui generis, there
are common characteristics that apply to all and there are patterns of operational
response that have been proven to be effective. The manual evidently borrows from
classic counterinsurgency works relating to the British experience in Malaya 17 and
the French experience in Algeria, 18 and it also updates the work that had been undertaken during the Vietnam conflict. 19 Most significantly, it draws upon contemporary experience in Iraq and Afghanistan in detailing a number of principles
the

labeled "paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations" 20 that provide a conceptual

framework

for operational planning.

manual outlines the elements of an insurgency and identifies the requirements that must be met in order to prevail. The doctrine is confrontational and counterintuitive to that which is required for conventional
warfare. The manual painstakingly describes that an insurgency is fundamentally a
political struggle, where the center of gravity is the population, which remains "the
In very clear terms the

deciding factor in the struggle." 21

It is

asserted that insurgents invariably use unlaw-

means to intimidate the population and discredit the legitimate government.
Such unlawful means are designed to bring about an overreaction by counterinsurful

gent forces. Violence

is

the currency of an insurgency

and

destabilizing the legiti-

macy of the host-nation government and its supporting counterinsurgent forces a
strategic goal. 22

Provoking violation of counterinsurgent ethics and values in react-

ing to an insurgency

is

a

means

to secure that goal. This perspective
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is

highlighted
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by counterinsurgent

specialist

to

Legal Interpretation

David Kilcullen when describing the operational

modus operandi of Al Qaida in Iraq as one that relies upon provocation, intimidation, protraction and exhaustion, and drawing the majority of its strength from the
"backlash engendered by counter- insurgent overreaction rather than genuine
popular support." 23 The COIN Manual describes that "[t]he real battle is for civilian support for, or acquiescence to, the counterinsurgents

ment. The population waits to be convinced.
less,

stay the longest, earn their trust?"

surgency

is

24

and host nation govern-

Who will help them more, hurt them

Thus the primary purpose of a counterin-

"securing the civilian, rather than destroying the enemy." 25

In countering an insurgency, traditional thinking regarding

combat and the

application of overwhelming force acts as a negative factor. "Cartesian or
reductionist" 26 logic that

means

for

problem solving

something,"
sense

is

27

may be

is

likely the

to exercise

so ingrained in military staff training as the primary
offers little assistance.

The temptation

do

to act, "to

wrong response; rather, the better solution in a tactical
patience, "to do nothing." 28 Such an approach is chal-

lenging to the military ethos; Sir John Kiszely notes that counterinsurgency "re-

some decidedly un-warrior-like attributes, such as
emotional intelligence, empathy with one's opponents, tolerance, patience, sub29
tlety, sophistication, nuance and political adroitness."
The battle is not conceived in the ordinary "formulaic and mechanistic" 30 sense but rather is more
conceptual, relying heavily upon sociological and psychological inputs. Kiszely
reinforces the need to work smarter rather than harder when conceptualizing the
counterinsurgency strategy, noting in tandem with the COIN Manual that dequires

.

.

.

warriors to acquire

priving the insurgents of popular support and winning

it

oneself

is

the key

objective:

[T]he contest takes place not on a

field

of battle, but in a complex civilian environment

Nor is it a primarily military contest

The war, is in large part a war of ideas, the
and the key battleground is in the mind the minds
of the indigenous population, and the minds of regional and world opinion. 31

battle largely

one

—

for perception,

Kiszely approvingly cites classic counterinsurgency expert David Galula's estimation of effort in battling an insurgency as "twenty percent military, eighty percent
political [as] a

formula that

reflects the truth."

32

The psychological imperatives

reiterated in General Rupert Smith's analysis in

serves that " [w]ar

amongst the people

ple in the streets

and houses and

battlefield." 33 Kilcullen notes

strategy,

what matters

is

is

The

different:

fields

—

all

it is

Utility

of Force

are

when he ob-

the reality in which the peo-

the people, anywhere

more pragmatically that "[i]n

[a]

—

are the

population-centric

providing security and order for the population, rather
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enemy

than directly targeting the
marginalize them."

The implications of the
lists

—though

this type

revised

COIN

doctrine are far-reaching.

number of contemporary counterinsurgency imperatives

a

planning and execution.

35

The manual

that should guide

These principles have been replicated in operational

guidelines within Multi-National Force-Iraq
fact,

of strategy will also effectively

34

become operationalized over

(MNF-I) protocols 36 and have,

the past few years. Their import

in

significant

is

with respect to both military ethos and public expectation, and, as will be demon-

under LOAC. The princi-

strated infra, also with respect to classic legal reasoning
ples of legal relevance recognized within the

manual include the following

contemporary "paradoxes":
•

"Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be," 37

•

"Some of the best weapons

•

"Sometimes, the more force

•

"The more successful the counterinsurgency

and the more
It is

risk

is

evident that

COIN doctrine
It

do not shoot," 38

used, the less effective

must be accepted."

counterinsurgent forces.
sult in

for counterinsurgents

is,

it is,"

39

the less force can be used

40

does knowingly place greater physical risk on

concedes that choices will need to be

made that will re-

higher counterinsurgent casualties. These truisms necessarily test resolve, 41

as well as public expectation.

The questions of insurgent targeting and the formu-

lation of collateral/incidental damage/injury assessments in this

environment play a pivotal part of the

manner
cussed

and

that reverses expectations

Such

certainties currently

intellectual

COIN strategy. Significantly, they do so in a

and conventional reasoning. As

infra, a revised interpretative lens

these legal tests.

new

will

be

dis-

must be applied when grappling with

analysis reconfigures the current self-contained ethical

underpinning traditional

LOAC reasoning.

Stability Operations
Stability operations are incorporated into

modern COIN 42 and form part of the so-

called "full-spectrum operations" operational design.

tions are likely to be

continuum.
erations

COIN and

stability

opera-

conducted conjointly but emphasize different aspects of the

Stability operations doctrine shares the

COIN aversion to kinetic op-

though it is more dedicated to broader capacity building. 43 Stability opera-

tions are defined within

[Stability operations

US joint doctrine as follows:

encompass] various military missions,

tasks,

and

activities

conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of
national

power

to maintain or reestablish a safe
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governmental

essential

humanitarian

relief.

services,

emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and

44

Despite the overwhelming emphasis previously placed
fare preparation, the Stability Operations
fact,

upon conventional war-

Manual notes that the US military has,

only been involved in eleven conventional conflicts during

its

in

entire history. 45

Conversely it has been involved in hundreds of operations that may be identified as
stability operations. Significantly, since the fall

US forces have been involved in fifteen stability operations. 46 The Stabil-

notes that
ity

of the Berlin Wall alone, the manual

Operations

Manual represents

a decisive

squarely addressed and where doctrine

is

"moment" where such

both tailor-made and comprehensive.

concerned with post-conflict operations.

Stability operations are principally

The (in)famous phase IV element of the Operation
was not accorded a particularly high

for example,

execution phases of the Iraqi conflict,
tion.

The

failure to

implement

a

47

operations are

Iraqi

Freedom campaign

plan,

priority during the planning

and

and yet was supposed to deal with stabiliza-

comprehensive stabilization policy

self- evidently

represented a significant strategic failure. As a result of that experience, and the
recalibration of enlightened doctrinal thinking, stability operations have

mally accorded a high priority within the planning framework.

been

for-

US Department of

Defense Directive 3000.05 stipulates that

Stability
shall

Operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense

be prepared to conduct and support. They

combat operations and be
of Defense]

activities

Stability operations are predicated

upon

[Department

is

the strategic proposition that in the

threatened

more by weak and

failing

act as sanctuaries for multinational terrorist networks, than

traditional strong nation-State entities. 49
stability

all

and planning. 48

contemporary environment, US security

which can

be given priority comparable to

including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises,

material, leadership, personnel, facilities,

States,

shall

and integrated across

explicitly addressed

operations

is

The

by

institutional design that underpins

the creation in a post-conflict State of an environment that

facilitates reconciliation; establishes the

development of political,

legal, social

and

economic institutions; and facilitates transition to a legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law. 50

It

does deal with capacity building (indeed, embrac-

ing the previously maligned notion of "nation building") and procedurally adopts

an interagency focus. 51 DoctrinaUy, the
to assist the

US Department

US military's

of State, which

is

role in stability operations

to lead in these efforts,

52

is

but also

principally to provide the necessary security to permit these conditions to

manifest.
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The

stability

operations doctrine has, not surprisingly, been dismissed as Uto-

53

The doctrine's precepts of providing "basic public services, physi54
cal reconstruction, the hope of economic development and social amelioration"
have been criticized by commentators such as Edward Luttwak, who query
whether models of Western liberal democracy (and the efforts required to create
pian in design.

such societies) are really the only political structures that will provide sufficient stability for

US security interests.

Notwithstanding these criticisms,

stability

operations doctrine and the integral

capacity-building elements have been strongly identified by counterinsurgency experts as being a critical factor in effectively combating an insurgency. In describing

the factors that contributed to the success of the 2007 Iraq "surge," for example,

"[W]e conducted operations to support the rule of law, which
helped deal with 'accelerants,' and we introduced what we might call 'decelerants'
such as political reconciliation and building competent, nonsectarian governance
Kilcullen notes,

and national
lence."

55

institutions,

which helped slow and reduce the

intensity of the vio-

Indeed, Kilcullen criticizes the prevalent thinking that underpinned the

original Operation Iraqi

Freedom planning for failing to anticipate the

military le-

verage required to facilitate Iraqi governmental capacity to ameliorate sectarian
tendencies: "[B]ecause our focus
getting ourselves out

was on transition rather than

no matter what the

situation

stabilization,

on

was on the ground, we lacked

the presence or relevance to generate that leverage." 56

Like the

COIN

edges that there

outcomes.

It

is

has

doctrine, the Stability Operations

Manual

implicitly acknowl-

a finite limit in the ability of military force to achieve societal

become

a necessary feature of

such recognition of the limitations of force

is

postmodern

conflict today that

indispensible to strategic success.

These lessons are learned over and over and yet have been demonstrated to
achieve success in the context of multiple

UN peace

operations where stability-

type functions have formed a core element of Security Council peace-keeping/

peace-enforcement mandates. 57

There remains considerable debate on the meaning of "rule of law" within the ac-

ademic literature and how it may be measured. Some perceive it as the external indicia

—
courthouses and prisons—namely an

of a functioning legal system

stations,

that

is,

the establishment of police forces
institutionalist perspective, 58

and

whereas

other more substantively based conceptions equate rule of law success to the acquisition

of internal values within the society and especially the power

elites.

59

This

may draw the critique of imperialism, especially in its emphasis upon international human rights (HR) standards being externally imposed upon a prevailing
too

culture. 60

program

Notwithstanding these critiques, the implementation of a rule of law
is

seen,

under

stability

operations doctrine, as a fundamental feature in
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building host-State legitimacy, 61 though as will be subsequently addressed,

without

its

it is

not

own operationally significant difficulties.

Part II. The Law of Armed Conflict: Interpretative Paradigms in
COIN/Stability Operations

The law of armed
Sovereignty

is

conflict reflects

represented in

its

an amorphous panoply of historical influences.

preeminent, as well as disaggregated, forms, as are

the humanitarian impulses that act as a counterbalance to sovereign military
rights. In

form,

displays a

it

jumble of sharp

distinctions, positivist freedom,

hu-

manitarian obligations and, of course, the perennial interpretative interplay be-

tween rules and standards.

The interdependence of rules and standards and between law and policy forms
the foundational structure and the basic intellectual framework for tackling the
paradoxes of restraint and freedom under the law. In discerning the correct interpretative valence of the law of armed conflict either in conventional warfare or under the more attenuated circumstances of COIN/stability operations, it is
especially critical to investigate the well rehearsed "dialectic" 62 reasoning that

employed when reconciling the advantages and disadvantages of employing

and standards and

is

rules

their respective modalities.

The purpose of this Part, therefore, is to survey interpretative techniques under
the framework of the rules/standards dichotomy as applicable to the law of armed
conflict. As the previous Part has demonstrated, there is a decisive shift in
reimagining the way the law should be applied in COIN/stability operations in order to achieve definitive military goals. Rules necessarily carry with them a level of
rigidity that potentially resists incorporation

always been open to a

more

of "policy," whereas standards have

intuitive application of socio-legal

norms. In the

environment these traditional approaches have been upended somewhat,
in relation to the

LOAC

COIN

especially

concepts of distinction (a rule) and proportionality (a

standard). This author will argue that in shaking these prima facie perspectives, the

COIN doctrine has created a fissure that reveals the limits of the traditional certainties

concerning interpretative valence. Simultaneously, however, we get an ex-

tremely insightful glimpse into the policy/legal interplay that underpins
international law

and which

offers a

all

unique opportunity for a more normatively

based and savvy approach to interpretation.
Rules and Standards
In his seminal article

"Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" 63 Duncan

Kennedy provides an illuminating account of the jurisprudence of
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standards.

Kennedy notes

that such jurisprudence

the choice between standards
cant,

and can be analyzed

standards respond to."

64

a rule

"premised on the notion that

and rules of different degrees of generality is

in isolation

Dealing

from the substantive
with

first

the dimension of "formal realizability,"

Hence

is

65

rules,

Kennedy

signifi-

issues that the rules or
identifies particularly

which acts to give rules their "ruleness." 66

may be construed as a directive that is issued in language that directs

action in a determinate way to test factually distinguishable situations. 67 Standards,

on the other hand,

are

more

fluid

and

refer to directives that relate directly to

one

of the substantive objectives of the legal order. Kennedy notes that examples of
standards are found in principles of "good faith," "due care," "fairness,"

etc.

68

when dealing with a standard, a judge is required to "both discover the facts
of a particular situation and to assess them in terms of purpose or social values embodied in the standard." 69 This process is plainly a more freewheeling exercise
Thus,

where underpinning values intentionally play a bigger role in the ex post reasoning
that

is

required under this regime.

It

also allows for a

more instrumental

applica-

tion of the law.
Pierre Schlag offers a similar, if more fused, explanation, identifying both rules

and standards
sponse."

70

The

as directives

"trigger"

comprised of two

maybe

parts,

namely a

empirical or evaluative.

71

"trigger"

and

a "re-

A rule paradigmatically

comprises a hard empirical trigger and a hard determinate response; hence he offers that a rule

may be

stated as follows: "sounds above 70 decibels shall be

ished by a ten dollar fine."
evaluative trigger

72

In contrast, Schlag defines standards as having a soft

and a soft modulated response,

dard as "excessive loudness

harm."

73

shall

Rules and standards

tional or absolute,

pun-

identifying an

example of a stan-

be enjoinable upon a showing of irreparable

may both be

general or particular,

may

be condi-

narrow or broad, weak or strong. 74 Rules are thought to be more

costly in terms of their

development with

legislators or courts,

employing greater

work in anticipating future variables they wish covered, and are perceived to be less
cost intensive in their application. Standards, on the other hand, offer a reverse
cost/benefit symmetry, being less costly to develop and more costly to apply in each
instance, requiring greater analysis

and appreciation of both particular and

sur-

rounding circumstances. 75

The acknowledged benefits of rules
against official arbitrariness.

76

are that they encourage certainty

Individuals

may

thus plan their affairs

and guard

more

confi-

dently knowing the boundaries of permissible and forbidden conduct. This may,

however, permit "close sailing" to social limits by canny individuals

more

precisely order their activities to follow, but not exceed, strict limits. 77 This

may, in turn,
ness.

who are able to

78

more socially suspect behavior as a "fixed cost" of doing busion the other hand, require individualized judgments about

foster

Standards,
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substantive compliance/violation that permit endorsed policy considerations to

play a significant role in the balancing that invariably takes place. 79 Conversely, the

ambiguity about where the limits
fect"

upon

individuals,

may lie within a standard can have a "chilling ef-

who may desist from

socially useful or desirable activities

because of self-imposed margins of appreciation to assumed

and determinations having

lack the certainty of rules

little

limits. 80

Standards

precedential value are

usually the result.

Because rules can also be general, judges (and other decisionmakers)

may end

up providing ad hoc exceptions and variations to their interpretations that act over
time to seriously undermine the certainties anticipated. 81 There may be other rules
that are more particular in character and which act to contradict general rules, or at
least carve
ist/realist

rules.

out specific areas of independent operation. Indeed, the historic positivdebate revolves around the very choices permitted

when

interpreting

H.L.A. Hart's "soft positivism," for example, anticipates a broad settled

"core" of meaning in the interpretation of rules and a smaller "penumbra" of debatable meaning. 82 Legal realists find Hart's assertions to be

context of appeal cases,

at least in the

somewhat overstated,
and, while equally relying upon the positivist

frame of rules as having determinative
culture

when

effect, find greater discretion

within legal

applying particularized canons of interpretation to reach socially

cognizable outcomes. 83

The Law of Armed Conflict Interpretative Structure
Evidencing

its

modern law of armed
ample evidence of both hard empirical rules and more fluid

evolutionary historical development, the

conflict displays

evaluative standards within
cal attitudes

its

structure.

These were products of different

toward questions of sovereignty and more recently

of legitimacy.

84

Given the

historical longevity of this

reflect

histori-

questions

body of law, fulsome

positive

freedoms are invariably argued in favor of military discretion and the prevailing
treaty rules, especially those

from the nineteenth and

tend to accommodate such advocacy.
tion of the

modern law of armed

tional jurisprudence

It

needs to be recalled that a great propor-

conflict

was fashioned

at a

time when interna-

was reluctant to presume limitations upon sovereignty. 85

Against this backdrop

it is

not altogether surprising that humanitarian advocates

modified their strategy in the post-World

War Two environment

new narrative to the substance of the law. The

LOAC

early twentieth centuries,

to introduce a

incorporation of standards into the

lexicon was anticipated to better achieve humanitarian outcomes within

orthodox interpretative

attitudes. 86

Moreover

it

seemed to permit greater partner-

ship with military voices in exercising statecraft. 87
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Mainstream

LOAC literature tends toward a classic "soft positivism"

terpretative valence.

Language

assessed very carefully.
ysis,

88

It

in

its

in-

parsed carefully and the pedigree of legal norms

is

has largely been a "closed system" of interpretative anal-

where there are exclusive relationships between

guage and

its syllogistic

Under this

theory, legal practitioners

legal ideas 89

and where

lan-

interpellation play a key role in divining legal meaning.

and judges

alike are able to skillfully

employ

these interpretative techniques to arrive at the "correct" legal answer in each case.

Of course, it axiomatically reflects the "Hartian" themes of interpretation. It is this
author's contention that such a methodological view has

its

unacknowledged limi-

tations especially in the context of COIN/stability operations. This article examines

the key

LOAC principles of distinction and proportionality under the aegis of the

new doctrinal
for

orientation applicable to

postmodern warfare and

will

make

a case

acknowledging a revised measure of interpretative approach.

The Principle of Distinction
The principle of distinction has been described as

a "cardinal" principle of the law

of armed conflict by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 90 Indeed, the principle as
reflected in Additional Protocol

the "Basic Rule" in Article 48,

to the 1949

I

which

Geneva Conventions (GPI)

91

is titled

states:

In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish

between the

civilian

population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.

Violation of Article 48

of GPI,

92

is

deemed

and under Article 85(5)

is

by virtue of Article 85(3) (a)
further defined as a "war crime" 93 that "High
a "grave breach"

Contracting" parties have a duty to repress and for which they have a duty to ensure

appropriate penal and disciplinary consequences are imposed. These obligations

extend to both subordinates and superiors

who come

within the ambit of com-

mand responsibility. 94 Given the central place of the principle of distinction in the

LOAC firmament, it is not surprising that it has been accorded such stature.
The terms of Article 48 appear clearly to be a "rule." Invoking Kennedy's
it is

clear that there

"at all times"

is

a high degree of formal realizability in

is

to be

made between "combatants" and the

well as "military objectives"
rect operations

ants."

The

and

"civilian objects,"

and

its

terms.

criteria,

A distinction

"civilian population," as

parties are obliged to "di-

only against military objectives" and, by implication, "combat-

directive

plainly contains the hard empirical trigger

determinative response. Combatants and military objectives only
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and civilians and civilian objects may not. Violation of this "Basic Rule"
both a "grave breach" and a "war crime."
As with
inclusive.

Protocol

generally stated directives, this rule

all

deemed

both under- and over-

is

The operation of other provisions within GPI 96 (as well as Additional
(GPII) for non-international armed conflict 97 ) make an exception for

95

II

the rule against attacking civilians in the case of those civilians
part" in hostilities, for "such time as they take a direct part."

logue on the issue of direct participation in hostilities

mapped out

(DPH)

98

who

take a "direct

International dia-

has, over recent years,

who may lose their
DPH extends down the

a series of functional categories for those civilians

99

The consensus view would seem to be
chain from primary "shooter" or "bomb layer"

immunity.

is

that

(among others) civilian planners and tactical facilitators, at least in relation to organized armed groups
whose members assume a "continuous combat function" in non-international
armed conflict. 100 Such expansion exceeds what the original drafters of the GPI
seemed to anticipate, 101 though the expansion does reflect emergent operational
realities and associated State practice. Current perspectives have nonetheless set
what appear to be policy limits on the breadth of the loss of immunity (despite the
logic of "continuous combat function" extending down the causal chain). Hence
financiers and those inciting such participation through propaganda are not concausal

sidered to

come

great strategic

insurgency.

103

within the

DPH

to include

rubric, 102 notwithstanding that such activity has

and operational significance on sustaining a conflict, especially in an
Thus, by virtue of a combination of legal construction and the

arti-

fice

of applied policy, certain civilians lose their immunity and others don't under

the

DPH

what

formula.

Some

determinations are based upon a logical deduction from

"direct participation" connotes,

and others

are based

upon

which seek to exclude those who might otherwise be caught by
their functional impacts in inciting or sustaining
ries

have been

relatively clearly defined

and

policy reasons

logically assessing

an insurgency. 104 These catego-

articulated,

and have been subject

to

They may also
be reasonably appreciated in any "kill-capture" targeting methodology undertaken
close superior court scrutiny in at least

by an opposing military force.
cation of a

list

minate way.
materials

It is,

one domestic legal system.

to paraphrase

of distinguishable factual

One

and can

is

list

relatively classic appli-

criteria that allows intervention in a deter-

able to compile a "list"

verify via this

Kennedy, a

105

from

a review of authoritative legal

whether an individual's function puts him/her

inside or outside the veil of immunity.

Accordingly, there appears to have been the development of a rule that, while
still

relatively general, permits a confident appreciation

tion based

upon

this directive

may be

of boundary. Military ac-

executed to the limits tolerated by the law

and, of course, canny military/legal planning
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while

still

purchasing the "moral absolutism" that "complying with the law"

provides.

While providing a firm lawful basis

upon

the law itself is predicated
plies in the context

military action

its

for the

conduct of "kill-capture" operations,

a different theoretical

model from

that

which ap-

of COIN/stability operations. Accordingly, as a template for

may

assumptions

lack the necessary operational acuity for

The primary corpus of modern LOAC was developed in the
immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The law, as comprised in the four
1949 Geneva Conventions, complemented the pre-existing Hague Law, which
dealt mostly with "means and methods." This collective body of law anticipated
State-on-State "industrial" warfare 106 to be the prototypical norm, where attrition
is the primary means by which to defeat military adversaries. The subsequent Vietpostmodern

success.

nam

provided significant impetus to the development of the 1977 Addi-

conflict

tional Protocols that acted to partially fuse

Geneva and Hague law with

contemporary relevance. Nonetheless, there was

upon

still

a

more

a significant emphasis placed

and the model for
Admittedly, GPI ex-

a linear conception of warfare between sovereign equals

military

triumph was

most assuredly one of

still

attrition.

pressly recognizes particular non-State fighters participating in conflicts relating

and alien domination and against racist regimes in their exof self-determination. 107 However, they were not treated in any original

specifically to colonial

ercise

manner; rather such

fighters

were "elevated" in status akin to that of soldiers

within State forces. Similarly, while non-international conflicts were specifically
dealt with

dissident

under GPII, the preeminent model was one that anticipated organized

armed

forces controlling territory

respect to that territory in order to

"responsible

command"

and exercising

State-like

implement the Protocol,

powers with

as well as exercising

over such forces in order to conduct "sustained and con-

certed military operations." 108

The framework

for engaging in conflict during COIN/stability operations es-

chews these norms. The

strategies

and

tactics for

COIN/stability operations are

profoundly more nuanced than what the law provides. The
sels

greater restraint

when confronting and

squarely within the criteria of DPH targeting.
categorization of individuals

—

swer for lawful targeting

COIN doctrine coun-

targeting individuals
It

has

become

who come

clear that functional

and the validity of the norm are not the complete an-

just as

become clear that a state cannot kill its way
of the Iraqi surge in 2007 was dependent on an

it

out of an insurgency. The success

has

extremely nuanced and politically aware strategy of engagement, where efforts

who were otherwise targetable under the DPH
The COIN guidance applicable to MNF-I makes it clear that discretion is

were made to reconcile with those
formula.

to be carefully exercised with respect to the application of force. Non-kinetic
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options have a decisive strategic role; hence under the point titled "Promote reconciliation" the

MNF-I guidance notes:

We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify
and separate the "reconcilables" from the

"irreconcilables" through engagement,

population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political
activities.

We

must strive to make reconcilables a part of the solution, even
and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables. 109

we

as

identify, pursue,

The guidance
with any great

and the

who may be

clarity.

dividual identity
ual

for

"reconcilable" within the policy

The criteria nonetheless

and broader

is

not defined

require greater consideration of in-

sociopolitical considerations relating to the individ-

sectarian/tribal/regional connections he/she

may be entwined within.

Kilcullen identifies such potentially "reconcilable" persons as "accidental guerillas,"

110

individuals

who

find themselves manipulated into insurgent activity but

without the hard-core ideological drive. "Reconcilables" are also plainly those persons

who may be

intelligence

turned against their terrorist sponsors and

who may offer both

and cooperation with the counterinsurgency effort. The turning of the

"Sons of Iraq," predominantly within Al Anbar province during the surge, for example, has been identified as a key outcome in addressing the insurgency. 111

When

the objective of a successful COIN/stability operation campaign

"win the population," rather than "kill-capture" the insurgents,
entation to legal interpretation

is

required. In reflecting

on

112

is

to

a different ori-

his experiences in Iraq,

MNF-I Commander General David Petraeus acknowledged that when engaged in COIN a sophisticated risk/benefit calculation is mandated when dealing
with the consequences of targeting. He implicitly acknowledges that such an analysis may transcend traditional LOAC thinking in terms of determining who may be
targeted when he notes:
former

[W]e should analyze

costs

and

benefits

of operations before each operation

.

.

.

[by

we developed over time and used to ask before the conduct of
operations: "Will this operation," we asked, "take more bad guys off the street than it
creates by the way it is conducted?" If the answer to that question was, "No," then we
answering] a question

took a very hard look

at the

operation before proceeding. 113

In reinforcing this point, General Petraeus refers to lessons learned by previous

US commanders, commenting that
[i]n 1986,

Command

General John Galvin, then

Commander

in Chief of the U.S.

Southern

(which was supporting the counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador),
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described the challenge captured in this observation very effectively: "The

.

.

.

burden

on the military institution is large. Not only must it subdue an armed adversary while
attempting to provide security to the civilian population, it must also avoid furthering
the insurgents' cause.

If,

for example, the military's actions in killing 50 guerrillas cause

200 previously uncommitted

citizens to join the insurgent cause, the use of force will

have been counterproductive." 114

The law of armed conflict doesn't deal well with these questions. With respect to
the principle of distinction,
targetable,

it

requires consideration of whether the person

is

not whether the person should in fact be targeted and what such targeting

How do we rationalize this? It may be
that formalist conceptions of legal interpretation under LOAC are not indicted unwill

do in the broader strategic environment.

new doctrinal focus and the principle of distinction may still retain its binary certainty. One might regard considerations of individual "reconcilability"
der this

and

cost/benefit analysis as

mere "policy"

overlays.

A

conscientious lawyer will

therefore guard against crossing the line, will ensure that he/she carefully stays

within the confines of "the law" and will

know where the seam of true legal advice

must end. To do so, though, seems a bit disingenuous. The policy overlay that is
mandated by the COIN/stability operations doctrine requires consideration of variables concerning individual identity, of affiliation and role, and of sociopolitical context. It does so because it has been proven to work in achieving the military goals

A responsible lawyer must take these things into account when dispensing

sought.

meaningful

legal advice.

Once these elements

garding distinction becomes

The

process.

less

are put into the balance, the rule re-

an empirical exercise and more of an evaluative

rule begins to transform into a standard.

quirement to determine whether or not the person

is

On the one hand is the rein fact targetable

under the

general

DPH formula and then on the other is the issue of individually specific cri-

teria to

determine whether or not the person

erwise has greater operational implications.

lawyer

is

doctrine

is

"reconcilable" or his targeting oth-

Under

this standard, the responsible

permitted to have broader regard to the purposes and social values the
is

propagating. Thus, in undertaking this exercise the role of policy be-

comes heavily implicated in the interpretation of the "rule." This in turn shapes the
quality of legal advice that

must be reached. The

issue

is

equally attenuated

when

dealing with the cognate principle of proportionality, which will now be addressed.

The Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality as outlined in GPI is provided in the following relevant recitation of Article 51(5)(b) under the heading "Protection of the civilian
population." Article 51(5)(b) prohibits indiscriminate attacks, defined as " [a] n attack which

may be

expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
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civilians,

damage to

civilian objects, or a

cessive in relation to the concrete

principle

is

and

combination thereof, which would be ex-

direct military advantage anticipated."

also contained in Article 57(2)(b),

which

is

listed

The

under the chapeau of

"Precautions in attack."

The principle plainly introduces a standard whose factors concerning collateral
damage to property and incidental injury to civilians need to be balanced and
weighed against concrete and direct military advantage. The principle is one that
has not easily been reconciled. Professor Dinstein notes, for example, that there

has always been a fundamental disconnect between balancing military considerations against civilian losses, as they are "dissimilar considerations." 115

General Rogers poignantly notes that "[t]he rule

is

more

easily stated

Major

than applied

in practice." 116

Numerous States parties to GPI have made declarations seeking to assure a
more expansive (and militarily advantageous) formalist architecture, including,
for example, declarations that the security of the attacking force

that

may be

a factor

may be taken into account when balancing against "excessive" civilian loss and

that proportionality assessments should be undertaken with respect to the "attack
as a

whole" and not individualized aspects of the

attack. 117 Dinstein notes the criti-

GPI as permitting possibly too
great a subjective assessment by military commanders when undertaking the balancing requirement. 118 As with the principle of distinction, a somewhat linear formulation of assessment is undertaken. Hence civilians and civilian objects are
accorded a "value" and an exchange is processed along consequentialist lines,
whereby an attack may proceed on the basis that "anticipated concrete and direct
cism leveled

at the principle as

elaborated within

by even the smallest of margins, the expected

military advantage" outweighs,
civilian loss.

Against this background the

COIN Manual signals

a self-conscious revision of

the application of the proportionality principle in accordance with

doxes" of counterinsurgency. Hence the manual

In conventional operations, proportionality
terms: civilian lives
gained. But in

how many

and property

COIN operations,

lost versus

COIN

environments, the

destroyed needs to be measured against
if

states:

usually calculated in simple utilitarian

enemy destroyed and

advantage

[military]

stated "para-

is

military advantage

best calculated not in terms of

insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or

detained .... In

do

is

its

number of civilian

lives lost

and property

how much harm the targeted insurgent could

allowed to escape. 119

The commentary subsequently notes
proportionality

may

that the principles of discrimination

and

have an additional sociopolitical significance, stating that
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"[f]ires that

resistance

cause unnecessary harm or death to noncombatants

—

and increase the insurgency's appeal

ceives a lack of discrimination in their use."

may create more

especially if the populace per-

120

The formulation of military advantage and express reference to the political
and social implications of the use of force aren't easily reconciled with classic recitations of the parameters for assessing military advantage over civilian cost. The
COIN Manual commentary cited above focuses on the individual identity of the

harm such

insurgent, requires assessment of future potential

(harm that the insurgent "could do") and seeks
civilian loss in

a person

may inflict

measure that against potential

to

terms of civilian reaction in relation to ongoing support for the in-

surgency and the associated risk of alienation. Such prescriptions plainly fit within

model of "winning the population" under the

COIN

by designing a
sociopsychological "barrier" between the population and insurgents, but do not
seem to square with the commentary offered on this principle arising out of the
a

negotiations that produced the Additional Protocols.

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary
the proportionality principle

commenting

is

strategy

Thus the International

to the negotiations notes that

to be viewed in the tactical context, not strategic,

that the military advantage should be "substantial

that advantages that

"would only appear

garded." 122 Similarly, the

ICRC Commentary

in the long
rejects

and

close" 121

term should be

any notion of

and

disre-

"political" ad-

vantage as coming within a formalistic reading of what the term "military advantage" anticipates. 123 This

is

not the type of calculation that the

COIN Manual

mandates.

The ICRC Commentary
incidental loss of civilian

naturally presumes that the balancing anticipates that

life is

vantage and seeks to impose

COIN

to be
finite

weighed (and

sacrificed) against military ad-

humanitarian limits on that equation. The

up conflating minimization of
incidental civilian loss with military advantage. Ganesh Sitaraman concludes his
analysis of this phenomenon by stating that there is a unification of both humanitarian concerns and strategic self-interest. 124 As a standard, the proportionality
principle more openly permits recourse to social purposes as an interpretative
tool. The ICRC Commentary reinforces this perspective by invoking the standardlike obligations of "good faith" 125 and "equity" 126 as criteria that must apply to
decision making under the proportionality principle. Has, in fact, the COIN direction to assess second- and third-order effects under the proportionality equaorientation of this formula, however, ends

tion rendered the proportionality standard

more

"rule-like" with respect to

weighing the humanitarian side of the equation? Certainly, the trend in

making has been to continually highlight humaniand this author has argued elsewhere that the ICJ has

international tribunal decision
tarian interests in

LOAC

127
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proposed a formula for proportionality that does accord a perceptible weighting
humanitarian requirements. 128

for

A military decisionmaker is obliged under the COIN doctrine to assess the civilby an attack in broader operational and strategic terms. This is
not mandated under the terminology of Articles 51 and 57 of GPI but nonetheless
ian loss occasioned

from the perspective of the military decisionmaker is a norm that now has authoritative effect.

Akin to the

status of a domestic law "regulation" the revised

COIN

Manual has definitive de facto impact. A strict formalist approach to this issue may
disregard such doctrine as

would be

mere

"policy."

As discussed previously, however,

who would adopt such

a foolish military lawyer

is

cannot be

easily dismissed as

is

damage. The harm

attitudes

from

neutrality to anger

and

129

Indeed, so strategically significant
context that the

just collateral

unintended. Civilian casualties tangibly undermine the

nominal protectors can change popular

active opposition.

the issue of incidental injury in the

is

COIN

commanding general in Afghanistan recently issued a directive de-

tailing very limited

and prescribed circumstances under which

and indirect fire can be undertaken
to resemble a "list" approach to
fact

no longer

[T]he fact or perception of civilian deaths at the hands of

counterinsurgent's goals
their

As Sarah Sewall emphasizes:

applied.

[I]n this context, killing the civilian

The COIN
manner in which

a posture.

doctrine has an empirical rigidity that necessarily influences the
the principle of proportionality

it

in residential areas.

when

130

incidental injury

close air support

Such circumstances

may

start

be occasioned. The

of incidental injury, however justified under formalist recitations of the law,

has proven to be a strategically intractable problem. Military policy has imposed a

high value on civilian loss that effectively weights the proportionality formula in

vor of the humanitarian

side,

not because

Kilcullen notes, "our approach
basic facts"

131

it is

fa-

the "nice" thing to do, but rather as

was based upon

a clear-eyed appreciation of certain

concerning the nature and quality of fighting an insurgency.

Rules/Standards and Legal Reasoning

The law of armed conflict sets, throughout its structure, the principles of military
necessity and humanitarian considerations in equipoise. 132 The humanitarian
strategy of relying upon both rules and standards to advance humanitarian priorities under this body of law is a considered, and a not-so-surprising, outcome. We
find hard empirically based rules to ensure a firm separation between combatants

and

civilians

under the principle of distinction and a more evaluative standard

for

undertaking proportionality calculations where incidental injury is anticipated. As
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we have
level

seen,

under prevailing canons of interpretation, rules provide a requisite

of certainty and objectivity, whereas employment of standards mandates that

perspectives" 133 be taken into account,

making "visible and accountable the inevitable weighing process that rules obscure." 134 The proportionality standard thus
"all

requires that an express incorporation

and open balancing of civilian lives be made

in the decision- making calculus.

As previously discussed, the

COIN doctrine has inverted these truisms by ren-

dering the principle of distinction
tionality

more

rule-like. It

more standard-like and the principle of propor-

seems ironic that the purpose of

actually advance humanitarian considerations, albeit

under a

litical) effect

self-interested strat-

would seem to be
Focusing solely upon military (and po-

egy of ensuring military success. Should this be a problem?
problematic from a formalistic perspective.

this inversion is to

under the law rather than upon

It

traditional functional categories has

the potential to obscure the integrity of the "equipoise" established under the law.

The evolution of "effects-based targeting" methodology, for example, which similarly applies a much more instrumentalist approach to targeting decisions, has
been resisted by international legal scholars because of its potential to undermine
the traditional legal distinctions between civilian and combatant. 135 The fear is that
if military effectiveness becomes a viable benchmark for confidence then civilian
protection will be progressively eroded.

There remains a strong professional adherence to the existing formalist tenor of

when deviation from its terms can actually increase
probability of humanitarian outcomes. Gabriella Blum has, for example, sur-

the law of armed conflict, even
the

veyed a range of case studies where
lessen humanitarian risk,

utilitarian

though she has

also

reasoning under the law would

demonstrated powerful resistance to

employment of such reasoning. 136 Her review of the "early warning procedure" decision by the Israeli Supreme Court in the case of Adalah v. IDF 137 is particularly instructive. The case concerned the use of Palestinian civilians by the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to provide early warning of an imminent arrest in
order to facilitate potential surrender and evacuation of innocent persons. Empirical evidence adduced by Blum tends to support the conclusion that use of such
volunteers has reduced casualties of both military and civilians when undertaking
the

such

arrests,

though concomitantly the use of such procedures

is

prima facie con-

number of provisions of LOAC. The Israeli Supreme Court unanimously
rejected IDF use of this technique, holding that this procedure was contrary to the
law of armed conflict, reiterating "the IHL prohibition on using the civilian poputrary to a

lation for the military needs of the

occupying army, and also the obligation to

tance innocent civilians from the zone of hostilities." 138
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pragmatic humanitarian outcomes that the IDF policy sought to optimize weren't
significant

enough

LOAC principles.

to obviate the risk of forensic violation of

Unlike the choices faced by the

Israeli

Supreme Court

in the

Adalah

case, the

reasoning applied under the COIN/stability operations doctrine doesn't constitute

LOAC;

a direct affront to the existing humanitarian principles underpinning the
rather

demands

it

a variegated reasoning process.

traditional categories

by providing

a narrower

Such reasoning can

exist

band of who may be targeted

(dis-

and when incidental injury is permissible (proportionality) and may thus

tinction)

meet with

These goals are certainly consistent with humanitarian

less resistance.

but they

priorities

demand

a

more

policy/political-oriented interpretative ap-

proach in individual cases, and, of course, they serve specific military ends.
ing else

within

it

demonstrates yet again the indeterminacy of the law and the

If noth-

artificiality

of formalist legal reasoning. H.L.A. Hart himself acknowledged that principles,
policies

and purposes can inform reasoning within the penumbral region of rules

and the more open context of standards. He remained adamant
making" occurred only at the "fringe"

139

that such "law

with respect to rules and was nonetheless

subject to "indisputable" measures of correctness with respect to standards. 140

still

This marginalization of principles, policies and purposes to inform
has been at the center of jurisprudential debate for

Morgenthau who advocated
sixty years ago.

a

more

many

legal

years. It

direct assimilation of policy

reasoning

was Hans

and law over

His functionalist advocacy required "precepts of international

law" to be interpreted in the light of "ethico-legal principles" 141 with a strong refer-

ence to "social" 142 context

come more

if

law was to escape

its

formalistic orientation

relevant to international discourse. In the

COIN

doctrine

and be-

we

see the

and standards

realization of this concept. Doctrine applies to reshape rules

alike,

such modification being consciously directed under specific means/ends rationality. It

remains to be seen whether

this

development

is

accepted for what

it is,

or

whether it will be reconciled and explained away within existing canons of interpretation,

no matter how artificial and

unsatisfying that explanation. In representing

an affront to interpretative approaches to rule formalism,
for

what

tion

is

strikes

it

it

may also be

resisted

presages. Conflating military effectiveness with humanitarian protec-

surely

sound

but, as in the

deep into judicial

Adalah

sensitivities

case, the acceptance

and runs the perceived

door to accepting a deeply instrumentalist approach

of this proposition
risk

of opening the

to the law that risks elevating

military effectiveness as an interpretative benchmark.
Alternatively, the

combination of rules and standards methodologies under

COIN/stability operations doctrine can operate to better inform ethical judg-

ment. In his critique of the principle of LOAC's concept of distinction, David

Kennedy queries whether the purpose of the
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"instrumental calculation." 143 The same critique may, of course, apply to the
principle of proportionality. According to Kennedy, the combination of invoking

a formalist style of interpretation in conjunction with an underlying utilitarian

orientation allows for a "proceduralization" of bloodshed that permits the avoid-

ance of any real sense of personal responsibility. 144 The
ations doctrine,

which demands

under the law, meets these

new COIN/stability oper-

sociopolitical analysis in

criticisms.

However,

any targeting solution

carries with

it

it

a particular cog-

Once individuals are assessed on criteria of "reconcilability" rather than
more formulaic DPH criteria, it animates both cognitive and emotional

nitive risk.

on the

processing of information. Thus, from an emotional perspective, whether a targeting action

is

an instance of lawful engagement or "murder" has the potential

for initiating significant cognitive dissonance. It

and the

dividual decisions under the law

quately

maintained

through

"firewall"

functional

a

is

an omnipresent feature in

between such concepts

DPH

category

is

in-

ade-

The

approach.

requirement for individual assessment based upon socio-legal considerations,

even when a person comes within the
cal "distance" that the existing

law

DPH criteria, threatens to unravel this ethi-

establishes.

In warfare, military lawyers effectively undertake the judicial decision-making
role. Military

lawyers will provide a multitude of interpretations and advice to

commanders on what always seem to be cascading legal problems. This advice is always time sensitive and always undertaken in the shadow of the law. The COIN/
stability

operations policy approach to questions of targeting imposes a definitive

high "value" on civilian
militarily strategic

life

that

is

heavily weighted

outcomes. This policy can in

fact

on achieving advantageous
be reconciled with existing

formulations of distinction and proportionality, but we should be aware of the way
this policy

is

guiding selection of legal canons of interpretation. The malleability of

interpretative devices, of turning rules into standards

and

vice versa, exposes the

apparent structural "certainties" of formalism and threatens incorporation of the
traditional risks of arbitrariness, subjectivity

and

inflexibility associated

with the

compounded manner. It would be wrong to read
too much into this phenomenon, however. Indeterminacy is more of a feature of
the law than we might like to think. The realist movement and its "critical legal
rules/standards dichotomy in a

studies" successors have long

been dedicated to ascertaining the inchoate policy

preferences of judicial decision making. Here, ironically, the role of humanitarian

considerations has been "imposed" as an express preference in the interpretation

of the principles of distinction and proportionality.

and an instrumental calculation.
fast

It

its

both an ethical distinction

also speaks the language of legitimacy,

becoming the currency of the law of armed

without

It is

cognitive risks.
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Part III. Legal Plurality in COIN/Stability Operations

The COIN/stability operations manuals emphasize the critical need for intervening forces to assume a particularized form of ethical orientation, one that displays
demonstrable compliance with the law and its underlying humanitarian ethos and
also accepts greater risk in achieving the military goals that have

been

set.

Acting

with "rectitude" has become a key theme in establishing the necessary legitimacy to

underpin COIN/stability operations. 145 The role of "soft power" has been highlighted as a fundamental tenet of success. In this regard Kilcullen notes, "America's

international reputation, moral authority, diplomatic weight, persuasive ability,
cultural attractiveness,

and strategic

credibility

tional adjunct to military strength. Rather,

—

it is

its 'soft

power'

—

is

not some op-

a critical enabler for a permissive

operating environment." 146 In the working environment of COIN/stability opera-

up numerous legal conundrums. The perennial question of the
between LOAC and human rights law within a conflict zone is one of

tions this throws

interplay
these.

Another

is

the choice between invocation of the

of the law of armed conflict

when

full

conventional apparatus

dealing with, for example, "irreconcilables," as

against resort to law enforcement measures

and associated criminal justice proce-

dures to be undertaken primarily by domestic national forces.

The dilemmas facing the legal advisor in a "post-conflict" conflict are multifaceted and perhaps more challenging than in a straightforward conventional war
context. At what point, for example, does the LOAC framework give way to human
rights norms and the application of domestic criminal law standards? Is it a sliding
scale? Are there particular categories of actor or context where the break is more
abrupt? COIN and stability operations doctrine makes it plain that counterintuitive
principles are critical to success,

odologies

still

though conventional

have their place. The challenge

ferred over the other. In
are operating, there

is

all

is

discerning

post-conflict societies

a strong will for

LOAC interpretative methwhen one

is

to be pre-

where intervening military forces

emerging national institutions to

assert their

understandable desire for sovereign independence. Concomitantly, a stated counterinsurgency "paradox" principle
is

normally better than us doing

institutions

is

it

is

"[t]he host nation doing something tolerably

well." 147 Establishing the legitimacy of domestic

a key factor in COIN/stability operations doctrine, though what

probable cost of forbearance

is

the loss of life in one's

own forces? Moreover, what if

complying with civil law processes (warrant-based arrests, for example)
sult in greater casualties for your forces

though resort to available

will likely re-

LOAC avenues of

action to "kill-capture," which minimize that risk, are equally available?
legal

option

is

the right one to take? Post-conflict societies are often in a

of war and peace, and the reality of complying with
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is

not like that in Western democratic

societies.

When is the assumption of greater

which COIN/stability operations doctrine mandates, not appropriate, espe-

risk,

cially

when

other legal regimes that mitigate that risk (though not without

cost to legitimacy) are equally applicable

some

and equally valid?

The Interaction of LOAC and International Human Rights Law in
COIN/Stability Operations

The

interaction of the law of armed conflict

much

and international HR law, which

a staple of contemporary mainstream academic debate, has

alization in the very contexts that

its

is

so

operation-

COIN and stability operations doctrine anticipates.

This requires practical disentangling on the ground. While the framework estab-

by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion 148 for reconciling these
questions makes plain that LOAC (referred to by the Court as international humanitarian law (IHL)) and HR law can both apply during a time of armed conflict,

lished

the

maxim

of lex

specialis will

determine the content of prevailing obligation. In

and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation, in issuing its advisory opinion the Court found that IHL represented the lex
149
specialis.
The ICfs subsequent pronouncement in the 2004 Wall advisory opinthat instance, dealing with the right to

ion 150 provided

may be

less

life

than exacting guidance

exclusively matters of IHL; others

rights law; yet others

when determining

may be

that

"some

exclusively matters of

rights

human

maybe matters of both these branches of international law." 151

The question of resolution between these two bodies of international law may,
however, be more prosaically tackled. Rather than a mighty clash of strategic principle where one body of law in toto trumps the other, there appears to be a more
nuanced assimilation that is occurring in practice. For certain coalition partners either policy or domestic legal directives will directly or indirectly apply

norms

human

They are rarely formally expressed at
the ground level as being one or the other and to the soldier on the ground the distinction is of little import. Hence, with respect to detention operations, which are
plainly a significant component of COIN operations, it is evident that the influence
rights

to their operational activities.

of domestic law, such as the

European Convention on
tivities

UK Human Rights Act (which in turn incorporates the

Human Rights) will continue to have application for ac-

occurring during armed conflict. As the Al-Skeini case 152 has established,

norms can have decisive legal application in a conflict so as to compel observance by particular forces with respect to particular fact circumstances. 153 While
courts will invariably rely upon a careful recitation of facts and circumstances
when formulating such standards, government and military policy will usually
provide for a broader degree of "margin" to ensure lawful and socially legitimate/
acceptable behavior. Hence the impact of this UK legislative authority (as judicially
these
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interpreted) has an assimilative effect in terms of standard operating procedures

(SOPs) written for such operations, ones that other coalition partners are required

and observe when engaging in combined operations. Whether the guidance derives from LOAC or HR law, from domestic or international law, the impact upon operations on the ground and the indirect policy do influence behavior
to respect

and

act as socializing agents

between forces acting

in concert.

Thus

in the event of

COIN operations within Iraq or Afghanistan, should non-UK forces wish to utilize

UK detention

facilities

there

a requirement for compliance with

is

UK legal

and

policy preferences. Given the specificity of such obligations the question of lex
specialis

becomes, in

effect,

one of HR obligations providing

definitive guidance.

The Orientation of Legal Advice
Grappling with the

when looking

at

reality

of legal plurality within an operational context, especially

both the horizontal and

vertical planes of interaction in a

COIN

environment, provides unique challenges. Lawyers are used to compartmentalizing
"disciplined, intuitive" 154

legal

concepts and applying time-tested forensic

legal

reasoning to the resolution of problems. The law of armed conflict provides a

skills

and

particularized intellectual structure. Counterinsurgency inverts

associated with such formalist thinking.

When

defeat

most of the truisms

was staring the coalition

in

new strategy was developed that recognized the
need for a more careful and judicious application of force ("We cannot kill our way
the eyes in Iraq in 2007, a radical

out of this endeavor"). Classic legal prescriptions under

LOAC don't quite match

the objectives being sought, or at least don't synchronize with the
easily,

new "means"

as

except in the pressing case of targeting "irreconcilables."

The

legal advisors in

been dealing with the
forces were

both Iraq and Afghanistan over the past few years have

classic "three-block

engaged in antiterrorism,

war" concept. 155 In these instances, the

as well as counterinsurgency, while simulta-

neously trying to build capacity and ensuring compliance with the multifaceted
rule of law foundation that COIN/stability operations doctrine

problems in these contexts are not so

easily

compartmentalized; these issues are

too deeply interconnected. Choices need to be
possibly being the loss of one's

own

soldiers

pears to be abstract and aberrant policy.
reflected in the COIN/stability operations

made holistically with the net result
through compliance with what ap-

It is clear,
is

demands. 156 Legal

though, that the

new doctrine

actually working in the strategic sense.

Doctrine plays a decisive role in military decision making and there
that operational planning teams have socialized the
effectively fighting this

is

evidence

new directions mandated in

postmodern warfare. As previously mentioned, there is not

a lot of evidence that the legal

community has been

as

ready to internalize these

fundamental changes. Lawyers have a tendency to interpret factual problems in
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accordance with extant legal prescriptions and prevailing models, and seek to
manipulate

facts to

ensure a sense of legal integrity

when

dispensing advice. Per-

haps the dissociative mechanism of distinguishing between law and policy that
lawyers readily employ to temper challenges to formalist orthodoxy in the area of
operational law will again prevail. Perhaps the law of armed conflict will retain

perceived ideational integrity, though stepping back from

this,

there

is

its

something

conform postmodern approaches into a legal framework
that predominantly dates back to the post-World War Two era (in fact, back to the
unsettling in trying to

nineteenth century).

It

seems to

set the stage for legal marginalization.

accommodation may be one that retains the substance of the law but is

The better
more open

to a modified interpretative valence.

Part IV. Conclusion

The body of the modern law of armed conflict is "the result of an equitable balance
between the necessities of war and humanitarian requirements." 157 Through the
mechanism of hard-line empirical rules, as well as flexible evaluative standards,
this

fundamental military/humanitarian balance

is

in perpetual creative tension.

The adoption of a shared vocabulary within the law has allowed an intersection of
dialogue between military professionals and humanitarian advocates that has, in
fact, empowered both camps. It is of no small measure, for example, that the principle

of proportionality

may

be celebrated as a desirable union of both military

economy and humanitarian restraint. The principle provides a moral and political
convergence: only "direct and concrete military advantage" and non-"excessive"
civilian loss are permitted. Yet, the

simple mechanics and elegant mathematical

confidence of the proportionality principle seem to permit avoidance of broader
ethical questions.

As David Kennedy has observed, mechanically complying with

the law can allow the avoidance of "ethical jeopardy" and the minimization of per-

sonal responsibility. 158

The recognition of the specifics of individual identity and
anticipating the second- and third-order effects of a "proportionate attack" are not
matters that have occupied much legal time in any planning analysis, and yet, as we
have seen in COIN, they can have enormous strategic policy significance.
The postmodern era of warfare challenges old legal orthodoxies. Concepts such
as avoiding incidental civilian injury in terms that far exceed legal limits and requiring greater precision in targeting than merely verifying the relevant civilian/

combatant categories of privilege (and

its

loss) represent a

powerful transformative

approach to conducting operations. The COIN/stability operations doctrine predicates are largely counterintuitive

terpretation.

When,

and at odds with traditional approaches to legal

in-

for example, has "emotional intelligence," as General Kiszely
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to

legal analysis? It

is

evident that the

weight of operational doctrine and increasing assimilation of human rights norms
into multi-splintered

SOPs

require a reconsideration of prevailing approaches to

interpretative valence. Perhaps issues such as

and the conflation of military advantage with preserving civilian

erations

der age-old formulas

may be

Perhaps

can continue to

legal advisors

tative rectitude

it

we must be

Could

not.

it

and distinguished

rationalized
insist

on

as

lives

"mere"

un-

policy.

a "Hartian" template for interpre-

and can answer all the relevant constituencies "out there" with a ro-

bust assertion that
lawyers

human rights norms applying to op-

"is

the law" that justifies

vigilant to

remain

be that policy has always

strictly

and

within

its

boundaries.

infiltrated legal reasoning in

not openly acknowledged? Perhaps the American

and

rationalizes actions,

realists

as

Or perhaps

ways that are

of the interwar period 160

much more flexible and accommodating
of policy inputs than what we might want to admit and, moreover, may do so withdid have

it

right

and legal

analysis can be

out impugning the integrity of the law. Perhaps the law of armed conflict

re-

we just need to be mindful of what we
mean by such success and be conscious of how we can get there. Either way, a real
revolution in military affairs is under way and it does implicate the law in fundamental ways. The coming storm offers a rare opportunity to recalibrate the interpretative valence of the law in a spirit of self- awareness made all the more ironic by
the fact that it is operational pragmatism that has sparked this phenomenon.
tains

all

we need to ensure

still

military success,

Notes
1. John
Kiszely, Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors, AUSTRALIAN
JOURNAL, Winter 2008, at 177.

2.

Mat

3.

Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of

ARMY

178.

War in the Modern World 5

(2007).

COIN Manual,

4.

Kiszely, supra note

5.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

1;

infra

note

5, at

&

iii.

Headquarters, Marine Corps

Combat Development Command, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL (University of Chicago Press 2007) (2006) [hereinafter
COIN Manual].
6. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 3-07, THE U.S. ARMY STABILITY
OPERATIONS FIELD MANUAL (University of Michigan Press 2009) (2008) [hereinafter Stability
Operations Manual].
7.

David Kilcullen, The accidental Guerrilla 129

8.

Id. at

9.

Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency,

VIRGINIA

(2009).

128-54.

Law REVIEW

and policy circles,

the

War on

Terror,

and

the

Laws of War, 95

1745, 1747 (2009) ("despite counterinsurgency's ubiquity in military

legal scholars

have almost completely ignored

314

it").

.

Dale Stephens

10.

SMITH, supra note

1 1.

Kiszely, supra note

12.

Id.

3, at 5.
1,

at 179.

There has been a strong sense of ad hoc doctrinal "catch-up" to synchronize with these
non-conventional operations especially during the 1990s. See, e.g., Peter Viggo Jakobsen, The
13.

Emerging Consensus on Grey Area Peace Operations Doctrine: Will It Last and Enhance Operational Effectiveness?, INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING, Autumn 2000, at 36; Michael Stopford,
Peace-Keeping or Peace-Enforcement: Stark Choices for Grey Areas, 73 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT

Mercy Law Review 499 (1996); International & Operational Law Department, The
Judge Advocate General's School, Operational Law Handbook ch. 23 (2001).
14.

Kiszely, supra note

1,

185-86.

at

15.

COIN Manual, supra note 5, at xxxv.

16.

Id. atxxi.

17.

Id. at

18.
19.

20.

234-35.

13 & 252
Mat 11-14.
Mat 47-51.
Id. at

("Lose Moral Legitimacy, Lose the War").

21. Id. at xxv.
22. Id. at 37-39, 42-43, 49-50; Stability Operations
23.

KlLCULLEN, supra note

24.

COIN Manual, supra note 5, at xxv.

7, at

Manual, supra note

6, at 1-29.

30-34.

25. Id.
26.

Kiszely, supra note

1,

at 182.

27. Id.

28.

COIN Manual, supra note 5, at 49.

29.

Kiszely, supra note

1,

at 184.

30. Id. at 179.
31. Id. at 180.

32. Id.
33.
34.

35.

SMITH, supra note 3, at 6.
KlLCULLEN, supra note 7, at 129-30.
COIN Manual, supra note 5, at 44-47.

MNF-I Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance (June 21, 2008), reprinted in
THOMAS E. RICKS, THE GAMBLE 369 (2009), available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/
CGs_Messages/080621_coin_%20guidance.pdf [hereinafter MNF-I Guidelines].
36.

37.

COIN Manual, supra note 5, para.

1-149, at 48.

38. M.,para. 1-153, at 49.
39. M.,para. 1-150, at 48.

40. M.,para. 1-151, at 48.

41

"Resolve"

nerability. See,

is

e.g.,

identified in

many accounts of COIN as being the key counterinsurgent vul-

Jim Molan, Thoughts of a Practitioner, AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL, Winter

2008, at 215, 220.
42.

COIN Manual, supra note 5, at xxiii.

Given the natural interaction between COIN and stability operations doctrine, I will be
referring to both as COIN/stability operations. The main point is that they are doctrinally distinct from conventional warfare.
44. Stability Operations Manual, supra note 6, at viii.
43.

45.

Mat

1-1.

315

COIN and Stability Operations: A New Approach to Legal Interpretation
46.

Id. at 1-3.

DONALD P. WRIGHT & TIMOTHY R. REESE, ON POINT II: TRANSITION TO THE NEW
Campaign, The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003-January
47.

See

2005 ch. 2 (2008), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/
onpoint/index.html, where the following is stated:

PH [phase] IV planning efforts by ORHA [Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance], the Joint Staff, and CENTCOM attest to the fact that many
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able contribution to the ongoing debate with

its

and through

this process has

made a valu-

successive yearly release of reports of

Law and Direct Participation in HostiliCHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
511 (2005); and Dale Stephens & Angeline Lewis, The Targeting of Civilian Contractors in Armed
Conflict, 9 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 25 (2006).
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Rule of Law Capacity Building in Iraq

Richard Pregent*
Introduction

This

article discusses the

US efforts to assist the government of Iraq (GOI)

establishing the rule of law (ROL).

It

focuses

in

on the period from the summer

summer of 2009, and the perspective is that of a military lawyer seconded to the US Embassy in Iraq. Although dated, the events and observations set
forth may provide useful lessons as the United States continues its reconstruction
of 2008 to the

and
of

stabilization efforts in Iraq

ROL

and elsewhere. Before beginning

capacity building in Iraq, the basic concept

a detailed review

must be placed within a

broader context.

ROL capacity building is one aspect of a broader national strategic goal of reconstruction

and

stabilization

of

"fragile, conflict-prone,

and

post-conflict states/' 1

Whether the premise that "weak and failed states are per se among the most significant threats to the United States" 2
sion;

it is

simply accepted as true.

beyond the scope of this discusWithin the Department of Defense (DoD) the

is

valid or not

reconstruction and stabilization mission

ROL capacity building is

is

is

described as "stability operations";

one part of those operations. 3 In a

situation a State's ability to keep the peace

typical post-conflict

by enforcing the law has been compro-

mised. Police, courts and detention capacity

may be limited or not exist at all. The

ROL plays a key role in establishing and maintaining stability, particularly in disciplining the actions of the State.

* Colonel, JA,

US Army.

It is,

however, only one part of the good governance

Rule of Law Capacity Building in Iraq

needed to help
operations

stabilize

and rebuild a weakened State.

Just as important to stability

the State's ability to provide for the essential needs of

is

clean water, adequate food

economy with

legitimate

and

shelter, a secure

employment

its

environment and a functioning

opportunities.

For the purposes of this discussion, the definition of the rule of law
the

US Army's Rule of Law Handbook has been

Rule of Law
public

and

is

a principle of governance in which

private, including the state

citizenry:

itself,

set forth in

adopted:

all

persons, institutions

and entities,

are accountable to laws that are publicly

promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international

human

That principle can be broken

down

rights

The

•

Individuals are secure in their persons

•

The

•

The law can be

state

standards.

into seven effects:

•

state

norms and

monopolizes the use of force in resolution of disputes.

is itself

and property.

bound by law and does not

readily determined

and

is

act arbitrarily.

stable

enough

to allow individuals to plan

their affairs.

and impartial

•

Individuals have meaningful access to an effective

•

Human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected by the state.

•

Individuals rely on the existence of legal institutions

conduct of their daily

lives.

legal system.

and the content of the law in the

4

This definition was adopted by both the

US Mission-Iraq (the Mission) and Multi-

National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) in their joint campaign plan.
It

must

also

be recognized that

ROL capacity building cannot be conducted in

an operational vacuum. Some degree of security must exist for technical advisors
to focus

on

a State's compliance with

its

own

laws, building a functional court

system, protecting the due process rights of pretrial detainees and the

many other

ROL capacity-building missions. There will be instances in which security and the
types of protections associated with the rule of law will
cases senior leaders will have to

that

some may

criticize as

make

the strategic decision to improve security

compromising the

active counterinsurgency there will

come into tension. In those

rule of law. Particularly during an

be times when the long-term goals of the rule
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of law mission will of necessity be a lower priority than establishing and maintaining security.

US ROL capacity-building efforts are hampered by a lack of both unity
of command and unity of effort. The DoD stability operations doctrine tries to recFinally,

oncile

two

conflicting facts: that reconstruction

conducted and led by

civilians,

and

and

stabilization efforts are best

that military personnel will oftentimes be the

only assets available to perform these tasks. 5 At times this conflict has defined the

US

government's (USG) ad hoc reconstruction and stabilization

efforts in Iraq

since the invasion.

This article will

first

discuss the tensions that occasionally arose

operations and

ROL

Departments of

State (DoS), Defense

capacity-building efforts, and then focus

and

between security

on

Justice (DoJ) played in

the roles the

ROL

capacity

building in Iraq. Finally, there will be an assessment of the effectiveness of the current

USG approach with specific recommendations for improvements.
and the Rule of Law

Security

The Awakening
In 2007

many of the Sunni insurgency leaders realized that it was in their best inter-

come to terms with the coalition forces (CF) and government in Iraq. 6 The
movement began in Anbar province and became known as the Awakening. As the
movement spread, MNF-I entered into agreements with regional Awakening leaders,
est to

literally bringing

former Sunni insurgents, the Sons of Iraq (SOI), into a contractual

relationship with CF.

The SOI were paid salaries by CF and were incorporated into CF

security plans and operations.

Some observers believe this development was a greater

contributor to the improvement in security than the increase in combat forces, com-

monly referred to

as the Surge,

In late 2007 the

ordered by the Bush administration in 2007. 7

Awakening began

to bear political fruit:

MNF-I

negotiated an

agreement with the GOI to incorporate a portion of the SOI into government positions. 8

SOI members were hired

into positions at the Ministry of Interior

(MOI)

and brought into the Iraqi army. This partial "reconciliation" between the GOI and
former insurgents was

strategically

key to improving security across the country;

wherever these agreements were put in place
cally.

Even though the agreements were

difficult to

maintain

politically for

primarily Shia elected government

acts

effective,

of violence decreased dramatithey were also extraordinarily

both the Sunni insurgency leadership and the

SOI had boycotted earlier national elections and chosen to become terrorists, while the SOI felt
the elected government had been complicit in the vicious sectarian ethnic cleansing that had convulsed the country since the Samarra mosque bombing in
officials.
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February 2006. 9 Thus
extremely

this political

compromise was both

strategically crucial

and

fragile.

As insurgents, many of the SOI had committed criminal acts before this reconciliation. In many cases arrest warrants had been legally issued by Iraqi judges.
These arrest warrants were not withdrawn with the advent of the Awakening nor

when CF

—and

later the

GOI

—entered

into agreements with the SOI. In 2008

there were several instances of Iraqi security forces (ISF) arresting senior Sunni

Awakening leaders based upon these pre- Awakening warrants. These arrests led
the SOI to believe the GOI was breaking faith with their agreements, creating a very
real risk that the security situation would backslide as the SOI turned back to the
insurgency. Although the arrests on their face were lawful, they also created the
strategic risk of destabilizing fragile political agreements.

At first glance, CF and Mission leadership seemed to be placed

in the position of

having to choose between supporting the arrest and prosecution of Sunni leaders
for

criminal acts or discouraging this enforcement of the law

encouraging Iraqi
political

officials to

ignore judicial arrest warrants

—

agreement that improved the nation's short-term

was no choice

in the matter; the realities

on the ground

—

essentially

in order to support a

security. In fact, there

dictated that security be

maintained and the warrants not be executed. Given the circumstances in Iraq

at

the time, short-term security necessarily took priority over long-term realization of
the principles underlying the rule of law.

The

resolution was that the

Awakening leadership would not be prosecuted

for

allegations of criminal acts related to the insurgency that preceded their agree-

ments with CF and the GOI. Criminal
ter the

allegations that arose for acts

committed af-

conclusion of these agreements, however, did result in arrests and

prosecutions. This political resolution was not formally approved by the Iraqi Par-

Awakening amnesty was never enacted. The executive branch simply
did not execute the legally valid arrest warrants issued by the courts. In principle,
this undercut the rule of law in Iraq. In reality, it made it possible for the SOI to
begin a reconciliation process with the GOI and improved security nationwide.
The improved security environment made it possible for the GOI, USG and the inliament; an

ternational

community to expand their reconstruction

efforts, to

include trying to

establish the rule of law. Ultimately, the leadership realized that the rule of law

capacity-building mission
tions that

make

must not block political accommodations between

fac-

stability possible.

UN Security Council Resolution Detainees
Another example of the tension between
security can be

ROL capacity building and maintaining

found in the disposition of legacy detainees. These individuals were
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detained by CF under the authority of a series of

UN Security Council Resolutions

(UNSCRs), the last being UNSCR 1 790, which expired December 31, 2008. It was
replaced by the US/Iraq security agreement (SA), which took effect the next day. 11
10

Article 22 of the security

agreement

states:

Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the United States Forces shall provide to the
Government of Iraq available information on all detainees who are being held by them.
Competent Iraqi authorities shall issue arrest warrants for persons who are wanted by
them. The United States Forces shall act in full and effective coordination with the
Government of Iraq to turn over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi authorities
pursuant to a valid Iraqi arrest warrant and shall release all remaining detainees in a safe
and orderly manner, unless otherwise requested by the Government of Iraq and in
accordance with Article 4 of this Agreement. 12

On January 1, 2009 when the SA came into effect, US forces held in excess of 15,000
The challenge was to devise a process that complied with the SA without
undercutting security, and in a way that supported the establishment of the ROL.
The end result was a qualified success.
Under the SA, detainees either had to be prosecuted pursuant to Iraqi criminal
law or had to be released. At the time, nearly two thousand detainees held by CF
under the authority of the UNSCRs were in some stage of criminal prosecution in
detainees.

an Iraqi court. These detainees could be transferred into the Iraqi
tion system as space

became

available.

Both the

GOI and CF were concerned that

releasing the remaining thousands of detainees at
safe

and orderly manner."

13

It

pretrial deten-

one time could not be done "in a

would put hard-earned

security

improvements

at

CF established a review and release plan for the remaining detainees.
Lists of detainees were given to the GOI each month with releasable information

risk.

that supported the detentions. Frequently the information supporting detention

was

classified so

very little evidence was provided. Most disclosures consisted of a

conclusory statement that the detainee was involved in supporting the insurgency.

The GOI

in turn either acceded to the releases or

provided warrants for the arrests

To the surprise of many, the GOI began to produce hundreds of
detainees CF intended to release. It quickly became evident that the

of the detainees.
warrants for

GOI was not issuing warrants as the result of independent assessments of evidence
in accordance with Iraqi criminal

mass-produced by the

GOI to

and constitutional law. The warrants were being

effect the transfer

of legacy detainees from

US

cus-

tody into Iraqi pretrial detention.

Many within

GOI

CF held were
security threats and their release would destabilize the country. Many within the
US forces leadership felt the same. Because a warrant enabled CF to transfer the
the

leadership believed that the detainees
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detainees into the Iraqi criminal justice system rather than release the detainees
into Iraqi society,
a positive

of law.

many US military leaders welcomed the flood of Iraqi warrants as

development rather than a violation of the principles underlying the rule

US

forces

made no

effort to

encourage the

GOI to

issue warrants that

based upon adequate evidence. Keeping these detainees off the

streets

were

was deemed

more important than ensuring that their deprivation of liberty was done in
dance with the law. The result was moving even more pretrial detainees

accorinto a

criminal justice system that was already glutted and dysfunctional.

One of the many organizations that worked closely with Iraqi officials to help establish the ROL, the Law and Order Task Force (LAOTF), had studied the detainee
population records at Rusafa prison, Iraq's largest detention

facility.

This prison

held over 20 percent of Iraq's entire detainee population and would house the vast

US

LAOTF's study showed that
over 20 percent of the prison population had been arrested by the Iraqi army and
no action had been taken on their cases since their detention order. Over 500 of these
detainees had been in pretrial confinement more than a year without any action
taken on their cases; over 290 of these had been in pretrial confinement for over
two years with no action taken. This study highlighted violations of Iraqi law and a
significant cause of the constant overcrowding and inhumane conditions for the
detainees. The United States was quick to bring this to the attention of the Minister
majority of detainees transferred from

custody.

of Justice for corrective action.
Despite this information,
rants with success.

into a

broken

US detention leaders chose to continue to equate war-

The warrants enabled

Iraqi pretrial detention system. This exacerbated the

and continued to overwhelm the
valid

on

that the

the United States to transfer detainees

their face, that the

SA gave

Iraqi courts.

Many argued that the warrants were

United States had no authority to question them and

the United States

no choice but

to transfer the detainees.

each of these statements was true, the reality was that the
effort to

overcrowding

While

US leadership made no

ensure that Iraq was taking these actions against US-held detainees in ac-

cordance with Iraqi law.

The

vast majority of the detainees transferred

that 80 percent of the detainee population

were Sunni, a

was Sunni.

It

reflection

of the

fact

remains to be seen whether

the

USG detention leaders have created a longer-term strategic risk. Will these detain-

ees

be treated like those detained by the Iraqi army and remain in pretrial confinement

with no action being taken on their cases for years?
reconciliation

and

radicalize the detainees

and

If so, will

their families

it

and

undercut
tribes

efforts at

once again?

Unlike the case of not executing arrest warrants against the leadership of the

Awakening, the decision to transfer thousands of Sunni detainees from
tion into Iraqi custody without

some

effort to
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process was a mistake. These wholesale transfers were expedient from a security

point of view. The focus on security, however, has arguably led the United States to

be complicit in what

is

de facto security detention.

It is

impossible to predict the

impact these actions will have on establishing the rule of law in
can be said
the

is

that this

Iraq.

The least that

was a lost opportunity to encourage the executive branch of

GOI to comply with its own laws.
The Counter-Terrorism Bureau

In 2006 and 2007 Iraq's security forces were virtually incapable of conducting
effective counterterrorism operations.

The Ministry of Interior

in particular

had

by criminal elements involved in sectarian violence. Iraqi special
operations forces (ISOF) were often hamstrung by an inefficient command structure

been

infiltrated

and a lack of funding. In response, and with the support of CF, the Prime Minister
(PM) established the Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB). The CTB was intended
to develop anti-terrorism strategies for the government, as well as conduct

counterterrorism operations. 14 The
fense

(MOD) and

placed

PM removed ISOF from the Ministry of De-

them under

his direct control. Initially this

was done

within the context of a statement of emergency (SOE) announced by the

PM and

approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) in accordance with the

The Constitution, however, states that an SOE may only be
declared for a period of thirty days and must be extended for similar periods with
the COR's approval for each period. 15 The original SOE lapsed and has never been
approved again by the COR in accordance with the Constitution.
With the technical assistance of CF, the CTB proved to be an effective counterIraqi Constitution.

terrorism force. There were incidents, however, where the
undisciplined and acting from a sectarian bias. Since

was not subject to ministerial
branch and the

it

CTB

appeared to be

was not part of a ministry, it

oversight. Tensions arose

between the executive

COR during 2008 as the PM pressed to have legislation enacted

CTB. 16 The proposed legislation, however, would have approved
the status quo and did not include oversight processes that were independent of the
PM's office. In early 2009 the COR passed a statute that prohibited expending
funds on any quasi-governmental institutions that were created or operated outside of established legal institutions. This was directly aimed at forcing the executive branch to institutionalize the CTB. Critics were concerned that the CTB,
which had grown to nine ISOF brigades located across the country, could become
the PM's personal militia.
legitimizing the

US

forces

ensure

its

were intimately involved in the development of the

fighting effectiveness.

The CTB

in fact
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the counterterrorism fight in Iraq,

maintaining security. The

CTB

and was an important

factor in creating

and

did not, however, have a legitimate basis in Iraqi

The executive branch had built it unilaterally without concern for the law. The
CF and US Mission leadership once again felt the tension of security versus the rule
of law. It had helped create an effective fighting force, but one that was operating
outside the authorities of the Iraqi Constitution and Iraqi laws. This tension was
primarily one between branches of Iraqi government and the US ability to influence that debate grew less as Security Council Resolution 1790 lapsed and the seculaw.

rity

agreement took effect. To date this internal Iraqi debate has not been resolved.

During the counterinsurgency

US

fight

forces

must be mindful

that the capa-

helps the host nation develop are consistent with that nation's legal

bilities it

structure. Supporting the

PM's effort to

be done in such a way that
State's constitution.

To do

State rather than a State

it

fight the

insurgency and terrorism cannot

undercuts the balance of powers established by that

so could result in the re-establishment of a strongman

governed by the rule of law.

Rule of Law Capacity Building
In 2008 both

MNF-I and the Mission were anticipating the expiration of UN Security

Council Resolution 1790

at the

end of the calendar

year. 17 This

end the United Nations Chapter VII authority for coalition
tary operations in Iraq as they had since the formal

would bring

to an

forces to conduct mili-

end of occupation

in

June 2004.

Without the consent of the government of Iraq, the host nation, there would no
longer be legal authority for

CF to be present on Iraqi territory, never mind conduct

unilateral military operations. Bilateral negotiations

had begun seeking an

ar-

rangement that would respect Iraq's sovereignty and growing sense of nationalism,
while simultaneously allowing for the support and technical assistance provided by

US forces
improve
It

was

—

assistance both sides recognized as absolutely essential to maintain

and

security.

in this context that a periodic review of progress in achieving the goals of

the joint campaign plan ( JCP) was conducted for the ambassador and MNF-I

com-

mander in the summer of 2008. At that time the JCP focused on four lines of operation: security, economic, political and diplomatic. The Awakening, the surge of US
forces and the increases in the capabilities of Iraqi security forces had resulted in a
dramatic improvement in the security environment; by virtually every statistical
measure

acts

of violence had reached

levels last seen in 2003.

Economically, Iraq

was facing a budget surplus. This was due primarily to record high
(approximately 95 percent of the Iraqi economy

is

based upon

oil

prices for oil

revenues).

An-

other contributing factor was government inefficiency; ministries simply could
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not execute their budgets. While

oil

production was

still

inefficient,

made by

COR

the

improve output.

in passing

On the political front,

some "benchmark"

was envi-

make needed

sioned that the budget surplus would provide the opportunity to
capital investments to

it

progress had been

legislation, 18 the executive

branch appeared to be making efforts to conduct security operations and govern in
a generally non-sectarian manner,
elections in
relations

December 2008.

and preparations were on track

for provincial

Finally, in the diplomatic arena, Iraq's international

were progressing. More nations, particularly regional neighbors, were

and Iraq was increasing its
participation in regional and international forums. Thus, impressive progress had
been achieved in each line of operation. The same could not be said for the estabsending delegations

and opening missions

to,

in, Iraq,

lishment of the rule of law.

While the
ernment,

it

Iraqi judiciary

was

was

legally

independent of the other branches of gov-

overwhelmed. The High Judicial Council recognized a need

also

for 3,000 judges; 19 there

were only about 1,250. Judicial security was a significant

problem; dozens of judges had been assassinated since 2003. These problems led to
significant backlogs of cases,

which exacerbated the

challenges. Pretrial detention conditions rarely

existing pretrial detention

met the most

basic international

standards. Conditions of overcrowding, inadequate hygiene facilities

—

ited medical support
trial

detention

facility.

police practice.

and very lim-

—

some cases there was none existed in nearly every preForcing confessions from prisoners was a well-established
in

MNF-I

police training teams reported scores of detainee abuse

cases at Iraqi detention facilities every

month, supported by physical evidence. In

addition, there were significant challenges

beyond

"courts, cops,

and corrections,"

on during post-conflict operations. Official corruption was endemic and the GOI had not developed the oversight mechanisms needed to combat it. The ministry inspectors general were neither
resourced nor empowered to act. The Board of Supreme Audit and the Commission on Integrity were similarly hampered. Most problematic was Article 136b of
the Criminal Procedure Code, which gave individual ministers the authority to
the areas military forces traditionally focus

member of their ministries. After this periambassador and MNF-I commander decided to make the rule of

block the criminal prosecution of any
odic review the

law a separate

line

of operation of the JCP.

The persons tasked to lead the lines of operations were the senior officers responsible for the US government efforts in those areas: the MNF-I Deputy Commanding General for Operations for the security line, and the Mission's senior
political, economic and diplomatic officers for those lines. The lead for the rule of
law line of operation was shared by the Mission's Rule of Law Coordinator (ROLC)
and the MNF-I Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), a US Army colonel. This was a
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reflection of both the realities
States

on the ground and the manner

had conducted operations

in Iraq since the invasion.

in

which the United

While the ambassador

was the senior representative of the United States, there was an overwhelming military presence. In

nearly as

August 2008 there were over 160,000 coalition forces in Iraq, with

many contractors supporting the military presence. These military and

civilian assets

were spread across the country. The number of Mission personnel

and contractors was
in

a small fraction

by comparison, and most were concentrated

Baghdad.
Civilian-Led Rule of Law Capacity-Building Assets

The ROLC was a senior executive service officer seconded to the Mission from the
Department of Justice. It should be noted that rule of law capacity building was
only part of his responsibilities. Both Do J and the Mission looked to that person to
oversee

all

USG justice activity in Iraq, the ROLC basically serving the role of legal

attache, as well as rule of law coordinator. In

August 2008 the number of personnel

under the ROLC's technical supervision included personnel from the
Service, the Federal
rity,

US Marshals

Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Secu-

ROL capacity-building misROLC personnel dedicated to the ROL mission included the ROLC deputy,

but few of these assets were in Iraq to support the

sion.

one action

officer

and

liaisons to the Ministry of Justice

(MOJ), Ministry of Inte-

High Tribunal (IHT), the Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement (INL) office, and the International Criminal Investigative
rior

(MOI), the

Iraqi

Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)
sors (RLAs) located with

The numbers and

sizes

office.

There were also resident

legal advi-

most of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

of PRT offices fluctuated frequently, but in the

summer of

2008 there were about twenty-six PRTs spread across the country. There were sev-

Baghdad and some of the eighteen provinces had two or more, while the
Kurdistan region had only one. The PRTs and their RLAs fell under the authority

eral in

of the Chief of the Office of Provincial Reconstruction (OPR) and not the

ROLC.

ROLC MOJ and MOI liaisons had limited impact. The capacity-building
mission for the MOI rested with MNF-I. 20 Thus the Mission's liaison was an obThe

server of events within the Ministry of Interior

and developed a network within the

ministry to arrange key leader engagements. This was an important function, but

make a critical contribution to ROL capacity building. Regarding the MOJ
liaison, it must be noted that, in the summer of 2008, the acting Minister of Justice, who had been in place for nearly a year, refused to cooperate with either CF or
the Mission. This continued until early 2009 when a new minister was appointed.
Thus, the Mission's MOJ liaison could accomplish very little. The IHT liaison
did not
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was known

Regime Crimes Liaison Office from 2003 to 2007. In the
earlier years it had a larger staff and provided significant amounts of technical assistance to the IHT. By 2008 the IHT was well established and the liaison office was
reduced to a single officer who observed the court's activities and provided technioffice

cal assistance as

the

as the

needed. The bulk of the

ROL capacity-building contributions by

ROLC were made by ICITAP, INL and the RLAs with the PRTs.

ICITAP's role was to provide technical assistance to the
quality of correctional facilities

GOI

and the professionalism of the

to

improve the

Iraqi Corrections

ICITAP had been present in Iraq since 2003 and helped the GOI make
enormous strides in its correctional system. In 2008 it had a senior corrections professional in the ROLC managing over eighty contractors divided into teams spread
across eleven prisons and six detention facilities. Although ICITAP's focus was on
post-trial detention facilities, it maintained a presence in some pretrial facilities.
ICITAP worked closely with MNF-I's Task Force (TF) 134 to train Iraqi corrections officers and help the GOI institutionalize this training capacity. The ICITAP
contractors were the USG's eyes and ears into Iraqi corrections facilities. ICITAP
was greatly responsible for the fact that by 2008 MOJ-run facilities usually met international standards and rarely generated allegations of detainee abuse. As discussed later, conditions in pretrial detention facilities were appalling, but most of
those facilities were run by the MOI.
The RLAs focused on rule of law capacity building at the provincial level and
below. As previously indicated, they were part of the PRTs, falling under the authority of the embassy's Office of Provincial Reconstruction, not the ROLC. The
PRTs had the broader reconstruction and stabilization goals of supporting good
governance by improving the local governments' ability to provide essential services, employment and educational opportunities, and health services, as well as
increasing the transparency of government to battle corruption. The RLAs focused
on the rule of law aspect of reconstruction and stabilization, tailoring their efforts
to the needs of a given region. The RLAs frequently served in austere and dangerous environments, and relied on MNF-I assets for security and movement support.
Several RLAs were retired military lawyers or assistant US attorneys on detail and
Service.

served for at least a year.

Although the INL

office

had no

rule of law capacity-building practitioners,

controlled the funding for the civilian rule of law capacity-building efforts

it

and

managed related contracts. INL funded ICITAP, most of the RLAs, Iraqi judicial
and law enforcement assistance programs, various information technology
initiatives and the construction of five prisons. INL also managed a $400 million
contract for the DoD to provide over 750 police and border advisors. The ROLC
had no authority over the director of the INL office. This was a significant source
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of friction in the Mission's rule of law capacity-building

efforts.

Frequently, the

INL office would act independently without coordinating its actions with the
ROLC. At other times, the INL office would disagree with the rule of law priorities
set by the ROLC and refuse to fund them. The tension between these offices reflected the greater tension
State.

DoS

between the Department of Justice and Department of

lacked subject-matter expertise in rule of law capacity building and

turned to DoJ for

this support.

DoS

Yet

refused to give that officer authority over

the funding of rule of law capacity building. This fundamental gap between
capabilities

and

and

responsibilities

is

at the heart

of

USG

DoS

failings in reconstruction

stabilization efforts.

Military-Led Rule of Law Capacity-Building Assets

By comparison

to the civilian-led effort the

the stabilization

sition

military applied far

and reconstruction mission, including

then-major general Petraeus

ing. In 2004,

US

Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I),

more

assets to

rule of law capacity build-

built the Multi-National Security Tran-

consolidating

US government

efforts to

GOI in rebuilding the Ministries of Defense and
military and police forces. In its early years MNSTC-I

provide technical assistance to the
Interior, as well as the Iraqi

focused on force generation to increase the

number of

ISF available to conduct

counterinsurgency operations. As the security situation improved in 2008,

MNSTC-I began

to shift

their respective

ministries'

MNSTC-I

assisted

establishing

its

both the

focus to professionalizing those forces and improving
ability to

MOI

open and transparent

and

support and oversee their operations.

MOD in developing codes of conduct, and

internal court systems to discipline their forces.

Dozens of MNSTC-I advisors and contractors worked within the ministries
stitutionalize oversight

and

mechanisms (inspectors general and human

at the training bases to assist in establishing training

respect for basic

human

rights

and the

rule of law.

and who had developed the

trainees.

MNSTC-I

also trained

skills

CF

rights offices)

standards that included

These advisors also worked to

"train the trainers," helping to develop a cadre of Iraqis
jects

to in-

who understood the sub-

needed to pass that knowledge on to new

training teams that were then assigned to the

commanders within Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), MNF-I's subordinate, operational command.
field

In 2008,

MNC-I had

120 military training teams, 35 national police training

teams and 244 police training teams operating in

Iraq.

These teams were partnered

with Iraqi units and worked with them on a daily basis to provide technical
tance in conducting operations and professionalizing the forces.

each subordinate

MNC-I

assis-

required

command to inspect all Iraqi detention facilities within its area of
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responsibility every quarter. Training teams

Monthly reports were provided

sessments.

were often used to conduct these
to the

MNC-I

as-

Provost Marshal and

proved to be an invaluable tool to identify the areas with the most significant prob-

MNC-I

had a contract for law enforcement support in addition to the
$400 million contract managed by INL referred to above. About 150 civilian law
enforcement professionals were provided under this contract and were distributed
down to the battalion level to work with the police training teams and partnered
Iraqi units. In 2008 over two hundred military lawyers and paralegals were serving
lems.

also

MNC-I. Many of them worked with the PRT RLAs and local Iraqi judicial
and law enforcement officers on various rule of law capacity-building projects.
TF 134 was created in 2004 to manage detention operations for CF. Although
the task force's principal mission was running detention facilities at Camps Cropper and Bucca, which housed thousands of security detainees, it also made significant contributions to rule of law capacity building. The TF 134 legal office was
within

staffed with

dozens of attorneys whose mission was to support the prosecution of

security detainees in the Central Criminal

the evidence

and provided

it

Court of Iraq. These lawyers marshaled

to the investigating judge in an effort to turn security

detainees held under the authority of Security Council Resolution 1790 into pris-

oners convicted and sentenced under Iraqi criminal law. Although this effort was

who

intended primarily to prosecute and punish those

added benefit of improving to some degree the
one of Iraq's

largest criminal courts.

attacked CF,

efficiency

it

had the

and professionalism of

21

TF 134 also conducted inspections of Iraqi prison facilities to ensure that the facilities

met basic standards before transferring detainees that were charged with, or

convicted

of,

committing offenses under

Iraqi corrections officers

TF 134

Iraqi law. In addition,

and integrated them

trained

into the guard force rotations at

Camps Cropper and Bucca, providing carefully supervised on-the-job training. In
2009, TF 134 initiated and oversaw, in coordination with ICITAP, the construction
of a multimillion-dollar training center near
the development of programs of instruction

downsizing of MNF-I in 2009,

TF

tions assistance transition teams.

Camp

Cropper. This effort included

and training Iraqi trainers. Despite the

134 also built a capability to

Much

field

like the police training

nine correc-

teams described

ICITAP cannot support, and
provide technical assistance to the Iraqi guard force and facility managers.
MNF-I created the Law and Order Task Force (LAOTF) in 2008. It was intended
to help build "Iraqi capacity for independent, evidence based, and transparent investigation and trial of major and other crimes before the Central Criminal Court
earlier, these

of Iraq." 22

teams

travel to Iraqi detention facilities

LAOTF was

located at Forward Operating Base Shield near Rusafa

prison, Iraq's largest detention facility,

and the Rusafa criminal
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prison included both sentenced prisoners and pretrial detainees. Although the
conditions were better than most Iraqi pretrial detention

facilities, it

was notoriously

overcrowded. The detention facility was poorly managed; corruption and sectarian
bias

were rampant. ICITAP's

by the

frustrated

efforts to

improve prison conditions were frequently
August 2008 the courts

inertia of the Rusafa criminal courts. In

were so slow that it would take three years to
of pretrial detainees languished awaiting

retire the

trial.

backlog of cases. Thousands

LAOTF's mission was

to

improve

the Rusafa criminal court's throughput.

LAOTF was initially staffed with US military lawyers, and criminal investigators
from Australia, the United Kingdom and US armed forces. It was intended that the
criminal investigators be paired with Iraqi criminal investigators to improve the
quality

and

efficiency of their investigations.

"mentors" for the Iraqi investigative and
Iraq's first defense clinic near the prison.

DoJ

civilian attorney

torial rather

It

The

military lawyers were titled

judges. 23

clinic

LAOTF

It

was comprised of about

who were "mentored" on how to

must be noted

also established

was run by an experienced US

and a military judge advocate.

twenty Iraqi defense counsel
Rusafa detainees.

trial

The

provide support to

that the Iraqi criminal justice system

is

inquisi-

than adversarial, leaving a very limited role for defense counsel. Most

Western-trained attorneys found

it

difficult to accept that the investigative

judge

served the roles of prosecutor and defense counsel, as well as that of independent
judge. 24

The goal of the defense clinic was not to change Iraqi criminal law or practice, but a more modest one of providing detainees with advocates who might be
able to move their cases through the investigative process more quickly.

LAOTF

also

assumed

a role in coordinating Iraqi judicial support to military

operations following the expiration of Resolution 1790. As the expiration date ap-

proached,

MNF-I conventional forces began to conduct all operations "by, through,

and with"

their Iraqi counterparts.

sued by Iraqi criminal courts.

LAOTF worked

Criminal Court of Iraq judges to
the issuance of warrants

These operations were based upon warrants

assist in

closely with the units

is-

and Central

the presentation of evidence supporting

and the follow-on prosecution of those cases. This support

helped to some degree in disciplining the operations of the Iraqi security forces

who were not accustomed to conducting counterinsurgency operations with a goal
of criminally prosecuting the detainees, an important rule of law goal.

Rule of Law Coordinating Center

As the importance of

rule of law capacity building

was being recognized by the

Mission and MNF-I leadership by making it a separate line of operation in the joint

campaign plan, the

ROLC and MNF-I

Staff Judge
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They also recognized that those efforts
commands and agencies; there was no unity of

were numerous actors working in the
were being conducted by separate

field.

command. Trying to achieve a unity of effort, they decided to create the Interagency Rule of Law Coordinating Center (IROCC).
The IROCC was intended to coordinate and synchronize rule of law capacity
building. In military parlance, it would serve the role of a fusion cell. The concept
of the IROCC was initially opposed by the senior DoS leadership in the Mission, a
result

of the ingrained institutional concern about the "militarization of diplomacy."

Only after repeated assurances

DoS

assets did the

Mission

that the

IROCC would have no authority over any

relent.

The concept was that the IROCC would be staffed with action officers from the
ROLC office and the MNF-I SJA's rule of law office. Those officers would continue
to work on rule of law issues but do so together in one office ensuring that all
would have a broad situational awareness, avoiding redundancies and achieving
synergies. The IROCC would be led by an Army judge advocate colonel working
for both the ROLC and the MNF-I SJA. When the draft fragmentary order
(FRAGO) was initially staffed, civilians within the ROLC office who would be

IROCC

DoJ employees who balked at
working within an organization led by a military officer. Once again, it was reiterated that the IROCC was a coordinating body and had no tasking authority over
working within the

either

DoS

Once

objected. These were

or DoJ personnel.

the

FRAGO was issued by the MNF-I commander, 25 the military entities
MNSTC-I, TF 134 and LAOTF)
coordination process led by the IROCC. Mission rep-

involved in rule of law capacity building (MNC-I,

immediately engaged in the
resentatives

RLAs)

(ROLC, OPR, ICITAP,

also participated.

IROCC was

and

MOI

liaisons,

a useful (and non- threatening) coordinating body.

and above

Initially the

PRT

INL, Baghdad

At the action officer level it was quickly discovered that the

teleconferences were held with
level

MOJ

all

Weekly video-

rule of law capacity builders at the operational

participating.

IROCC focused on Iraqi detention facility inspections. A central data-

base, accessible to

all

ROL capacity builders, was developed for inspection reports, as

was a central inspection/assessment calendar to de-conflict the oversight process.

MNSTC-I advisors to the Ministry of Defense Human Rights Office and Ministry
of Interior Inspector General offices were able to better coordinate
port for Iraqi inspections of Iraqi detention
quickly provide reports of inspections

The

results

MNC-I was

able to

sup-

more

and serious incident reports to the MNSTC-I

liaison officers to ensure inspection reports

gated by the Iraqis.

facilities.

logistical

were not

stale

and could be

investi-

of all inspections were more efficiently and broadly

shared across the inspecting community. Significant incidents or particularly bad
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conditions could be quickly brought to the attention of both the Mission and

MNF-I

leadership.

The IROCC supported

a "targeting" process for key leader

engagements.

The IROCC became the established mechanism for USG rule of law capacity
builders to coordinate and de-conflict their efforts. During the weekly meetings
rule of law capacity-building initiatives

were presented, ranging from real property

The IROCC
from MNSTC-I,

dispute resolution to coupons for legal representation for the indigent.

held a separate forensics forum, gathering subject-matter experts

MNC-I, ROLC, MNF-I, LAOTF and TF
courts.

It

its

Ministry of Interior

was quickly discovered that there were overlapping

portunities that
dispel

and the UK Mission, to discuss initia-

develop a forensic capability within

tives to help the Iraqis

and

134,

had not been

The forum helped the leadership
courts would not accept forensic evidence,

and to focus their efforts on the weakest link in the forensic arena
also held

and op-

identified earlier.

"urban legends" that the Iraqi

The IROCC

efforts

—

police training.

an information technology forum during which

it

gathered

who were

developing databases or information management systems for

the Iraqis (TF 134,

LAOTF, INL and MNC-I). The goal was to achieve compatibil-

all

ity

those

and avoid creating

a series of separate, unique

and incompatible information

management systems.
The International Committee of the Red Cross attended several IROCC meetings, as did the UK Mission legal advisors. After six months the IROCC attempted
to engage with the international community to coordinate ROL capacity-building
efforts there as well. The Mission leadership objected, saying that this was the ex-

DoS and

clusive province of the

there

is

the

no organization comparable

munity in

ROLC office.
to the

It

should be noted that to date

IROCC within

the international

com-

Iraq.

Despite the bureaucratic hesitation, the
ing mechanism.

It

IROCC proved to be a useful coordinat-

remains to be seen whether the various agencies involved in

re-

construction and stabilization operations in the future will embrace the concept of
a fusion cell in the field.

State

Department Leadership

The concept of "nation

in Reconstruction

and Stabilization

building," widely criticized during the 1990s with

US

in-

volvements in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, took on a new
legitimacy after the attacks of 9/1
itarian operations,

US

1.

During those

earlier

peacekeeping and human-

support to the capacity-building efforts

fell

to the military

because of both a lack of interest on the part of policymakers within the Clinton administration and a lack of capacity within the Department of State. After 9/11
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many now viewed weak and failing States

as potential threats to the

United States

because of their inability to deny safe haven to transnational terrorists, or, as in
the case of the Taliban, a willingness to provide such a haven. 26

The lack of a civilian capacity to plan, coordinate and execute post-conflict governance and capacity
building became clear after the invasion of Iraq and the toppling of the Saddam
Hussein regime.
In 2004 the State Department established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). In the same year Congress supported the
creation of the

S/CRS with funding in

cal year 2005.

The congressional language

its

Consolidated Appropriations Act for
set forth a

broad

stability

fis-

and recon-

struction leadership role for DoS, including developing a readily deployable
capability of civilian subject-matter experts to lead reconstruction activities in re-

gions or countries trying to overcome crises. 27 In

December 2005 President Bush

signed National Security Presidential Directive 44

(NSPD

44), explicitly tasking

US government

and

the Secretary of State to lead

and coordinate

reconstruction efforts. 28

Secretary of State was given the responsibility to not

The

all

stabilization

simply lead the interagency process on this subject, but also develop a strong

civil-

ian response capacity for post-conflict situations.

Over the

last

four years the S/CRS established an Active

and Standby Component. The S/CRS's goal

to have 250

CRC-A full-time and 2,000 working in

working in the
side

is

Component (CRC-A)
government personnel

other federal agencies out-

DoS but available for surge requirements. The S/CRS also seeks to create a re-

serve force of

up

to

two thousand persons not employed by the government but

available for deployments. 29 This force structure has not

funded to

date.

The Bush administration proposed a

tive for fiscal year 2009, requesting
initiative.

This

been authorized or

Civilian Stabilization Initia-

$248.6 million to finance the

first

year of the

sum represents a small fraction of the monies expended by the USG

and reconstruction. 30 In the last two years a very
limited number of DoS personnel have been deployed by the S/CRS to support
in Iraq each year for stabilization

capacity-building initiatives in Sudan, Haiti,
that, since its creation in 2004, the

Iraq and has

Chad and

S/CRS has had no

Liberia. 31 It

significant

must be noted

involvement in

made virtually no contribution to the reconstruction and stabilization

efforts there.

Virtually all

USG rule of law practitioners currently working in Iraq are military,

DoJ or contractor personnel. Although INL and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) administer many large ROL-related contracts, neither

Iraq. It

is

organization has a

particularly

DoS

rule of law subject-matter expert serving in

noteworthy that the Mission's Rule of Law Coordinator

seconded to the Mission from DoJ. In

Iraq, the State
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management of rule of law capacity building and

contracts out

all

reconstruction

and stabilization efforts. It is unclear whether either DoS or USAID has the subject-

manage these contracts.
In the fall of 2008 the American Academy of Diplomacy issued a report on what
32
it described as a "crisis in diplomatic readiness."
The report recognizes that DoS
is incapable of performing the missions given it by NSPD 44 and acknowledges that
the military has assumed a greater role in diplomacy as a result: "The 'militarizamatter expertise on

tion of diplomacy'

macy and

is

noticeably expanding as

fill."

33

The report

was a 2,400 personnel

illustrates

filled

do not have the

DoS problems in several areas.

In 2008

2006, 29 percent of the positions that re-

shortfall; in

quired language proficiency were
ally,

DoD personnel assume public diplo-

assistance responsibilities that the civilian agencies

trained staff to
there

staff to

with persons without those

skills.

Addition-

USAID has 2,200 persons to administer $8 billion in development funds, while

in 1990 they

had 3,500 to manage $5

recommendations
rizations

billion annually.

The report makes

specific

to deal with the problems, including increasing staffing autho-

by more than 4,700, increasing funding by hundreds of millions of dollars

and transferring authority over security assistance programs from

DoD to DoS. 34

Department of Defense Stability Operations
In 2005 the Department of Defense
sion.

35

that

it

made

This was a fundamental change to

had an important

erations.

stability

operations a core military mis-

US military doctrine; DoD had accepted

role in post-conflict reconstruction

and

op-

stability

The directive tasked the development of doctrine and force structure.

It

ac-

knowledged that the immediate goals of these operations were establishing security

and providing for the population's humanitarian needs. The longer-term goals were
developing indigenous security capacity, a market economy, rule of law, democratic
institutions

and

a civil society.

The

directive also stated that "integrated civilian

military efforts are key to successful stability operations." 36
rective

to the

fundamentally changed

same

level

the di-

US military doctrine by elevating stability operations

of importance as traditional combat operations. 37

The US Army published

Field

Manual

3-07, 38

its stability

October 2008. The doctrine was developed to implement the
directive

Most important,

and provide guidance on how US

forces

operations doctrine, in

DoD stability operations

and personnel would contribute
39

achieving the reconstruction and stabilization goals of the national strategy

NSPD

and

44 missions. Field Manual 3-07

and reconstruction

tasks that

rule of law capacity building
for the general populace.

sets

and

out a series of security, stabilization

must be accomplished
is

to

in post-conflict situations;

included with the provision of essential services

Echoing the

directive, Field
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that

many of the

stability operations tasks

would be most

effectively

performed

by host-nation or USG civilian personnel, but recognizes that civilians may not be
available to perform these tasks: "In the event civilians are not prepared to perform those tasks, military forces will assume that responsibility." 40 While Field

Manual 3-07 appears to recognize the reality of the limited USG civilian reconstruction and stabilization capabilities, it arguably creates more problems than it
resolves.

How does the Department of Defense plan for the inability or unwillingness of
the Department of State to accomplish

its

mission? Does the State Department's

and reconstruction experts to perform and manage those
Iraq justify DoD's development of the force structure, doctrine, training

inability to field stability
efforts in

and funding to meet another agency's responsibilities? Will Congress allow DoD to
develop a budget that

is

to

some

extent a contingency plan for

DoS

failures?

Mission Definition

Finally, the inability to clearly define the rule

of law capacity-building mission in

must be addressed. A mission's goal must be defined with some degree of clarity before resources can be allocated in a disciplined manner and objective metrics
developed to assess progress. In Iraq this was the function of the joint campaign
plan. As noted earlier, rule of law became a line of operation in the new plan published in December of 2008. The challenge with the rule of law annex was how to
define success or measure progress. The annex identified six broad areas to focus
rule of law capacity-building efforts. The first two dealt with detainees and are beyond the scope of this discussion. The last four focused on judicial security, Iraqi
detention conditions and capacity, corruption, and improving the civil and criminal
Iraq

justice systems.

At the beginning of a post-conflict operation,

rule of law goals can often be

quantified. For example, immediately after the overthrow of the

regime, police stations, courts and detention

facilities

Saddam Hussein

needed to be reopened. This

required physical structures and trained staffs. Objective metrics can be used to de-

termine

if

there

is

sufficient

This was true in Iraq for the

bed space, or adequate numbers of judges or
first

cient

The greater challenge is in trying to
rule of law." By 2008 the rule of law planners

several years.

quantify progress in "establishing the
in Iraq

were frequently faced with trying to quantify the unquantifiable.

must the courts be?

police.

How well

trained

must the

police be?

How

How effi"modern"

must the law be?

The end result was a rule of law annex that set forth broad goals with intermediate steps that might assist the Iraqis in enhancing the rule of law. The annex was
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broad enough that
available; the

port.

The

it

could consume whatever military or civilian assets might be

only constraint was the Iraqi willingness to accept the technical sup-

rule of law

annex

where MNF-I and the Mission needed to

identified

make an effort in rule of law capacity building, but failed to define what the level of
effort should be. The result is that the rule of law capacity-building mission in Iraq
could be a never-ending saga; it is capable of absorbing an infinite amount of
resources.

Recommendations
A.

The

Department

State

embrace

should

its

responsibilities

in

The S/CRS has no presence
responsible for reconstruction and

reconstruction and stabilization operations.
in Iraq. If that organization
stabilization efforts,

US

it

should

Mission in Baghdad.

is

fill

DoS

the rule of law coordinator post at the

has spent five years developing a very

limited capacity and missed the opportunity to develop subject-matter
expertise

by

practice.

DoS needs

to focus

on

existing operations, as well

as developing a capacity for the future.

B.

The

rule of law mission in Iraq

must be

clearly defined

by DoS

in

DoD. Only then can requirements be defined and
developed. DoS must lead this effort and not outsource

coordination with
specific metrics
its

C.

responsibilities.

Congress should

fully

fund the Civilian Stabilization

the recommendations of the American

D. As

DoS

Academy of Diplomacy.

develops the civilian capacity to plan, coordinate and execute

reconstruction and stabilization operations,
agencies should continue to

E.

Until

Initiative, as well as

fill

DoD and other government

the voids in the

field.

DoS develops this capacity, DoS should accept the need for DoD to

accomplish the mission. The two departments must work together
cooperatively until

supporting

F.

An

DoS can assume

the lead

and

DoD

can assume a

role.

annual report to Congress should be required cataloguing these

interagency contributions, as well as

DoS

progress or lack of progress in

developing the capabilities needed to meet
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Conclusion

The US

rule of law capacity-building efforts in Iraq have been,

extensive in terms of both

tentioned,

manpower and funding. These efforts have been well in-

and in many areas have accomplished

noted that the

and continue to be,

a great deal. This said,

it

must be

USG rule of law capacity-building community in Iraq lacks unity of

command. This

is

a result of DoS's lack of will, as well as capacity, to assume

its

The institutional concern over the "militarization of diplomacy"
on DoD's intrusion into what DoS believes is its area of responsibility. It
recognize, however, that DoD is filling a void caused by DoS's lack of

leadership role.
focuses
fails

to

capacity.

Rule of law capacity-building missions must be clearly defined. Without that
clarity resourcing will

never be adequate nor will progress be quantifiable. These

missions must be defined, planned for and executed under the leadership of an adequately funded and

empowered

State

Department.
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Defined as follows:

on a distinctly American policy of internationalism that
and values of the country. It clearly aims to make the world a safer,

1-48. National strategy is based
reflects the interests

better place,

where a community of nations

lives in relative peace.

To

that end, the

National Security Strategy and subordinate supporting strategies focus on a path to
progress that promotes political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other
nations,
1-49.

and universal respect

The body of

for

human dignity.

security strategy that shapes the conduct of stability operations

includes the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy,
Military Strategy of the United States of America

(known

and The National

as the National Military

Combating Terrorism, the
National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction. Together with national policy, strategy provides the broad
direction necessary to conduct operations to support national interests.
Strategy). Related strategies include the National Strategy for
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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW OF WAR
IN IRAQ

XVI
The Dark Sides of Convergence:

A Pro-civilian Critique of the Extraterritorial
Application of Human Rights

Law in

Armed Conflict

Naz K. Modirzadeh*
Introduction

International human
celebrate.
tic

rights

academics and

activists rarely

have a great deal to

Compared to their colleagues in private international law or domes-

law, they are faced with creating a convincing account of "real" law.

work on

They often
around the

most horrifying atrocities committed against individuals
world, struggling to draw the world's and the international community's attention
to the plight of subjugated and silenced masses. Like their colleagues who work in
the field of international humanitarian law (IHL, or law of armed conflict), they
focus on history's darkest moments, when humanity seems lost or forgotten.
Yet, in the last decade, human rights scholars and advocates working at the cutting edges of academia and litigation have led a tremendous amount of innovation
in the literature and in courtrooms and UN committees around the world. They
have managed to transform a long-accepted truism of international law, and to
the
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The Dark Sides of Convergence

challenge States

and

their militaries to

fundamentally reconsider the nature and

scope of their obligations on the battlefield.
Indeed, the idea of co-application of international humanitarian law 1 and
rights

human

law has drawn a tremendous amount of academic attention and a huge

amount of innovation in international and domestic jurisprudence. This transformation, this much-touted
as the

shift in the field

of international law,

is

often referred to

2

"humanization of humanitarian law" and, more technically, the "conver-

gence" 3 of international

human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian

law. Yet in the current headlong

tutions

approach into convergence,

rights

and rights insti-

may carry risks to the very goals many humanitarian-minded international

lawyers seek to achieve.

The current debates around the applicability of human rights during conflict, the
extraterritorial applicability of human rights and the post facto enforcement of

human

rights claims against military personnel

to avoid the central question of whether adding

—good

engaged in armed combat appear

human rights to the legal terrain of

good for the longevity of legal constraints on conduct during conflict and good for the promotion of human rights. Underlying the
huge number of scholarly papers on the issue of parallel application of IHRL and
war is good

for civilians,

IHL, 4 as well as the increasingly pro-convergence jurisprudence of key international courts,

is

an assumption that more

human

rights (in a formal sense) always

more enjoyment of basic rights. To the extent that a major scholarly project
seems to be intent on demonstrating that human rights law was always meant to
apply during armed conflict and that the main challenge before us is the specific
and detailed enforcement of discrete rules of IHRL, we need an honest assessment
of what we want human rights law to do for us and how the pragmatic and tactical
equal

deployment of human

rights

arguments

will affect the overall fate

of rights dis-

course in war.

The goal of

this article

is

not to delve into the legal complexities of various

courts' interpretations of the details of the application of human rights law in war,

but rather to take a bird's-eye view of the debate and to question whether

good thing

it is

a

on the extraterritorial applicability of human rights to armed
The tone of the many articles and commentaries on the topic of

to insist

conflict situations.

"convergence" suggests that if only the views of various
thinking courts were applied fully by the military,

UN treaty bodies and forward-

it is

obvious that the experience

of civilians caught up in armed conflict would be improved, that detention would

be more humane, that accountability for violations would be increased
short,

and

outcomes would be more humanitarian.

to raise questions about

human rights

scholars

whether even the

and advocates would
350

I

aim to question

full realization

—

that, in

that assumption,

of the aspirations of

actually be better for civilians in war.
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The
with

real desired

impact of insisting on the co- application of human rights law

IHL is far more limited than a frank reading of most of this scholarship would

suggest. Indeed,

it

seems that rather than transforming the very

legal

framework

within which armed conflict occurs the main upshot of promoting parallel application

is

States

to increase the available legal

forums and accountability measures to which

can be subject after alleged violations occur. This

promotion of

full parallel application,

framework of post facto
civilians in

article

questions whether

with the intent of only changing the

accountability, actually harms the capacity for law to protect

war. This paper argues that the formalist machinations currently

ployed to argue that violations of IHL should

em-

come within the jurisdictional ambit

of human rights instruments and courts may be harmful to the very aims liberal international lawyers seek to achieve.

bad

equally as

for the Iraqi civilian as

My
it is

argument
for the

is

that parallel application

American

soldier.

As we

pull

is

back

the layers of legalistic argumentation, the real role of rights discourse and the real

function of human rights law on the battlefield seem
leading scholars suggest,

law seem

much less thought-out than

and the implications for this new approach to international

much more problematic than the current debate on the issue presents.

For the

civilian

and the soldier, the vague overlap of these two bodies of law is at

and at worst raises expectations that cannot be met. The civilian in
Basra during the occupation would be told that he might have some human rights

best incoherent,

claims against the British (in the event that they have a certain kind of control over

human

US forces (because they refuse to recognize
the applicability of the law), full human rights claims vis-a-vis the Iraqi transitional
government (depending on what stage of the Iraqi transitional government we
would be looking at, and depending on the interpretation of what it would mean
for human rights obligations to continue to apply to Iraq even after the invasion
toppled its pre-existing government), and moderate human rights claims vis-a-vis
him), no

any European

rights claims against

States party to the

European Convention on

Human

Rights that

would happen to have any control over an individual Iraqi in the south. Contrary
to IHL, where the civilian (or prisoner of war or enemy combatant) is not a rightsholder but a person to
therefore

whom obligations are owed by a party to the conflict

where we would look to the behavior of the party to the

to determine

whether there has been a violation of the

pectation that there

is

a clear duty-bearer who

is

rules),

(and

conflict in order

IHRL

raises the ex-

capable of responding to the rights

claim held by any individual on a given territory.

From

the perspective of the

commander

seeking to provide regulations to the

on the Stated relevant obligations under international law, rules of
warfare and doctrine on the battlefield must be whittled down to clear and brief
rules of engagement. While senior commanders, military policymakers and
soldier based
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military lawyers advising high-ranking officers

may

(and often do) take policy,

and additional bodies of law into account, the rules that ultimately govern
conduct and determine whether soldiers are subject to criminal liability must be
politics

those that are clearly recognized by the State in question as applicable to a
particular conflict.

Part

I

sketches the background of the development of IHL and IHRL, and pro-

vides an overview of the stakes in the debate over extraterritorial applicability of

IHRL

in

armed

of ten concerns one might have

conflict. Part II presents a list

about the current accepted consensus toward convergence. Part

III

concludes

with a view toward possible pathways forward.

Part I: Background

In this section,

hope

I

to the Relationship

between IHL and IHRL

to lay out the key signposts in the debate

on convergence,

pointing out the actors in each salient aspect of the discussion on convergence.

My

not to go into the detailed and complex questions involved in each

as-

purpose

is

pect of the debate, but to provide a bird's-eye view of the key questions and the
practical implications of a given position. In particular,

the increasingly
"settled issue"
rights
It

law in

common

on the

I

want to draw attention

to

reference in the scholarly literature to a "consensus" or

first-order questions relating to the applicability of

human

conflict.

may be useful before delving into the key signposts of the debate to review the

generic narrative of the question of convergence, one that seems to be accepted by
all sides.

In presenting this narrative,

ingly innocuous assumptions within

I

am hoping to foreshadow some of the seem-

it

that will

come back to be important

in

our

on the convergence question.
The first question in the debate over convergence, one that is largely treated in
the past tense in contemporary scholarly literature, is whether human rights law
critique of contemporary positions

applies at all during

armed conflict. Here,

there

is

usually a reference to the "tradi-

tional" or "classical" position of international law, in

"law of peace," and

which human

was the

IHL the "law of war," with a clear and unquestioned separation

between the two. In the "good/bad old days" (depending on who
intellectual history)

rights

of international law,

it

was

clear that the

is

presenting the

law of peace could not

apply during armed conflict because the law of peace addressed the relationship

between the State and the
of peace, whereas

citizen/territorial subject

during the normal conditions

IHL was a highly specialized legal regime created in close consul-

tation with military personnel for the purposes of regulating the state of exception

from day-to-day governance

that characterizes warfare. This traditional under-

standing of the clean separation between the law of peace
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and the
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we are talking about a situation of armed conflict, we will necessarily be in a context where human rights will be impossible to
apply, and where there will be little to no accountability for human rights violalaw of war (IHL) accepts that when

tions. In addition,

standing that those

underlying this "traditional" position seems to be an under-

who must

deal with the law, enforce

it

on

the ground and be

accountable for compliance are very different.
So, if we imagine that the line

below

is

the overall span of a

human

life,

from

birth to death,

human rights law addresses every possible way in which this human life might encounter the State, and even how the individual might encounter other private actors within the State: the right to education, 5 the right to basic health care, 6 the right

to shelter, 7 the right to

marry the person of one's choosing, 8 the

right to parent ac-

cording to one's values, 9 regulation of encounters with police and the courts, 10 regulation of one's encounter with imprisonment, structuring of paid labor
equality of labor,
others.

11

political participation,

12

and

religious participation,

13

and

among

The historic singularity of human rights law, and its revolutionary transfor-

mation of traditional Westphalian sovereignty, is the notion that the individual has
rights

on the

international stage

—

that international law can reach into the State

and regulate the relationship between the individual and her government. In vesting the individual with rights
dividual to imagine

by virtue of her personhood, IHRL empowers the in-

and pursue

a

full, rich,

emancipated, politically vital existence.

IHRL is unlimited in its scope and potential; it quickly moves beyond the basic necessities of bare human sustenance and provides the constitution for a society built
on individual choice and engagement. So, we might see our individual's lifetime as
legally covered by IHRL in this manner,

IHRL

where the scope of IHRL's influence on the individual's relationship with the

and public

The

life is

limited only by the development

traditional

model conceives

State should enter into

that

if,

and expansion of IHRL

in the span of this individual's

State

itself.
life,

her

armed conflict, it is at this very moment that IHRL ceases to
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be relevant to her relationship to the State and, instead, IHL alone regulates her
lationship to belligerent actors until the

re-

end of hostilities.

War: IHRL

/

Peace:
return to

very limited

IHRL

7
IHRL

Again, in this model,

IHRL is merely suspended for the duration of armed conflict

and is immediately "reactivated" once the
nance of its

At

its

State returns to a

normal

state

of gover-

own territory.

most basic

level,

the concept of convergence suggests that because

IHRL

always applies to individuals in their relationships to the State (except in the limited
cases of derogation as allowed

under the International Covenant on

Civil

and Po-

number of other IHRL treaties), it continues
to apply during armed conflict, but may be limited or refined by IHL as the lex
specialis. Convergence argues that IHRL cannot be arbitrarily suspended simply
because an armed conflict has broken out on the territory of a State with internalitical

Rights (ICCPR) but not under a

tional obligations

tion

by IHL.

under human

So, in

rights law,

but that

it

may be limited in its applica-

our individual's timeline,

IHRL

IHRL

continues to apply in parallel to

IHL

for the duration of the

armed

conflict,

and as before IHL ceases to apply once the armed conflict is over. Theoretically, this

would apply for any and

all

discrete

human rights obligations of the State in ques-

ICCPR; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women; Convention against Torture (CAT) and Convention on the Rights of Children (CRC), then that State would remain responsible for
tion: so if a State has ratified the

its

obligations within those treaties (and vis-a-vis the relevant treaty bodies) during

armed conflict, except insofar as particular obligations are altered or limited by
the function of IHL. As a result, in the event that our individual's State finds itself
fighting off an invasion from a neighboring enemy, the State would continue to be
responsible for the human rights of individuals on its territory for the duration of
the armed conflict, while both the State and the invading nation would be responsible for IHL vis-a-vis the population.

the
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The

first-order question of the convergence debate

should apply side by side during armed

conflict,

is

whether IHRL and IHL

and how that parallel application

can be articulated in theoretical terms and put into practice. As

we will see,

while

the theoretical or principled position for parallel application seems to be domi-

nant (and even wholly uncontroversial

at this stage), the

question of

how

these

bodies of law should apply in tandem, what provisions of human rights law con-

and what additional obligations

tinue to apply to the State

are created

by the

operation of human rights law are hotly contested.

Assuming the theoretical applicability of human rights law is accepted, the second major question in the debate focuses on extraterritorial applicability of human
rights law during armed conflict. This asks whether a given State carries its human
rights obligations abroad on the backs of its military forces. IHL is by its nature extraterritorial:

IHL follows fighting forces and its applicability in a given situation is
by a

factual assessment of the circumstances at a given time.

rights

law has traditionally been closely tied to the particular

generally determined

For

its

part,

human

and systems of governance of the State that brings human rights reguupon itself. The broad question of extraterritorial application of human

institutions

lations
rights

law (within which armed conflict

is

but a particular instance) concerns

whether a State can ever have obligations under its various human rights treaty (or

customary law) obligations that extend beyond its territorial borders,
jurisdiction

and some limited understanding of foreign

its territorial

territories in

which

it

enforces jurisdiction (such as embassies abroad).

We could imagine this question as having an impact on all sorts of contemporary situations: States could be held responsible for the

human

rights violations

committed by multinational corporations acting abroad, and they could be

re-

sponsible for violations committed by international financial institutions of which

they are members. Here the debate goes beyond whether human rights law continues to apply during

armed

would be responsible

conflict

and

to control the

on

concomitant concerns: whether a State

its

human

rights violations of

an armed group

armed conflict;
whether a State would be responsible for violations of various civil and political
rights while defending itself against an invasion; and whether a State would have
carrying out violations

its territories

in a non-international

obligations to provide humanitarian access under the right to food or other provisions of ICESCR.

The question then becomes whether IHRL

obligations of a par-

when it is engaged in military actions abroad. If
they do, do they carry the full scope of human rights obligations, or some minimal
ticular State travel with that State

"core" of rights?

Is

the State responsible for the institutional context in which indi-

viduals enjoy their rights in foreign lands, or only for those encounters between

foreign individuals

and the

State's representatives?
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human rights bodies in determining whether States have
complied with their human rights obligations in the course of armed conflict?
national or regional

For the growing number of international bodies, courts and States that argue
that, at least in principle,

bulk of the

legal

volvement

is

debate turns to the question of what

required before the application of

mere presence enough?
quired?

human rights law does travel with the obligated State, the

Is effective

human

of control or military in-

rights

law

is

triggered. Is

control rising to the level of occupation re-

the level of control required

Is

level

more constraining than the standard for oc-

Must an individual be in the custody of a State before that State's human
rights obligations extend to that individual on foreign soil? These questions
whether human rights law applies extraterritorially to some extent, and, if so, what
cupation?

jurisdictional reach

is

provided

—

are at the core of the debate over convergence. 14

Current human rights scholarship and lawyering strongly support the extraterritorial

application of

human

rights

law in armed

conflict, a position slowly gaining

recognition in key domestic and international jurisprudence. 15

Having provided a narrative summary of the development of these areas of law,
it

may be useful to now provide an overview of the ways that the two bodies of law

function.

IHL is, if nothing else, grounded in and justified on the basis of its practi-

cality, its

intimate connection to military professionals and what they are asked to

do

in the heat of battle.

tive

enough, or that

it

The defense of IHL

against the charge that

skews the calculus of

entitlements of the military,

is

life

that this state of affairs

war. As such,
is

legal restraints

is

and other key

commanders and

on what

military personnel

we must be modest in our

restraints

IHL

on protection of civilians, propor-

on

warfare; during conflict,

its

provi-

instructors to create simple, concrete rules for

conduct, and the battle-relevant aspects of IHL provide
its

way to maintain

for the law to act: prior to conflict,

the basis for military doctrine and training

sions allow

the only

during the most brutal and unregulated fog of

IHL offers three key moments

tionality, distinction

not protec-

and death toward the needs and

the legitimacy of the law in the eyes of commanders, that

aims for complex

it is

may do

commanders with the lim-

in the pursuit of their objectives,

provisions for the treatment of various categories of individuals; after

and

clear

hostilities,

IHL provides the grounds for disciplining troops who violate the rules according to
national military law grounded in international norms, as well as creates the legal

framework

for accountability of military personnel

and others

in the

command

structure in other legal forums (such as international tribunals, national high
courts, the International Criminal Court, etc.).

In practical terms,

it is

in the first two areas that

been noted that post facto accountability for IHL

IHL is most impactful: it has often

is

extremely difficult to establish. 16

Liability for violations of provisions related to proportionality, distinction
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other obligations under

standard

is,

IHL

that involve balancing or a

reasonable-commander

in practical terms, usually established only in the

violation. 17 In this sense, the rules of IHL

most extreme cases of

emphasize a priori prevention of viola-

and focus on the basic protections owed to those individuals hors de combat
as well as a pragmatic set of detailed rules for treatment of prisoners of war and others
tions,

detained by parties to the

armed

conflict.

and distributed

for being diluted

The provisions of IHL

are ideally suited

in simple terms to military professionals in the

battlefield: indeed, the interpretation

of IHL rules

is

often based in the practicality

of application in the heat of battle. 18

IHRL

is

based on a different

set

of assumptions about the

way

that States act,

and the capacity of the international community to regulate that behavior.
rights
set

law functions as an agreement by States with other States ratifying not only a

of obligations vis-a-vis those they govern, but also laying out a specific and de-

tailed set
State.

of rights claims that can be activated by the population of the ratifying

Whereas IHL focuses on the obligations of the high contracting

cusing

on

cific levels

to

Human

make

the statuses of those

who

parties, fo-

enjoy particular protections or are

owed

spe-

of care (with no reference to rights-holders or individuals in a position

claims against legal obligations),

IHRL

identifies a

broad scope of rights

spanning civil and political life; economic, social and cultural rights; and a

series

of

more specific individual rights where the State is expected to take positive action as
well as refrain

from certain behavior. 19 IHRL sees the greatest potential for achieve-

ment of human

rights in national

implementation of international norms by en-

amendment of domestic

couraging domestic absorption of treaty provisions and
laws and practices that potentially violate

human

rights obligations. Unlike

IHL,

human rights law very rarely sets out a balancing equation between the entitlements
of the State and the rights of the individual: while there are specific arenas in which
the interests of the State are weighed against the enjoyment of the right (such as when

the government seeks to limit rights during a state of emergency under the deroga-

ICCPR or when States are entitled to limit free expression for
public order reasons), IHRL stricdy regulates the actions of the

tion provisions of the

public morals or
State

and insists on the consistent provision of judicial and due process protections

for individuals. Perhaps
ines

its

most

significandy, international

arena of application as that of a State in

full

—through domestic

nance, constantiy negotiating

human

rights

law imag-

control of its systems of gover-

institutions

environment of a particular culture and approach to

—

its

role within the

citizenship. Unlike IHL,

which assumes the tragic and destructive backdrop of war and is thus modest in
ambition,

human

rights

law lays out the

full

vision for a future

community of the

governed endowed with increasingly substantial claims against those in power.
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Part II: A Preliminary List of Critiques:

Is

More Human Rights Law

Always a Good Thing?

A common theme in writing and debate on the subject of the parallel application of
IHRL and IHL in wartime, particularly regarding extraterritorial applicability of
human rights obligations, is the notion that we are witnessing a now- inevitable
trend of progress toward more human rights, that the question of convergence is
no longer a question of "whether" as much as "how far." As one author notes, in
summarizing a range of articles on the debate, "With respect to the
ions,

it is

conflict
albeit

is

IHRL during armed

submitted here that the continued applicability of

by now firmly determined."

20

differing opin-

Another leading commentator concludes,

with apparent hesitation,

How these two bodies of law, which were not originally meant to come into such close
harmony in the broader framework of international law remains to
be seen over time. But one thing is clear: there is no going back to a complete separation
contact, will live in

of the two realms. Potentially, a coherent approach to the interpretation of
rights

—maintaining

and humanitarian law

contribute to greater protection of individuals in

their

distinct

armed

conflict.

features

human

—can

only

21

One striking aspect of the huge volume of scholarship celebrating and analyzing
the co-applicability of IHL and IHRL in armed conflict is the lack of critique of the
concepts and assumptions underlying this new legal order. While a number of
scholars

do seem

to recognize the technical challenges

posed to those responsible

human rights in battle, the field has not been subject to critical thinkpossible costs of bringing human rights discourse and human rights

for enforcing

on the

ing

frameworks into the realm of war. Given that the very few examples of scholarship
rejecting or limiting the applicability of

human

rights

law in war are drafted by

those sympathetic to States that object to extraterritorial application of their hu-

man

rights obligations, 22

it is

appealing to dismiss

critics

of convergence as either

seeking to avoid regulation of conduct or seeking to maintain the most permissive
legal

on

regime possible for troops. Indeed, most scholars and practitioners working

this issue

—whether

in

human

rights litigation or those taking a strong aca-

demic position favoring convergence

—seem

stance against convergence could be either
ests

to

from

assume that the only possible

States protecting their

own

and the entitlements of the military (read the United States and Israel),

23

inter-

or from

commanders who fear that it will be practically impossible to implement human rights law on the ground. For those engaged in this debate, the very

those military

appeal of this rapidly growing genre of scholarship
fault lines:

it

seems rather

intuitive that the
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pro-human
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and scholars concerned with States that justify their behavior in the
framework of permanent war, would be in favor of the expansion of the human
rights regime by any means possible, and through any legal contortions necessary.
rights lawyers

Equally,

it

seems clear that the "bad guys," States that reject these very laws because

they are overly restraining or expose them to liability for horrific violations, or conservative scholars

plication of

and lawyers sympathetic to the military, would be against the ap-

human

rights in the battlefield

and would engage

in anachronistic

arguments about the glorious past of international law when things were

clear

and

laws stayed in their appropriate spaces. Given these alternatives, one would want to

be on the side of progress, the future, the best use of the international legal system
for the increasing realm of human rights application.

In this sense, the debate over extraterritoriality and convergence,

when mapped

onto debates over the "war on terror," and treatment of detainees in the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, has taken on a politicized tone:

vor of human

it

seems natural that those in fa-

humane treatment of individuals in detention and increased
regulation of warfare would be on the side of more convergence, while those on the
rights,

side of powerful States, limitation of individual rights in favor of national security

and protection of the entitlements of the military against the involvement of the in-

community are on the side of discrete application and strong use of the
lex specialis principle to privilege IHL over IHRL during armed conflict.
In the rest of this section, I would like to unpack these assumptions and take a

ternational

step

back from the overwhelming tone of victory and

characterize the bulk of scholarship
tion.

I

want

to ask

flict,

and holding

seems to

and litigation on the topic of parallel applica-

whether there are reasons

law, strengthening enforcement

inevitability that

why those

in favor of human rights

and legitimacy of international law in armed con-

States accountable for their obligations

when

they act militarily

ought to question the enthusiastic embrace of convergence. Rather than suggesting
a particular posture such scholars or lawyers ought to take

on the

issue,

I

hope

to

more principled debate over the issue of whether convergence is a good thing for human rights, for IHL and for the role of international law
in armed conflict. It is possible that the remarkably limited amount of critical
scholarship on this topic (other than papers drafted by those who take a clear contraargue that there must be

convergence position)

reflects the fact that there is

nothing concerning here, that

no aspect of convergence that should raise critical questions. It may
be that, when we look at the weight of evidence and legal analysis on the topic, there
are no real costs to convergence, and only benefits to be gained
but maybe not.
indeed there

is

—

Below,

I

present a partial

list

of concerns

I

think

move toward extraterritorial application of human
the form of ten critiques of

we ought

rights

to have about the

law in armed

conflict, in

and questions on the currently dominant approach.
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The list is not meant to be

exhaustive, nor does every critique apply to every possi-

ble instance of parallel application

to

open up space

on the ground. Rather, the purpose of the list

is

for a pro-rights, pro-civilian protection objection to full-scale

convergence, and to encourage a more
scholars engaged in these

two

critical

approach to the issue by lawyers and

fields.

End of a Gun: Do Divergent Foundations Matter?
As though referring to long-lost cousins who have recently become friendly, many
Rights at the

scholars

and courts discussing the question of convergent application begin or end

their analyses

by noting that IHRL and IHL have very different backgrounds. 24 The

common approach to this issue is to articulate that at one time (in the early days of
both bodies of law)

it

was thought that the two were completely

distinct,

and

that

they indeed have very different "upbringings" in the context of international law,

but that, throughout the 1970s and beyond, this foundational difference has

IHL and IHRL first were recognized as "complementary"
armed conflict and are now increasingly recognized as "convergent." This com-

to matter less
in

come

and less

as

mon

story of progress acknowledges that there are important normative distinc-

tions

between the bodies of law, 25 but that

come to

courts have

as

key

UN

bodies and international

recognize co-application, these original differences have been

surpassed by the recognition that both generally serve to protect "humanity." 26

The debate here tends

to focus

on two key issues:

first,

some authors and jurists

look to the detailed pedigree of each body of law to determine whether drafters and
early

commentators

in fact envisioned

any future convergence. Such authors look

to travaux preparatories, early conferences

on human

rights law,

and commentar-

on the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols in order to argue either
that the two bodies of law were never intended to commingle and that convergence
is a dangerous departure from foundational intent, or (more commonly) to argue
ies

that the seeds of harmonization

World War
latter

II

IHL and

were present both from the very early days of post-

in the intent of drafters

and key commentators

alike.

This

group argues that while foundational differences were present, and norma-

tive differences persist, early drafters

imagined a future where both bodies of law

could be utilized to enhance the overall humanitarian goals of international law. 27

The second aspect of the debate looks to institutions, on the one hand, pointing out
that the early institutional history of the two legal regimes kept them separate and
encouraged the creation of two distinct professional
institutional history of human rights

ternational

law within the

fields (often

turning to early

UN and of IHL within the In-

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and in State conferences), and, on

the other, looking to the claims of contemporary institutions about the increased
capacity for

human rights bodies to engage with IHL. 28
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For

strict separationists,

tions of the laws

and

such as those supporting the

US position,

the founda-

their differing origins support the sentiment that

IHL

dis-

IHRL and that human rights obligations were certainly not meant to be
applied when States act militarily outside of their territories. 29 In mining the founplaces

dations and historical origins of the two bodies of law from this perspective, the

widely acknowledged difference in the

spirit

and purpose of the laws informs their

and institutional development, pointing to the intent that they be kept separate as the laws of war and the laws of peace.
initial

codification as well as their normative

For pro-convergence commentators, the origins of the law, particularly the travaux
preparatories of the

two Additional Protocols

well as the text of various

to the 1949

Geneva Conventions,

UN conferences (often noting the

as

1968 Tehran Confer-

ence as a key turning point toward convergence), and the progressive

movement

of human rights treaties away from any notion of strictly territorial jurisdiction,
point to early support for the eventual merging or co-applicability of

IHRL and

IHL for States when acting outside of their territorial jurisdictions.
To this point, we can see how the profoundly different roots and early articulations of IHRL and IHL could play into the conclusions of either side: either the origins clearly should show us the intended walls between the two bodies of law or the
historic and normative differences were only a point on a spectrum toward a more
humane and rights-oriented approach to international law in general. Here, I want
to suggest that we step back from this perspective of origins and foundations and
instead question to

what extent the extremely divergent underpinnings and moral

philosophies of IHRL and

IHL ought to compel critical thinking about supporting
the extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaties in armed conflict. That is,
rather than pointing to origins as an

argument

for or against the drafters' intent

human rights law into their legal frameworks when
fighting or detaining or occupying abroad, I wonder if we should look to origins
and foundations to question whether today we should promote this type of human
that States should incorporate

rights enforcement.

want to suggest

on

away from the
more difficult question of whether human rights law belongs on the battlefield, and
whether the foundations of the law should constrain and limit scholars and jurists
from moving forward too boldly in articulating the human rights obligations of
I

that the current debate

States at war. In later sections
battle rules in the

I

will ask

whether

origins has shied

human

same way as IHL, but here I want

rights

to ask,

law translates into

What
movement if

do we want

it

to?

human rights law and the human rights
extraterritorial applicability of human rights in armed conflict is taken seriously in
costs

might be borne by

the years to

come?

361

The Dark Sides of Convergence

commonly noted that the history of international humanitarian law rests on
a number of factors that explain and ensure its widely recognized universality and
It is

The

legitimacy within a diversity of States.

law, rooted in early notions of chivalry

and professional military conduct, was drafted in close coordination with military
experts and senior military personnel, and is promulgated with a close eye to the
practical challenges faced

by military forces. Part of this story of IHL

is

also

about

we rely on Colonel Draper's retelling of
how cynics see the law of war, namely "how to kill your fellow human beings in a
nice way," 30 or look to the ways in which IHL allows the lawful killing of combatants and does not make illegal the killing of civilians and those hors de combat as
the

morbid

calculus of the rules, whether

long as their deaths are incidental to a lawful attack and not disproportionate to the
military advantage anticipated. Despite the very legitimate criticisms of this aspect

of IHL

—

horrific

It is

—

a

it is

clear in

willingness to allow (or at least not punish)

its

objective

hostilities, its

and simple

body of law specifically crafted to

and relationships between
it

its

bloodshed of those not involved in

combatants
mises.

apparent inhumanity,

its

States that

blindness to the killing of

to understand in

regulate

its

compro-

moments in human history

have often been thought ungovernable, and

does not pretend to be anything other than the most plausible

set

of rules for an

admittedly terrible context.

IHRL and IHL is that the latter only recognizes
obligations of the State toward those who fit into a particular status: protection and
One

of the differences between

rules regarding rights

and

responsibilities are purely status based, not deriving

from one's basic humanity as

in

human rights law. This is often raised as a point of

weakness of IHL, but one could also argue that

this aspect

delimitation of a set of protections for the nationals of the
intentionally limited in

—the

of the law of war

enemy

—

is

precise

and

understanding of the ugly nature of the relationship

its

between an invading/attacking State and the enemy population. 31 There are
gations to those individuals, yes, but

it is

obli-

understood that those obligations are in

an environment of duress, fear and belligerency. IHL does not pretend that this
lationship,

vaded

between the forces of the invading military and the

territory, is

anything other than tense and hostile.

assume or pay heed to the claims of the invading forces
vading or their intentions toward the
baseline obligations of the

enemy

It

civilians

re-

of the in-

does not allow us to

as to their

civilian population. It

purposes for in-

simply

sets

out the

military to protect the civilian population

and

those hors de combat, both in active hostilities and under occupied control.
I

want to suggest that once we introduce

rights talk to this equation,

reshape the relationship of the military forces to the

enemy population, perhaps

ways that are not imagined by those who support the
of human rights law and

its

convergence with IHL.
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In the voluminous literature on
extraterritorially, the

law obligations
exactly at
tions

most agreed-upon baseline

the "effective control"

test.

toward a foreign population on the

—
person or
—the

confusing

under current law, that

relies

The

basic

law begins to apply

argument comes down to

to have

human rights obliga-

Most scholunclear and somewhat

territory of that population.

test

—while

still

on a demonstration that the military has "effective control" over

territory (and possibly whether the State

violation

rights

for the initiation of human rights

what point an enemy military force begins

ars agree that

a

is

when human

so-called "cause

and

effect" test

is

responsible for a particular

of jurisdiction), which seems to be

similar to (though not identical to) the test of occupation.

Again, rather than burrowing into the wide-ranging debates over appropriate
activation of extraterritorial jurisdiction

the control required for
ity to exercise civil

I

want to argue that whatever our test for

human rights jurisdiction (identical to occupation, capac-

administration, physical presence, control over a territorial

space analogous to an embassy), 32 such application of IHRL in
cates the

moment when human

armed

conflict lo-

rights start to oblige the State in question

on

the

use of military force. Rather than focusing on the question of the type of control
that

is

being used, or the type of administration that the foreign party can or cannot

exercise, I
tion

is

am concerned that no matter whatformulation ofextraterritorial jurisdic-

used, the pro-convergence position bases the applicability of human rights

law on the use of armed force in a foreign land.

Should those interested in the long-term development of human
courage such a vision of rights? To what extent does

this

undermine the very foundations of human

approach to

rights

law en-

human rights

and open up its
most basic tenets to being questioned? The relationship imagined between the
soldier and the enemy civilian in IHL, and that between the government agent and

jurisdiction

the "citizen" 33 in
claims, in the

way they

rights law,

IHRL are central to the way the law sets out both obligations and

ways that the bodies of law create accountability for violations and in

armed conflict,
much of the determination of appropriate treatment lies in the mind of the reasonable commander in recognition of the necessity of creating rules that must be able
to function and be considered legitimate during combat. In a regular governance
context, the determination of rights- respecting conduct lies with a web of institutions, domestic judicial guarantees and international bodies.
A civilian who is made aware of the basic (and rather minimal) obligations of
the armed forces of an enemy State for her protection clearly understands the purthe

task ratifying States with ensuring compliance. In

pose of IHL: to ensure that in the very worst imaginable context, she
basic level of protection
hostilities,

—not

not to be tortured

is

guaranteed a

to be directly targeted if she does not participate in
if

she

is

detained, to have access to basic lifesaving
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The logic behind the law is also apparent: this is not a
long-term relationship, and the law does not provide the grounds for a good society or interactions based on trust and due process. Rather, this is a set of rules that
humanitarian

relief, etc.

restricts the military forces

while they fight, while recognizing that they will

fight,

and that people (even those not involved in the fighting) will die in the process. The
addition of human rights law to this clear and honest (albeit stark) framing of roles
and relationships runs the risk of confusing all actors and (more important)

raising

expectations that can never be met.
It is

worthwhile here to look

criticized

at the

UK House of Lords decision in Al-Skeini,

tators felt that the Lords did not
sponsibility,

and were overly

worth examining

as

go

far

enough

34

much

a case

discussed and often

where many commen-

in recognizing extraterritorial re-

deferential to the

ECtHR

decision in Bankovic in

35

The approach of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
an exemplar of what many commentators would see as an

construing jurisdiction.
is

language of the

overly restrictive reading of jurisdiction (and one allowing the military to avoid responsibility for particular acts).

Lord Brown begins by

the Bankovic decision as to Article

1,

noting the few "circumstances in which the

Court has exceptionally recognized the
State,"

setting forth his reading of

extraterritorial exercise

of jurisdiction by a

which include

[w]here the State "through the effective control of the relevant territory and

its

inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent,

government of that territory, exercises all or some of
the public powers normally to be exercised by [the government of that territory] " (para
71) (ie when otherwise there would be a vacuum within a Council of Europe country,
the government of that country itself being unable "to fulfil the obligations it had
undertaken under the Convention" (para 80) (as in Northern Cyprus[)]. 36
invitation or acquiescence of the

Based on

this

reading of Bankovic, and arguing that the appellants' approach to

would "stretch to breaking point the concept of jurisdiction extending
extra-territorially to those subject to a state's 'authority and control,'" Lord Brown

jurisdiction

concludes that

except where a State really does have effective control of a territory,
secure Convention rights within that territory and, unless

bound

cannot hope to

it

to secure reconcilable with the customs of the resident population. Indeed

it

it is

goes further than that. During the period in question here
the

it

within the area of the

unlikely in any event to find certain of the Convention rights

Council of Europe,
is

it is

it is

common ground that

UK was an occupying power in Southern Iraq and bound as such by Geneva IV and

Hague Regulations. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides that the occupant
"shall take all measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public

the
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order and

safety,

country."

The

while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the

appellants argue that occupation within the

meaning of the Hague

Regulations necessarily involves the occupant having effective control of the area and
so being responsible for securing there
this

Convention

all

being the case, however, the occupants' obligation

rights

is

and freedoms. So

far as

to respect "the laws in force,"

not to introduce laws and the means to enforce them (for example, courts and a justice
37
system) such as to satisfy the requirements of the Convention.

My point here is that even if we apply the exact same jurisdictional test for extraterritorial application as

we would apply for the application of occupation law (the

from a combination of Hague and Geneva law), doing away
deal of the confusion addressed by courts trying to work through this

factual test derived

with a great
issue,

we have not done away with the core problem of extraterritorial applicability

during armed

conflict. Military

directly following

occupation

is

a situation of caretaker governance

an invasion or war in which the occupied population has been

subjected to the control of the belligerent enemy force because

has lost the war.

It is

its

own government
on the caFourth Geneva

inherently temporary and has stringent limitations

pacity for the State to govern precisely because the drafters of the

Convention recognized that many occupying

would attempt to create the
presence, that they had created a

States

impression that the population welcomed their

legitimate governing regime, that they were liberators. Occupation law reminds

everyone involved that the relationship
rious military force

not only consistently

discrete "rights" vis-a-vis the occupiers, 38 the

recalls the security

the use of force, arbitrary detention
is

rights

needs of the occupying military,

and other

not simply a technical lex

which human

fundamentally one of a dominant, victo-

and a vanquished, unequal population of "protected persons."

While these persons may hold

This

is

it

law

allows

security measures.

specialis issue,

where lawyers can parse out

can be overlooked by the more specific function of a given

provision of IHL (such as security detention or limitation of rights to

—the

trial).

Rather,

and necessary difference
between IHRL and IHL. It seems that the pro-convergence argument would hold
that occupation is exactly the situation in which human rights law applies extrathis

is

at the

territorially

very heart of the difference

critical

(even courts that have restrained extraterritorial jurisdiction during

armed conflict acknowledge that occupation may be the archetypal context for extraterritorial human rights obligations to hold). But life under occupation was
never meant to be like life in one's country governed by one's own leader(s): occupation law secures the

minimum

protections of the occupied, but

it

also acts to

prevent the occupying power from slipping into the position of the legitimate (read
national, territorial) government. Its provisions ensure that the occupying

power is

not able to control the State lawmaking and governance infrastructure in such a
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way that would facilitate meaningful human
cific

rights compliance.

Whatever the spe-

function of these restraints in a given occupation situation, the normative

spirit

of the law, the message that

it

communicates to the occupied population,

is

community does not believe that the occupier is in your
country for your good or benefit, and its stay is temporary, potentially difficult,
clear: the international

violent
that

it

and limited. Whatever criticism one has of occupation law,

does not allow us to forget that

pretend that

we

majority of

It

it is

legally impossible to

in a position to apply

human

human
own

its

is

its

situation. 39

imagine that an occupying

rights standards: obviously, for the

rights provisions, the occupied territory

obliged to respect key rights under

advantage

does not allow us to

are in peace, or that the population has consented to

My point here is not that
power could be

we are in armed conflict.

its

ratifications,

gime, the occupying power would have a pre-existing

and

IHL

would already be

as the caretaker re-

obligation to respect

those agreements. As Ralph Wilde argues, in criticizing the Al-Skeini decision's
jurisdictional formula,

In the

first place, it is

assumed

that

human rights law properly applied, with all the

advantages of limitation clauses, derogations, and, for the

on Human

ECHR

[European Conven-

margin of appreciation, would actually oblige the State to
and in particular in a manner that would put it
at odds with obligations under the law of occupation
[TJhese assertions presuppose
validity
particular
approach
to
the
relationship
between
different areas of interthe
of a
national law, without having explained the basis for this validity. A clash between two
tion

Rights], the

exercise public authority both generally

areas of law is feared,

one area of law so
choosing

and a solution to this clash offered by defining the applicability of
remove it from being in play, without explaining the basis for

as to

this particular

method of norm

clash resolution. 40

Wilde continues, arguing that the law does not make

it

clear that

human rights law

should be rendered inapplicable through the functioning of occupation law's limitation

An

on the governing power of the occupier,
equally plausible scenario, of course, in light of both the

relationship to other areas of law,

is

that a relatively

ECHR

modest

set

itself

own territory,

even

if

its

of substantive

obligations would actually subsist, qualitatively and quantitatively different
in play in the State's

and

from those

derived from the same legal source. 41

This argument builds on the idea that those States (primarily the United States

and the United Kingdom) who are worried about extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction have little reason to worry, because the actual law- added impact of human rights would be minimal. Wilde approvingly quotes the dictum of Lord
Justice Sedley in the Al-Skeini decision at the
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level,

a quote that
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merits close reading, as

convergence

captures the message one encounters frequently in the

it

literature,

If effective control in the

jurisprudence of the [European Court of

Human

Rights]

marches with international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict, as it
clearly seeks to do, it involves two key things: the de facto assumption of civil power by
an occupying State and a concomitant obligation to do all that is possible to keep order
and protect essential civil rights. It does not make the occupying power the guarantor
of rights; nor therefore does

it

on

demand sufficient control for all such purposes. What it

do all it can. If this is right, it is not an
answer to say that the UK, because it is unable to do everything, is required to guarantee
does

is

place an obligation

the occupier to

nothing. 42

This argument seems like an appealing solution to the problems posed by con-

vergence and extraterritorial applicability.

It

suggests that clearly the occupying

power would not be required to apply the entirety of human rights norms, or really
be obligated to respect and apply human rights law in the same way that it would at

home, but rather to do
might wish that

all

its

best.

While this

is

of course a laudable principle, and we

occupiers would act in this manner,

I

question the legal argu-

ment and the plausibility of such a solution to the practical challenge of identifying
what exactly is the function of human rights law on the battlefield. What rights do
the people in this situation actually have against the occupying power? How can we

know whether an occupier is doing "all it can"?
Before we enter into the pragmatic and practical problems

raised

by such a

vague legal standard (and I believe there are many), it is worth considering whether

one reason we find
in such a

it

so difficult to blend these two bodies of law in practice, even

narrow context

as envisioned

by the Bankovic or Al-Skeini

the true import of the genetic difference between

heeded. That

is,

courts,

IHRL and IHL was

is

that

not properly

the issue of differing origins, differing foundational philosophies,

and differing imagined communities of the law is not simply a historical artifact to
be overcome by progress;
flict is

it

reflects the

wisdom of not pretending that armed con-

anything other than what it is: unpredictable, often cruel, bloody and unjust.

In valuing foundations and origins in a different light,

reason that

we

are able to see that

one

human rights law was not originally drafted to apply in extraterritorial

exertions of military force
essary for the spirit

and

and occupation is precisely because the relationship nec-

letter

the invaders and the invaded.

of human rights law to hold does not exist between

Nor should it.
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Dismissing Dilemmas as "Technical": Leaving the Hard Cases Untheorized

how many scholarly articles on convergence and court decisions on
of extraterritorial applicability of human rights in armed conflict refer-

striking

It is

the issue

ence the challenge of practically applying this body of law on top
addition to IHL.
tice's (ICJ)

of,

through or in

An oft- referenced paragraph from the International Court of Jus-

Wall advisory opinion serves as a useful starting point:

As regards the relationship between

international humanitarian law; others
law; yet others

may

some

may

be

rights

be matters of both these branches of international law. 43

Many commentators
quent reliance on the
hold on a particular

human rights
may be exclusively matters of
exclusively matters of human rights

international humanitarian law and

law, there are thus three possible situations:

have noted that

paragraph, and the Court's subse-

this

lex specialis principle to

set

of facts,

is

determine which body of law

will

an unsatisfying and confusing way to approach

the actual application of human rights law during

armed

The Court does
not go on to provide any examples of such a division of applicable law, and its subsequent decision on the issue does little to build on this paragraph's language. As
one scholar has argued, the actual functioning of the
riously elusive

and provides

little

in the

conflict.

lex specialis principle

way of concrete

is

noto-

interpretive guidance for

solving conflict of laws problems in this arena. 44

While many scholars and
sion

jurists

on how the convergence

the current law
tackle

is

acknowledge the tremendous current confu-

principle applies in practice (while reiterating that

indeed that both bodies of law apply in

how human

rights

law

will actually

all

armed

conflicts),

few

be applied in the day-to-day military

operations that characterize armed action abroad. 45 These questions are often referred to in an offhand
will

as technical matters to

be dealt with by those

be made responsible for applying the vague principles of convergence.

section,

to

manner

I

want

to ask

whether

this leaves the job

46

who

In this

of courts and theorists half done:

what extent must human rights law theory be transformed in order to make con-

vergence a coherent
rights

reality?

To what

extent

law that would be wrought by true

do the possible changes

extraterritorial application

to

human

have implica-

how we think about and theorize human rights norms today? If soldiers
become human rights enforcers, if military commanders acting outside the territory
of the State party to the human rights treaty are put on the front lines of interpreting human rights provisions, how do these technical and pragmatic choices impact
tions for

our understanding of rights?

Once

again, long-standing differences

our understanding of this

issue.

between IHRL and IHL should inform

IHL theory treats the practical realm as sacrosanct:
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most serious scholarship or jurisprudence on the laws of war supplements any theoretical argument or model with a claim for why the posited theory is practicable,
pragmatically sound, and capable of being applied by the military and to soldiers.
For most IHL scholars putting forth theoretical or normative arguments, plausibility to

the military planner, the reasonable

most

as

commander and the military lawyer is al-

important as acceptance by fellow scholars and policymakers. 47

rights scholars,

Human

with their focus on a State's obligations to control and shape

its

own institutions in its own seat of power (its government, its means of coercion, its
courts,

its

police,

its

school system,

its

national budget and financial decisions), are

not so constrained.

Avoiding the

difficult

question of practice and operations seems like

more than

an oversight or a decision to leave those matters to future scholarship and jurisprudence. 48 While a

number of scholars seem

to recognize the significant problems

posed by convergence to actual military practice during armed
ing in particular the dilemmas faced by coalition forces that
terpretations of the applicability of human rights law (as

conflict, referenc-

may have different in-

was the case

in Iraq), as

would be asked to make human rightsbased decisions, few present a coherent theory of how their ideas can be realized.
My sense is that this derives from two underlying problems with the current debate.
First, due to the sense that those arguing for convergence are clearly on the "right"
side of the debate and that they are obviously making arguments for more humanity and more protection, there is little pressure for those making convergence arguments to normatively justify their positions and ground these normative claims in
well as the

means by which the

military

an understanding of how convergence

is

that

improve the

status of civilians

The operating assumption of pro-convergence scholmore human rights obligations on the battlefield will mean more

caught up in armed
arship

will actually

conflict.

human rights enjoyment for the affected population. Second, the ubiquitous claim
main legal battle has been won, that with the three key ICJ decisions (the
Nuclear Weapons and Wall advisory opinions and the Congo decision) international law today simply demands convergence, makes it easier to avoid the hard
that the

cases of how these vague opinions can be translated into operational guidelines for
soldiers. 49
I

question whether this reliance on hyper-positivism

problem. While

article after article analyzes the

same

is

enough

judicial

to solve the

and quasi- judicial

ECtHR, leading through Issa; the key deand the Human Rights Committee's rele-

material (the Loizidou line of cases at the
cisions of the

IACHR;

the ICJ decisions;

vant views and General

Comment

exactly how well-founded
rarely

move

into exactly

is

31) in an effort to meticulously demonstrate

the claim that convergence

which human

is

in fact law, these analyses

rights provisions
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which international humanitarian law norms,

how

detention operations on the

ground would materially change, how commanders would embed human

how

interpretation into their orders,

pacted,
struck.

and how the balance between

50

It is

decisions

rights

around targeting would be im-

security of forces

and

would be

civilians

worth considering that the reason we see so little of this type of discus-

on convergence is that the main contribution to
battlefield regulation envisioned by those who advocate convergence actually has
very little to do with the key areas that IHL regulates. Perhaps advocates of convergence have spent so little time theorizing what exactly will converge how military
sion in the voluminous debate

—

human rights law into their advice to commanders,
how military planners should use human rights law in their preplanned targeting
and how occupation authorities should consider human rights in detention opera-

lawyers should incorporate

tions

—not because

these are insignificant concerns, but because they actually

imagine that the payoff of activating extraterritorial obligations of human rights
will

be in the aftermath of war.

It is

oft-cited decisions of the ICJ, the

worth remembering that the

ECtHR and the Human

tainly do not limit convergence in this

majority position seems right

clear texts of the

Rights

Committee

cer-

manner: the formalist reading of the current

—human

rights

law does apply, and

applies

it

extraterritorially.

now

seem to have won the
formalist legal battle, they have a responsibility to begin work on the hard cases that
I

would argue

that

that advocates of convergence

and marginalia. They must begin to articulate a theory
of exactly how human rights go to war, and make a link between vague declarations
have been

left

to footnotes

of applicability and detailed recommendations for practice and operations. Fore-

shadowing some of the

critiques that will follow,

be fraught with tensions and

I

would argue

difficult choices that

considered and weighed by advocates thus

that this

work will

have not been properly

far.

Lowest-Common-Denominator Governance: Creating a False Sense of
Rule of Law

Much

of the jurisprudence and literature on extraterritorial application and con-

vergence focuses on the level of effective control required in order for
rights obligations to apply to the State

engaging militarily beyond

upshot of the current approach seems to
trine (rejected in Bankovic,

lie

its

human

borders. 51

between the "cause and

The

effect" doc-

but revived in other cases and still promoted by a

num-

ber of scholars) and the idea that a State acting extraterritorially during armed
conflict would have

human rights obligations consequent to its degree of control of

the territory and population of the invaded State. While the current law
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most of it seems

clear,

to agree that the degree of obligation

would

increase as a

more control, culminating in detention of persons as the clearest ex-

State asserted

ample of control

for

human rights applicability purposes.

Assuming that this

interpretation of contemporary international law

is

correct,

me that this encourages us to take a lowest-common-denominator approach to governance, and the ways in which human rights are respected in a real
it

seems to

place with an actual population. 52

regime that

It is

important to note here that IHL is not a legal

concerned with governance: while of course there are provisions in

is

occupation law about

how an

administering a territory that

good governance agenda, or

it

occupying power should engage in the act of
controls, those rules

do not purport

promote

to

a

to lay the foundations for democratic or rights-

respecting statecraft.

When we make the move to add human rights law (and, its important corollary,
the expectation and reliance of the

members of the population that they have legiti-

mate human

rights claims against various foreign State entities as represented

through their

militaries) in concert

strikes

with increasing degrees of effective control,

it

me that we treat governance as something that can be parceled out, dimin-

ished to

some

set

of basics, and diluted to a generic palette of tasks that could be

equally borne and applied by any actor

who happens to be part of the

invading/

occupying forces. The reliance on control as the central mechanism by which

human rights law applies extraterritorially during armed conflict seems to threaten
the very core of human rights principles: that they are intimately tied to the way in
which a
to

its

State governs, the

people,

rights claims

ways in which it communicates its system of governance

and the means by which

and

rights

it

demonstrates

enjoyment over time.

its

accountability to their

How can enemy soldiers

step into

What is lost when we minimize the act of governing to
the levers of control that may or may not be in place at a given time? Unlike targetthis

governance function?

ing decisions, orders regarding proportionality assessments or civil-military cooperation in humanitarian assistance operations, rights

by-minute decisions taken by commanders and

do not function

in minute-

based on a

rela-

two-way exchange between the rights-holder and the duty-bearer.

How

can building a prison, erecting a checkpoint or detaining a group of young

men

tionship, a

soldiers; they are

human rights to function?
It seems worth considering that this approach to human rights applicability en53

provide the appropriate foundations for

courages us to see governance as synonymous with control: whoever happens to be
able to exert brute force over the civilians at a given
that they have

human

some

moment

sliding degree of control will have

rights obligations.

I

am

in the conflict such

some

sliding degree of

not making a pragmatic argument here (see the

above critique for that point), though there are clearly
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system seems patently unworkable in actual
the argument that such an approach to

conflict. Rather,

I

want to put forward

human rights obligations and human rights

claims (meaning what the civilians hold in their hand, what they are able to under-

who

stand,

they are able to turn to in real time) harms

that are not currently being

I

its

forts to foster

law in ways

costs in the

ways

I

have

dis-

think the inclusion of rights talk in effective military control

also allows us to avoid the

caught in

rights

measured by proponents of convergence.

Lowest-common-denominator governance has
cussed above, but

human

ways in which armed conflict actually impacts how people

chaos experience

and sustain the

justice.

As documented extensively elsewhere,

rule of law in Iraq have not

proved

effective.

54

ef-

To the

extent that any semblance of rule of law existed prior to the 2003 invasion, the war,

subsequent occupation and conflict between armed groups have devastated the
ability
is

Human rights law

of Iraqi citizens to access and rely upon the legal system.

at the

core of the concept of rule of law, especially in the sense that

often-nebulous concept to a set of treaties and mechanisms.
ine the full

human being living her day-to-day life and

it

grounds this

Human rights imag-

interacting with organs of

the state in a myriad of ways.

The legal claim that human rights law now applies extraterritorially to States in
armed conflict, and the increasing embrace of convergence in the practice of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), 55 humanitarian organizations,

UN agencies 56 and other key actors on the ground, allows us to feel that we

are doing

or that

something to improve the experience of rule of law in countries like

we

Iraq,

are increasing the capacity of the population to raise claims against the

invading or occupying army. While we know that the actual legal system of Iraq has

been decimated by years of conflict, sanctions, and
conflict, the use

ligations of coalition actors
Iraqis to enjoy
legal

human

occupation and internal

reference to the

real cost that this has

rights

human rights ob-

on

the capacity of

by emphasizing international obligations and fancy

argumentation. But replacing the domestic legal system with "the interna-

tional

community" or with the

accepted
etc.)

—and the constant
—masks the

of rights talk

now

human

legal

system of another country (the domestically

rights obligations of the Netherlands,

United Kingdom, Canada,

does not necessarily improve the experience of law or the accountability of

actors vis-a-vis the Iraqi civilian.

International rights

mean

wise, or focusing energies

little

without local law and order. Pretending other-

on supporting

handful of victims with prominent

human

rare "impact litigation" connecting a
rights lawyers in

Europe or

civil rights

organizations in the United States, does not change that. Such litigation, and find-

human rights violations, may improve the
British or Canadian legal order and it may over time improve the behavior

ings of individual liability of soldiers for

Dutch,
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of these States' militaries in actions around the world, but

it

does not necessarily

increase the rights enjoyment of Iraqis.

My point here is not to say that such cases are unimportant or that we should
not value their potential for positive transformation of military behavior and public
attitudes

back home toward the actions of their States abroad.

My concern is that the

among human rights lawyers and scholars that there is "no difference" between IHL and IHRL is disconnected from reality as experienced by civilians
increasing sense

in the countries

most

affected

debates. 57 Furthermore, the increasingly le-

by these

on convergence allows us to pretend that international law is doing more for civilians in armed conflict than it actually does (or can). IHL, which
renders discussions of governance and rule of law as (at best) out of place and (at
worst) insulting, prohibits us from making such a slide, and forces us to properly
ascertain the horrible impact of war on affected populations' experience of day- togalistic insistence

day justice.

Can the Moral Force of Human Rights Withstand Their Formal Application in

Armed Conflict? Setting Human Rights Up to Fail
The current focus on legalistic convergence (as opposed to actual operational
practice and concrete examples of parallel application) undermines the moral
power of human rights law, and threatens to diminish the hard-fought gains of human rights norms and rights discourse in the past several decades. To put it simply,

we all know at an intuitive level that an Iraqi in Iraq under occupation cannot possame human

sibly enjoy the

States. Yet, there is

rights as

no way (so far)

can as an American citizen in the United

I

cussions of international legal application.

during conflict or occupation as

I

commonsense idea in disIf the Iraqi cannot have the same rights

to translate that basic

do during peacetime

in

my home State, but hu-

man rights lawyers want to argue that he "has human rights," what rights should he
have? What does human rights mean if we strip it down this way, if we pick at
which

rights

can be enforced in which circumstances by particular armies

at

particular times?

As I have noted above in a different context, claiming that international law now
recognizes the

(full) applicability

of IHRL to States fighting outside of their

own

among the civilian population (as well it should). If I
am told I have a bundle of rights, who has the duties? How do I claim them? Where

borders creates expectations

do

I

go? This

that the

is

a very different matter

from explaining

to the civilian population

armed forces or the occupying power have an obligation to minimize civil-

ian harm, to provide adequate access to basic lifesaving goods
vilians.

that

Human

it is

a

rights

is

a set of negative

manner of relating, one

that

and

is
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soldiers

in

and enemy civilians. The

armed

conflict implicates

human rights application
and the promise of human

call for extraterritorial

human

rights language

rights in the very ugly business of control

pressed to the civilian population in a

by an enemy

military.

Can

this

be ex-

way that does not permanently pervert that

human rights law? After the conflict is over, and the
enemy forces are gone, will the civilians now again citizens, no longer categorized by their status
be able to see human rights law in the same light? If converpopulation's appreciation for

—

—

gence

fails

to deliver in

any meaningful way

in terms of material changes to the

experience of civilians in armed conflict (and, given the lack of development of
concrete operational rules for

how

military lawyers, planners

might change their behavior as a result of adding human

good reason

to believe this

might be the

case), will

rights

human

and commanders

law to IHL, we have

rights

law and rights

discourse suffer lasting damage?
It is

worth noting that the international community has invested tremendous

resources in increasing the awareness of and respect for
ulations in the developing world

—

particularly in the

human rights among pop-

Middle East 58

and religious objections to universal rights.

nificant cultural

a long way to go before

it is

—

against sig-

Human rights law has

accepted as the framework for the relationship between

how is this regime affected by the declaration that
any military force that happens to act on the territory has human rights obligations
equivalent to those held by the home State?
This is another way in which the distinction between IHL and IHRL reflects a
the governed and the governors:

serious

and deep

torically

had

difference.

As

reflected in

a "culture problem":

emerging scholarship, IHL has not

one finds very few debates

in the

his-

post-World

War II writing on IHL discussing cultural relativism versus universalism, multiple
or plural interpretations of proportionality and distinction based on local norms,
or different approaches to detention based on custom. 59 Whether well-founded or
not,

IHL has

generally been able to comfortably claim universal adherence

acceptance based on

its

practical credentials,

its

lack of the

"name and shame"

and
ap-

proach to enforcement and monitoring, and its profound respect for the sovereign.

IHL focuses

some important exceptions) on the behavior of the professional
military, and relies on its very limited scope of application and limited relevance to

how

States

(with

govern people's daily

lives to assert its relatively

nance over the norms regulating armed
In this light,

if

we

conflict.

Kingdom to

full extra-

"could not have taken

legislative

consider the objections of the United

territorial application

of the CAT, arguing that

it

or judicial measures of the kind required by Article 2 of the
islative

unchallenged domi-

CAT in Iraq since leg-

authority was in the hands of the Coalition Provisional Authority and ju-

dicial authority

was

in the

hands of the

Iraqi courts," 60
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pro-convergence position would ask us to respond by accusing the British of seeking to maximize their military entitlements as an occupying

power

power (including the

to interrogate security detainees or keep individuals in administrative de-

tention with very minimal fair

guarantees), while actively trying to avoid the

trial

increased protective and rights-based regulations of the

CAT. However, one could

would be valid concern on the part of an Iraqi that the British
ability to craft and make decisions based on human rights ought to be limited, preas a military occupier
to have the
cisely because we would not want the British
kind of influence over Iraqi institutions that would arguably be necessary to fully
also argue that there

—

—

respect human rights law vis-a-vis Iraqi individuals
courts.

IHL keeps

who find themselves before the

the British position limited: they have responsibility over their

own actions vis-a-vis enemy civilians when they are taken into custody, when they
are on the opposite end of a gun and when they are within the range of a bomb.

Human rights law asks that the State with obligations to an individual takes real
permanently transform institutions that structurally violate

steps to

will the still-fragile

encouraged to take the helm of such transformations?

to encourage foreign invading States to

vis-a-vis the

How

worldwide acceptance of human rights law and rights discourse

fare as military forces are

we want

rights.

promote

Can human

population under attack?

rights

a

human

rights

agenda

law be respected in

manner, and would the population accept such an articulation of human

Do
this

rights?

To put it another way, while I understand the short-term gains of demanding that
the British respect

human

rights

law in their actions in Iraq (one could perhaps

argue that it would result in better trials, or less torture, though again this has yet to

be convincingly demonstrated by any argument about how

human

rights

law

would materially change the current panoply of rules under IHL), I do not want an
occupying power that has invaded my State to be recognized by the international
community as having a "rights-based" relationship with my population. I do not
want that State to be in a position to argue that it has to engage in certain institutional changes in order to be able to

home.

I

do not want a

comply with its human rights obligations back

State that has

no

relationship to civil society in

has no long-term understanding of my population,
etc.,

to have a

hand

in shaping

its

human

rights

its

history,

its

my country,

religious values,

framework simply by virtue of its

choice to invade.

Seen in

this light, the aggressive

rights bodies

promotion of full convergence by some human

and human rights lawyers seems to flip the legitimacy of the rights re-

One might argue that the current interpretation of extraterritorial applicability of IHRL in armed conflict is much more limited than I am suggesting
that
human rights really apply only when the invading/attacking/belligerent State is in a
gime.

—

quasi-governing stance vis-a-vis

my

population. But, given that there are no
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coherent legal grounds for this limitation, the concerns raised here should give

pause to the march toward convergence.

If convergence applies to

detention today,

how can we know whether it will be said to apply to speech, religion, education and
elections tomorrow? What if it is argued (as one could well imagine in Iraq) that
the invading or occupying State

enforce

human

rights

is

in fact far better suited

and experienced

to

law in these sectors than the host State?

In this sense, in a context where

human rights norms are currently under attack

much of the world for representing the wish of Western States to change developing countries, and where human rights discourse has recently had to defend itself after being marshaled by those who used human rights arguments to support
in

the invasion of Iraq, the dilemmas of convergence raised here ought to be

considered as serious threats to the legitimacy of the

human rights project. The pro-

convergence position imagines a world in which the duty-bearers of rights held by
individuals have an exchangeable responsibility that can be shifted between States,
coalitions of States

and even international organizations

that

happen

to be acting

upon a civilian population at any given time during armed conflict. Today, my human rights might be owed by the armed forces that happen to be transferring
through my village, tomorrow by my own State, the next day by the coalition forces
that will

occupy for several months. Something is lost

in this shift, in this exchange.

The governor-governed relationship that is central to the corpus of human rights,
and central to rights talk and rights advocacy, is not only about who is held responsible before an international court, or what State holds the duty. It also empowers
the rights-holder, and provides the central logic for the legitimacy of human rights
law in gaining State consent and popular universality: the bonds of trust,
geography, home, kinship, culture, refuge and family that create the context in
which the governor-governed relationship takes shape mean that the rights-holder
has a clear sense of who owes him respect of his rights, and why. It gives the rightsholder the agency to change and impact the duty-bearer. IHL not only has no such
provisions; it is inherently opposed to such a conception of relations. 61 The admixture of what makes IHL legitimate and what makes IHRL legitimate may delegitimize both bodies of law, and impact the ways in which the law is able to regulate.

The Call for "Basic"

Rights: Reintroducing a Hierarchy of Rights?

A survey of the scholarly literature on the parallel application of IHRL and IHL, as
well as the key judicial

and quasi-judicial documents on

this fiercely

debated topic,

reveals the repeated use of phrases such as "basic" rights, "hard-core" rights or

"core" provisions of human rights law. 62 This language seems appealing, in that

appears to refer to some previously agreed-upon, truly
rights provisions,

and

to argue that

we must simply
376

vital

subset of

it

human

take that agreed-upon set of

Naz K. Modirzadeh
"super-rights"

armed

conflict.

rights, is

and

However,

they apply extraterritorially to States engaged in

and

this language,

this frequent invocation

of "basic"

deeply problematic, and goes against the dominant (and, until now, vic-

torious) trend in
indivisible

are

insist that

more

human rights law and scholarship to insist that human rights are

and cannot be picked apart or

prioritized

"serious" or "urgent" than others.

63

the reason that the derogation clause of the

Indeed,

on

the basis of which rights

it is

ICCPR was

often noted that part of

not replicated in subse-

human rights treaties is for the precise reason that it seemed to encourage a

quent

some rights that were considered more important by the international community than others. It is surprising to see human rights proponents referencing a return to some vague conception of basic or fluid rights,
insofar as the human rights movement spent many years convincing States that
such an approach to their obligations was unacceptable and went against the spirit
sense that there were

of key

treaties.

From a legal interpretation perspective, the problem of how to respond to the
human rights lawyers who claim that only some rights must be applied by States
acting abroad has been recognized by a number of courts. As the much- criticized
Bankovic court points out in rejecting the "cause and effect" theory of extraterritorial

IHRL

applicability, the obligations

of the

ECHR should not be

"divided and

tailored in accordance with the particular circumstances of the extra-territorial act
in question." 64

The Al-Skeini decision (also disputed by proponents of convergence for not going far enough in recognizing extraterritorial obligations in armed
conflict) references this language of the ECtHR and states,
and must be secured where a
contracting state has jurisdiction. This merely reflects the normal understanding that a
contracting state cannot pick and choose among the rights in the Convention: it must
secure them all to everyone within its jurisdiction. If that is so, then it suggests that the
obligation under article 1 can arise only where the contracting state has such effective
In other words, the whole package of rights applies

control of the territory of another state that
all

the rights

and freedoms

in Section

1

it

could secure to everyone in the territory

of the Convention. 65

Canada Federal Court of Appeal decision rejecting extraterriapplication of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to Canadian

Similarly, the recent
torial

Forces in Afghanistan states,

Canadian law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, either
applies in relation to the detention of individuals by the Canadian Forces in
Afghanistan, or it does not. It cannot be that the Charter will not apply where the
Surely,
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breach of a detainee's purported Charter rights

is

of a minor or technical nature, but

apply where the breach puts the detainee's fundamental rights at

will

That

is, it

cannot be that

it is

risk.

the nature or quality of the Charter breach that creates

where it does not otherwise exist. This would be a
completely unprincipled approach to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 66
extraterritorial jurisdiction,

from

Yet,
rial

a practical

application sense)

and strategic perspective, convergence

makes

it

(in the extraterrito-

virtually impossible not to prioritize rights or rein-

troduce the long-dead notion of a hierarchy of rights. As the Court of Appeal in AlSkeini notes,

"No doubt it is absurd to expect occupying forces in the near-chaos of

Iraq to enforce the right to

marry vouchsafed by Art. 12 or the equality guarantees

vouchsafed by Art.

I

14.

But

do not think effective control involves

this." 67

Indeed,

would be incredibly difficult to make to
without some degree of limitation on the entire scope

the argument for parallel application
States (and their militaries)

of rights provided in the relevant treaties (particularly when advocates of extraterritorial application

some minimal

gesting that

would apply with minimal control or during
This reference to some inherent limitation to which human

active hostilities).
rights

argue that rights would increase with the level of control, sug-

would

rights

actually oblige States acting militarily

legal basis outside

abroad (which has a very weak

of the non-derogable provisions of the ICCPR) seems directed

and United Kingdom) concerned about

to those States (mainly the United States
extraterritorial jurisdiction, assuring

they would be required to apply

them

that there

many of the

is

no

actual expectation that

relevant treaty obligations.

may be a good strategic approach for arguing that extraterritorial applicaof IHRL in armed conflict is a reasonable expectation, or one that we can

This
tion

imagine taking hold in practice, but

both a

legal

and principled

it is

perspective.

exceptionally difficult to uphold from

What would

it

look

like to actually deter-

mine which rights apply with a given level of control? Who would determine which
are "core" rights and which are those rights that could be left out of the equation?
The military? The UN treaty body? Again, some seem to argue that States would
be required to apply only the non-derogable provisions of the ICCPR, but what

many other treaties implicated when courts speak of the applicability of
"international human rights law"? 68 More important perhaps, to what extent do

about the

these arguments

human

—once put

rights law?

Do we open

would justify applying
cult

conundrum to

of international

into practice

—threaten

the indivisibility principle of

the door for States to argue that other situations

rights obligations

on

a sliding scale? This

seems

like a diffi-

escape from: once advocates argue for the parallel applicability

human

rights

law in armed
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some degree of control, the temptation to pick and
choose rights is almost unavoidable. Such a move comes with real risks for the cothese rights apply according to

herence of human rights law and

its stability.

Lex Specialis as Everything and Nothing: Diluting the Clarity of IHL?
One response to the above critique is to rely on the lex specialis principle

to deter-

mine when IHRL will fill gaps in IHL, on using IHRL as a supplementary legal regime that is often overridden by the laws of war. 69 While the principle presents an
appealing mechanism, it seems to be utilized by scholars and jurists across the
spectrum of views on convergence to advocate for their approach to the dilemma.
As one author notes, "[E]ven more worrying is the fact that the broadness of this
principle allows manipulation of the law, a maneuvering of the law that supports
diametrically opposed arguments from supporters that are both for and against the
compartmentalization of international humanitarian law and international human
rights law." 70

Some would argue that the actual impact of convergence and extraterritorial apthat when
plicability as recognized by courts is strongly limited by this principle
we seek to actually make sense of how rules and behavior would be impacted by the

—

decisions of the ICJ the changes in rules that apply in

Proponents of this view would argue

gagement for a particular

that, for

combat would be minimal.

example, in developing rules of en-

theater, military planners

and lawyers would almost

al-

ways find themselves in a situation where IHL addresses the behavior they seek to
address. In this way, lex specialis functions to render relatively meaningless the legal

may formally apply simultaneously during
armed conflict, but in any given factual situation the relevant human rights norm
principle of convergence: yes, the laws

(freedom of movement, freedom from torture, the right to life, freedom from arbitrary detention)

IHL

would be trumped by the more

specific or

rule (military necessity, proportionality, distinction,

more clearly applicable
prohibition on torture,

treatment of prisoners). 71

Such an approach might serve to address the lack of clarity and minimal oper-

by current legal interpretations of convergence and extraterritorial applicability, and might allow States to continue to craft rules that
are seen as compliant with the law while the norms are still being figured out.
ational guidance provided

However,

as a long-term

ularly for States

approach to the question of parallel application,

and military professionals seeking

norms, as well as for the coherence of both
the problem seems lacking in a

to

partic-

comply with changing

way of looking at
such an approach would

legal systems, this

number of ways.

First,

seem to gut the very notion of convergence, and render the claim that both bodies
of law apply somewhat incredulous. Second, there
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substantive law where a

human

rights claim could

be made and not dismissed by

the lex specialis of IHL. This might be the case where

matter that

much

is

explicitly addressed

IHL is completely silent on

or where

a

human rights law provides
IHL (such

as in de-

in the introduction to this article, however, the bulk of the

power of

richer detail

tention situations).

As noted

by IHRL,

72

on

a given situation than the basic rule of

73

IHL to regulate and to protect lies in the development of clear rules and clear guidance to commanders and soldiers before combat decisions are made. 74 To the extent that even the

most sophisticated scholars of international law seem to find the

work with and lacking in specifics, it seems unrelies heavily on this principle will serve to protect

principle of lex specialis difficult to
likely that

rights or

an approach that

enhance the

clarity

of existing

rules.

Indeed, one risk of the current lack of

practice-oriented theories for understanding

and interpreting

apply and differentiate the two bodies of law

not only that

is

State obligations to

human rights law will

not actually be added to the rules in any meaningful way, but also that the

clarity

of

One- Way Convergence? The Question of Distinct Professional Cultures and
Languages
One needs only to attend any academic conference or panel on IHL and IHRL

in

IHL

rules will be blurred in the process.

order to observe the vast differences between the professions, academic cultures

and approaches

to theory, lawyering

essential characteristics, or that there

either of these bodies of law,

I

and
is

practice.

Without claiming that these are

never overlap between those

who focus on

want to argue there that these professional identities

matter and have an impact on

convergence in practice as the

how we ought

field

to understand the implications of

emerges.

Before the very recent trend toward seeing

IHRL and IHL as subsets of the same

and professional choices leading to becoming a practieither field were quite divergent. While both are, of course,

legal field, the educational

tioner or specialist in
fields

of public international law and share

affinities

of background and training to

IHRL scholar/lawyer and IHL expert are two rather different characters. Traditionally, those interested in IHL have had professional experience in the military, in government or with the ICRC. Many scholars who have
some extent,

the "typical"

had such professional experience remain

connected to the

relatively small

often meeting at the

same academic

closely

community of IHL practitioners and scholars,

conferences and relatively familiar with the range of perspectives within their ranks

on the key debates. Many IHL

scholars remain actively engaged in the application

of principles, either through advising States or international tribunals, contributing to

ICRC and

other expert processes, or working closely with those
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and humanitarian actors. While there have been significant efforts
to increase the training and academic development of IHL in the developing world,
military lawyers

most scholarship, commentary and expertise on this body of law continues to stem
from the West.

Human rights lawyers, advocates and practitioners are a much less well-defined
group, and represent a

much

larger

rights practitioners are lawyers,

body of professionals.

rights

not

all

human

and many have professional backgrounds in advo-

cacy organizations, non-governmental groups, domestic
rights organizations,

Firstly,

civil rights

and human

and community-based organizations. Scholars of human

law are also drawn not only from the

legal discipline,

phy, political science and anthropology. There

is

no

but also from philoso-

institution in

human

rights

power and influence of the ICRC, and while there are
some leading global non-governmental organizations (NGOs), they enjoy less of a
direct link to State policymaking than their counterparts at the ICRC. While today
that matches the history,

number of State-based human rights institutions and departments in
ministries of foreign affairs, many human rights lawyers consider themselves to be
there are a

machinery. As

human rights law has

advocates of victims against the State and

its

enjoyed tremendous popularity as a

of study in the global south,

scholars

field

its

lawyers,

and experts represent a diverse group of leading thinkers and practitioners

around the world.

The above caricatures are just that, caricatures, but they serve to emphasize that
as these two fields merge more and more, and as convergence begins to trickle
through to lawyering, scholarship, training and implementation, there maybe real
differences of approach, engagement and professional styles that are underappreciated in the current debate. As more and more prominent human rights organizations (such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) take on
IHL in their monitoring, reporting and advocacy, 75 it remains to be seen whether a
third professional community of those who work specifically on convergence will
emerge. Alternatively IHL may have to expand its ranks to include human rights
lawyers that may have wildly different perceptions of the laws of armed conflict,
how its rules are and should be interpreted and applied, and how practitioners concerned with either or both bodies of law should engage with State actors and the
military.

One might
tinct

argue that there

and maintaining

rights lawyers

is

real value in the

two professions remaining

their divergent internal cultures.

and advocates come

To

the extent that

to speak in the language of IHL, with

dis-

human

its

accep-

tance of civilian deaths that are not excessive in relation to the military advantage
anticipated,

war,

its

its

recognition of the massive destruction to military objects

waged

in

constant balancing of humanity against the powerful argument of military
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necessity,

and

its

faith in the decision

making of the reasonable commander,

something be lost in the advocacy for the
of human rights lawyering, and

rights of individuals? Will the

will

moral core

on the promise of aspirational goals,
be lost as these lawyers and scholars immerse themselves in the technicalities of
warfighting? Do we want to maintain a space in international law and policy for the
its

insistence

voice of human rights advocates that speak purely in the language of human rights

same way that IHL
lawyers and scholars must? In the sense that convergence focuses on how human
rights law comes into the realm controlled by IHL, will the conversation and conversion go only one way, without demanding the IHL lawyers and scholars also
become conversant with human rights law and its tremendous history of internal
and do not need to acquiesce

to military entitlements in the

theoretical debates?

To some

extent, the substance of

human

rights claims, as well as the style of

human rights argumentation and advocacy, currently seems incongruous with the
substance and approach of IHL. Today, the human rights advocate would stick out
at a meeting of IHL experts. The human rights lawyer would probably make awkup questions of jus ad bellum, 76 passionately emphasize the rights of individuals to their claims, and stress the obligation of States to

ward

references to peace, bring

investigate

would

and punish every

likely

be

polite,

but see

act of State-sponsored killing.
little

Most IHL lawyers

opportunity to engage on the technicalities of

on the number of civilians who could be killed in an otherwise legal attack without giving rise to liability or on the highly detailed debate over when civilians can be said to be directly participating in hostilities. 77 The convergence of the
targeting,

two bodies of law could dramatically change this conversation: it could foster a new
group of professionals who would be wholly comfortable with such language, and

who could easily discuss which human rights rules would be trumped during an air
campaign. This might ease the integration of the two bodies of law,

it

might even

some of the critiques I have listed here. But it might also diminish the capacity of the human rights movement to speak with a clear voice and to
advocate on behalf of individuals against States. Both professions are vital to the
protection of civilians in armed conflict and to the lives those civilians are able to
lead once armed conflict has ended. My argument is not that one is morally supelead to solutions to

rior to the other,

other's

but rather that their distinction, even their distaste for one an-

approach to the key

issues, to States

and to the

military,

is vital

to the

functioning of the separate bodies of law, and to their capacity to marshal future
lawyers and professionals to their ranks.

382

—
Naz K. Modirzadeh

Human Rights Bodies in the Chain of Command: Incompatible Systems of
Accountability?

IHRL

armed conflict
and side by side with IHL, how can we understand the ways in which human rights
bodies will come to address States engaged in armed conflict, and how might the

To

the extent that convergence suggests that

military enforcement structure incorporate

applies during

human rights law?

own internal governance and enforcement structures: the reason that it travels so well is that it relies on the training, command structure and
disciplinary machinery of the military. Theoretically at least, IHL should apply just
IHL relies on

its

and effectively in a jungle war with little to no judicial mechanisms as
in a prolonged air war over an enemy capital. IHRL, on the other hand, is rooted
in institutions, in the particular infrastructure of a Stated approach to governance,
as efficiently

in the transformation

—over time—of

a State into a

more human

and rights-enforcing space. This transformative goal
It relates

geographically bound.

to shifts in culture, to alterations in domestic law that reflect the incorpo-

ration of human rights

norms

and to the development of
and international treaty bodies and

into the national system,

a long-term relationship between the State

other

is

rights-respecting

human rights mechanisms.

As the two merge, and
various (and perhaps

all)

as the

conception of human rights jurisdiction expands,

human rights bodies will be in a position to consider the

application of their particular treaties to situations of armed conflict, perhaps

multaneously addressing a State's compliance with human rights norms on its
territory, as well as its

behavior in a far-off conflict.

si-

own

To the extent that the function

of human rights law during armed conflict opens up the conflict to the inquiry and
interpretation of human rights bodies, the
to pass
treaty,

judgment not only on a

State's

more those bodies will be

compliance with a given

in a position

human

rights

but also on that State's compliance with IHL as interpreted through the lens of

human

rights law.

That

is,

in order to determine exactly

how a given human

rights

treaty applies in a situation of armed conflict outside the territory of the obligated
State, a given treaty body would
flict,

use either lex specialis or

need to first assess that there is in fact an armed con-

some other mechanism

body of rules applies to the situation before
applies to those areas
level

where IHL

of violation of a

should be

made

human

is

it,

in order to determine

which

determine whether human rights law

(supposedly)

silent,

and then determine what
and what remedy

rights provision has occurred

available to the claimant.

Such a scenario involves a number of significant

steps. First,

it

suggests that hu-

man rights bodies will increasingly be getting involved in the notoriously difficult
task of classification of conflict. Second, they

would need

to

—

engage in enough analysis of IHL in order to determine which
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are relevant

and within

complaint cases, in

their scope of review (in individual

court cases and in assessing State party reports).

answers to these questions, the

human

And

rights bodies

depending on their

finally,

would be

in a position to in-

upon and judge military behavior that falls within both categories of
or where IHL is (supposedly) silent (targeting of civilians taking a direct part

terpret, reflect

law,

in hostilities,

curfew regulations, treatment of

process of administrative detainees,

women

in detention, judicial

due

78

etc.).

This might be something to celebrate: one might argue that this opens up the traditionally insular field of IHL to a

and

that

it

IHL compliance beyond military tribunals or

extends the conversation on

special courts.

the

much broader scope of interrogation and analysis,

However,

as

such jurisprudence and quasi-jurisprudence develops in

Human Rights Committee; the Committee against Torture; the Committee on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the ECtHR; the IACHR; and other venues,

we might ask whether such varied analysis and feedback to States on detailed issues
of IHL is in fact good for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Depending on
the State, they

may be

have wide-ranging assessments of the
States

respond to

this?

which may

subject to the views of a range of treaty bodies,

At what

level

critical issues listed

How

above.

should

would we measure compliance?

The cost is not just in the possibility for a cacophony of conflicting or incoherent
views on issues such as classification or direct participation in hostilities. It is also
the possibility that these bodies would not be seen as legitimate to provide detailed
analysis of legal issues seen as the province of military professionals.

human

rights bodies begin to seek out

issues to their ranks?

Would

all

IHL experts to bring specialization on these

How would their views be weighed against domestic State in-

terpretations of

IHL? The more we move away from broad, vague

("human

law applies during armed conflict") and toward specific assess-

rights

ments of military conduct

generalities

more we must ask whether human

in conflict, the

bodies are the appropriate or competent organs to address issues of IHL.
the risks to the legitimacy of both these bodies

gard

much

and human

rights

law

of their analysis (as has arguably been the case with the

Committee's General

Comment No.

rights

What are

if States

Human

disre-

Rights

31)?

Undermining Sovereignty and Long-Term Rights Development
While scholars and human

State or private actors, ultimately
as the

have explored the obligations of non-

rights bodies

human

rights

law centers on the sovereign State

only entity with legal obligations under the law. This

matter of jurisdiction or obligation;
velops,

and

selves to the

its

it is

also critical to

is

more than

how human

a legalistic

rights

law de-

long-term vision for transforming those States that subject them-

human

rights regime.

It

recognizes that as States open themselves to
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the scrutiny of human rights bodies, as they engage with
rights actors, as their

human

rights

domestic courts and internal State regulations come to absorb

norms, the relationship between the governor and the governed im-

proves by becoming
States, their

NGOs and other human

more

transparent, accountable

compliance with

human

rights

and democratic. For many

law has been linked to their economic

development, their good relations with other States and their reputations on the
international stage.

One dilemma that has received little or no attention in the literature on convergence and in the work of human rights lawyers encouraging an expansion of extraterritorial applicability of human rights law is how these developments endanger
the sovereignty of those States on which foreign militaries act, and how in turn this
impacts the long-term development and growth of human rights enjoyment.
While there has been so much focus on chastising those powerful States that reject
or severely limit extraterritorial applicability, there seems to have been very
attention paid to those States that have been or will be invaded, occupied,

and otherwise subjected
States'

human

is

easily

I

imagine that part of the reason for

other reason

this

is

that the

manipulable by States such as the United States that

reject extraterritorial applicability or like the

limit the contexts in

bombed

to the possibility of extraterritorial application of other

rights obligations.

sovereignty argument

little

which human

United Kingdom, which

rights principles

is

seeking to

would apply to the military. An-

may be that thus far specially impacted States

(almost uniformly in the

developing world) have not verbalized a concern about this matter.

The Al-Skeini court touches on this issue with language that has been widely
criticized by scholars. First, in approvingly citing the Bankovic court's finding that
the ECHR is "essentially regional," and deeply rooted in the notion of the cultural
and legal space of the Council of Europe, the House of Lords notes,
The

essentially regional nature of the

Convention

is

relevant to the

way that the court

operates. It has judges elected from all the contracting states, not from anywhere else.
The judges purport to interpret and apply the various rights in the Convention in
accordance with what they conceive to be developments in prevailing attitudes of the
contracting states. This is obvious from the court's jurisprudence on such matters as
the death penalty, sex discrimination, homosexuality and transsexuals. The result is a
body of law which may reflect the values of the contracting states, but which most
certainly does not reflect those in

many other

parts of the world.

So the idea that the

United Kingdom was obliged to secure observance of all the rights and freedoms as
interpreted

by the European Court

in the utterly different society of southern Iraq

manifestly absurd. Hence, as noted in Bankovic [citation omitted], the court
far" recognised jurisdiction

is

had "so

based on effective control only in the case of territory

which would normally be covered by the Convention.
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would run the

not only of colliding with the jurisdiction of other

risk

human

rights

bodies but of being accused of human rights imperialism. 79

In the latter part of the decision, again in language that seems to have been dis-

missed by scholars, 80 Lord Brown, in citing the Article 43 Hague constraints on
transformation of the territory by an occupying power, notes,

The

meaning of the Hague Regulations
necessarily involves the occupant having effective control of the area and so being
responsible for securing there all Convention rights and freedoms. So far as this being
appellants argue that occupation within the

the case, however, the occupants' obligation

to respect "the laws in force," not to

is

introduce laws and means to enforce them (for example, courts and a justice system)

such as to

law

is

requirements of the Convention. Often (for example where Sharia

satisfy the

in force)

Convention

territory occupied.

Lord Brown

rights

later refers to the

ritorial application

sumption against

clearly

be incompatible with the laws of the

reasoning behind the general limitation on extrater-

of domestic laws: "The essential rationale underlying the pre-

extraterritoriality

sovereign legislature to intrude

Ralph Wilde

would

81

is

upon

that ordinarily

it is

inappropriate for one

the preserve of another." 82

may well be correct that these positions represent "crude chauvin-

ism," 83 or "orientalist positioning of Islam

and Europe

as

normative opposites." 84

He might even be right that "subjecting the UK presence in Iraq to the regulation of
human rights law would have the effect of mitigating, not exacerbating, the colonial nature

either the

of the occupation." 85

1

am not seeking to defend the actual position of

Lord Justice, or to comment on the possible conflicts between Shari'a (or

any other domestic or regional set of norms) and international human

rights law. 86

human rights lawyers and those seeking to expand extraterritorial applicability of human rights law have been surprisingly silent on this
Rather,

issue. It

want

I

seems

to argue that

that,

taken from the perspective of a State (and

which extraterritorial application of human

rights

its

population) on

would play out, the risk of human

and transformation buttressed with the

lan-

guage of human rights (and imposed through the means of military control),

may

rights imperialism, or colonialism

be neither preposterous nor
This

is

ill

founded.

one of the ways in which the lack of rigor and clarity in the arguments

extraterritoriality has a cost in

plication. It

is

understanding the

that

posed by

important to be very clear here about what

when we speak of extraterritorial
flict. I

risks

raise this

because

it is

very

is

its

for

increasing ap-

actually envisioned

applicability of human rights law in

common to

armed condismiss the above concern by noting

"most of the rights" would apply regardless of extraterritorial applicability due
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to the legal obligations of the invaded or occupied State. This

is

a faulty argument,

and it slides over the more transformative and radical implications of extraterritoriality. Of course an occupying power would be responsible to apply the human
rights norms that the occupied State has consented to, as well as alljws cogens and
customary norms that the State would equally be obliged to
the grounds for triggering

respect.

But that is not

human rights obligations as imagined by proponents of

convergence. Rather, the strong convergence argument suggests that an invading

own human rights obligations, as well as its own domestic inof how those human rights apply. Any other conclusion would go

State brings with

terpretations

it its

against the very purpose of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

This

is less

a claim about culture than

it is

one of the dangerous potential for

undermining not only the sovereignty of invaded

own

but more specifically their

States,

domestic understandings of the interpretation and application of interna-

tional

human

rights law. If we take extraterritoriality seriously, if we

advocates of convergence are being honest

assume that

when they suggest that the full range of

human rights obligations should apply in armed conflict, then how can this problem be avoided? Here, those who favor extraterritoriality tend to make an appealing and emotional argument that one sees repeated in both the literature

from the ECtHR's

recent court decisions. In the widely cited language

many convergence

sion (which

Court

scholars see as

and

Issa deci-

moving away from Bankovic), the

states,

may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights
and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State but who are found to
be under the former State's authority and control through its agents operating
Moreover, a State

whether lawfully or unlawfully
in such situations stems

—

in the latter State [citations omitted]. Accountability

from

the fact that Article

1

of the Convention cannot be

interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention
territory

of another State, which

it

could not perpetrate on

its

own

territory.

on the

87

A scholarly assessment of this language in Issa adds, "It is a strange idea, indeed,
to suggest that a country's law cannot apply to criminal conduct of its nationals, to

when they violate the
One can see why this is such a compelling argument, and why it urges us to

say nothing of its very agents, just because they are abroad
law."
rally

88

around the applicability of the law.

enforced,

it

It

seems to

would make a mockery of human

say, "If extraterritoriality

rights,

it

rampant simply because they acted outside of their own
ever, a deeply flawed
at stake here. First,

argument, and

it

would allow
territories."

takes our attention

is

States to

This

away from the

is,

not

run

how-

real costs

we must clearly distinguish extraterritorial application of hu-

man rights law from State responsibility for the acts of its agents, which is regulated
387
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through rules on State responsibility, attribution and domestic criminal law.

do not need the

of human rights law in armed conflict

extraterritorial application

to create criminal liability for agents of the State that

acting with the color of State authority. Second,
discussion, extraterritorial application of full
flict

makes

diction

a significant

jump from

existing

by addressing the conduct of the

of another State, a State with
territory.

And

finally,

its

We

and

human

commit crimes abroad while
this point

is

rights treaties in

narrow exceptions to

State

and

its

often lost in the

armed con-

territorial juris-

agents vis-a-vis the nationals

own human rights relationship to individuals on its

of course,

it is

not as though States acting abroad in armed

would be engaging in unregulated mayhem were it not for the extraterritorial application of human rights law, would be free to commit wanton crimes
against the population of another State by virtue of their border-crossing. Indeed,
conflict

the bulk of the entire field of international humanitarian law
regulation of exactly the
State

and engages

in

moment when one

armed

is

dedicated to the

State crosses the border of another

conflict there.

If extraterritorial applicability

of human rights law in armed conflict grows and

expands in the ways promoted by convergence advocates, these dilemmas go be-

yond the

level

of the abstract, and position weak States at a tremendous disadvan-

would be in force on their
territories to their peoples. In an important recent Canadian case regarding detention and transfer of detainees in Afghanistan, we see this argument playing out in
tage in understanding

greater detail than
cability

and consenting

anywhere

else.

to the laws that

The human

rights lawyers arguing for the appli-

of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms to Canadian de-

tention operations

make

a curious

argument

problem, claiming, as Justice Mactavish

to

overcome the sovereignty

states,

Government of Afghanistan has implicitly consented to an extension of
Canadian jurisdiction to its soil. As evidence of this, the applicants point to the fact that
Afghanistan has surrendered significant powers to Canada, including, most
importantly, the usual State monopoly over the use of coercive power within its
[t]hat the

territory.

I

89

can understand that as a

tactical

the applicability of the law. However,

many human

maneuver

this

approach

may have

extended

from a principled perspective, I wonder how

would want to share with their colleagues in Afghanistan (or Iraq or Pakistan) that due to their State's "consent" to the presence of
foreign military forces on their territory, they had in fact ceded sovereignty over the
rights advocates

laws applicable to their
militaries? Relying

own

citizens to the

governments controlling those foreign

on Canadian precedent on the question of
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jurisdiction generally, Justice Mactavish rejects this aspect of the argument, noting

been no consent by the Government of Afghanistan to having Ca-

that "there has

nadian Charter rights conferred on

its citizens,

within

its

territory." 90

maybe that human rights advocates have shied away from acknowledging this
critique, or engaging seriously with the costs posed to human rights law and thirdIt

world sovereignty by the extraterritoriality argument, because some of the claims

I

have posed above (the local laws problem, the sovereignty problem, and the colonialism problem) seem to be (perhaps disingenuously) cited by those

from the posture of defending the US or

extraterritoriality

may

who oppose

Israeli positions. 91 It

well be that opposing or questioning extraterritorial application of

rights

human

law in armed conflict makes for strange or distasteful bedfellows in some

no reason to avoid critical inquiries into the implications of
the arguments currently posed before courts and human rights bodies and in
scholarship promoting a more robust application of one State's legal obligations
and interpretations on the territory of another, particularly in light of
contemporary politics around the misappropriation of human rights discourse by
cases.

However,

this

is

military interventionists.

Once human rights lawyers
cult to pull

in the

West go down

back and limit the sweeping

legal

this road,

it

may be very diffi-

arguments that are currently being

made. One could imagine that beyond the dilemmas raised above,
real risks to the

could pose

long-term development of human rights law in countries that expe-

rience this type of extraterritorial jurisdiction being claimed
their territories

this

—though,

significantly,

and played out on

not actually litigated on their

territories

or

by their courts or judges.

Bad Lawyering? Asking IHRL to Do the Hard Work of Transforming IHL and
Global Politics

A final concern relates to some of the issues raised immediately above, but goes to
the heart of what proponents of convergence claim in legal argumentation,

what they actually seem

and

to be seeking in terms of outcomes.

A first critique focuses on the gap between the legal claim that the full scope
of human rights law applies once extraterritorial jurisdiction

and the

conflict,

rights lawyers
tion,

it is

and

scholars.

As

difficult to identify

obligations that
applies.

actual cases

That

is,

and examples we
I

see

is

activated in

brought forward by

armed

human

have noted above, as a matter of legal interpreta-

any intrinsic limitation on the scope of human

rights

we determine

that extraterritoriality

while scholars seem to want to argue that

we should not worry,

would apply

to a State once

that the actual scope of human rights law implied in convergence

sonable, this goes against the principle of indivisibility
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when

determination of which rights apply

(allowing States to pick and choose, to

argue that "positive" obligations do not apply, or that only certain "negative" obligations are truly binding).

As I have argued above,

in order for extraterritoriality to

mean anything, and in

order for lex specialis to be able to function as between two bodies of law, then hu-

man rights law must substantively add something to the current set of obligations
and protections

laid

out in IHL. This seems only logical.

are vigorously fighting for
this

and advocates

human rights law, arguing that the lack of application of

law would allow States to commit violations they would otherwise be pre-

vented from committing at home, or that the true
that

If scholars

it

must be applicable

thority,

spirit

to an obliged State wherever

then surely they must believe that there are

corpus of human rights law that

of human rights law means
it

real,

chooses to extend
material aspects

its

au-

from the

add to, transform, enhance or build upon the

will

existing obligations of IHL. Yet, curiously, very few scholars or advocates have put

forward such concrete proposals or examples of the substantive, normative
contribution of human rights law application.
Instead, in the range of cases

countable for their domestic

where advocates have sought to hold

human

rights obligations in military action abroad,

they seem to focus on substantive rules of
corollaries in the protections of IHL.

human

rights that

of civilians alleged to be participating in
tactical

reason for

this:

hostilities

and

is

a risk of torture, targeting

killing

of civilians. There

is

that

human rights law provides stand-

ing for individuals to claim their rights under international law,

standing,

for violations against

is

of all the differences between IHL and IHRL,

perhaps the most important in this arena

and remedy

have their exact

Most of the cases focus on torture or death in

detention, transfer of detainees to custody where there

an excellent

States ac-

and to seek redress

them. IHL, on the contrary, provides no such

and currently provides no avenues for individual complaints of violation

under international humanitarian law or any obligation for violating States to provide redress or

remedy

to those against

whom war crimes or grave breaches have

been perpetrated.
Thus, the convergence of IHRL and IHL, and the extraterritorial application of

human rights law in armed conflict, provides a crucially important and potentially
revolutionary ability for individuals and their advocates to bring cases against
States for violations.

—

opening

Because of the way that

lex specialis functions, the

the granting of standing to individuals

—

procedural

allows courts to assess

and pro-

remedy for violations that are simultaneously contrary to a State's obligations
both under IHRL and under IHL. Looking at the current cases, it may well be that
the most important takeaway of all of this technical, lengthy debate over extraterritoriality, formal applicability of human rights law and parallel obligations comes
vide
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down

to, in practical

State for

terms, the possibility to bring individual claims against the

damages or other remedy.

One might

argue that this will have incredibly powerful implications for the

armed conflict. The more States are on alert that they may
be subject to liability and findings for remedy in human rights bodies or under
their domestic human rights law, the more they will improve their standards, limit
violations of IHL, and take greater care with proportionality and distinction. Yet,
it seems to me that such a position involves making tremendous sacrifices and igprotection of civilians in

noring considerable risks in order to gain the rare opportunity to bring such cases
before courts. If human rights advocates are claiming that the true vision of extraterritorial applicability

of human rights in armed conflict

is

that States will

now be

bound by the full panoply of human rights in their relationships with individuals
on the territories they invade, but with the real intention of using these arguments
to open up the opportunity to bring individual cases that involve violations of
IHL, these advocates risk being blind to

impact

how the full force of their arguments will

human rights law and practice in the long term.

In this light, the actual practice of convergence and extraterritoriality (as op-

posed to the soaring claims of its proponents) seems to be the best attempt

at a

workable solution to the problem of the lack of serious enforcement of IHL, and
the lack of any capacity for individuals to

demand that States recompense them for

the damages wrought during war. While instrumentalizing

manner may provide short-term
one family may ensure that
tions),

it

leaves unaddressed

its

payoffs (one victim

son

is

human

may receive

rights in this

compensation,

not transferred to brutal detention condi-

and untheorized the broader implications for how law

functions in war. Also, this approach seems to

lawyers do not intend to keep:

it

make

a promise that

signals to individuals

on the

human

territory of

rights

an

in-

vaded State that those military forces who invade, occupy or detain have a qualitatively different relationship

with them than that provided by IHL;

these individuals ought to expect a different type of behavior

of the reason we do not see
in practice

it

suggests that

by these

forces. Part

much discussion of how this vision of the law will work

may be that there is actually little intent to

develop rules for battlefield

lawyering or training of soldiers, but only to create a mechanism for accountability
after violations

have taken place. This abdicates the responsibility set up by speak-

ing in the language of human rights. Ultimately, having human rights claims means

know whom to go to to get the water turned on, to get food for your
and to complain to when the police harass you or when your political

being able to
children,

party

is

shut down.

The paltry literature on what exactly a war imbued with human
for the people living through

it

leaves us

rights looks like

wondering whether convergence can ever
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live
all

up to its formalist promise that the law will be there, that the parties must apply

(or some?) of their

humanitarian law
conflict?

human

rights obligations in addition to their international

responsibilities.

To whom should

What

claims will people have in the midst of

they take these claims? In coalition situations, which

party is responsible to answer to the valid (at least legally) rights claims that conver-

gence seems to encourage? Inviting reliance by civilians can be good for their hu-

man
will

rights

work.

enjoyment only

only purpose

If the

far-off land,

if

not clear

it is

we have some
is

sense of the

way

in

which the system

to create claims after violations have occurred in a

how this actually respects the human rights that conver-

gence seeks to identify and demand.

Using

human

rights law,

and the broad

legal

claim of extraterritoriality for this

much narrower purpose, avoids doing the hard work of actually transforming and
re-envisioning

turn to the

IHL in the way that most advocates would want. It allows lawyers to

legalistic

machinations of jurisdiction instead of advocating for the

wholesale reconsideration of accountability in the laws of war. This
debate, one that

must be had and one

that

is

surely influenced

is

an important

by the ways

that hu-

man rights law has transformed our global legal culture. As long as we pretend that
the debate is about the full application of human rights law, when it is primarily
about accountability mechanisms and remedies for victims of IHL violations,

I

would argue that we are not having the challenging and critical political battles that
need to be fought

in order to achieve the deeper

ends of extraterritoriality. In

this

way, extraterritoriality takes energy away from the efforts to strengthen IHL and to

make

States

more accountable

for their actions in

armed

conflict.

A similar critique, and one that will likely be popular with those who oppose exon grounds of protecting military entitlements, is that the arguconvergence and extraterritorial application can sometimes shade into

traterritoriality

ments

for

backdoor pacifism. That
actually

is,

meant to develop

interpretations

to the extent that over-regulating the battlespace

a robust set of actual

when taken

is

not

human rights obligations and their

to war, but instead

meant

to change the calculus for

when entering into armed conflict, joining coalitions or contributing troops
to peace enforcement operations, this strikes me also as a misuse of human rights
law and language. If advocates believe that human rights law (standing on its own,
as applied to States on their own territories and through traditional mechanisms of
States

human rights monitoring and enforcement)
ing to war, or that

it

should in

fact preven t States

from go-

adds serious considerations to the jus ad helium questions of

the legality of war, then they should say so, and they should expand the provisions

of human rights law that seem to support such an outcome. 92 Advocating for an
unclear, vague, confusing admixture of

human

rights

and IHL on the

battlefield

with the ultimate goal of influencing jus ad helium encourages bad lawyering and
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much more

avoids the

compelling debates that could be taking place within hu-

man rights law about the costs of war itself.
Part III. Looking Ahead

If scholars

and practitioners weigh the

new approaches

should consider
rigorously.

costs

and

risks

I

have discussed above, they

that address these

dilemmas honestly and

With the goal of increasing protection of civilians

securing the

human

rights of all individuals,

armed conflict,
clarity and effec-

in

and enhancing the

armed conflict, how might the field react to
section, I want to propose some possible ways

tiveness of the regulations of parties to

some of the above

critiques? In this

forward, not necessarily as pragmatic solutions to knotty legal problems, but to re-

of how human rights law impacts the role of law in armed conflict.

cast the question

There

is

no question that the

interplay between international

human rights law

and international humanitarian law is here to stay. There is no going back to a clean
separation between the two fields, if such a separation ever existed. More and more
the key actors in
ganizations,
tools that

armed

conflict (militaries, State policymakers,

human rights groups)

are

humanitarian or-

merging the two discourses and identifying

draw on rules and mechanisms from both fields.

How might we imagine

paths ahead that recast the question of convergence? These four paths forward are

not actually meant to be a practical list of approaches that I
ing, or a list that

am necessarily advocat-

does not entail dilemmas of its own. But, given the critiques above,

and assuming we want to be more honest and rigorous about what we are doing in
this area

of law and policy, these possibilities suggest some ways that

we might re-

think the entire question of extraterritorial application of human rights in armed
conflict.

Create New, Leaner

Body of "Human Rights at War"

One possibility is that human rights scholars and practitioners, rather than focusing on the rules of international humanitarian law or how human rights law can
directly interact with those rules, develop and expand a new field of "human rights
at war." Such a project might take a number of forms. The central feature would
be that it would focus on building consensus around the key aspects of human
rights

law that could practically apply during armed

ways in which
such

conflict,

and focus on the

human rights bodies and mechanisms could interpret and enhance

tools.

At the most ambitious

would involve strengthening or redrafting
those aspects of human rights law that would severely limit the capacity of States to
enter into armed conflict, and would develop the rules of IHRL to take a strong
level, this
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on jus ad bellum determinations. As some scholars have suggested, there is
much in the corpus and drafting background of human rights law that suggests a
strongly contra- conflict posture. Here, lawyers and policymakers would identify
and build upon those trends within the law, working with States to highlight the
ways in which their human rights obligations bind them to limit their engagement
in armed action altogether.
Such a human rights law of war, unhindered by the constraints of IHL, might
position

—rethinking

even be proposed as a direct challenge to IHL

and concepts

human

that structure our

war might

rights at

tionality, distinction,

central assumptions

contemporary thinking on justice

in war.

A law of

directly question current understandings of propor-

precautionary measures, occupation and treatment of de-

tainees, using the drastically different language

and approach of human

rights

law

more civilian-protective mode. One could imagdevelopment of human rights would blend legal understandings of

to rethink these categories in a far

ine that such a

jus

ad bellum, jus

in hello,

and

post-conflict

and

stability

operations to create an

overall set of obligations for States that fight. 93

While such an approach would certainly
menting a transformation of this

I

profound challenge

scale, efforts in this direction

guments between IHL and IHRL, and would
the serious (and

face a

insist

on keeping

in imple-

would sharpen

ar-

in the foreground

would argue, necessary) tensions between the two

fields.

Indeed,

debates between States and scholars on such an approach could illuminate the ways
in

which human

rights

law and practice, outside of the well-defined and narrow

discourse of IHL, might reshape our understanding of the normative constraints

on armed

conflict

and the duties owed

to civilians.

A less ambitious approach within this category would be a project among State
human rights treaties, human rights bodies and scholars to actively identify a subset of human rights provisions that create the toolkit of "human rights at
war." Here, human rights advocates and scholars would have to be honest in acknowledging that they do not foresee the entirety of human rights law applying in
armed conflict. Rather, they would identify the key provisions of human rights law
parties to

that, different

substantively

from protections and obligations already enshrined

add

to

what

civilians

would
armed con-

in IHL,

could expect from State parties to

and what civilians could demand under human rights law. This might involve
a gathering of States to clarify consensus around key provisions, moving away from
flict,

the current confusion of multiple layers of litigation, regional

human rights bodies

and domestic interpretations of convergence, providing support

for this leaner,

thinner body of human rights law.

Such an approach would provide an opportunity for the development of a new
cadre of professionals: individuals with experience, background and influence in
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both IHL and IHRL, equipped with the tools of fact-finding and advocacy com-

mon to human rights, but also able to engage with military professionals and State
policymakers in discussing the
conflict. State

must be made during armed
and consent would be critical to such an enter-

difficult choices that

involvement, buy- in

some of the legitimacy challenges discussed above.
While perhaps more pragmatic than the current approach, such a step would
involve the risk of diminishing and narrowing human rights protections, and conceding that indivisibility would have to give way to the desire to introduce at least
some robust human rights protections that all States understand must be
prise, mitigating

operationalized and applied throughout their military planning and practice. Further,

such an approach might lead to

vocates

and

new engagements between human rights adon those

military professionals, focusing

through negotiation

—

are seen as applying in parallel to

legal provisions that

IHL provisions.

Develop and Strengthen Accountability Mechanisms in IHL

A second possible approach to the dilemmas discussed above might focus entirely
on innovating around accountability mechanisms in IHL. Perhaps inspired by the
ICJ's vague call for parallel application of the two bodies of law, such an approach
might involve

efforts to

enhance existing accountability mechanisms within IHL

(most existing Geneva Convention mechanisms are currently moribund) or to

in-

troduce some of the monitoring and accountability mechanisms present in the hu-

man rights system to
At the strongest

IHL. 94

level, this

could involve introducing a mechanism for individ-

ual complaints or individual standing
ples

under IHL

at the international level.

Exam-

might include creating mechanisms for individuals to make claims against the

would hear
claims, interpret the rules of IHL according to specific fact situations, and provide
decisions, remedies and redress. Such a development would be outside of, and in
addition to, existing mechanisms for internal military discipline, domestic war
crimes legislation and international criminal law. Rather, such a body would focus
solely on individual complaints against the State for violations of IHL in armed
conflict (because this would not involve substantive human rights law, the mechanism would by nature have extraterritorial reach, applicable to any States engaging
in the armed conflict at issue in the case). 95 In addition to hearing complaints and
State domestically, or a centrally located international

body

that

mechanism could also have a
of IHL in the same vein as many of

adjudicating cases, one could imagine that such a

body that would oversee and interpret the
the

rules

UN human rights treaty bodies.

Such an approach would involve a new drafting process, perhaps similar to the
optional protocols created subsequent to a
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mechanism and creating new procedures for
individual complaints cognizant of the particular needs of the IHL system, and calibrated to the realities of armed conflict. Given the deep dilemmas present in makseeking the consent of States to such a

ing the current legal interpretations of convergence a reality, one might argue that

such an approach, while requiring major efforts at bringing together States and initiating a

new process, holds a greater promise of long-term success and real results

for victims than the divergent

and often conflicting approaches of individual States

to extraterritorial application of human rights in

armed

conflict.

This approach would have the advantage of creating a standardized mechanism
for

monitoring and accountability. Rather than relying on rare cases brought on

behalf of individuals in foreign courts, States would be required to implement the
necessary procedures within their
violations

and

alter

armed forces to monitor compliance, investigate

behavior in response to findings of the

new

mechanism. Because the military would necessarily be involved
the incentives to

comply and

approach of extraterritorial
Finally,

participate

human

would

in such a process,

be higher than the current

rights application.

such an approach would have an additional advantage compared to the

jurisdiction of human rights bodies: because

binds non-State actors,
against

also

accountability

it

may

also

armed groups. While seeking

it

would be working with IHL, which

be in a position to hear individual claims
redress or compensation

from such groups

would provide a major obstacle, the legal framework would exist to explore ways
in which non-State parties to an armed conflict could also be brought into the accountability system.

Strengthen Territorial-State Mechanisms for Holding Actors Accountable for
Violations

A third approach would indeed look to convergence, but a different breed of this
argument than

have challenged in

I

strengthen and embolden domestic

this paper.

human

This possibility would seek to

rights obligations

and mechanisms

during armed conflict (whether non-international or international). That

approach would focus on the continued

parallel application

is,

this

of human rights law

during armed conflict per the current dominant legal consensus, but not extraterritorial application

As human

of these

rules.

rights advocates have pointed out in arguing for extraterritorial ap-

plication of human rights law as a
see

means

contemporary cases where the United

(the only
States

means) for accountability, we

and other States deny that they are

engaged in an international armed conflict in countries such

conflict are

gap

As many have pointed out, the rules of non-international
ill-suited to these contemporary situations, where major States

in protective rules.

armed

as Iraq, creating a
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are involved in massive combat, stability
ritory of another State,

and State-building operations on the ter-

but without the rule framework of international armed

conflict or occupation. In

such a situation,

it is

less clear that

IHL by itself is able to

cover adequately the encounters between troops and Iraqis, or provide a clear set of
roles

and

responsibilities for all actors involved.

it

first

glance,

it

does appear that

home State of the military forces, is the only

extraterritoriality, applied through the

available answer. Yet here

At

seems that advocates of extraterritoriality forget the

role of the territorial State.

One approach to increasing protection in these contexts would be to insist that
host States harness their power to hold

compliance with IHRL. In Iraq today,

and most well understood human

est

on their territory accountable for
the Iraqi government that has the clear-

parties

all

it is

rights obligations vis-a-vis the Iraqi people.

This obligation to protect the rights of the people extends not only to the acts of the
Iraqi State,

but also implies that the government

will protect Iraqis

from any

human rights that occur in Iraq.
In this model, human rights advocates and scholars would focus their energies
not on extraterritorial application of human rights law in armed conflict, but
threats to their

rather

on

the ways that parallel application

of invaded States to

and

munity

territorial State's

human

one could imagine that advocates could work with

rights obligations. Here,

tor

comply with the

insist that all actors

territorial-State courts

and convergence strengthen the hand

and human

investigate abuses,

rights bodies, strengthen their

and monitor

clauses entered into

by the

power to moni-

closely the bilateral agreements

territorial State

and im-

with foreign States and their

troops.

Of course,

the reality

is

that the legal systems in

many countries in the midst of

or recovering from armed conflict are not well equipped to monitor and enforce

human rights law. And for most Iraqis, the foreign military forces on their territory
are not seen as accountable to Iraq,

its

government or its people.

ing that turning to Iraqi institutions to enforce and investigate
tions

by those on

its

rights organs

It

am not suggest-

human rights viola-

would necessarily provide
probably would not. Not only do Iraqi human

territory or within

better results in the short term.

I

its

jurisdiction

and courts lack the capacity to adequately investigate alleged human

rights violations

by military

forces or private military contractors, but they are

immunity agreements, as well as the political impossibility of
tremendous power imbalance. However, such efforts would allow the

faced with various

taking

on

citizens

a

and civilians in the State to understand what human rights law can actually

promise them, and would provide a
current state of how

much more

human rights law applies
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Rather than drawing our attention to impractical legal claims for extraterritorial
application, or emphasizing legal formality with

no

real intention

of altering the

substantive rules affecting invading State behavior, such an approach

on human
State to

rights obligations

where they are

strongest,

would build

and empower the

enhance accountability and transparency in the long term. Even

to investigate

and hold accountable foreign

States

fail,

affected
if efforts

such a process, and such a

would make real the true promise of what
human rights law and human rights discourse can do in a situation of conflict. To
the extent that the current insistence on extraterritoriality is a tactical attempt to
take advantage of more sophisticated and better understood courts in Europe, the
United States and Canada in order to litigate complex human rights issues, it
denies those who hold the rights in question the power to truly take ownership of
public debate within the country

itself,

their claims.

power dynamic of human rights
advocacy, shifting the center of gravity of the debate and its language away from
Western capitals and toward the States most impacted by armed conflict (such as
Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan). We might imagine that local human rights organizations and advocates would take the lead on determining how to craft human
rights strategies appropriate to armed conflict, building their capacity to work
with both human rights and IHL, and working with domestic lawyers and laws to
enhance enforcement. This approach would also have the payoff of building up
Indeed, this approach might

flip

the current

these domestic institutions for the long term: as parallel application of
rights

human

and IHL would always be in the background, domestic human rights and legal

mechanisms would increase

their capacity to deal not only with foreign militaries,

but also with the violations committed by internal armed groups operating within
the State.

Move from Law to Policy, Emphasizing Pragmatism over Formal Legal Rules
In this final path, human rights advocates and scholars would need to get their
hands dirty in actual military policymaking and planning. Rather than

insisting

on

formal normative consensus, or repeatedly citing unclear and relatively impractical legal definitions

human

of "effective control," "cause and effect" and other grounds for

rights jurisdiction, those following this

approach would make a definitive

turn away from law and toward policy.

Leaving behind the normative certainly of convergence and the trump card of
rights talk, advocates

and scholars might instead seek

the language of military policy
references

much

and planning.

to formulate

human

rights in

We increasingly see that the military

of its behavior on policy grounds. Thus, detainee treatment going

above the standards of IHL (such as providing advocates for detainees going before
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boards, or providing compensation for civilian victims of attacks)

plained not

on

the basis of IHL (where States

is

often ex-

would normally deny that they have

such obligations) or formal human rights obligation, but rather as a matter of policy

may well be presented as influenced by a number of factors including

(a policy that

human rights, counterterrorism and nation building).
It may well be that human rights talk and rights culture have, to varying degrees
based on the country in question and its domestic rhetoric around rights and international law, been absorbed into military and State thinking on strategic and policy

on the ground. Indeed, one could likely trace the human rights origins of
key provisions in individual coalition member's detention policies in Iraq and Afdecisions

ghanistan, or in important paragraphs of their bilateral security arrangements with

those nations.

Human rights actors and scholars can and should be proud of such

impact on strategy and policymaking, and that the absorption of

norms

into bilateral agreements,

terinsurgency doctrine

97

96

human

rights

detention policies, rules of engagement, coun-

and even individual orders

improved conditions and treatment of

civilians

in the field

may well result in

and prisoners inspired by the

content of human rights instruments.

But we should not forget that there

is

a difference

between decision making and

conduct on the basis of policy, and obligations to act as a matter of law. At the margins,
still

and in areas where interpretations of law are wildly divergent, formalism may

matter.

To

the extent that concerns about the specifics of applying conver-

gence, or "operationalizing"

human

rights

law

is

its

norms, are dismissed by States with claims that

already applied as a matter of policy, or that

and parcel of any on-the-ground decision- making environment,

it is
it is

already part

worth point-

when a detainee brings a claim for remedy on the basis of internahuman rights law, or when a humanitarian organization is attempting to

ing out that
tional

understand its roles and responsibilities on the ground, actual legal obligations will
determine outcomes.

However,

this

approach could be the most impactful of

all

in terms of real

change to State and military behavior, and tangible increases in protection,

treat-

ment and respect for basic rights. While it involves considerable sacrifices in terms
of the types of argumentation available to human rights advocates, and while it
moves away from the current focus on litigation, this approach would facilitate
more fluid negotiations with the military planners and decisionmakers on the
ground and at the capital level, leaving law and obligations out of the room and focusing on the practical ways in which States can improve their outcomes by incorporating

human

rights principles into the day-to-day operations of soldiers.

imagine that one reason
rights advocates

is

that

it

this

approach would be unattractive to

would involve,

first,
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might involve

that

justifying these principles

on the

basis of counterterrorism,

counterinsurgency, increased cooperation of the population with the military, increased acquiescence of the population to the policy desires of foreign States,

Second, such an approach would necessarily
realities

mean

etc.

getting involved with the ugly

of military decision making, accepting that not

all

legal rights-holders will

be granted protections in the same way, and that military security will likely always

trump policy-based
rights

rights

Finally, contrary to

much

of

human

advocacy that relies on soliciting public support and eliciting public outrage,

approach would

this

and protections.

likely

need to be confidential, involving

little

engagement

with the public and focusing on identifying compelling and practical tools that will

convince States that

it is

their military policies, rules of engagement

That

said, this

human

embrace aspects of human

in their interests to

approach

may

and

facilitate a

rights into

orders.

discussion and practical engagement

moves out of academic scholarship and
discussions at conferences over lex specialis, and shifts to the real choices human
rights advocates expect military leaders and soldiers to make on the ground. Rather

with

rights in

armed

conflict that

than engaging in an adversarial conversation mediated by courts or

human

rights

would ask that human rights advocates envision rights
through the prism of armed conflict, and from the perspective of the military. This
raises a number of serious concerns about the extent to which this would still be
bodies, this approach

human

rights

advocacy as we

significant changes in

know it, but

it

may also

pave the way for actual and

on-the-ground decisions, and in the

caught in armed conflict to lead more dignified

ability

of individuals

lives.

Notes
IHL and LOAC (law of armed conflict) interchangeably throughout, while acknowledging and appreciating Yoram Dinstein's call to refer to this body of law as LOAC exclusively, yoram dinstein, the conduct of hostilities under the international law of
Armed Conflict 13-14 (2004).
2. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 243-44 (2000). Meron's article was part of the first wave of work on
this issue, and did not call for the full implementation of human rights in international armed
1.

I

will use

conflict as
3.

I

it is

will

sometimes imagined today.

be using the terms "convergence," "parallel application" and "co-application"

inter-

changeably to refer to the concept that international human rights law and international humanitarian

law are applicable simultaneously during armed

conflict,

and

that States are obligated to

comply with obligations under both bodies of law (including obligations to report to relevant
legal bodies, cooperate with organizations, etc.), and that to some extent, individual soldiers can
potentially be liable for violations of either or both bodies of law for their conduct during hostilities

outside of the territorial State. While

plication" represent different

it

could be argued that "convergence" and "parallel ap-

methods of co -applicability, with the former indicating a sudden
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moment when both

bodies of law

come

together

and

framework blending

create a single legal

provisions from both regimes, and the latter representing dual and distinctlegal frameworks that

apply independently of one another until and unless they come into direct contact, the literature

seems to

treat the

two terms as having the same meaning and resulting in similar implications in

terms of legal framework.
4.

Any argument that attempts to take on a topic on which there has been so much scholar-

ship runs the risk of becoming mired in a literature review or a rehashing of existing material.

There is a tremendous amount of writing on both the general topic of overlap between IHRL and
IHL, and the various subtopics within the broad issue of convergence. Indeed, two recent full

volumes of law journals were dedicated exactly to

this issue. See

LAW REVIEW (2007);

40 ISRAEL

90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS (2008). For an understanding of the broad issues
related to overlap and convergence, see, e.g., Noam Lubell, Parallel Application of International
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: An Examination of the Debate, 40
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 648 (2007); for a focus on human rights law in occupation, see Aeyal M.
Gross, Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor's New Clothes of the International Law
of Occupation?, 18 EUROPEAN lOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 8 (2007); Danio Campanelli,
The Law ofMilitary Occupation Put to the Test ofHuman Rights Law, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF THE RED CROSS 653 (2008); for a clear articulation of the contra-convergence position, see
Michael J. Dennis, Non-Application of Civil and Political Rights Treaties Extraterritorially During
Times of International Armed Conflict, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 453 (2007); for a very useful and
comprehensive review of the relevant international jurisprudence on the debate, see lohn
Cerone, Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of International Human Rights Law
During Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace Operations, 39 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1447 (2006); for the leading analysis of how human rights norms might
impact right to life and use of force issues, see Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A
Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

International
5.

Law

l,

9 (2004).

on Economic,

International Covenant

2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec.
6.

Id., art. 12.

7.

Id., art. 11.

8.

Id,

9.

International Covenant

16, 1966),

and Cultural Rights

13,

G.A. Res.

993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].

on

16, 1966),

Civil

and

Political Rights art. 18,

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),

999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

Id., arts. 9, 14.

12.

ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 8.
ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 25.

13.

Id., art. 18.

14.

Because of the sheer volume of writing on this issue in recent years,

1 1.

art.

art. 10(1).

U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec.
10.

Social

my goal here is not to

do justice to the many contributions on the question of convergence, nor to focus on the nuance
I want to try to give a rough map of the key issues in
the debate, before moving into the critique. For a more detailed review of the current debate, see

within each sub-issue of the debate. Rather,
Lubell, supra note 4.
15.

Armed

I.C.J. 116,

If

Activities

216 (Dec.

on

the Territory of the

19); Legal

Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo

v.

Consequences of the Construction of a Wall

Uganda), 2005

in the

Occupied

Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,

sory Opinion]; Issa and Others
[hereinafter Issa];

U.N.

Human

v.

If 106 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall AdviTurkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 567 (2004)

Rights Committee, General
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Comment No.

31:

The Nature of the

—
The Dark Sides of Convergence
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties

to the

Covenant, % 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/

Comment No. 31]; Francoise J. Hampson,
Rev. 1 /Add. 13
The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 549
(May

26, 2004) [hereinafter General

(2008).

See generally Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Violations of the Ius in
Imperfect Balance, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW

16.

Bello:

An

Challenges (Symposium in Honour of Knut Ipsen)
Volker Epping

not only the lex

It is

more

171 (Wolff Heintschel

von Heinegg

&

eds., 2007). Fleck notes,

specialis character

of international humanitarian law, but even

so the particular deficiencies of law application in international

armed

conflicts,

non-international armed conflicts and internal disturbances which makes the exercise

of individual and international responsibility a complex,
task.

difficult

and often hopeless

Lawyers, tasked to find appropriate remedies for violations of international

humanitarian law, are navigating in foggy areas in which relevant provisions are not too

more than often competing
peace and justice.

systematic and
for restoring

interests

obscure what should be achieved

Id. at 173.

17.

E.g.,

Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Order, ffi| 706, 719 (Dec.

5,

2003).

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 950, U 3346 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski
GENEVA
& Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987), which notes,
See, e.g.,

18.

Thus historically, the law of armed conflict was created largely in the heat of battle, and
the weight and obligation of its implementation and development rests primarily on
the shoulders of those

who

exercise military

command

—which has always been

fundamental responsibility

in the field.

To withdraw this
commanders

that of military

from them, would undoubtedly have constituted a serious

error,

and the Protocol was

careful to avoid this.

ICCPR, supra note 9, arts. 18, 19; ICESCR, supra note 5, arts. 9, 1 1; Convention on
Forms of Discrimination against Women arts. 13, 14, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
arts. 2, 5, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
19.

E.g.,

the Elimination of All

Lubell, supra note 4, at 650.

20.

Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 90
International Review of the Red Cross 501, 548 (2008). See also Lubell, supra note 4, at
660, which concludes, using the analogy of a difficult but worthwhile romantic relationship that

Cordula Droege,

21.

seems

common in this genre of scholarship:

It is

clear that while International

Law have been engaged

Humanitarian Law and International

in a relationship for

patches that need to be navigated before

can

live

22. See,

many

years, there are

Human Rights

still

some rocky

we can be assured that the two branches of law

together happily ever after.
e.g.,

Dennis, supra note

4, at

453-502. Mr. Dennis

is

a long-standing attorney in the

US Department of State.
One author notes, "Few states have contested, vis-a-vis the human rights bodies, the application of the human rights treaties abroad. Apart from Israel, it is doubtful whether any state
Office of the Legal Adviser,
23.
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has consistently objected to the extraterritorial application of

human

rights instruments."

Droege, supra note 21, at 519.
24.

See, e.g.,

Watkin, supra note

tional humanitarian law differs in

The

relative or

4, at

9 (noting that " [t]he normative framework of interna-

many respects from that of international human rights law").

married couple metaphor

is

seen often in writing on this topic. See,

e.g.,

Robert

Kolb, The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: A Brief
History of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 80
International Review of the Red CROSS, 409 (1998) (noting, "Today there can no longer be
any doubt: international humanitarian law and international human rights law are near relations"). See also Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 293 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS (1993) 94-1 19, at 94 (stating
that "as human rights law and humanitarian law have totally different historical origins, the codification

of these laws has until very recently followed entirely different lines").

25.

Dennis, supra note

26.

See, e.g.,

4, at 453.

Prosecutor

v.

Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, U 183 (Dec. 10,
human dignity is the basic underpinning

1998) (noting that "[t]he general principle of respect for

and indeed the very raison d'etre of international humanitarian law and human rights law").
27. Meron, supra note 2, at 239.
28. Hampson, supra note 1 5, at 56 1 See also Nancie Prud'homme, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 356 (2007).
.

29.

Dennis, supra note

4, at 453.

Human Rights Regime and the Law of
Armed Conflict, 1 ISRAEL YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 191 (1971).
31. See Dan E. Stigall, Christopher L. Blakesley & Chris Jenks, Human Rights and Military
Decisions: Counterinsurgency and Trends in the International Law of Armed Conflict, 30
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1367, 1370 (2009) [hereinaf30.

G.I.A.D. Draper, The Relationship between the

ter Stigall et al.].

32. See,

Certain
33.

e.g.,

Ralph Wilde, Triggering State Obligations

Extraterritorially:

The Spatial Test

Human Rights Treaties, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 503, 516 (2007).
Human rights are not based on the status of citizenship in any formal

sense;

I

in

use the

term here to denote the concept of a member of a community, a person in a society that relates to
a government, a member of a civil polity. While, of course, human rights protections extend to
individuals

who

find themselves

on the

territory of

time, the bulk of human rights law, jurisprudence

between the governed and the governors, those
those

an obliged State even for a short period of

and scholarship focuses on the

who

relationship

are part of a society for the long term

and

who are in power in that society.

34. Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for
35.

See, e.g., Wilde, supra note 32,

Defence [2007]

UKHL 26 [hereinafter Al-Skeini (HL)]

and Hampson, supra note

1

5, for critiques

of the Al-Skeini

(HL) decision.
36. Al-Skeini (HL), supra note 34, f 109.
37. Id.,

1ffl

127, 129.

21-22.

38.

See DINSTEIN, supra note

39.

One of the rare articles to take a critical view of convergence theories from the perspec-

1,

at

of concern for civilians (as opposed to from a military or State entidement perspective)

an
important piece by Tel Aviv University Professor Aeyal Gross, questioning the application of human rights law in the most long-standing military occupation in contemporary history, that of
Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Gross argues that
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[rights] analysis is usually best at identifying and treating individual localized violations,
which are deemed the exception in a regime where democracy and human rights are the
norm. In the context of occupation, where the norm is the denial of rights and the lack
of democracy, rights analysis may distort the picture by pointing to rights denial as the
exception rather than the norm. Rights analysis is weak at creating structural changes.
The result, even if the rights of the people living under occupation prevail in specific

cases,

may

often be the legitimation of rights' denial rather than the opposite: cases

where individuals win
that protects

human

Gross, supra note 4, at

rights' victories

rights

8.

may create

the

myth of a "benign occupation"

even though they are mostly denied.

Gross's significant article seems to have gained

little

notice in the

literature on convergence, and I hope to argue here that his analysis can and should be expanded
to include situations beyond the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and the specifics of long-term

occupation.
40. Wilde, supra note 32, at 518-19.

Mat 519.

41.

42. Al-Skeini v. Sec. of State for

Defence [2005]

EWCA

1609 (Civ.),

tff

196-97, quoted in

Wilde, supra note 32, at 519 [hereinafter Al-Skeini (Civ.)].
43.

Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note

44.

Prud'homme, supra note 28.
The Al-Skeini decision recognizes

45.

15, H 106.

the problem in reviewing existing

ECtHR

decisions,

noting,

The problem which

House has to face, quite squarely, is that the judgments and
decisions of the European Court do not speak with one voice. If the differences were
merely in emphasis, they could be shrugged off as being of no great significance. In
reality, however, some of them appear much more serious and so present considerable
the

difficulties for national courts

which have

to try to follow the jurisprudence of the

European Court.
Al-Skeini (HL), supra note 34,
In

its

leading case

on

^|

67.

this issue, the

Canada Federal Court of Appeal

also recognizes the

challenge posed to national courts attempting to understand the current interpretation of the

law on

this issue,

somewhat

noting that "the current state of international jurisprudence in this area

Amnesty

is

Canada v. Canada (Chief of the Defence Staff),
v. Canada]. A range of scholars across the
4
F.C.
214
[hereinafter
Amnesty
[2008]
546, H
spectrum of the debate has also recognized the lack of clarity on this issue. See, e.g., Dennis, supra
note 4, at 482 (noting that "there is no clear understanding concerning the precise manner in
which the obligations assumed by states under international human rights treaties interact with
the lex specialis of international humanitarian law, if it is assumed the former apply
extraterritorially during periods of armed conflict and military occupation"); Francoise
Hampson, Is Human Rights Law ofAny Relevance to Military Operations in Afghanistan?, in THE
WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 485, 510 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009) (Vol. 85, US
Naval War College International Law Studies) (noting that "[h]uman rights bodies and the ICJ
are of the view that [human rights law] also applies to cases of military occupation but it is not
clear how human rights bodies understand the concept of occupation, and the application of
human rights law is not free of theoretical and practical difficulties. What is wholly unclear is the
extent to which and the manner in which it applies in other extraterritorial circumstances,
uncertain."

International

particularly to the conduct of military operations"); Stigall et

that "various countries, regional organizations

position

on the proper

al.,

supra note 31, at 1372 (stating

and international organizations

extraterritorial application or jurisdictional
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international

confusion

human rights norms"); Droege, supra note 21,
how the two bodies of law can apply

over

"[^Jurisprudence

on

concrete cases

will, hopefully,

at

502 (reiterating the current

and

coherently,

stating

provide more clarity over time.

.

.

.

that

[S]ome

areas are becoming clearer and in other areas patterns are emerging but are not consolidated").
46.

This

not a

is

new observation, and

is

certainly not a critique that applies equally across

do seek to propose
improved theoretical models for applying lex specialise for harmonizing IHRL and IHL. In addition, some recognize the current paucity of thinking within pro-convergence scholarship on application. Citing another notoriously vague phrase in the (quasi-)jurisprudence on the issue, the
the board. Several scholars, particularly in the newest iterations of the debate,

UN Human Rights Committee's language in General Comment 31
spect of certain

Covenant

rights,

more

noting that "[w]hile in re-

specific rules of international

humanitarian law

specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights,

may be

both spheres of law

are complementary, not mutually exclusive," the author notes,

Such generalizations are unlikely to offer solace to those tasked with the responsibility
for implementation of the complementarity principle in the field. Thus, given the
adoption of this doctrine, there would appear to be merit in exploring the capacity for a
joint general comment between the Committee bodies, which could offer guidance on
how to address the challenges and obstacles associated with the application of human
rights norms during armed conflict and their relationship with international
humanitarian law. In the absence of such direction, the clarity and precision necessary
to implement complementarity will remain missing.
John Tobin, Seeking Clarity

in Relation to the Principle

Recent Contributions of Some International Bodies, 8

LAW 356, 366

of Complementarity: Reflections on the

MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL

(2007).

Michelle A. Hansen, Preventing the Emasculation of Warfare: Halting the Expansion of
Human Rights Law into Armed Conflict, 194 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 1, 51 (2007).
47.

48.

In a striking example, one scholar states, "This article holds that, undoubtedly,

law speaks about and to armed

rights

human

and then appends the following footnote to the
some difficulties." Karima Bennoune, ToArmed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 UC DAVIS JOURNAL OF
conflict,"

sentence: "Admittedly such an application does raise

ward a Human Rights Approach to
International Law and Policy 171, 196 n.125 (2004).
49.

I

am not suggesting that human

rights law is necessarily more difficult to translate into
would be impossible to craft tactical battle rules based on human
rather that this work seems not to have been done by many promoting extraterrito-

military application or that
rights

law

—

rial applicability.

it

Dale Stephens addresses this issue elegantly in his analysis of the debate over the

relationship between the

two bodies of law. Dale Stephens,

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice

Human Rights & Development Law Journal
50.

It is telling

overview of how

Human

in the

and Armed Conflict:
Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE
Rights

(2001).

l

that the two leading articles providing such a clear-eyed

and practical-minded

LOAC practice and theory would be impacted by co-application are written by
and Stephens, supra note 49.
General Comment No. 3 1 supra note

senior military law scholars. Watkin, supra note 4, at 9;

51
10;

Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note

Bankovic v. Belgium

Coard

et al. v.

1

5,

^

1 1 1

;

,

1

5,

^

App. No. 52207/99, 2001 -XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333; Issa supra note 1 5;
the United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, Sept. 29,
et al.,

1999.
52.

Francoise Hampson's assessment

is

incredibly useful to keep in

mind

here.

She notes,

"Human rights more generally refers to values and precepts that may (or should) be the basis of
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policy decisions, such as the rule of law, democracy, participation, transparency and accountability.

Human

rights in this sense

is

part of the 'good governance' agenda."

Hampson, supra

note 45, at 486.
53.

One scholar,

after

providing an exhaustive review of the relevant case law, concludes,

bound by human rights law even when engaged in
from their home territories. Even during the invasion phase of an armed
conflict, it would seem that a state would exercise sufficient control over any individuals
It

thus appears that states remain

hostilities far

with

whom

its

forces

come

beneficiaries of that state's

in contact for those individuals to

the content of those obligations would be the

within the

fall

within the scope of

human rights obligations. This, however, does not mean that
same as if the individuals in question were

home territory of that state. The scope

of the obligation, at

least in

terms of

the level of obligation as explained above, will vary with the degree of control exercised
in the circumstances.

Once an individual is taken into detention by the state, the degree

of control over the individual will clearly have increased.

Cerone, supra note
54.

4, at

1507.

Haider Ala Hamoudi, Reconsidering the 'Rule ofLaw' in Iraq, JURIST, Sept.

8,

2009, http://

jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/09/reconsidering-rule-of-law-in-iraq.php.
55. See,

e.g..

Brief for Interights et

al.

as

Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants and Respon-

dents, Al-Skeini (HL), available at http://www.interights.org/view-document/index.htm?id=

245; see generally Rachel Brett, Non-governmental Human Rights Organizations and International

Humanitarian Law, 80 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 531-36 (1998).
56. S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009) (noting "that the deliberate targeting of civilians as such and other protected persons, and the commission of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of applicable international humanitarian and human rights law
.");
in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security
Gerard McHugh, Strengthening Protection of Children through Accountability:
The Role of the UN Security Council in Holding to account Persistent Violators
of Children's Rights and Protections in Situations of Armed Conflict (2009) (in a report discussing the role of the UN Security Council in holding violators of children's rights and
protections in armed conflict accountable, noting that "[t]he term 'children's rights and
protections' is used throughout this report to include the human rights of children as specified in
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights Covenants and
.

treaties, as well as the

armed conflict)

.

protections afforded to children (by virtue of the obligations to parties to

in situations of armed conflict

under applicable treaty-based and customary in-

ternational humanitarian law").
57.
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Harvard University, Live

Litigating Violations in Iraq (Sept. 22, 2009), http://

ihlforum.ning.com/events/human-rights-in-the (password required).
58.

See, e.g., Office

mary of National

of the United Nations High Commissioner for
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Human Rights, SumHuman Rights

Undertaken within the World Programme for
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-national-initiatives2005-2009.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2009); Alfred
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and International Humanitarian Law, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 614 (2007); Ramesh Thakur,
Global Norms and International Humanitarian Law: An Asian Perspective, 83 INTERNATIONAL
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61.

Defence [2004]

EWHC 291

1

If

103 (Admin.).

A slightly different way of thinking about this is presented in the excellent and thought-

provoking piece by Aeyal Gross,

who notes,

[G]overnment-governed relationships

exist

during occupation as well, although they

assume a different nature because the ruled have not given their consent and the ruler is
not accountable. Transplanting
blur

its

human

rights to a situation of occupation

inherently undemocratic rights-denying nature, and confer

may

upon

it

thus
the

perceived legitimacy of an accountable regime.
Gross, supra note 4, at 33.

Bennoune, supra note 48, at 205 (noting specific rights that would apply in the
Iraq war); Cerone, supra note 4, at 1498-1507 (arguing that the level of obligation of States acting
62.

See, e.g.,

legal interpretation, and that there is likely a "variable scope of obligawhere so-called negative rights would apply frequently extraterritorially, and so-called
positive rights might apply according to a reasonableness test where "the adoption of affirmative
measures is only required when and to the extent that the relevant party de jure or de facto enjoys
a position of control that would make the adoption of such measures reasonable." Id. at 1505);
Stigall et al., supra note 3 1 at 1 375 (arguing that " [t] he proper rule in situations of military occu-

abroad varies in current
tion,"

,

human rights norms extraterritorially ...").
World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme ofAction art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 pt. 1 (July 12, 1993) (declaring that "[a]ll
pation or control
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to apply basic

63.

human

rights are universal, indivisible

Conference on
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Human Rights, April 22-May 13,

A/CONF. 32/41 (May 13,

interrelated"); International

1968, Proclamation of Teheran

art. 3,

U.N. Doc.

1968) ("Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible,

the full realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights

is

impossible").

Bankovic, supra note 51, ^ 75.
65. Al-Skeini (HL), supra note 34, ^ 79.
66. Amnesty v. Canada, supra note 45,
64.

m 310, 311.

67. Al-Skeini (Civ.), supra note 42, ^ 196.
68.

I

am not addressing here the question of an occupying power's (in the IHL sense) obliga-

tion to apply the laws in force in the occupied territory. In reality, of course,

most of the "core"

rights that are regularly referenced as applying extraterritorially would indeed apply through this

mechanism. But the convergence argument seems to want to avoid limiting the extraterritorial
applicability of IHRL to situations of military occupation, and indeed its insistence on the additional application of IHRL would suggest that its proponents believe that some obligations would
be added on top of the already existing obligations under IHL.
69. Many authors refer to the principle as one tool for resolving the problems that arise from
parallel application. For a comprehensive treatment of the history of this principle in addressing
convergence, see Prud'homme, supra note 28, at 355-78.
70.

Mat 383.

There remains, of course, the major issue of accountability and enforcement mechanisms (human rights principles that would not be negated by even the most muscular use of lex
specialis), which I will address in below sections.
71.

72.

See

Hampson, supra note

15, at 560.

For a useful attempt at clarifying the various ways in which the rules would interact,
and how lex specialis might operate in context, see Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in
73.

Denial: The Co-application ofHumanitarian
ries,

37 Israel

Law Review

Law and Human Rights Law to the Occupied Territo-

17 (2004).
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74.

Hampson

notes,

The solution to the lex specialis problem in practice has to be capable of being applied by
those involved at the time they act or take decisions.
event, even if that

is

when

it is

enforced.

.

.

.

It

cannot be determined

Some way needs

to be

after the

found to develop a

coherent approach to the problem.

Hampson, supra note
75.

15, at 562.

One scholar notes,

A further explanation for the increased interest in IHL among human rights groups has
been the increasingly technocratic and professional nature of some international
human rights work. Becoming versed in the intricacies of IHL has allowed human
rights advocates to talk like experts and to find a place at the table with military officials
and government representatives, debating the choice of targets. This was a pragmatic
endeavor which in many ways made sense. Still, too many important concessions can

be made for a place at the table when the terms of the discussion held there have already

been

set.

Bennoune, supra note 48,
76.

See

the conflict

id.

at 2 14

at 222.

(noting that

"when a war is patently illegal,

humanitarian law, then the central

is

illegality,

.

which

.

.

is

if the

only mode of analyzing

the wellspring of all other vi-

An interesting argument is made by William A. Schabas, in one of
the very few analyses critiquing the impact that convergence might have on human rights law
and practice, who notes, in illustrating how IHL does not consider the "legitimate aim" (in a
human rights law sense) of a State in assessing the legality of a military attack,
This is where the attempts to marry international human rights law and international
humanitarian law break down. International human rights law is not indifferent and
olations, will

be overlooked").

does not look favorably upon unjust war. Indeed,

war or

pacifist

it

might be said that there

is

an anti-

dimension to international human rights law that is largely absent
from international humanitarian law.

understandable and logical reasons

—

—

for

William A. Schabas, Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights
Law and the Law ofArmed Conflict, and the Conundrum of"Jus Ad Bellum, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
592, 607 (2007).

By way of example, one former Pentagon targeting specialist who went on to become a
military analyst at Human Rights Watch has noted that "[t]he administration of President
George W. Bush sanctioned up to 30 civilian deaths for each attack on a high-value target in the
Iraq war." Suzanne Koelbl, The Pentagon Official Who Came in from the Cold, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 3, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/worldZO, 15 18,6 17279,00
.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). Whether or not this is an accurate number, the point is that
IHL forces us to speak in such terms, and its language is often focused on precisely such an impossible calculus. Many human rights lawyers and advocates find this very concept repugnant;
indeed, they find such an approach anathema to the notion of human rights. Human rights lawyers' arguments and claims, outside of IHL, may be critical to ultimately changing the way States
understand armed conflict, or the degree of support that home-State populations are willing to
grant for political decisions taken to go to war or behavior in war. The more they are brought
into the language and discourse of IHL, the more they are complicit in the balancing of military
necessity and humanity, the less they are able to fulfill this vital function. See Sharon Otterman,
The Calculus of Civilian Casualties, NEW YORK TIMES NEWS BLOG, http://thelede
77.

.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/the-calculus-of-civilian-casualties/ (Jan. 6, 2009) (noting that
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the acceptance of thirty civilian deaths per high- value target was also reiterated by General T.

Mi-

chael Moseley).

In her subtle and pragmatic analysis of the issues facing human rights bodies that take on

78.

Hampson sets out the dilemmas the current
human rights bodies seeking to utilize lex specialis, engaging in
classification and determining in what instances human rights law would demand a higher level
issues of international

humanitarian law, Francoise

array of legal options presents to

of protection than international humanitarian law. She

is

ultimately critical of the current ap-

proach of human rights courts to the issue of extraterritorial application (to the extent that the
interpretation is limited to situations of occupation, however defined, and situations of deten-

human rights law continues to apply in armed conflict
and because it would allow States a much broader leeway than they would receive from the same
human rights courts in situations of non-international armed conflict. Ultimately, despite the
significant challenges she illuminates, Hampson is optimistic (I would argue overly so), noting
that "[t]he test for any solution is that it must be both coherent and practical and should seek to
avoid diminishing existing protection. It ought to be possible to achieve consensus on the implications in practice on the simultaneous applicability of IHL and human rights law." Hampson,
tion) for ignoring the ICJ decision that

supra note 15, at 572.
79. Al-Skeini (HL), supra note 34, f 78.
See, e.g., Stigall et al, supra

80.

tion of these

norms

note 31, at 1375 (stating that "[t]he suggestion that applica-

extraterritorially

is

a

form of cultural imperialism

81.

Al-Skeini (HL), supra note 34, J 129.

82.

M,f 141.

is

preposterous").

83. Wilde, supra note 32, at 522.
84. Id. at 521.
85. Id. at 522.

For an analysis of the relationship between Islamic law and international

86.

Naz K. Modirzadeh, Taking Islamic Law Seriously: INGOs and
Hearts and Minds, 19 HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 181 (2004).
law, see

human

the Battle for

rights

Muslim

supra note 15, f 71 [emphasis added].
supra note 31, at 1375.

87.

Issa,

88.

Stigall et al.,

89.

Amnesty v. Canada, supra note 45, If

152.

90. Id.,\\72.

Dennis, supra note

471-72.

91.

See, e.g.,

92.

Two scholars discussed above do make such a bold claim, and wisely bypass the well-trod
human rights law actually de-

4, at

convergence/extraterritoriality arguments in order to argue that

mands

that States avoid war. See Schabas, supra note 76;

Bennoune, supra note

48.

some development in this direction in recent scholarship, providing an aggresIHL and its underpinnings from the perspective of human rights law
and moral philosophy. See David S. Koller, The Moral Imperative: Toward a Human RightsBased Law of War, 46 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 231 (2005) (stating that "the
commonly shared understanding of the concept of human rights provides a solid basis for drafting
replacements for the IHL principles of discrimination, and proportionality, resulting in a
93.

There

is

sive frontal challenge to

human
94.

rights-based law of war."

Id. at

243—44). See also Bennoune, discussed supra note 48.

See Watkin, supra note 4, at 9 (noting that "[t]he approach to the control of force in

armed conflict as the exclusive domain of international humanitarian law is facing an intensified
effort to have it encompass human rights norms and their associated accountability structure").
95.

One scholar considers

such a

possibility,

but ultimately
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it:

The Dark Sides of Convergence
might be tempting to propose a radical solution: the creation of a right of individual
IHL which would be submitted to a new dispute settlement
mechanism, and the exclusion of such cases from human rights bodies. This would only
It

petition for violations of

work

if

human

the ICJ accepted that a rigid distinction had been created between

IHL and

rights law.

Hampson, supra note

15, at 572.

96. Arrangement for the Transfer of Detainees Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Can.-Afg., May 3, 2007, available at http://

www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/arrangement_detainee.aspx?lang=eng.
97. See HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY & HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS
Combat Development Command, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, The US Army/Marine Corps
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL (University of Chicago Press 2007) (2006).
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Detention Operations in Iraq:

A View from the Ground

Brian J. Bill*
Introduction

many, detention operations Iraq
be
For
abuses
occurred
Abu Ghraib. The ensuing
in

that

will

forever linked with the criminal

1

in

responsibility to those involved satisfied

efforts to assign personal

some proportion of the public and

left

demanding more. As the story eventually faded from the front pages, public
interest in detention operations in Iraq faded as well, and many could be forgiven
the assumption that such operations had all but ended in the wake of Abu Ghraib.
Yet detention operations did not end in Iraq. Indeed, they expanded well beyond the scope that many believed possible earlier. At their height in late 2007, coothers

alition forces 2

were detaining in excess of 26,000 persons within

Iraq.

But

like the

dog that didn't bark, the later operations failed to attract any significant notice, despite their extensive nature. This article will

attempt to shed some light on subse-

quent detention operations conducted by the coalition
aspects associated with the legal authorities to detain

Part

I

will discuss the legal

and

the

ance,

command

and then

initially

on those

release detainees.

background against which detention of persons

authorized during conflicts and other operations. Part
tail

forces, focusing

structure of the operation

II will

describe in

is

some de-

and the applicable regulatory guid-

will explain the various review processes

by which detainees were

interned and then eventually released. Because the author's experience in

'Captain,

JAGC, US Navy.
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detention operations was in 2007 and 2008, the processes discussed will necessarily

be limited to that time period. This need not be a significant liability, as that period
offered both already- developed

and innovative processes

that deserve study,

potential emulation in similar situations in the future, with

which Part

and

III will

be

mostly concerned.

— The Law

Part I

The detention operation with which

this article

is

primarily concerned

is

that

the auspices of relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.
thorities granted there did

under

The au-

not arise in a vacuum, however, and the international laws

applicable to earlier phases of the operations in Iraq

still

some degree of

retained

authority. Accordingly, a review of those applicable laws will be presented.

A.

Combat Operations

Common Arti-

Following the initiation of combat operations 3 on March 20, 2003, 4
5

of the Geneva Conventions was triggered, and therefore

cle 2

all

the provisions of

the Conventions applied to operations that followed. In addition, the jus in hello

provisions relating to targeting of persons

on the

battlefield 6

were also applicable.

Accordingly, combat forces were permitted to use lethal force against combatants,

and required to refrain from the use of force against non-combatants. Persons captured on the battlefield would be assessed to
their

fall

into

one of several

Geneva Convention

Relative to the

Article 4 of the

Treatment of Prisoners of War

tion) sets out the criteria for prisoner of war status, the

are

and

subsequent treatments depended on the applicable categories.

Combatants would normally be considered prisoners of war.

ing

categories,

(PW Conven-

predominant categories be-

members of the enemy's armed forces and members of organized militias who
under responsible command, wearing a distinctive sign, carrying their arms

openly, and observing the law of war. 7
categories,

Assuming the person fits into one of these
he is immediately treated as a prisoner of war in accordance with the re-

mainder of the

PW Convention, and he

is

detained for the remainder of the con-

8

The detaining power is under no obligation to review the status of
prisoner of war nor to release him until after the cessation of hostilities.
flict.

If there is

taining

doubt about the detained person's

power

shall

with Article 5 of the

status as a prisoner of war, the de-

convene a tribunal to make the determination

PW Convention.

9

Article 5 provides very

the nature of the tribunal; the practice of the United States
trative panel

the

is

little

to set

in accordance

guidance as to

up an adminis-

of three officers to hear the evidence, with no involvement of counsel

for the person in question. 10

The charter of the
412

Article 5 tribunal

is

a limited one:

Brian J.

does the person whose case

is

before

it

physically present before the tribunal)

no requirement that the person be
meet one of the criteria of Article 4? The tri(there

bunal need not determine that the person
likely

do so

in

Bill

is

is

a lawful combatant, though

making a determination of status. The text of Article

it

will

5 supports this

conclusion, beginning, "Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having com-

u This
verbal formulation indicates that it is, by this point, a given the person has committed a belligerent act, though who has made that determination is nowhere stated.
mitted a belligerent act

The Article

and having

fallen into the

hands of the enemy

.

.

5 tribunal, therefore, does not determine whether the person's deten-

tion will continue, but merely decides whether the provisions of the
tion will apply to that detention.

Another implication

is

in the other categories

—

for example, the

armed forces

PW Conven-

that the drafters

thought that doubt would only arise in the case of a potential

service

."

.

—

it is

illegal

may have

combatant, for

not necessary that the

member ever commit a belligerent act to receive prisoner of war protection.

Should the person be determined not to be a prisoner of war, the next step in the
legal analysis is

one of some controversy, brought into prominence by the decision

of the United States to detain persons in Guantanamo. That decision

is

not the

fo-

The US
position is that there is a gap in coverage between the PW Convention and the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Civilians Convention), into which persons characterized variously as illegal combatants, unprivileged belligerents, or, as used in Guantanamo, enemy combatants
fall. Customary international law permits the detention of all combatants, legal or
illegal, for the pendency of the conflict. The characterization of a combatant as "ilcus of this

so the respective positions will merely be summarized.

article,

him liable for prosecution without the benefit of combatant immualso depriving him of protection under the PW Convention. The

legal" renders
nity,

while

no gaps between the 1949 Conventions, and that
a detained person who does not benefit under the PW Convention must necessarily benefit from the Civilians Convention.
Assuming the "no-gaps" position as a matter of convenience of discussion, the
detaining power next turns to the Civilians Convention to determine whether
detention is available. The first issue is whether the person is a "protected person"
contrary position

is

that there are

under Article 4 of the Civilians Convention. 12 In

short, Article 4 declares all

non-

national (of the detaining power) civilians to be protected persons, then excepts
certain subclasses

from

that protection. 13 Non-protected persons benefit only

from the general protections

set forth in Part II

of the Civilians Convention, 14 and

from the general standards of humane treatment contained
cle 3. 15

Protected persons benefit from the

in

Common

Arti-

more substantive protections contained

in Part III of the Civilians Convention. In the context of detention, the legal
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analysis

depends on where the protected person is being detained, though the prac-

tical effect

Part

III

between the two

is

not great.

of the Civilians Convention

tected Persons."

The

first

section

is

is

and Treatment of Pro-

entitled "Status

entitled "Provisions

Common to the Territo-

of the Parties to the Conflict and to Occupied Territories." This section

ries

more specific than those set out in Common Artiare not appreciably greater. 16 The next two sections are split in their coverage

provides protections that, while
cle 3,

between that afforded to protected persons in the

power and those who

home territory of the

are detained in occupied territory.

17

detaining

As regards the power to

detain protected persons, the applicable articles provide similar, though not identical,

protections and procedures.

Article 41,
territory,

which applies to protected persons

permits internment or assigned residence

methods of control mentioned
ticle

in the detaining power's

in the present

42 goes on to provide that internment

the detaining

views of the

power makes

initial

it

18

of protected persons

Convention

[are]

home

if "other

inadequate." 19 Ar-

may only be ordered "if the security of

absolutely necessary." 20 Article 43 provides for re-

decision to order internment, with reconsideration of the deci-

sion occurring "as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative

board," and a further review accruing twice yearly. 21
In occupied territories,
ticle,

42;

Article 78.

There

under Article

78,

is

initial

the provisions related to internment are in a single ar-

a slightly different standard

internment

Unlike Article 42, which

makes the

all

is

silent

is

from

that espoused in Article

possible "for imperative reasons of security." 22

on the procedures by which the detaining power

determination to intern, Article 78 provides that such a decision

must be made "according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying
Power." 23 The Article 43 "reconsideration" is in Article 78 restyled as an "appeal,"
to be decided "with the least possible delay." 24 Further review of continued intern-

ment

is

to be "if possible every six months," 25

which

is

probably a better formula-

tion that the "twice yearly" formulation in Article 43. This section of Article 78

concludes with the requirement that the review be by a "competent body" 26

by the detaining power, which
Article 43,

is

much

less

though maybe about the same

set

up

rigorous than the court suggested by

as the administrative

board option

also

provided in Article 43.

B.

Occupation Phase

President Bush announced the end of

combat operations on May

date marks the beginning of the occupation phase in Iraq.

mained applicable at this time,

28

1,

2003. 27 This

Common Article 2

re-

and the Geneva Conventions therefore continued
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in full applicability as a matter of law. Accordingly, the legal authorities to detain
civilians

were unchanged during

this period.

Shortly after the occupation began, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)

was established to function

as the interim

government of Iraq. 29 The

CPA issued

some of the procedures affecting detention operations.
These will be discussed in some detail later. It is necessary to note now, however,
that the CPA pronounced that its orders and regulations would remain binding
Iraqi law after the dissolution of the CPA. 30 This is important because some of the
various orders codifying

procedures used in later detention operations continued to trace their authority

from

CPA issuances,

C. United Nations

as the Iraqis

had neither rescinded nor repealed them.

Mandate

With the imminent standing up of the new Iraqi government, the United Nations
Security Council provided a different legal authority for continued combat and detention operations, apart from the previously explicit reliance on Geneva Conventions rules related to international armed conflict or occupation.
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546 31 was passed on
June 8, 2004, in anticipation of Iraqi resumption of sovereignty on June 30, 2004. It
32
is explicidy a Chapter VII
resolution by which the Security Council acts in its
mandatory, international law-making role. For present purposes, paragraph 10
contains the following, where the Security Council

[d]ecides that the multinational force[ 33 ] shall have the authority to take

measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and
accordance with the

letters

annexed to

necessary

stability in Iraq in

this resolution expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi

request for the continued presence of the multinational force
tasks

all

and

setting

out

its

34

Two letters are annexed to the resolution. The first was from the Prime Minister
of the Interim Government of Iraq, Dr. Allawi, in which he wrote:

we are able to provide security for ourselves, including the defense of Iraq's land,
sea and air space, we ask for the support of the Security Council and the international
community in this endeavour. We seek a new resolution on the Multinational Force
(MNF) mandate to contribute to maintaining security in Iraq, including through the

Until

tasks

and arrangements

set

out in the

letter

from Secretary of State Colin Powell

President of the United Nations Security Council.

35

Secretary Powell's letter contains the critical language:
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Under

the agreed arrangement, the

MNF

stands ready to continue to undertake a

broad range of tasks to contribute to the maintenance of security and to ensure force
protection. These include activities necessary to counter ongoing security threats posed

by forces seeking to influence Iraq's political future through violence. This will include
combat operations against members of these groups, internment where this is necessary
for imperative reasons ofsecurity, and the continued search for and securing of weapons
that threaten Iraqi security.

UNSCR

1546 therefore authorized internment for imperative reasons of security,

and while
proper,

37

it

it

references.

may have been preferable to have had such language in the resolution
nevertheless included the authorization through this internal chain of

The authority to intern was not dependent on any other international law

authorities; that

is,

with the resumption of Iraqi sovereignty

that the occupation,
this

is

By

36

and the

ability to intern

was recognized

it

that

through Article 78, had ended. Rather,

an example of the Security Council making binding international law.
its

terms,

UNSCR

1546 was to expire

forming an Iraqi government;

cember

15,

38

conclusion of the process of

at the

prior to the national voting that took place

2005, the Security Council acted again in

mandate until December 31, 2006.
ber 31, 2007, and

UNSCR 1790

41

UNSCR

UNSCR

1723 40 extended

further extended

it

1637

39

to extend the

yet again to

it

on De-

Decem-

December 31, 2008. In each
was made to combat opera-

to

of these subsequent resolutions no explicit reference

tions or internment. Rather, each reaffirmed the authorizations contained in

UNSCR

1546, which itself contained the

combat and internment

authorizations.

Returning to the authorization for internment, the language chosen for Secretary Powell's letter

—internment

for imperative reasons of security

—appears

to be

taken directly from Article 78 of the Civilians Convention as the closest legal analogy.

Whether

that

was objectively true or

the Security Council,

it

was

Article 78

not,

and whether

and associated

it

was the intention of

articles to

which coalition

forces looked in designing the operation to be later described.

D. Post-mandate Authority
Prior to the Security Council action in
that the

UNSCR

1790, 42

UN mandate would end after December 31,

tions throughout 2008,

it

was already recognized

2008. 43 After long negotia-

two agreements were signed on November
45

17, 2008.

44

The

number of aspirational principles to
guide future relationships between the United States and Iraq. The Security Agreement 46 sets forth the rules to be followed by US forces beginning on January 1,
Strategic

Framework Agreement

set forth a

2009. Very decidedly, the broad mandate of the

UNSCR era had ended. In regard to

detention operations, the Security Agreement

moved away from

threat" administrative internment

model
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the "imperative
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detention overseen by the Iraqi judiciary. 47 Those detainees whose detentions

predated January

1,

2009

(i.e.,

those

who had been

detained under authority of

the Security Council resolutions) are to be released "in a safe and orderly manner"
unless the Iraqis are able to charge

sume

them criminally, in which case the Iraqis will as-

custody. 48

Part II

—Description ofDetention Operations

A. Structure
In this section, the practical application of the law, such as
tion operations will be described.

It will

it

was, to actual deten-

begin with a short explanation of the com-

mand relationships as they existed at the time. Although such details usually appeal
only to military professionals, a familiarity with the various units and

officials will

help in understanding the interplay of the various procedures used in detention
operations in Iraq.

The combatant commander with
Central

Command,

49

responsibility for Iraq

is

the

headquartered in Tampa, Florida. Central

numerous orders containing policies and guidance that were

Commander, US

Command issued

utilized in detention

operations.

commander

Commander,
Multi-National Forces-Iraq, often abbreviated as MNF-I. The commander has
always been a US Army four-star general; the commanders during the period to be
discussed below were Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno. 50 The relevant major subordinate commanders to MNF-I were Multi-National Corps-Iraq, or
MNC-I, and the Deputy Commanding General for Detention Operations (DCGDO), who was also designated as the Commander, Task Force 134 (TF 134). 51
MNC-I, commanded by a three-star Army general, contained all of the operating
The senior

coalition force

forces in Iraq. Iraq

manded by

in Iraq

was designated

as

was divided by MNC-I into subregions, each of which was com-

a two-star general. 52

Though

the boundaries between

them changed,

there were, during the times relevant for this article, six subregions, designated as

Multi-National Divisions-North, Baghdad, and Central, and Multi-National Force-

West, 53

US

all

of which were

US commands; any detainees from these units would go

The remaining regions were Multi-National Division-CenterSouth, comprising a small region commanded by the Polish, and Multi-National
Force-Southeast, most notably containing Basra, commanded by the British. 54
Few detainees were taken in Multi-National Division-Center- South, though
they would eventually wind up in US detention facilities. The British ran their
into

detention.

own detention

facilities.
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The

position of the

Deputy Commanding General

for Detention Operations

was an unusual one. As a result of the abuses uncovered at Abu Ghraib, 55 the DCG-

DO was established as a two-star general position, reporting directly to the Commander, MNF-I. The

DCG-DO was responsible for setting and implementing de-

tention policy throughout Iraq. Anomalously, a two-star general was in the
position to
tice this

make policy that a three-star (MNC-I) was to follow. Although in prac-

unusual power relationship proved no problem, there were occasions,

mostly related to policies associated with the release of detainees, where the interests

of MNC-I and

DCG-DO clashed. Unless the situation was otherwise resolved,

Commander, MNF-I, made the final decision.
The DCG-DO also commanded TF 134, 56 and it was in this position that the
commander spent the great majority of his time. 57 The primary responsibility of
TF 134 was the proper care and custody of the detainees in centralized facilities,
known as theater internment facilities (TIFs). 58 Subsidiary responsibilities inthe

cluded the lawful interrogation of detainees and the provision of due process hearings to the detainees regarding their continued detention.

TF 134 was

itself largely

made up

of individual augmentees and ad hoc units.

commanding general would deploy
the commander of TF 134 was ordered indi-

Unlike the multinational divisions, where the
to Iraq with

most of his normal

vidually to his position.
officers

and

The

staff,

rest

enlisted personnel

of the headquarters staff consisted of active-duty

from

all

bers of the reserves or National Guard.

of four to twelve months, though
ters staff were

six

of the armed services, or mobilized

mem-

Many were volunteers, serving tour lengths

months was the norm. Under the headquar-

subordinate organizations, though only the major organizations ap-

plicable to this article will be discussed.

1.

Care and Custody

Doctrinally, care

MP

and custody of detainees

commanders were placed

is

a military police

in charge of the theater

was an instance where an existing

staff,

normally an

(MP)

function, 59

internment

MP

facilities.

and

This

brigade headquarters,

would deploy in full. 60 Their staff would be augmented in theater by individual
augmentees. The guards in the compounds would come from other existing MP
companies, most of which were in the reserve or National Guard, 61 or from provisional units of
duties.

guard

62

airmen or

Redundant

force,

with

and professional

its

sailors

whose

layers of command

specialties

were anything but MP-related

were necessary to ensure that

this diverse

vastly different service experiences, functioned as a cohesive

force in an

environment that permitted no mistakes.
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Interrogations

All interrogations of detainees within a theater internment facility were

conducted

by the Joint Intelligence and Debriefing Center (JIDC). The JIDC was commanded

by a colonel of the military intelligence branch, who reported directly to the Commander, TF 134. The personnel under the JIDC commander comprised a military
intelligence brigade headquarters element, typically from the Army reserves or
Army National Guard, heavily supported by individual augmentees from other
services, as well as

by various contractors.

Every security detainee, shortly after his arrival at the theater internment facility

would undergo a screening interview by JIDC interrogators. The purpose of the screening was to gather basic biographical information, and to generally assess the detainee's knowledge and
cooperation. 64 Although the facts and circumstances that led to the detainee's capture and internment would be discussed, the screener's task was not to attempt to
prove or disprove the facts underlying the capture; rather, he was to assess whether
the detainee knew anything that would be of future tactical or strategic importance. For example, if a detainee was captured while emplacing an improvised explosive device, or IED, the screener would undoubtedly ask about the
circumstances surrounding that act, but would focus his questioning on whether
this detainee knew where the device was made, or who was in charge of the network
responsible for IEDs in that region, and so on. If the screener believed that the detainee had information on these areas, he would schedule the detainee for further
interrogation at a later time. Most detainees, however, were screened as having little intelligence value, and were never again interrogated.
The follow-on interrogations which did occur were conducted in accordance
with Army Field Manual 2-22. 3, 65 as had been made mandatory by the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005. 66 The field manual lists the approved "approaches" an inand while

still

being processed into the

facility,

63

terrogator

may take with any detainee; 67 anything not listed is per se unauthorized

and the manual makes

clear that certain actions are always prohibited. 68

there was concern that,

by explicitly setting out the approaches that would be used,

the quantity
fer,

3.

and

quality of the intelligence gained

Though

from interrogations would

suf-

anecdotal indications are that the fears have been unjustified. 69

Legal Reviews

The legal section of TF 134 was uniquely structured, and had a very limited and defined mission. In a normal military command, the judge advocate to a commander
is responsible for providing advice on many topics: military justice, administrative
law, fiscal issues, ethics, operational law and contracts, among others. The commander of TF 134, however, did not have such a judge advocate on his staff; rather,
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Commander, MNF-I, was tasked to provide him
advice in all of these areas. The head of the TF 134 legal office was instead denominated as the Legal Advisor to TF 134; his mission was solely the legal processing of
the Staff Judge Advocate to the

detainees. 70

The TF 134 legal office was staffed exclusively by individual augmentees, predominantly from the Air Force and Navy, with a very few from the Army (mostly
reserve or National Guard),

2007, the

TF 134

legal office

Marine Corps and Coast Guard. At

its

height in late

had approximately 150 personnel assigned. Of these,

approximately one-third were judge advocate

officers,

with the remainder

made

up of enlisted paralegal specialists, information technology specialists and investigators. As the number of detainees decreased throughout 2008, so did the size of

TF 134 legal office.
The TF 134 legal office was structured largely along functional lines. Each of the
review boards was assigned a number of judge advocates and enlisted support perthe

sonnel.

The Central Criminal Court of Iraq

liaison office

was

similarly staffed.

A

headquarters element section was also established to coordinate the actions of the
other sections and to process special cases. Each section reported to a designated
officer-in-charge,

who

reported to the Legal Advisor,

who

in turn reported to the

DCG-DO.
B. Legal

Guidance

As discussed in Part I, the "law" under which the United States operated was the Security Council resolutions permitting detention for imperative reasons of security;

the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians, specifically Article 78,

would be applied by analogy. In the absence of other binding law, 71 policy and regulatory guidance filled the void. However, in the discussion that follows, it will be
noted that there are few citations to authority, for the following reason: there was
little

binding authority.

Department of Defense Directive 23 10.0 IE 72 contains overarching guidance for
all

US

detainee programs.

The

directive

mandates humane treatment for

all

detainees 73 and, regardless of the detainee's legal status, requires that the

protections contained in

provides that detainees

Common

who

Article 3 be applied as a

minimum. 74

It

also

are not prisoners of war "shall have the basis of their

detention reviewed periodically by competent authority." 75 The directive otherwise provides

little

specific guidance.

The Coalition Provisional Authority

required, in

its

Memorandum

3,

76

cer-

tain procedures to be followed in the detention of security detainees. Detainees

whose detention

lasted

more than seventy-two hours would be

view of the decision to intern,

77

and

that review
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Further reviews were required "periodically," with the
six

months.

first

review required within

79

Using these directives

as a base,

Commander, US

Central

Command,

issued

which governed detention operations in general and

several supplemental orders

the legal review process in particular. 80

The Commander, MNF-I,

further imple-

mented the Central Command orders, especially when the Central Command order permitted the Commander, MNF-I, to delegate certain of the powers that had
been bestowed upon him. 81 These orders were still written at a relatively high level
of generality. When they were more detailed, they were usually descriptive of the
procedures already developed within
practices

TF

134.

Put another way, TF 134 developed

and procedures which were thought to best implement the overarching

guidance, though hardly as unconstrained actors, as both Central

Command and

MNF-I were always aware of what was going on in TF 134. When the time came to
revise the Central Command and MNF-I orders, those responsible for the revisions
were usually quite

satisfied

prime example of

(MNFRC).
lease

82

this

with making directive the procedures being used.

A

was the Multi-National Force Review Committee

This was a TF 134 initiative to improve the

Combined Review and Re-

Board (CRRB), but it was not mentioned at the time of its implementation in

either the Central

Command or MNF-I directives. When updated, both directives

ordered the implementation of the Multi-National Force Review Committee in the

form

in

which

it

was already being used.

This lack of detailed guidance provided a useful degree of flexibility and permitted

TF 134 legal personnel, who were dealing with issues on a day-by-day basis,

adopt procedures best suited to the circumstances.

It

to

should not be characterized

no oversight. Procedures were not changed unless they yielded improvements and then only after consultation with the chain of command.
as a totally

ad hoc process, changeable

at will

and subject

to

Although the procedures occasionally changed, the substantive standard used
throughout

all

legal reviews

was always the same: whether the detainee was an

imperative threat to security. This

critical

standard never received any further

elaboration in any of guidance discussed above and so the term was used in
loquial sense.

its

col-

83

C. Practice

1.

Preliminary Matters

Detention begins when a soldier on the ground determines that a person
Coalition forces in Iraq had been authorized the
also

been authorized the power to engage
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in

is

a threat.

power to detain persons, but had

combat operations, which imply the
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use of force (up to and including deadly force): detention on the battlefield

an

is

The soldier may decide to subsequently release the
person captured or may decide that he presents a more lasting threat, in which case
he would return to his unit with the detainee in custody. The detainee will be enrolled in the unit's internment facility and if qualified interrogators are available
application of authorized force.

will

be questioned. Within a short period, normally fourteen days, the unit must

decide to release him, or to seek longer-term detention in the theater internment
facility. If

the

latter,

must be approved by a brigade commander.
convoyed or flown by the capturing unit to Camp

the decision

The detainee is then is either
Cropper TIF, 84 which is located within Victory Base Complex. 85 At Camp Cropper,
the capturing unit turns over

warehoused

all

personal effects of the detainees. These effects are

until they are returned to the detainee

upon his release. The capturing

unit personnel also turn in whatever evidence they have to support continued detention.
tains,

At a minimum,

among

this

must include a completed standard form, which con-

other things, identifying information about the detainee, a short

synopsis of the conduct which led to his capture and identification of relevant witnesses. In addition,

two sworn statements describing the capture or other circum-

stances are required. In
pictures, charts

most

more information would be included, such as
statements. Assuming these items were all pro-

cases,

and other relevant

duced, TIF personnel "sign" for the detainee and his personal
turing unit

is

effects,

and the cap-

relieved of any further responsibility for both.

Administrative in-processing consists of a medical screening and treatment
required; clothing

if

and supplies issue; and various briefings related to rules and reg-

ulations inside the TIF. Importantly,

it is

an internment security number, or ISN;

at this point that the detainee
86

it is

by

this six-digit

is

number

assigned
that the

detainee will be referred to throughout his period of detention. This entire process

may take two

or three days, during which the detainees are segregated from the

general population within the TIF.

perform the

initial

It is

also during this period the

IIDC would

interrogation screening interview. At the conclusion of the in-

processing, the detainee

would be assigned

to a

compound within Camp Bucca or

Camp Cropper TIFs.
Contemporaneous with the
will

detainee's in-processing, the detainee's legal

be put together. This all-important

tainee himself. Initially
unit, together
ing. It

is

it

consists only of the

will often serve as a

proxy for the de-

paperwork delivered by the capturing

with the results of the interrogation screening and medical screen-

delivered to the Task Force 134 Magistrate Cell for further processing.

At the Magistrate

Cell,

personnel place the paperwork into standard six-part

folders, labeling the outside

parts

file

file

of the folder with the detainee's ISN. The various

—standard forms, statements, other evidence,
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and process paperwork

any,

ining a particular

file
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are arbitrarily chosen

and only serve to make exam-

for a certain piece of information easier.

The

contains only paper, though occasionally capturing units will include a

DVD which might contain video

or

dence, to the extent that

housed within the

CD-ROM

or scans of additional documents. Real evi-

exists,

it still

normally

file

87

is

referred to in the

but

file

is

physically

Camp Cropper TIF warehouse.

Though a file would seem to be only a file, the detainee file has a few unusual features that are

therefore
is

marked

Iraqi

files

file

because they affect future reviews.
that are classified,

and the

entire folder

is

as containing classified information, usually at the secret level.

rarely an issue in

volve these
share

if only

there are portions of the

First,

This

worth discussing,

normal processing because all US personnel whose jobs in-

have a secret clearance. Indeed, in general terms

it

was possible to

most classified material with coalition force personnel in the course of duties;
members of the Combined Review and Release Board 88 were also permitted

some classified data. The problem arose when it was necessary to convey
information from the file to the detainee, either in written form or in person, duraccess to

ing the Multi-National Force Review Committee. 89

shared with the detainee. In those instances,
in

more

it

No classified material could be

was necessary to convey information

general terms that were not classified.

A further problem with classifica-

some of the material in the file would be classified as prohibiting dissemination to all, or most, other countries; the shorthand would be that the
information was classified as NOFORN, meaning no foreign dissemination. Iraqi
members of the Combined Review and Release Board were not permitted access to
tion was that

NOFORN material. Accordingly, part of the process of putting the files together in
the Magistrate Cell was to segregate NOFORN materials into yet another file folder
was contained within the normal

that

six-part folder.

When the time came to pro-

member, for example, the NOFORN folder would be pulled
and at the conclusion of the hearings the NOFORN folder would be returned

vide the
out,

file

to an Iraqi

to the six-part folder for storage.
It

should be noted that no sustained effort was attempted to translate

information contained in the
ties

file

Such a task was beyond the

of the already overworked translators. Certain material

ness written statements)

would

start in

Arabic material remained in the
translated into Arabic,

the

into Arabic.

file.

file.

(e.g.,

all

of the

capabili-

detainee or wit-

Arabic and be translated into English; the

Any correspondence

with the detainee was

and both the English and Arabic versions were included

in

But US service member statements, intelligence and interrogation reports,

and any other documents remained

in English only.

At the boards where the

Iraqi

members did not speak English (a significant number did), the interpreter assigned
to the board would go through the file and provide an on-the-spot translation of
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the relevant documents. This was not a perfect solution, but under the circumstances,

it

was the best that could be done.

The final comment about the files in general concerns one of the most troublesome types of evidence the Iraqi informant. Sectarian violence was often higher
than violence directed against coalition forces. Even within particular sects, there
are the lawless and the law-abiding. Iraqis almost always knew who the "bad guys"
were. It took a personal act of courage by an Iraqi to provide a statement to coalition forces implicating his or her neighbor in insurgent acts. Sometimes these
statements would be the basis upon which targeting decisions would be made. In
other cases, after a person was detained coalition forces would canvass the village

—

soliciting statements in the

tention

hopes that the prospect of the person's continued de-

would encourage informants to come forward. In

either case,

it

was neces-

sary to provide the informant with a measure of confidentiality, as any other course

put the informant's

life

in great danger.

Some units would protect the informant's

name by assigning him a number, which is all that would be reflected in the file. 90 If
the informant number was not enough to protect him, perhaps because he gave information that would otherwise reveal his identity, the report might be

some

level,

which led to the

There were two great
istic

yet

way

it

to test their veracity.

was never

clear

problems discussed above.

classification

difficulties

with these statements.

Most would be

First,

there was

oath,

same weight that

would. More important, once the informant pro-

vided his statement, he had no further relationship to the case as

through the various

levels

real-

and whether the informant

believed that swearing to an American or his designee carried the
official

no

characterized as sworn statements,

who was administering the

swearing before an Iraqi

classified at

of review. Both the sheer

the dangerous security situation in the field

it

progressed

number of detainee

cases

and

made it unlikely that informants would

be interviewed a second time about a particular case, and the format of the reviews,
being administrative rather than criminal, did not require any personal participation

by the informant.

If the

So, the informant's statement

had

to be taken at face value.

informant had provided truthful information in the past

noted by the capturing unit in the paperwork they provided),
the information might give

unknown

reliability

it

more

credence.

91

(this

was often

the board assessing

On the other hand, an informant of

might be viewed with skepticism. The

detail

provided by the

informant could be another indicator of truth, as might the informant's averment
that he personally witnessed

merely hearing about

might

it.

some

action

on the

Corroboration

part of the detainee as opposed to

among

various informant statements

also help.

The second problem flowed from the

first. It

became

evident, at least as early as

the time in which the detainee population was growing rapidly, that certain Iraqis
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were informing on their neighbors for personal reasons. The so-called "grudge
former"
ble

on

isn't a

its face,

new phenomenon.
that a person

92

If coalition forces received

information, credi-

was an insurgent, they would obligingly pick up the

neighbor and whisk him away. In Iraq

at the time, there

was no

effective sanction

for bearing false witness against a neighbor. If subsequently released, the

detainee would not know the identity of the informant against
risk.

in-

As boards became more experienced with

former

him so there was no

assessing the validity of informant

statements, these types of statements tended to stand out, but not always. 93

2.

Magistrate Cell Review

The Magistrate Cell was staffed with an officer-in-charge and ten to twelve attorneys, slightly more enlisted paralegals and several interpreters. From the middle of
2007 until the middle of 2008, it operated around the clock, with two shifts working twelve hours each. This coincided with the surge in troops in Iraq, hence the
greatest influx of detainees. In the

age would arrive every day at

fall

of 2007, more than sixty detainees, on aver-

Camp Cropper TIF and require review by the magis-

The attorney magistrates would typically review cases from a single
operational area; for example, two attorneys might be assigned to cases coming
from Multi-National Division Central. The benefit of this arrangement was that
the reviewing attorney was better able to become familiar with the method of processing the evidence used by that unit and build a relationship with those responsitrate.

ble for the processing at the operational level.

Through

policy, the Magistrate Cell review

days of the detainee's arriving at the TIF.

94

would begin working on the

came

cases as they

bled. In practice, the seven-day limit

number of cases

was

was to be complete within seven

Accordingly, the attorney magistrates
in

and the

file

folders

rarely violated, despite the

were assem-

overwhelming

arriving daily.

The procedure used by the magistrate was unremarkable: did the evidence contained in the folder95 support the belief that this person was an imperative threat
to security? If the magistrate's answer was yes, a notification was prepared for the
detainee and his detention would continue, subject to subsequent reviews. If no,
the capturing unit was given notification of the intent to release the detainee and
invited to submit additional evidence that might not have been included in the
original package.

The magistrate would

also frequently contact the capturing unit

asking for clarification of materials in the package; for example,

ence in the

and ask

for

file
it.

to a witness statement that

The

intent

only to ensure that

all

was not

if

there

there, the magistrate

is

a refer-

would call

was not to perfect the case for continued detention, but

the available facts were in front of the decisionmaker.
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after these efforts, the

evidence was

still

insufficient the detainee

would be pro-

cessed for release.

The attorney magistrate's decision was, in general effect, final. There were too
many cases coming through the office for the officer-in-charge to do anything
more than random quality assurance checks and the TF 134 Legal Advisor was even
less able to oversee individual cases. Insofar as these attorneys would process many
hundreds of cases during their tours, their judgment became quite refined.
An additional decision made by the attorney magistrate was whether there was
sufficient competent evidence in the file to merit prosecution at the Central
Criminal Court of Iraq. 96 As seen, the paper file was sufficient for the purposes of
deciding on continued detention, but the file alone, to the extent that its contents
could even be shared given its often classified nature, would not prevail in a
prosecution in Iraqi court where witnesses and physical evidence were necessary. Accordingly, the magistrate would refer those cases that appeared to contain
the requisite unclassified and available evidence to the TF 134 legal office charged
with assisting with prosecutions. The magistrates were instructed to be liberal in
referring cases, since cases could be non-referred, but there was no effective mechanism to prosecute cases which had not been referred in the first place. Even with
this liberal practice, the referral rate for prosecution was fairly constant at only 15
to 20 percent.

The

notification of continued detention prepared

that continued detention

of appeal
so, to

rights,

when the

magistrate decided

was appropriate was additionally styled as an advisement

with an invitation to the detainee to choose to appeal, and,

submit reasons why he was not an imperative threat to

cations were delivered to the detainees in translated

security.

form and read

if he

These

did

notifi-

to those

who

were illiterate. 97 Written appeals were translated back into English and entered into
the

3.

file

for review

by the next board.

Combined Review and Release Board Review

Regardless of whether the detainee elected to appeal his continued detention, his

would be reviewed automatically by the appellate body, called the Combined
Review and Release Board, or CRRB. To put it another way, the CRRB reviewed every case that passed through the Magistrate Cell. The CRRB was to review the case
case

within ninety days, 98 though in practice, especially once the Multi-National Force

Review Committee came into being, the

CRRB

review was completed within two

or three weeks of the magistrate's decision to continue detention. Until

it

was

re-

placed by the Multi-National Force Review Committee, discussed below, the

CRRB also performed the six-month periodic review of every detainee's case. The
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CRRB procedures were the same, whether the case before it was an initial appeal or
later periodic review.

The CRRB was a panel made up of both Iraqi and coalition force officials. The
Iraqi members were generally civilian employees from the Ministries of the Interior, Justice and Human Rights. The coalition forces members were always US military officers, usually drawn from MNF-I staff elements. The panels were
composed so that each had an Iraqi majority, although due to absences, that was
not always possible. The lack of an Iraqi majority did not invalidate the board. To
permit the attendance of the Iraqi members, the CRRB convened in the International Zone. The members were already working elsewhere in the International
Zone, and were provided with passes, or were met and escorted, which permitted
their entrance to the US Embassy Annex within the International Zone.
The process was overseen by the CRRB office of the TF 134 legal office, with an
officer-in-charge and four to six attorneys, together with paralegal and interpreter
support. The CRRB office was responsible for "docketing" all the cases and preparing the files for review. The file would be reviewed to ensure its completeness and
the reviewing attorney would write a summary of the case, which would be translated into Arabic. Material which could not be shared with the Iraqis because of its
classification as NOFORN would be placed in a separate folder within the larger
detainee folder if it had not already been done beforehand. Boards were held up to
five days a week, depending on the cases ready for review and member availability.
On the day of any particular board, the files would be brought to a conference
room where the members had been assembled. A CRRB attorney and interpreter
would accompany the files. There was little ceremony. If there were no Iraqi members, or if the Iraqis read and understood English, as many did, each member
would read through the file on his own and provisionally vote whether there was
sufficient evidence to consider the detainee

an imperative threat to security or not.

Discussion of the cases was encouraged, though

much they did,
would be

if at all.

tallied;

it

was up to the members

how

At the end of the consideration and discussion, the votes

a majority prevailed. If the Iraqi

members did not understand

would perform an ad hoc translation of the relevant evidentiary documents in the file as it was impossible, due to the volume of cases and
English, the interpreter

chronic shortage of skilled interpreters, to translate everything in every

file

other

than the CRRB attorney-prepared summary of the case. Discussion of the cases had
to be through the

medium of the interpreter, but it still occurred. The CRRB attor-

ney played little role in the board other than ensuring that

all

the

files

were consid-

ered and the voting was taking place.

The

historic

recommended-for- release

to 15 percent, especially

when

it

rate at the

CRRB was approximately

12

was the only board conducting periodic reviews.
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Once

the

CRRB became

the initial appeal-only board, the recommended-for-

release rate increased, but only marginally, never reaching 20 percent.

4.

Multi-National Force Review Committee Review

The CRRB was an

though not necessarily

efficient,

effective, tool for

determining

whether a detainee was an imperative threat to security. Chief among the problems

was the file on which the reviews were based: there was little or no change

in the

file

from review to review. The evidence supporting the detainee's initial detention, as-

suming that it was sufficient to pass through previous boards, was more likely than
not to also prove sufficient to pass through any subsequent boards. Indeed, the

among the boards were the change in the membership reviewdifferent members might reach different conclusions based on the

only real differences
ing the

file;

same evidence in the file. The CRRB was also, perversely, too efficient, especially
when members, most notably the Iraqi members, were long-term members. As
with any task, the longer one works on
detainee

files

were often quite

thick,

but

and

the better

it,

among

faster

one becomes. The

the paper there were usually

all

only a couple of very important pieces of relevant information. Ignoring the

an experienced

member knew what to

look

but

for,

it

occasionally happened that

the trivia contained information that could have a bearing
theless, as the

board had a hundred or more files before

ation of each was usually sacrificed for speed.

review became that of the

Each

file

had, as

its first

photographs of him

file,

A

as part

the outcome. Never-

factor in this as well

not the underlying person

of the evidence, but

on

every day, careful consider-

it

page, a picture of the detainee,
this

trivia,

was that the

whom the file represented.

and occasionally had other

was not always enough

to im-

upon the members that they were dealing with a real person, not just an ISN.
The file-only method of review had a more practical downside: disruption in the
TIFs. General Stone, the DCG-DO at the time, would often liken the situation to
that of the movie The Gods Must Be Crazy\ in which a Coke bottle, discarded from a
press

passing airplane, lands near an African tribesman, and he then attempts to return
this gift

of the gods. Releases from the TIFs were almost as haphazard,

the detainees' point of view.

One day a

detainee

at least

from

would be tapped on the shoulder

know how that decision was
reached or why. Likewise, those detainees around him, who didn't get the tap, were
equally mystified about why they too were not being released. Detainee discontent
and told

that he

resulted in riots

was about

to be released: he didn't

and near-riots becoming increasingly common in Camp Bucca."

For all these reasons, the

DCG-DO decided to institute a new review procedure,

which was named the Multi-National Force Review Committee. The

single biggest

innovation was that the detainee was to appear before the board and participate in
the hearing. This led to

many other practical changes.
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because transportation of large numbers of detainees was impossible, the

detainees could not
ees.

Bill

Accordingly,

come to the boards. Instead, the boards had to go to the detain-

all

boards would henceforth be held within the TIFs in order to

movement. Space to hold the boards was initially
a problem, but was solved relatively quickly. Camp Cropper only required a single
board to handle its volume of boards and a trailer in the TIF proved adequate to the
facilitate

easy and secure detainee

need. At

Camp Bucca, with its much larger detainee population, a suite of trailers

was eventually installed to comprise what became known as the
It

"Justice

Complex."

included several board rooms, administrative spaces and a holding area for the

detainees.

Second, whereas the CRRB was able to work through a hundred or more cases in
a day, any reasonable board procedure involving the detainee

would have to accept

many fewer completed boards per day. With a detainee population during this period exceeding 20,000, topping out at

more than 26,000

in the

fall

of 2007,

it

was

necessary to complete just under one thousand boards per week in order to ensure
that

all

detainees were provided a review every six

This necessitated greatly expanding the

ous combinations were

tried,

months

(or twenty-six weeks).

number of boards running every day. Vari-

with nine boards (eight at Camp Bucca, one

at

Camp

Cropper) hearing twenty cases per day, with boards held six days a week finally being settled upon. This gave a theoretic capacity of over one thousand cases per

week, though that capacity was never reached as boards would often be cancelled

and rescheduled due to administrative
availability

due to

difficulties

with moving

sickness, difficulty in finding sufficient

boards or security issues beyond control

(e.g.,

files,

members

detainee unto

sit

on the

a security operation or exercise run

by TIF leadership). As many as thirty boards per day were tried, but that proved to
be too many, exhausting the board members. As the detainee population decreased, the

anything

number of hearings per day per board was decreased.

less

than

fifteen hearings per

It

was found that

day was too "easy" on the members, when

the standard workday in Iraq was twelve hours.

The solution was to slowly decrease

number of boards, maintaining fifteen to twenty hearings for each.
Third, because of the increased number of boards, there was an increased need
for members. Recall that the CRRB was a joint Iraqi-coalition forces board. With
that in mind, the Iraqis were approached prior to the first MNFRC, briefed on the
the

concept, and asked whether they would like to participate as members. Although

new board system and expressed an interest in sending
members, no Iraqi members ever participated. This could be explained by a num-

they were supportive of the

ber of reasons. The
offices

CRRB was held in the International Zone, close to the ministry

of the Iraqi members. Gaining access to the Embassy Annex complex

through security was a challenge, but one that was met.
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Camp Cropper from the International Zone was
possible, but only in armored convoys. Travel to Camp Bucca was all but impossiheld at the TIFs. Daily travel to

ble for the Iraqis

on

their

own, and spending an extended period

at that

very re-

mote location, once they got there, would not have appealed to any of the potential
Iraqi members. While the Iraqis would have been welcomed as members, their absence did lead to many administrative conveniences, as there was no need to worry
about access to
Iraqis

classified material in the files that

and no material

in the files

could not be shared with the

needed to be translated by the

interpreters.

The question was where to find the other members. MNC-I was initially invited
to send members prior to the first boards, but declined, although as will be discussed it did send members later. With no Iraqis, no MNC-I members, and no extant ability to task other units to provide members, all MNFRC members were at
first drawn from TF 134. Officers from throughout Camp Bucca were tasked with
sitting on the boards, without being relieved of their normal duties. Senior officers
in the grade of 0-4 and above to sit as president of each board were in especially
short supply and therefore those that were available were tasked disproportionately. The TF 134 chief of staff decreed that all TF 134 staff officers assigned to the
headquarters would travel to Camp Bucca to sit on boards for two weeks. This
helped, though wasn't a full solution. TF 134 also requested, and was granted, the
assignment of a group of officers and senior enlisted personnel whose sole job in
Iraq would be as MNFRC members. They reported administratively to the Legal
Advisor. Their presence greatly relieved the burden on personnel assigned to the
TIF staff from sitting as members. Additionally, as these permanent MNFRC
members heard more and more cases their expertise greatly increased, improving
decisions. Nevertheless, the "TF 134-only" boards were responsible for the lack of
acceptance of the results early in the process.

With no prior
utilized for
icy

practice to consult in the design of the

an Article 5 tribunal,

and procedures

100

set forth in the

MNFRC,

the procedures

Army regulation providing pol-

for the treatment of, inter alia, detainees, 101 were used

by anal-

The board was composed of three members. The president was a senior
officer, 0-4 or above. One of the other members could be a senior enlisted person,
ogy.

in the grade of E-7 or above. 102

entitled "Instruction to

Each member was provided with a

Members," signed by the DCG-DO, which set forth his

pectations for their performance

Each member signed the
stood the contents.

memorandum

and

his thanks for their serving as

ex-

members. 103

memorandum indicating he or she had read and under-

MNFRC staff members would also provide training on the pro-

on how to read and understand the detainee files.
The night before the board the members were required to read the files, taking
notes as necessary. The boards began early in the morning and ran until all were
cess, especially
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completed. Each board was held in a separate hearing room, minimally configured

with a table in the front for the members, a table for the detainee, a seat for the interpreter

and several chairs in the back for any observers. A guard was always pres-

whose physical custody the detainee always remained.
The hearing followed a script. The president began by explaining the nature of

ent, in

and its purpose, paying special attention to an explanation of the standard of imperative threat to security that the board would be using to arrive at its
decision. The detainee was told that he could offer evidence of any kind. He could
the hearing

make a statement, but was not compelled to do so. If he consented to make a statement and to answer questions, he was encouraged to speak truthfully; to this end
he was sworn in in an appropriate manner. The preliminaries over, the president
The detainee then had the
The board members would then ask ques-

detailed the nature of the evidence against the detainee.

opportunity to rebut the evidence.

104

tions, usually about the detainee's pre-capture conduct,

but also about his conduct

within the TIF and often his intentions once he was released. At the conclusion of
this portion, the president

would return to the

script,

remind the detainee that the

board would be voting on whether the detainee presented an imperative threat to
security,

and dismiss him back to the TIF. The members would deliberate and vote;

a majority vote won. Each member would sign the voting sheet and a short description of why the board voted as

The dissenting member, if
any, also had the opportunity to write a short statement. The MNFRC staff member collected the voting sheet and file, and set up the next board.
The critical role of the interpreter must be mentioned here. Accurate, faithful
interpretation was required but occasionally not delivered. All interpreters were
hired by a government contractor, which certified as proficient all those it hired.
Some were clearly more proficient than others, 105 but in a theater where interpreters of any proficiency were in short supply, the MNFRC staff was happy to have every one it had. Another problem that sometimes occurred was that the interpreter
took on too much of an expanded role, propounding questions that weren't asked
by the assigned members or embellishing answers made by the detainee. In certain
situations, this

made

it

did was written on

it.

sense; for example, if the detainee didn't

question as phrased by the member, the interpreter could
a different

manner or

trusion was improper

as a series

for release

its

and was stopped.

vote to release did not

itself effect

had to be approved by the DCG-DO,

tice to disregard the

more reasonably ask it in

of questions. At other times, the interpreter's in-

The MNFRC result yielded a recommendation to the
the detainee:

understand the

recommendation of the

106

DCG-DO on the status of

a release. All

recommendations

who was free in theory and prac-

MNFRC or that of any of the other

boards earlier discussed. This was a continued complaint of the International
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Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives. In the ICRC's view, the board
deciding the appeal under either Article 43 or 78 of the Civilians Convention
needed to be "independent," and to have the final authority on release. 107 The
complaint had two strands. One was that the members of the boards needed to be
independent of the

DCG-DO;

because the members

were not independent. The response was always

all

worked

for

TF

134, they

that, as a practical matter, the

DCG-DO had little interest in, and absolutely no direct input into, any board. His
interest

the

was merely institutional: Was the procedure fair and being followed? Were

members being exposed

science? If so, results in
notice.

to

the evidence and were they voting their con-

all

any particular case were a matter outside of the DCG-DO's

Never were magistrates or board members upbraided

dations and so they were independent in reality, even

if

for their

recommen-

not in theory.

There was no good answer to the second strand of the complaint about the

DCG-DO's

DCG-DO

The

final authority.

regulations delegating release authority to the

did not permit further delegation to a lower level such as a board nor

would the DCG-DO have been inclined to do so even
vide quality assurance provided
releases

the

were appropriate.

108

some

level

if possible.

His ability to pro-

of comfort in the operating forces that

In the great majority of cases, the

recommendation of

MNFRC (or any other review board) was followed, and the detainee released.

In those instances

when

the

recommendation was not followed,

it

additional information being brought forward that convinced the

the detainee remained an imperative threat.

From
The

the beginning, the

tuted,

it

had

a

Some

DCG-DO

that

109

MNFRC yielded a higher release rate than the CRRB.

institutional response progressed

nal acceptance.

was because of

explanation

is

minimum number

from expectation, through mild alarm,

to

fi-

When the MNFRC was first instiboards; the CRRB still functioned as the

in order.

of

primary six-month review mechanism.

It

happened

at a

dependent requirement for major releases of detainees

time that there was an in-

(e.g.,

the coalition generally

number of detainees during Ramadan as a gesture of goodwill). To "harvest" these increased numbers of releases, the early boards were "seeded" with cases
of detainees who were thought to represent lower threats. The resulting release recommendation rate for these MNFRCs was just under 25 percent, compared with
12 to 15 percent for the CRRB, fulfilling the need for releases. The rate was high,
but expected. However, once the "seeding" stopped and regular cases came before
the boards, the recommended release rate stayed at around 25 percent, and actually
released a

began increasing, until

it

reached a relatively steady rate of over 40 percent. This

was the alarm phase, mostly on the part of the operating forces, which increasingly

came to view the MNFRC as merely a release board. Within the TF 134 staff, the increasing recommended release rate was troubling only if it indicated that either the
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members were not taking their duties seriously. Investigation proved neither to be true. Put another way, the TF 134 staffs view was that if
and was followed the recommended release rate was
the process was fair
merely whatever it was. The substantial increase over that of the CRRB was attributed to three factors. The first was the presence of the detainee. As a simple matter
process was bad, or the

—

—

of human nature, having a real person in front of you, instead of merely a
his picture,

is

more likely to engender empathy, and,

difference. Second,

in close cases,

file

with

may make the

though the detainee's evidence was nearly always just his

state-

ment and answers to questions, it was more than what was in the paper file. Finally,
a board process, following a script, lent itself to greater deliberation on each case.
Matters which might have escaped the notice of the CRRB could be discovered by a
board which had more time to review the case.
Final acceptance of the MNFRC process, and the higher recommended release
rate, took more time. In the beginning of 2008, MNC-I members began to participate on the MNFRC. At the direction of MNF-I, MNFRC panels would have two
MNC-I members each, giving them the majority vote. The results were instructive.
On the first Saturday 110 with MNC-I members, the recommended release rate
"dropped" to around 20 percent. On Sunday, it increased to maybe 24 percent, and
so on, upward every day, until by Thursday it was again near 40 percent. On Saturday, new members would be seated, and the process repeated. Eventually, Saturday's rate began increasing, and within several months, the new boards were
consistently recommending releases at around 40 percent, regardless of the day. 111
The reasons could only be discovered anecdotally. In the beginning, hostility toward the process was clearly evident; that hostility waned as individual members'
tenures wore on and waned organizationally as MNC-I recognized that these results

were attributable to their

own members.

In the end, the operating forces,
stake,

which

more focused

script,

through their participation in the release process, took an ownership
led to their acceptance of the results.

Although the

MNFRC

permanent members,

received

many improvements

MNC-I members

—

—one of the more

a

interesting

was the

as-

signment of personal representatives to some of the detainees. The credit belongs
to the

ICRC

representatives

appeared before the
nificant

who

first

proposed the

idea.

As

indicated, detainees

MNFRC alone. Among the population of detainees was a sig-

number of juveniles. 112 The ICRC asked whether it was possible to help the

juvenile detainees at their

MNFRC review for

it

would be a very important, but also

The ICRC representative initially suggested assigning
compromise was reached, modeling the concept on that

forbidding, process for them.

counsel to the juveniles.

A

of the personal representative assigned to persons appearing before a Combatant
Status

Review Tribunal. 113 The personal representative was not a lawyer;
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role

was not

role

was to

to act as

assist the

an advocate during the hearing. Rather, the representative's
detainee in preparing for the hearing, explaining the process

and appearing with him

The personal representative could make a
statement for the detainee and could suggest to the members questions that might
be relevant, but he or she was not to offer argument in the manner of counsel.
The implementation of providing a personal representative for juveniles began
in late 2007. One of the officers assigned as a permanent MNFRC member was reassigned as the juvenile personal representative. A naval reservist, whose civilian
at the hearing.

job was as a school teacher with significant counseling experience, was chosen for

showed that she was an excellent choice. Experience also
showed, as reported by MNFRC members and juvenile detainees alike, that the initiative was a success. The ICRC next asked to expand the program to represent
the position; experience

other vulnerable populations, to include female detainees, third-country nationals
(i.e.,

detainees

who were not citizens of Iraq) and those detainees with diminished

mental capacity. These, too, were successfully implemented, mostly because of the
overall limited

numbers. 114 Expanding the program further was explored with the

ICRC, but no other discrete population

that

needed representation was

identified.

The ICRC was unapologetic in its request that every detainee receive the benefit,
but that was logistically and administratively impractical. Indeed, the ICRC, while
happy enough with the limited personal representation, never hid its ambition to
push the

MNFRC process until, step-by-step, legal counsel were assigned to all de-

tainees at every hearing.

Though not

part of the

MNFRC process, some mention should be made of the

programs offered to the detainees within the TIF,

some of these
In mid- 2007, when faced with

as participation in

could have a positive impact on the detainee's case.

numbers of detainees and rising discontent among them, the DCG-DO decided to implement a set of formal programs that eventually became known as
Theater Internment Facility Reconciliation Center, or TIFRC, services. 115 The services included literacy programs (well over half of the detainee population was illiterate), limited vocational training, work programs and religious engagement
116
classes.
Though these programs could be viewed as a kind of social work, the focus was on reducing the threat a participating detainee presented, thereby facilitating his earlier release from custody. The programs had two main purposes. The
first responded to the finding that a majority of the detainees had joined the insurgency for money: they had no jobs and were willing to take cash to emplace IEDs,
etc. The vocational training and work programs were designed to address that
rising

problem. The second purpose responded to the belief that insurgent extremists

Once

were misusing Islam to encourage insurgent

acts as a religious duty.

tainees learned to read, they could study the

Quran, with the help of Iraqi
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contracted by US forces, and determine for themselves that Islam teaches quite the

The hope was that completion of the programs would change a former
security threat into no threat at all.
The TIFRC concept was developed contemporaneously with the MNFRC, and
integrated into the MNFRC's process. MNFRC members were specifically directed
to consider the detainee's participation, if any, in the TIFRC services in making
their determination on whether he presented an imperative threat. It was to be
considered merely as a factor among many: there was no pressure to recommend
release for successful participants, and failure to participate was not to be considered negatively. Additionally, the MNFRC members had the opportunity to recommend for future TIFRC participation those detainees whose detention they
decided to continue but who might benefit, next time, from having gone through
the programs. Providing them with this recommendatory power was valuable early
opposite.

TIFRC process when the services were just beginning. When the services became more widely available to all detainees, the MNFRCs were no longer given the
in the

option of "retain, with TIFRC."

5.

Special Release Processing

The discussion up

to this point has focused

on

regularly scheduled reviews,

the initial review at the Magistrate Cell through the

CRRB and MNFRC. However,

there was another significant method by which detainees' cases

and detainees

—

released

that

was through

from

would be reviewed,

special release processing.

Although there

were many ways that the special release process could be initiated, the single constant

was that the

DCG-DO made an individual decision whether to grant the release.

Special release requests originated
officials. It

was a rare meeting with

from many

Iraqi

sources.

Some came from

Iraqi

government officials, or other important

personages, such as influential sheiks, where the

DCG-DO did not return with a list

of detainees to consider for special release. Other requests would come from within

from the battalion through the MNF-I level would often ask
further their engagement efforts. A somewhat separate category in-

the coalition: officials
for releases to

cluded those requests from doctors, asking for the compassionate release of detainees with terminal or serious medical conditions.

These requests were individually processed. 117 Attorneys within the headquarters

element of the

torneys,"

TF 134 legal office would be designated as

whose job would be

relevant facts,

and make

granted or not. The

a

to research the case, write a

recommendation

as to

"Special Release At-

memo

detailing the

whether the request should be

memo was staffed through the Legal Advisor to the DCG-DO,

who would make the final decision. The standard against which the decisions were
made remained the same imperative threat to security but there was a

—

—
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willingness to accept

more risk in these releases than with normal periodic reviews.

This was most evident for requests which originated from within the coalition:

ground commander, with knowledge of the
to accept

him back within

detainee's background,

was

his battlespace, with reluctance the request

granted. There was generally less tolerance of risk with requests

though the

118

political considerations associated

if a

willing

was often

from Iraqi officials,

with such requests could often

tip

the balance.

6.

Criminal Prosecution

CPA Memo

3 provided that coalition forces could detain

two

classes of persons:

those "suspected of having committed criminal acts and [who] are not considered
security threats," 119

with the mandate

and others

set

out in

"for imperative reasons of security in accordance

UNSCR 1546." 120 To the extent the authority to detain

persons for criminal acts had been used earlier, by 2007
coalition forces to

apprehend and hold

a person

threat. Rather, all detainees processed into the

Cell

it

who

was exceptionally rare for

presented only a criminal

TIF went through the Magistrate

and were assessed as imperative threats to security as already described. That is

not to say that criminal prosecutions did not occur, for that was another major op-

must be discussed, albeit briefly. 121
Order 13 122 established a national-level court

eration that

CPA

Court of
tions,

CCCI. The Court's

Iraq, or

misdemeanor or

felony,

jurisdiction extended to

though

in

its

couraged to concentrate on the most serious

nicity or religion.

123

national Zone.

was the court to which

It

sat in

cases,

Baghdad
all

all

criminal viola-

discretionary jurisdiction

it

was en-

such as terrorism, acts intended

and violence based on

to destabilize democratic institutions,

The CCCI

called the Central Criminal

race, nationality, eth-

in a building just outside the Inter-

coalition force detainee criminal cases

were referred.

Within the TF 134

legal office there

was

a

CCCI liaison office, which was tasked

to prepare cases for eventual prosecution at

would

receive the

files

forwarded to

it

CCCI. Attorneys within

from the Magistrate

Cell

that office

and determine,

based on their experience with the Court, whether prosecution was worthwhile,
based on either the nature of the misconduct alleged or the

and

availability

of witnesses.

state

of the evidence

A case for which prosecution was not deemed worth-

while was "non-referred," after which the detainee's case would be returned for re-

view by the

CRRB or MNFRC, as appropriate, to determine whether he remained

an imperative

threat.

Those cases that warranted prosecution were prepared

for prosecution

by the

CCCI liaison office attorney, and then presented to the Iraqi prosecutor and investigative

judge for proceedings in accordance with the Iraqi criminal code.
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CCCI liaison office attorneys did not themselves prose-

important to note that the

cute any case; however, their role hardly ended with passing off a prepared case

file.

The CCCI liaison office attorney would collect all physical evidence, summarize all
other evidence, arrange the presence of witnesses and ensure that the detainee
defendant appeared. The attorney would be present for the investigative hearing and
subsequent trial, and would be responsive to any questions or requests for evidence
from the judges. Investigative judges would often solicit from the attorney questions
that they (the judges) might want to ask. If the CCCI liaison office attorney didn't act
as the prosecutor, he or she was certainly a very active "shadow" prosecutor.
Convictions resulted in just less than 60 percent of the cases.

of any normal

Compared to those

US jurisdiction, where conviction rates regularly exceed 90 percent,

these results were not particularly impressive. However, there were several reasons
to be satisfied with the results.

The

Iraqi system did

not engage in any type of plea

bargaining, so a powerful incentive to plead guilty to charges was removed.

fendant taking his chances at trial

were also forced to take cases to

occasionally rewarded.

is

trial

A de-

CCCI liaison attorneys

they knew would not result in conviction. For

example, assume coalition forces raid a house and find a cache of illegal weapons,

They detain all of the military-aged males in the house.
CCCI liaison attorneys would have to bring all of these persons to the joint trial,
knowing that the Court was likely to convict only the owner of the house or someIED-making materials,

one

else

who

etc.

could be said to have possessed the weapons, acquitting the

even one of the persons found during the raid was not brought to

trial, all

rest. If

defen-

dants would point to the missing person as the possessor of the weapons and the

Court would find no one

guilty.

Those convicted would be transferred to

due to the overcrowding of Iraqi

facilities it

Iraqi custody as

often did not

soon

happen

as possible

but

quickly. These

compound, while awaiting
the same as all other detainees,

detainees remained in the TIF, though in a separate

They were otherwise treated
other than that their periodic reviews ended because they were considered to have
begun serving their sentences.
eventual transfer.

If the

Court

failed to convict the detainee defendant, the criminal

ended but the person was
ately reviewed

the
its

file

would be immedior MNFRC for its recommendation. In the case where

still

by the CRRB

proceeding

a security detainee. These cases

contained information that could not be shared with the Court because of

classification, the

board could well conclude that the detainee remained a threat

and recommend his continued detention despite the acquittal. This was a source of
confusion for the detainee and of tension with the Court, though most of the
judges understood the separate security-based detention authority.
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—Applications for the Future

Part III

This article has presented a description of the detainee operations during a portion

of coalition operations in Iraq, and

may prove

to be of

some

limited value in the

documentation of that experience. However, more important, the lessons learned

may prove to be useful in future operations. The following comments and recommendations are offered in that hope.
Before offering such comments,
scribed earlier or

it is

important to

insist that the practices de-

recommended below should not be taken

as establishing

that will bind the United States or others in similar situations.

was applied by analogy to detainee operations,
ways, very demanding. This author

is

is

law, such as

it

not very detailed nor, in some

confident that the reviews of the cases of de-

tained persons went beyond what the law required.
set the

The

custom

The United

States

was able to

conditions for the practices described by devoting substantial financial and

personnel resources to the detention mission in Iraq; those generous resources

may not be available in a future operation, and thus it may become necessary to adhere only to the more minimal requirements of the positive law. Other nations may
not have the resources under any circumstances to enable them to provide more

than the law requires and the
of a

US practices should not force them, through a claim

new customary international law obligation,

to try.

A. Detainee Personal Appearance
All things being equal, a review at

which the detainee appears and speaks is likely to

be better than one in which he

not given that opportunity. "Better" in this con-

text

means more likely to

is

arrive at a correct assessment of the level of threat the de-

tainee presents. Detention

is

costly: to the detaining

power

in resources

and

personnel; to the detainee and his family, which often suffers; and to the occupied

or host nation, depending on the legal authority for the detention, which needs to

move beyond civilian internment as it reasserts its own sovereignty. Of course, in a
situation in

which

civilian

internment

is

permitted in any form, things are not

al-

ways equal. The somewhat relaxed requirements for hearings under the Geneva
Conventions clearly recognize that in a conflict certain unavoidable impositions

on individual rights will occur and that even a minimal process will, if followed, be
better than no process at all.
Nevertheless, if resources permit, it would be worthwhile to permit the detainee
to appear at all levels of review. The MNFRC proved successful, and if it worked
with over twenty thousand detainees, it would certainly work in smaller-scale detention operations.
its

The CRRB would have been replaced totally by the MNFRC in

reduced role as the ninety-day appeal board but for the Iraqi participation.
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MNFRC was unable to be arranged and the

the Iraqis did participate,

politically inexpedient to abolish

it.

it

was determined to be

However, a future detention operation need

not be constrained by these considerations, and the appeal and subsequent review

board could be designed from the beginning with the appropriate membership.
Permitting a personal appearance at the

initial

review stage, at the point where

MNFRC-like panel (though it
conduct the hearing, and make the

the Magistrate Cell functioned, need not require an
could);

it is

quite possible for the magistrate to

decision, alone. Consideration

was given to permitting detainees to personally ap-

pear before the Magistrate Cell, but insufficient manning prevented that from oc-

The attorneys assigned as magistrates were already employed full-time in
preparing and perfecting the files, writing summaries, and so on, and levying an
additional requirement upon them to hold a hearing for each of those same cases
would have been impossible. But, as stated before, with greater personnel resources, or with fewer cases, it would have been possible and beneficial.
The problem with this recommendation is that it is essentially irrevocable durcurring.

ing the remainder of that operation. Should personal appearance be the standard
set at the

beginning, and the operational

rity situation deteriorates,

it

will

be

tempo dramatically increases or the secu-

difficult to revert to a file-only review,

because of the negative reaction from the detainees,
tions,

such as the ICRC, monitoring the process. There

fore, in starting

been

124

with the

mostly

and possibly by organizais

a certain appeal, there-

minimums and improving them once

a steady state has

realized.

B. Personal Representatives

The

decision to grant a personal representative to the detainees, or any subgroups

must be based on the perceived need and the availability of resources. It
may yield better results and will help the perception of fairness by the detainees. Efforts to turn any of the hearings into a fully adversarial process, with or without the
thereof,

involvement of counsel, should be resisted until such time as national policy-

makers direct a different course, and then only after debating the compatibility of
such a procedure in an area of conflict.
C. Technology
Better uses of technology may not have directly benefited the quality of the reviews,

but certainly would have eased the administrative burdens associated with the
hearings. Consider the role of the detainee

view, even at the

MNFRC.

If the file

with that detainee. (In almost

all

was

file. It

lost

cases, the file
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was the centerpiece of every

re-

or missing, nothing could be done

could often be reassembled from

its
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constituent parts scattered throughout the force.)

The

logistical effort to track

and
and

move the files was impressive. The files were assembled at the Magistrate Cell,
when their review was complete, they were boxed up and convoyed to the International Zone, where they would be collected by the CRRB (and a more limited number by the CCCI liaison office). Upon completion of the CRRB review, they were
boxed up again, convoyed back to Victory Base, put on a plane at Baghdad Interna-

and convoyed to Camp Bucca. If the file was needed
for special release processing, it would return along that path to Victory Base Com-

tional Airport, flown to Basra,

plex,

and maybe back to

station in this possibly
Ideally, files

unending process.

would begin

their lives as

scanned images, using a program such as

manner

similar to the six-

New material (e.g., the results of a periodic review)

could be inserted

Adobe Acrobat
part folders.

Camp Bucca again later before it returned to another way

to organize the pages in a standardized

at the appropriate place in the electronic

server,

with visibility throughout the force.

puters with which to read the electronic

Many efforts were made
existence

made

it

The files would reside on a central
Board members would each have com-

file.

files.

to reach this ideal, but the sheer

in

impractical with the then-current resources. Scanning can be

time consuming and quality assurance must be
to be destroyed.

number of files

Each resulting

file

strict if all

paper documents are

often exceeds twenty- five megabytes in

size.

While storage requirements are considerable, though manageable, bandwidth considerations are not so easily solved.

Some method must be reached

"originality" of a single version (the paper

that can be
intractable

file

will likely

be the most

short supply, especially in an area of conflict
tion

system has this obvious advantage)

changed only by those authorized to do

—bandwidth

may make

their solutions so

to ensure the

so.

None of these problems are

difficult challenge, as

—and

it is

always in

future technological innova-

much easier.

Another technological solution, one which was investigated but not imple-

mented mostly due to lack of bandwidth again, was "virtual" hearings, at which
one or more of the members might participate from a remote location. Such a system would have much appeal, eliminating the onerous travel to a remote location
such as Camp Bucca. 125 The quality of the resulting hearing, however, would be
correlated to the quality of the video-teleconference link, as the visual aspects of a

more important than the aural. Compare, for example, a situation where the members appeared to the detainee, and the detainee to the members, on a laptop screen using a webcam versus a full-motion, wide-screen
hearing are often

presentation.

ways

A virtual presence is always

how much degradation

is

inferior to real presence; the issue

acceptable.
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D. Broad Participation Membership
Boards, specifically the

MNFRC, worked well with "general purpose"

matured and the types of persons who

officers, yet

on the boards broadened
the process improved. When designing a review panel for a future board, it would
as the process

sat

be best to begin with the broadest possible participation.
In an operation which permits the involvement of representatives of the host

them participate will likely outweigh the administrative burdens (clearances and disclosure predominantiy). They need not be given
the majority vote, such as was the case in the CRRB, though the political situation,
especially one in which the visiting force's presence is based on host-nation consent, may warrant that concession. The cultural sensitivities and awareness that
such members bring to the board cannot be otherwise replicated.
Concerning own-force members, senior enlisted members are always a valuable
addition, despite an otherwise pervasive preference for officers only. 126 Members
from the operating forces must participate. In addition to their wealth of experience resulting from seeing the same type of incidents that have resulted in detennation, the benefit of having

tion occur firsthand, their involvement helps to lend an ownership stake in the

process to the operating forces. 127 Permanent members,

almost certainly have
ing many,

little

many boards

if

they are available, will

or no operating exposure, but their experience review-

will help to establish

some

parity of treatment across the

process.

E.

Programs within the TIF

Administrative detention has been recognized as necessary during the types of operations described.

port with enumerated standards: these responsibilities are
the military police,

must comdoctrinally exercised by

The conditions under which the detainees

are held

and help to maintain the peace and order of the detainee camps.

However, the same conditions

may also have a direct bearing on the legal reviews.

Programs such

TF

as those of the

134

TIFRC

discussed above are designed to re-

duce the threat the detainees present post-capture. Participation in these programs

by the detainee must be highlighted to the board reviewing his continued detention and assessed as one additional factor among many in determining whether the
detainee remains an imperative threat. If members, educated about the

TIFRC

programs, are according them no weight in their decisions, the programs should be

changed or cancelled, except to the extent that they serve a separate military police
function within the TIF.

on board
leases

On the other hand, programs which have a positive effect

decisions should be expanded, with the

of those

who

are

no longer

threats.
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Conclusion

some form, is a reality in every operation, just as the application of
force, in some form, often including deadly force, is also a reality. The availability
of detention to soldiers in a conflict may tend to reduce the amount of force that
would otherwise be used to complete a mission: without detention available, the
soldier can either shoot to kill or let the targeted person run away to fight again toDetention, in

morrow. Detention

is

hardly cost-free, and

its

very availability can often lead to

The law regarding detention attempts to
strike the appropriate balance in often general terms, explicitly relying upon the
good faith of the parties in applying the law to facts on the ground.
The detention operations described in this article represent an evolution over
several years. They were characterized by an overall good-faith effort to apply the
letter and spirit of the law, but they were far from perfect. The damage caused by
Abu Ghraib is incalculable, but it focused command attention on detention operations and made incredible resources available to improve them, and so resulted in a
much better product. Procedures were developed and conscientiously applied, but
mistakes are likely in any system. Many were detained, and for too long, who did
not deserve to be detained. The process eventually found them, and they were reabuses of the authority that allows

leased.

Many were

released

who

oversight, failure to synthesize

all

it.

should not have been released, either through
available information or

some returned to the insurgency and killed coalition force memcitizens, and this too is a tragedy. Mistakes on either side are inevita-

reviewing board;
bers or Iraqi
ble; the best

by misjudgments by the

systems can only hope to minimize them.
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Appendix
(TF 134 Letterhead)

Reply to Attention of

MNFI-DCG-DO

5

August 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE REVIEW COMMITTEE
MEMBERS
SUBJECT: Multi-National Force Review Committee Instructions
1. You have been selected for important duty as a member of the MultiNational Force Review Committee (MNFRC). This duty is a critical part of the efforts of the Multi-National Force, and vital to a measured and steady reintegration
of security internees back into Iraqi society. While assigned, this will be your pri-

mary duty, until your assignment ends. You should review this letter and other instructional material that will be made available to you prior to your first board.
2. The persons who appear before you are security detainees. We detain
them under the authority of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions
which permit us to hold those who present imperative threats to coalition forces or
the Iraqi people. Although in
criminal,

it is

many cases

their

conduct could be characterized

as

not necessary to our detention that they be charged with, or con-

victed of, a crime. Similarly, the detainees are not serving a sentence. Rather, they
are held because they have
3.

Your

task

is

threat to security.

been determined to be security threats.

to determine whether the detainee remains an imperative

You must

believe that there are reasonable grounds to sustain

that finding. "Reasonable grounds" consist of sufficient indicators to lead a reason-

able person to believe that detention
4.

You

should

consider

the

is

necessary for imperative reasons of security.
following

factors

in

arriving

at

this

determination:

Your focus should be on the threat the detainee presents today, not the
threat he posed when he was captured. Pre-capture conduct may be important
as an indicator of the detainee's threat level now, and in the future, but it is not
the sole indicator. The detainee will have undergone several legal reviews prior to
appearing before you. You are in no way bound by their findings and
•

recommendations.
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•

You

have access to

will

classified

and

unclassified information associated

with the case. As you review the information, focus on
conclusions of others:
•

it is

your job to draw the conclusions.

You should understand

(TIF) can change a person

change, and apply

it

—

that time spent in the Theater Internment Facility
for

good or

for bad.

including:

It is

your job to

to your threat determination. In this regard,

provided with a "report card" for each detainee.
the TIF,

not on the

facts,

any disciplinary

It will detail

infractions;

performance; participation in educational

you

performance

You

will

in

enlightenment

religious

Be aware that a detainee may

engage in negative or group behaviors in a prison-like environment for
preservation.

be

will

any instances of positive

classes,

courses, or in various vocational training courses.

his

assess that

self-

be provided with various assessments of the detainee by

counselors, psychologists, and religious leaders. Take

of these items into

all

account when you make your decision.
•

You

Make

have the opportunity to question the detainee.

will

use of it, but

be mindful of disclosing classified information, especially sources and methods of

you to determine the detainee's credibility, and what weight
you give his answers. Be aware that cultural differences may complicate this
challenge. A cultural advisor will be available to help you in this regard.
collection.

•

It is

up

to

Treat the detainee with respect.

background. Don't be affected by his
Finally,

remember

that,

Show no bias to
manner of dress

his regional or religious

or personal appearance.

boards, he only gets to appear before this one, and your decision

profound impact on
5.

his

will

is

not unduly influence junior members.

whether the detainee
he

is

going to have a

be able to discuss the case with

your fellow members, and vote. Each member's vote
will

is

of these

life.

At the conclusion of the hearing, you

members

many

although you will be participating in

an imperative threat to

you should vote

equally weighted. Senior

You must

security. If

he

is

not,

decide

first

you should

to Retain. Majority rules. If the majority

vote to Release;

if

votes to Retain,

you next vote whether the detainee should be recommended

is,

participation in TIFRIC, or TIF Re-Integration Center. This

more

fully in

information available to you, but

is

program

is

for

described

generally for those detainees

whom you feel will benefit from the suite of services offered on their way to eventual release. Again, majority rules.
6. If

you have any questions about

sor or his

this duty, contact the

MNFRC Representative.
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7.

Thank you

Bill

for participating in this process.

You

making a

are

differ-

ence in our efforts to ensure the safety and stability of Iraq, and the success of the
Coalition Force mission.

/signed/

DOUGLAS M. STONE
Major General,

USMC

Deputy Commanding General

for

Detainee Operations
I

hereby acknowledge receipt of these instructions and will comply with

all

of the

above:

Signature and date

Notes
Seymour M. Hersch, The Annals of National Security: Torture at Abu Ghraib,
THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/
1.

See, e.g.,

05/10/040510fa_fact.
2. As will be discussed, though technically a coalition operation among many nations, the
primary actor, and in most cases the only actor, in the detention operations discussed in this arti-

was the United States. Nevertheless, since some aspects of the operation did involve the coalition in the broader sense, the term "coalition forces" will be used as a shorthand.
3. Note that this article will not discuss the legal basis for initiating conflict, or jus ad bellum.
For such a discussion, see Andru E. Wall, Was the 2003 Invasion of Iraq Legal?, which is Chapter
IV in this volume, at 69.
4. See President George W. Bush, President Bush Addresses the Nation (Mar. 19, 2003),
cle

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303 19-1 7.html (announcing that combat operations had begun in Iraq
March 20 in Iraq due to the time difference).

as of

March

19,

2003, in Washington,

DC, but

common to all four Geneva Conventions. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3 1 14, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 1 [hereinafter Wounded and Sick Convention] Convention for the
5.

Article 2

is

;

Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Shipwrecked Convention];
Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter PW Convention]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civil-

Sea

ians Convention];

all

reprinted in

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam

Roberts

8c

Rich-

ard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) at 197, 198; 222, 223; 244, 245; and 301, 302; respectively.

Common Article 2 states: "[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war
or of any other
Parties

armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting

"
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6. See generally Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to
Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, re-

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 5, at 73. See also Protocol Additional
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-

printed in
to the

national Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,

OF WAR, supra note

5, at

1

125 U.N.T.S.

3,

reprinted in

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS

422.

PW Convention, supra note 5, art. 4.

The remaining categories of persons eligible for
government not recognized by the detaining
power, civilians accompanying the force, certain merchant mariners, and civilians comprising
mass levies. Id. For a discussion suggesting additional inferred conditions over the four enumerated in the text, see YORAM DlNSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 36 (2004).
7.

prisoner of war

status include

armed

forces of a

8.

PW Convention, supra note 5, art.

9.

Id., art. 5.

118.

See Headquarters, Department of the

10.

Army, Reg.

190-8,

Enemy

Prisoners of War, Re-

tained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees (1997) [hereinafter

190-8 has applicability

AR

each provided

among

all

four

US services:

190-8 a designation within their

AR

the Air Force, Marine Corps and

own

190-8].

AR

Navy have

systems of regulations.

11.

PW Convention, supra note 5, art. 5 (emphasis added).

12.

Civilians Convention, supra note 5, art. 4.

13.

The exceptions from protected-person status include nationals of a country not a party
and nationals of neutral States in the territory of the detaining State, and

to the Convention,

nationals of cobelligerents anywhere, so long as the neutral or cobelligerent State has normal

diplomatic relations with the detaining State.
Part

14.

War."

Id.,

II is

Part

Id.

entitled "General Protection of Populations Against Certain

II.

The

articles therein (Articles

Consequences of

13-26) generally protect hospitals, medical per-

sonnel and transports associated with the same, and encourage the parties to specially protect
certain vulnerable populations (expectant

women,

common

children, etc.). Id.

Geneva Conventions. See Wounded and
5, art. 3; PW Convention, supra note 5, art. 3; Civilians Convention, supra note 5, art. 3. Although by its terms Common Article 3 applies only to armed conflicts "not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties," the ICRC Commentary makes clear that these
same standards were intended to apply to all armed conflicts. The Commentary states:
Like Article

15.

2, Article

Sick Convention, supra note

3

is

5, art. 3;

to

the

all

Shipwrecked Convention, supra note

of Common Article

The value of the provision [sub-paragraph

(1)

the field within Article

does, the

3.

Representing, as

the least determinate of conflicts,

in

international

armed

conflicts proper,

applicable. For "the greater obligation

Commentary on Geneva Convention

WAR 38
16.

(Jean

S. Pictet ed.,

Compare,

e.g.,

it

terms must a

its

when

all

3] is

not limited to

minimum which must be applied
fortiori

be respected in

the provisions of the Convention are

must include the

lesser," as

one might

say.

Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of

III

1958) [hereinafter

ICRC COMMENTARY].

Civilians Convention, supra note 5, Article 27 requirement of

humane

Common Article 3, paragraph
Common Article 3, id., paragraph
the taking of hostages with Common Article 3, para-

treatment without adverse distinctions with a similar provision in
1, id.;

1(a);

Article 32's,

and

Article 34's,

graph 1(b),
17.

id.,

id.,

prohibition

on

id.

Section

"Occupied

prohibition of murder and torture with

II is

entitled "Aliens in the Territory of a Party to the Conflict,"

Territories,"

id.
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Although the Civilians Convention

18.

residence, the focus of this article

is

Bill

internment along with assigned

typically discusses

only on internment, and therefore any references to assigned

residence will be henceforth disregarded.
Civilians Convention, supra note 5, art. 41.

19.

The

text of the article

is

make clear that nothing more severe than assigned residence or internment
implication, assigned residence or internment is therefore permissible.

actually written to

is

possible;

by

clear

20. Id., art. 42.
21. Id., art. 43.

The ICRC Commentary suggests that the "imperative reasons of security"
is more stringent than the "absolutely necessary" standard of Article 42,
even though their colloquial meanings seem substantially equivalent. Comparing Article 78 to
Article 42, the Commentary states:
22. Id., art. 78.

standard of Article 78

In occupied territories the internment of protected persons should be even

exceptional than

it is

more

inside the territory of the Parties to the conflict; for in the former

case the question of nationality does not arise. That

is

why

Article 78 speaks of

imperative reasons of security; there can be no question of taking collective measures:

each case must be decided separately.

ICRC COMMENTARY,

supra note 15, at 367.

:

Article 4 1 " [T] here might be situations

government to

—

The observation

it

and

commentary to
which would force a

resolved in the

—

a threat of invasion for example

act without delay to prevent hostile acts,

categories without always finding

is

to take measures against certain

possible to consider individual cases." Id. at 256.

Civilians Convention, supra note 5, art. 78. In discussing the content of the "regular pro-

23.

cedure" to be followed, the Commentary refers the reader to the "precise and detailed procedure
to be followed" set out in Article 43.

promised detail is lacking both
are written at the
art.

43;
24.

same

level

ICRC COMMENTARY,

in the text of Article

supra note 15, at 368. However, the

43 and its accompanying commentary; both

of generality as Article 78. See Civilians Convention, supra note

ICRC COMMENTARY, supra

note

5,

15, at 261.

Civilians Convention, supra note 5, art. 78.

25. Id.

26. Id.

more than
Dinstein,

The commentary to Article 78 offers the observation that the reviewing body must be
a single individual. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 369. But see YORAM
The International Law of Belligerent Occupation 175 (2009), where Profes-

sor Dinstein discusses, approvingly, Israel's decision to have Article 78 appeals decided

by a sin-

gle judge.

27.

Iraq

See President George W. Bush, President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in

Have Ended (May

1,

2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/

2003/05/2003050 1 - 1 5.html.
28.

"The Convention

Convention, supra note
29.

lished

shall also

5, art. 3,

CPA Regulation No.
itself.

Section

1

apply to

all

cases of partial or total occupation

" Civilians

para. 2.

on May

means by which the CPA estabdeclared that "[t]he CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily
1,

issued

16, 2003,

is

the

in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional ad-

"The CPA is vested with all executive, legislative, and judicial authority neces" Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, CPA/REG/
sary to achieve its objectives
ministration

16

May

"

2003/01 (May

16, 2003), sec.

1,

available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/

20030516_CPAREG_l_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf.
30. CPA Regulation No. 1 states, "Regulations and Orders will remain

by the Administrator or superseded by legislation issued by democratic
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in force until repealed

institutions of Iraq." Id.,
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CPA also issued various memoranda. These are defined
and orders, id., sec. 4( 1 ); as such, they cannot be considered
"law" in the same sense as regulations and orders.
31. S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
sec. 3(1).

Throughout

its

existence, the

as interpretive guides to regulations

U.N. Charter chap. VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression).
33. S.C. Res 1511, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003), also a resolution under Chapter
VII, previously authorized "a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq." Id., para. 13.
32.

34.

S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 31, para. 10.

35. Id. at 8.
36. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
37.

The public statements of many Security Council

representatives adverted to the impor-

tance of the explicit Iraqi request for assistance to their voting for the resolution. See Press Release, Security

in Iraq;

Council, Security Council Endorses Formation of Sovereign Interim Government

Welcomes End of Occupation by 30

Doc. SC/8117 (June

8,

June, Democratic Elections

by January 2005, U.N.

2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8117

.doc.htm. Accordingly, the annexation of the Allawi letter to the resolution no doubt served a
political

38.

purpose.

S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 31, para. 12.

U.N. Doc. S/RES/1637 (Nov. 11, 2005).
40. S.C. Res. 1723, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006).
41. S.C. Res. 1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007).
39.

S.C. Res. 1637,

42.

Id.

43. See

The White House,

Fact Sheet: U.S. -Iraq Declaration of Principles for Friendship

and

Cooperation (Nov. 26, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2007/1 1/20071 126-1. html.
"Iraqis have expressed a desire to

to helping
year,

Among

the principles contained in the declaration are

move past a Chapter VII MNFI mandate and we are committed

them achieve this objective," and "[a]fter the Chapter VII mandate is renewed for one
begin negotiation of a framework that will govern the future of our bilateral rela-

we will

tionship." Id.
44. For a more detailed treatment of the two agreements, see Trevor A. Rush, Don't Call It a
SOFA!: An Overview of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, ARMY LAWYER, May 2009, at 34.
45.
Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation
between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://

www.mnf-iraq.com/images/CGs_Messages/strategic_framework_agreement.pdf.
46.

Agreement Between the United

States of America

and the Republic of Iraq on the With-

drawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their

Temporary Presence

in Iraq,

Nov.

17,

2008, available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/

CGs_Messages/security_agreement.pdf [hereinafter Security Agreement].
47. See

id., art.

48. Security

22. See also

Rush, supra note 44,

Agreement, supra note 46,

at

42-46.

art. 22.

The area of responsibility for Central Command included Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn
of Africa, Iran and Pakistan. See United States Central Command, AOR Countries, http://
49.

www.centcom.mil/en/countries/aor/
countries assigned to the

(last visited

commander of

Aug. 31, 2009). Needless to

Central

challenges.
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General Petraeus assumed the position of Commander, MNF-I, on February

50.

10, 2007.

MNF-I Command, http://www.mnfiraq.com (search "petraeus assumes command," All Words option) (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).
General Odierno assumed command on September 16, 2008. See Multi-National Force-Iraq,
See Multi-National

Force-Iraq,

Petraeus Assumes

Odierno Assumes Command of Coalition Forces in Iraq, http://www.mnf-iraq.com (search
"odierno assumes command," All Words option) (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).
5 1 The other major subordinate command, Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq, was not involved in detention operations.
52. These were usually division commanders in their normally assigned, non-deployed billet.
53. Multi-National Force-West was the region commanded by a Marine Corps general, the
operating forces of which were predominantly, but not exclusively, Marines. The different
name "Multi-National Force" versus "Division" is the remnant of an earlier command relationship by which the Marine commander, then a three-star general, was independent of MNC-I

—

—

and reported directly to MNF-I.
54. As the Polish and British forces departed from Iraq, their areas of responsibility were assumed by Multi-National Division-Central, which was re-designated as Multi-National

MND-C, MND-SE Operating Areas Combine
to Create MND-South, http://www.mnf-iraq.com (search "mnd south british," All Words opDivision-South. See Multi-National Force-Iraq,

tion) (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).
55.

See Antonio

M. Taguba, Army Regulation

Brigade (certified on June

4, 2004), available

15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police

at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report

.pdf [hereinafter Taguba Report] General Taguba
.

recommended " [t]hat a single commander in

CJTF-7 be responsible for overall detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater of OperaCJTF-7 was the predecessor command to MNF-I.
56. The genesis of the name of the task force came simply from the name of the building
Building 134 on Camp Victory at which the task force was initially headquartered.
57. As will be seen below, the execution of the detention operation mission was overwhelmingly more time consuming than that of creating policy. In recognition of that, all of the commander's staff resided in TF 134; there was no identified staff for the DCG-DO.
58. Operating units, such as divisions and brigades, would also operate small internment
facilities, at which detainees would be held for a limited period of time before being transferred
tions." Id. at 21.

—

to the theater internment facility.

The operations at the lower-level

facilities

are not the focus of

this article.

59.

Headquarters, Department of the Army,

FM 3-19.40, Internment/Resettlement Opera-

tions para. 3-12 (Sept. 4, 2007). In accordance with

US Department

of Defense, Directive

2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program para. 1.2 (Sept.
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231001p.pdf [hereinafter

5,

2006), available at

DoDD 2310.01E], the

Secretary of the Army is designated the Executive Agent for Detention Operations. As such, doctrinal publications

60.

such as

FM 3-19.40 have applicability across service lines.

TF 134 benefited from having both active-duty brigade elements, commanded by a coloand reserve or National Guard units, commanded by brigadier generals (0-7).
One of the consequences of the extensive detention operation missions in Iraq and Af-

nel (0-6),
61.

ghanistan was that active-duty
62.

MP units were heavily stressed, and therefore in short supply.

For example, Navy provisional units might be made up of aviation mechanics, sonarmen

or boatswain's mates, and be

augmentees,

who would form

commanded by

a surface warfare officer. All were individual

into units in the United States, train for a period of time, deploy

and then upon redeployment return

to their original units.
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63.

Headquarters, Department of the Army,

FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Opera-

tions para. 6-13 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/civ_liberties/Field_Manual

_Sept06.pdf [hereinafter

FM 2-22.3].

64. Id., para. 3-24.
65.

FM 2-22.3, supra note 63.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Div. A, Title X, § 1002, Pub.

L. No. 109-148, 1 19 Stat.
2680 (codified at 10 U.S.C.S. § 801 Note (LexisNexis 2009)) [hereinafter DTA]. The Act provides: "No person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or

66.

under detention

in a

Department of Defense

nique of interrogation not authorized by and

facility shall

listed in the

Intelligence Interrogation." Id., § 1002(a). In essence, the

be subject to any treatment or tech-

United States

Army Field Manual on

DTA "enacted" certain portions of FM

welcomed by many as a means of providing transparency to interrogation operations, and criticized by others on constitutional
grounds or the practical ground that by limiting interrogation methods to those publicly dissem2-22.3, supra note 63, into positive law.

inated, potential

enemies

The

decision was

may benefit by developing effective resistance techniques. See James A.

Barkei, Legislating Military Doctrine: Congressional Usurping of Executive Authority Through

Detainee Interrogations,

LAW REVIEW

193 MILITARY

97 (2007) (arguing that the

DTA

impermissibly intrudes upon the President's powers).
67.

FM 2-22.3, supra note 63, chap. 8.

68.

Id.,

para. 5-75.

As a participant in many briefings to distinguished visitors, among them congressional
and Department of Defense officials, at TF 134, this author heard many questions about
the effect of the Detainee Treatment Act/FM 2-22.3 scheme. The JIDC commander and his head
interrogator always responded that they supported the policy and believed that it did not ad69.

leaders

versely affect their ability to harvest useful intelligence.
70.

This position was another result of the recommendations of General Taguba. See Taguba

Report, supra note 55, at 21, where
for detainee operations

is

it

was recommended

"[t]hat

it is

critical that

the proponent

assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training

and knowledge of international and operational

law, to assist

and advise on matters of detainee

operations."
71.

It is

argued that

human

rights

law

is

equally applicable and binding to the detention op-

erations in Iraq conducted by the United States. For purposes of this article the author will sim-

ply espouse the

US government position

72.

DoDD 23 10.0 IE, supra note 59.

73.

Id.,

para. 4.1.

74.

Id.,

para. 4.2.

75.

Id.,

para. 4.8.

76. Coalition Provisional Authority

CPA/MEM/27

that

human

rights

Memorandum No.

law did not apply.

3 (Revised), Criminal Procedures,

June 2004/03 (June 27, 2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/

20040627_CPAMEMO_3_Criminal_Procedures__Rev_.pdf [hereinafter

CPA Memo 3].

77.

Id., sec. 4.1.

78.

Id., sec. 4.2.

79.

Id., sec. 4.3.

80.

US Central Command promulgated its orders in many areas, to include those applicable

FRAGOs), in recognition that the FRAGO
modified a previously issued overarching order. The FRAGOs changed with some regularity
and, more important, were always classified, so they defy easy citation. The general provisions
to detention operations, as Fragmentary Orders (or

discussed here, however, are unclassified.
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81. MNF-I issued its order in this area in memorandum form. Like the Central Command
FRAGOs, the memorandum order was classified, and citation to it, even if possible, would not be

helpful.

82.

See infra Part II.C.4.

83.

S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 31,

merely puts forth the standard of "imperative reasons of

same language in Article 78, Civilians Convention, supra note 5. The ICRC
Commentary makes it clear that it should be a high standard, but struggles to provide further coherent guidance as to its meaning. Internment under Article 78 is said to be "even more exceptional" than that under Articles 41 and 42, though only in the sense that internment must be
applied individually as opposed to collectively. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 367. See
security," echoing the

discussion, supra, in note 22. In a
State

comment to Article 42, it is offered that in order to intern "the

must have good reason to think that the person concerned, by his

qualifications, represents a real threat to

sertion reads:

its

present or future security."

activities,

knowledge or

The footnote

to this as-

"The fact that a man is of military age should not necessarily be considered as justi-

is a danger of him being able to join the
The Commentary raises as many questions as its solves. Interning a person for his "activities" is straightforward, and is the normal basis on which detention
would depend. "Knowledge" and "qualifications" are less clear: is it possible to intern a person
for merely knowing how to make or emplace an IED? And what to make of the footnote regarding those of military age? It begins by saying that being of military age is not a reason for intern-

fying the application of these measures, unless there

enemy armed forces." Id.

at 258.

ment, but then says that it can be such a reason

if there is

a danger of the person being able to join

the opposing force, regardless of any intention of doing so. Other commentators have also struggled with the quality of the standard. See,
raeli

e.g.,

DlNSTEIN, supra note 26,

at

173 (citing various

Is-

court cases construing the "imperative threat" standard, revealing only different verbal

formulations, with

little

additional specificity); Ashley

S.

Deeks, Administrative Detention in

Armed Conflict, 40 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 403, 406

(noting

only that Article 78 establishes a "high" standard, representing a balance between the needs of the

and individual liberty).
84. TF 134 owned two camps containing TIFs. Camp Cropper is the facility through which
every detainee first passed. It was at Camp Cropper that all administrative processing and initial
interrogations would be conducted. Some detainees would remain at Camp Cropper; others
would be sent to Camp Bucca in southern Iraq close to the border with Kuwait. Camp Bucca was
built solely for the purpose of holding detainees. It was administratively subdivided into two and
then three individual TIFs, mostly for the purpose of command and control, but for this paper, it
State for security

will

be treated as a single

facility.

Complex surrounds Baghdad International Airport and extended to most
of the area that was known as the Al Faw Palace complex. This is a different area from the International Zone, popularly known as the "Green Zone," which comprises an area on the western
bank of the Euphrates River. The US Embassy is located in the International Zone; first housed in
Saddam Hussein's former presidential palace, it has since moved to a new building elsewhere in
85. Victory Base

the zone. Certain of the review boards discussed later were conducted in the International Zone.

Victory Base

To

get

Complex and

from one

86.

See

the International

Zone

by approximately seven
convoy or a helicopter flight.

are separated

to the other required either a military

miles.

DoDD 2310.01E, supra note 59, para. 4.4.1.

87. As will be evident throughout this article, detainee operations are neither premised upon
nor necessarily directed toward successful criminal prosecution. Soldiers are not criminal inves-

and the uncertain

any forensic exploitation of the
capture site. To take the clearest case, detainees would often be found in possession of dangerous
tigators

security situation rarely permitted
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weapons;
terest

after taking pictures

of them, the weapons were usually destroyed in the

field in the in-

of safety and force protection.

88.

See discussion infra Part II.C.3.

89.

See discussion infra Part II.C.4.

90. The unit would maintain the information permitting a correlation between the assigned
number and the informant's actual identity.

sess

FM 2-22.3, supra note 63, at 6-10, for a discussion of the "rating" system used to as-

See

91.

cooperation and knowledge of detainees or other informants.
See David Dyzenhaus, Symposium: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty: The Grudge Informer

92.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1000 (2008).
An anecdote might be helpful. Detainee A was picked up and held on the strength of the

Case Revisited, 83
93.

statement of a neighbor that implicated Detainee
later claimed, truthfully in the eyes

A in various

insurgent

activities.

Detainee

A

of the board which voted for his release, that he was feuding

with this neighbor because he (Detainee A) had accused the neighbor's daughter of immoral be-

whose case happened

havior. Detainee B,

to

come up

same time, was also the
had complained to
which he was detained by coali-

for review at the

victim of the same neighbor's complaints; in this case, Detainee
the authorities that the neighbor was running a bordello, after
tion forces. Detainee

have been release

if

B was also voted

CPA Memo

See

Although the

stated he

results in

each of these cases

viewed individually, the happenstance of them both being reviewed

same time made the truth
94.

for release.

B

3,

may

at the

clearer.
sec. 4.2. It was generally assumed that the Magistrate
by the guidance, though an argument could be made that the
by the commander and his staff complied with the requirement.

supra note 76,

Cell review was the review required

review at the brigade level

The detainee did not appear before

95.

about

efforts

96.

made

the magistrate. See the discussion in Part

III, infra,

to explore the possibility of detainee involvement at this stage.

See discussion, infra Part II.C.6,

on the process followed

for criminal prosecutions.

correspondence was delivered by a TF 134 organization called the Detainee Assis-

97. All

many paralegals, and several intermain task was to answer any questions the detainees had about their legal situations.

tance Center. Minimally staffed with an attorney or two, as
preters,

its

98. Article 78 required that the detention

parties concerned.

procedure "shall include a right of appeal for the

Appeals shall be decided with the

least possible delay." Civilians

Convention,

CPA Memo 3 did not include a requirement for an appeal; the six-month review was the first required review subsequent to the initial seven-day review. CPA Memo 3, supra
supra note

5, art. 78.

note 76, sec.
tice

6.

The ninety-day review was clearly established in written guidance and actual prac-

by 2007, but

99.

its

genesis

is

unclear.

Certainly detainee disturbances were not caused solely by the review system utilized,

An additional factor was the work of detainee provocateurs,
generally identified as extremists, who continued to carry on the insurgency from within the inthough

it

ternment

was a contributing

factor.

facilities.

100.

PW Convention, supra note 5, art. 5.

101.

AR

190-8, supra note 10, para. 1-6, entitled "Tribunals."

was one of the divergences from AR 190-8 (the other was that no written record,
aside from the written voting sheet, was prepared). AR 190-8 states that all members are to be
commissioned officers. Id. The decision was that senior enlisted personnel, with their significant
military experience and maturity, would often be better members than would very junior officers.
In other military administrative boards, such as boards to administratively separate members from
the service, the three-member panel may include a senior enlisted member; see, e.g., Headquarters, Department of the Army, Reg. 635-200, Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations
102. This

452

Brian /.

para. 2-7.a (June 6, 2005);

Bill

Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy, Naval Military

1910-502 (June 21, 2008). A less principled reason was the need to increase the pool of members from which TF 134 drew.
Personnel Manual

art.

The text of the "Instructions to Members" is included as an appendix, infra.
I offer no claim here that these hearings were contests among equals. The military
detainers had many resources to draw upon to collect evidence, while the detainee often had little
more in his defense than his own statement and answers to questions.
105. Common to any operation which relied upon interpreters, the quality of the interpretation provided could only be assessed by other interpreters, whose own proficiency could be as
103.

104.

questionable.

As the DCG-DO was exercising delegated power from MNF-I, the Commanding General, MNF-I, also had the power to order a release, which he exercised occasionally.
107. Admittedly, neither the text to either of the articles nor the Commentary specifically
makes these a requirement. See Civilians Convention, supra note 5, arts. 43, 78; ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 260, 368. The ICRC's position was based more on practical realities. For a board to be fair, it had to be able to arrive at an independent decision. For a board to be
worthwhile, it had to have a final effect and not be merely recommendatory.
108. This is hardly a legal argument. Rather, it is a concession to the need to relieve some of
the natural tension that exists between the operating forces which capture and detain persons
and an organization such as TF 134 charged with holding, and releasing, those same detainees. In
very general terms, the operating forces would prefer that no detainees were released: they were
threats when captured, and would be threats again if released. It is too easy, in their view, for gar106.

rison-based organizations, such as

TF

134, to release detainees, because they aren't likely to en-

street. Having a general officer make the final decision reduced some
amount of the public recrimination.
109. The process followed was this: every MNFRC release recommendation was vetted
through the capturing unit for comment. If the capturing unit had no comment or objection, the
release would be approved. If the unit objected, it was required to provide additional information about the detainee that might not have been available in the file. Once received, the detainee
would appear before a second MNFRC, which had the benefit of the new evidence. This second
board (which, in the mania for acronyms, was called the P-MNFRC, for Post-MNFRC) was unconstrained by the results of the first, and its new recommendation would be followed in the
same manner as a regular MNFRC.
110. No boards were held on Friday, the Islamic holy day. The MNFRC work week began on

counter them again on the

Saturday.

The

111.

to the

rates

provided here are rough averages and

reflect the

DCG-DO, who reported it in turn to MNF-I. The actual

trend of the data reported

data are

now

unavailable

and

irretrievable.

112.

CPA Memo 3, in the section discussing security internment, stated: "Any person under

the age of 18 interned at any time shall in

the initial date of internment."

age was often difficult, as
available.

many did

not

cases be released not later than twelve
3,

know

months

after

Determining a detainee's
their birthdates, and documentation was rarely

supra note 76,

Those under age eighteen who had been detained

other process necessary. Those
benefit

all

CPA Memo

sec. 6.5.

for

one year were released with no

who turned eighteen while in custody did not, TF

from the CPA Memo 3 provision, and their detentions continued

134 reasoned,

until they

were other-

wise released.
113. See

tary

Memorandum from

Departments

et

al.,

Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the MiliImplementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for
the

453

Detention Operations in Iraq: A View from the Ground

Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (July 14, 2006) (End. 3,
Personal Representatives Qualifications, Roles and Responsibilities), available at http://

www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf.
1

14.

TF

134 held several hundred juveniles, though because of the ability to hold them for

only one year, they appeared usually only once each before an MNFRC. See discussion supra note
112.

There were usually fewer than two hundred third-country national detainees, and female
and were usually fewer than five. There was no

detainees never exceeded twenty at any one time,
established

method

mental capacity. The medical comone time to screen every detainee for mental ability for its own treatment purfor identifying those with diminished

mand planned at
poses. TF 134 would have used whatever list they provided, but little came of it. Identification of
those in this

last

category was therefore ad hoc. Because of the limited numbers, only two per-

Camp Cropper, where all juveniles and feCamp Bucca for anyone else.
115. Early in his tenure as DCG-DO, which began in May 2007, General Stone had a vision of
moving away from the warehouse model used at Camp Bucca to smaller, regionally based TIFs.
sonal representatives were necessary at a time: one at

males were held, and one

at

These would be designed and built as TIFs first and foremost, but with facilities to permit the services discussed in the text. Initially

denominated

name was

Two TIFRCs were

TIF Re- Integration Centers (TIFRIC), the
planned, one in Ramadi in western Iraq,
and one in Taji, just north of Baghdad; only Taji was completed in late 2008. While awaiting
these facilities, Camps Cropper and Bucca TIFs were reconfigured to offer the same services, so
that they became TIFRCs in the same sense.
116. Naming the religious component proved very difficult. It could not appear to be the US
government encouraging religion from the point of view of a US audience nor the United States
"teaching" Islam to an Iraqi audience. Religious "engagement" was chosen as a somewhat neutral

later

changed to TIFRC.

as

term.

When

were received, it was impractical to consider each individual
as described in the text. For example, it was not unusual to receive a list of ISNs from Iraqi officials that ran into the hundreds of detainees. In those cases, the cases would be sent immediately
to an out-of-cycle MNFRC; the members were made aware of the reason for the special hearing.
117.

The

results

large-scale requests

of the

MNFRC would then substitute for the recommendation usually made by the

special release attorney for the
118.

DCG-DO's

decision

on

release.

One of the consequences of regular unit rotations through the theater was that successor

units often

had

little

information about "their" detainees (in the sense that the detainees had

and would return to, their areas of operation). Departing units would somefiles and bring them back with them to their home bases in the United
States or elsewhere; sometimes they would be stored in a warehouse on a base in Iraq with no
easy means of retrieving individual files. It would occasionally happen that a unit would ask for
the release of a detainee about whom it had little information, and when more fully acquainted
with the facts underlying the original detention, it withdrew its request.
been captured
times box up

in,

all

detainee

119.

CPA Memo

120.

Id., sec. 6.1.

121.

For a more detailed description of the procedures used in criminal prosecutions by authors

3,

supra note 76,

who were assigned to TF

sec. 5.1.

134, see Michael

J.

Frank, Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the

Central Criminal Court of Iraq, 18 FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2006); W. James
Annexstad, The Detention and Prosecution ofInsurgents and Other Non-Traditional Combatants A

—

Look at the Task Force 134 Process and the Future of Detainee Prosecutions,
2007, at 72.
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122. Coalition Provisional Authority Order

nal Court of Iraq,

CPA/ORD/X 2004/13

Bill

No. 13 (Revised) (Amended), The Central Crimi-

(Apr. 22, 2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/

regulationsZ20040422_CPAORD_13_Revised_Amended.pdf.
123. Id., sec. 18.

The MNFRC was designed, in part, to address detainee discontent. See discussion supra
note 99 and accompanying text. The MNFRC largely fulfilled its promise, and was often credited,
by the DCG-DO and other officials, with being the single biggest factor in subsequent TIF "calming." Detainees finally saw that reviews were ongoing, and participated in the hearing of their
own cases. Increased numbers of detainees were being released. As time went on, the calming effect dissipated, for there were detainees who appeared before MNFRC and yet were not being released. Had the MNFRC simply been ended, and the CRRB reinstituted, we could have expected
124.

much worse.
125.

A species of this worked successfully at CCCI. Those US service members who were wit-

nesses in a

CCCI

case,

but

who had rotated back to the United States, were permitted to testify

before the investigative judge via video teleconference.
126. Two anecdotes may help illustrate the point. General Petraeus observed an MNFRC at
Camp Bucca several months after they had begun running. He sat in on a case in which the de-

tainee

was alleged to have been involved with an IED attack on

explosion the soldiers traced the wire used to initiate the

IED

coalition force soldiers. After the

to the house in

which they found

—

—

and remained quietly as the
Unanimously they provisionally voted to retain. General Petraeus got up
to leave, and said something to the effect of "If I was voting, I would vote to release" and left. Two
of the members the two officers then changed their votes. The sole enlisted member stood
his ground; that is why they are invaluable to a process such as this. The other anecdote relates to
comments members would make at the conclusion of their service on the MNFRC. Senior enlisted members would often say that they were going to go back to their units and make sure they
did things correctly in the future, and were able to do so in a way that officers cannot.
127. As with many matters discussed, this is a recommendation based on practicalities, not
the law. In the abstract, detainees should be released or detained based solely on the quality of the
evidence; the operating forces, in a military hierarchy, must acknowledge that. Nevertheless, it
must be recognized that the operating force's lack of acceptance of the process can ultimately
frustrate the entire effort. A process in which they are given a voice may avoid that result.
the detainee. General Petraeus sat through the entire hearing

members

deliberated.

—

—
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XVIII
The Role of the International Committee of
the

Red Cross in Stability Operations

Laurent Colassis*
I.

What

is

Introduction

the role of the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

in stability operations in Iraq? In order to

necessary to examine the ICRC's mandate,
legal challenges

it

faces as

it

conducts

II.

its

main

answer

this question,

activities in Iraq

it is

and the major

its activities.

The ICRC's Mandate

The ICRC is a neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian organization formally mandated by States party to the Geneva Conventions (GC) to ensure,
among other activities, assistance to, and protection of, victims of armed conflicts
or other situations of violence. 2 Its work is firmly rooted in public international
law. The Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 3 and
resolutions of the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent un1

derscore the legitimacy of the ICRC's work. States have also given the
sponsibility to

ICRC the re-

monitor the application of international humanitarian law (IHL). 4

As the guardian of IHL, the ICRC takes measures

to ensure respect for, promote,

Deputy Head of the Legal Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of the ICRC.
*

Geneva. The views expressed in

The Role of the ICRC in

Stability Operations

body of law. 5 The ICRC is also "particularly concerned about a possible erosion of IHL and takes bilateral, multilateral or
public steps to promote respect for and development of the law." 6
In order to carry out its activities in international armed conflicts, the ICRC has
been granted an explicit right to regular access to prisoners of war under Geneva
Convention III (GC III) 7 and to civilians protected by Geneva Convention IV (GC
IV). 8 The ICRC also enjoys a broad right of initiative for other humanitarian activi9
ties. In non- international armed conflict, the ICRC may offer its services to the
parties to the conflict under Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
In situations that have not reached the threshold of an armed conflict, the ICRC
"may take any humanitarian initiative which comes within its role as a specifically
neutral and independent institution and intermediary." 10
reaffirm

and even

clarify

and develop

III.

The ICRC has been present
1980.

11

During these

even in March 2003
led coalition

years,

this

ICRC Activities in Iraq

in Iraq since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq

it

at the start

war

in

maintained a permanent presence in the country,
of the international armed conflict between the US-

and the regime of Saddam Hussein. 12

Some five hundred
people are killed on average every month and two thousand people are wounded in
As of this writing, the security situation

in Iraq

is still fragile.

indiscriminate attacks and mass explosions that occur predominantly in Baghdad,

Ninewa and Diyala governorates. 13
to the situation

between

Security has improved, however, as

May 2006 and August

compared

2007 when two thousand to three

thousand civilians died each month because of the armed conflict. 14 Thanks to

improvement, the ICRC has been able to expand
side the country. After

its activities

and

its

this

presence in-

running a mainly remote-control operation for a few years,

ICRC delegation for Iraq has returned to direct implementation of all its activi15
ties
and can now access large parts of the country.
ICRC delegates are based in Baghdad, Najaf, Basra, Erbil, Suleymanieh and
Dohuk, and regular visits are made to offices in Khanaqin and Ramadi. 16 In 2008,
the

Iraq was the ICRC's third-largest operation in the world, preceded only

and Somalia, representing an expenditure of US$88.5
about the same for 2009. 17 More than 530
Jordan, 91 of whom are expatriates.

18

In 2008,

ICRC

The budget remains
Iraq and in Amman,

million.

based in

In the current context, priority

protection activities, with a particular focus
the Multi-National Force-Iraq

staff are

(MNF-I)

in

delegates carried out
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by Sudan

is

given to

on persons detained or interned 20 by
Iraq and by the Iraqi authorities.
19

—
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•

twenty visits in ten places of detention under the authority of the MNF-I

a total of 33,000 internees

and detainees were visited and 3,500 were followed up

individually;
•

twenty-one visits to eight places of detention holding 9,500 detainees under

and

the authority of the Iraqi government;
•

visits to

twenty-six places of detention holding almost 3,000 detainees under

the authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government. 21
Besides visiting detainees, the
their families. In 2008,

the

thousands of people deprived of their liberty were visited by

ICRC and were able to

ceiving visits

from

ICRC helps to maintain the links between them and

restore

and maintain contact with

their families or

their families

by re-

exchanging news through Red Cross messages

(RCMs) and phone calls. Almost 31 1,000 messages were exchanged with the support of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. The ICRC also supported families visiting
their relatives interned at Camp Bucca near Basra by covering part of their travel
expenses and providing financial support for 69,600 visits to 20,550 internees. At
from detention were repatriated to
their countries of origin under the auspices of the ICRC. In addition, 805 detention
their requests, twenty-nine detainees released

certificates

were issued to former detainees, enabling them to qualify for social wel-

fare benefits.

The ICRC also established a "helpline" for families in Iraq seeking in-

MNF-I custody. This helpline received an
average of 1,800 calls a week from families who wanted to locate detained relatives
formation about family members in
or send

The

RCMs. 22
conflict has also resulted in

widespread displacement throughout Iraq,

mainly for sectarian reasons. Around 10 percent of the population has been
nally displaced.

23

The ICRC provided monthly food and hygiene

98,000 internally displaced persons in 2008.

inter-

assistance to

24

During 2009, the ICRC continues to try to determine the fate of those who went
missing during the successive conflicts involving Iraq since 1980. The civilian population affected
activities

by the armed

conflict

is

include providing emergency

also

provided with assistance. Assistance

relief,

support to seventeen hospitals and

twelve primary health care centers, and emergency repair

and sanitation

infrastructure.

25

The ICRCs

visiting detainees. Regular visits are

made

work on

health, water

priority in Iraq during 2009 remains

to

more than twenty-seven thousand

by the Iraqi central government, the MNF-I and the Kurdistan Regional Government. 26 However, this does not reflect the total number of persons
detainees held

The ICRC will continue to assess the security conditions in Iraq in order to increase the number of places where it can visit detainees in
order to support the Iraqi government in strengthening its detention systems and
currently held in the country.
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meeting international standards regarding conditions of detention and treatment.

ICRC reached oral agreements with all Iraqi ministries that have places
of detention under their authority, and the ICRC is negotiating an overall agreeIn 2008, the

ment with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding visits to

all

places of detention

in the country.

IV. Legal Challenges Arising from Detention/Internment by a

Multinational Force in a "Host" Country

The ICRC classified the situation in Iraq as an international armed conflict between
March 2003 and mid-2004, when the hostilities were inter-State. After the handover of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the interim Iraqi government on June
27

28, 2004, following

UN Security Council Resolution

(UNSCR)

The hostilities became non-international in
character, involving a group of States on one side, and non-State armed groups on
the other. 28 The explicit, valid and genuine consent of the Iraqi government to the
1546,

the legal situation changed.

continuous presence of foreign forces in Iraq
qualification of the conflict since
Article 42 of the 1907

it

human

life

in Iraq

Hague Regulations) 29
is

the key element that led to this re-

has transformed hostile armies (in the sense of

provement of the security conditions

armed conflict

is

in Iraq

into friendly armies. Despite the im-

and the

common perception that the

largely over, widespread violence

continue to affect the Iraqi people.

30

and

a lack of respect for

Indiscriminate attacks

injure dozens of people every day. Because of the level of intensity of the

confrontations and the degree of organization of the parties involved,

31

kill

or

armed

the

ICRC

continues to characterize the situation in Iraq as an internationalized internal

armed conflict, 32 or as a multinational non-international armed conflict, governed
by rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts, particularly Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the rules of customary international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts, international human rights law and
Iraqi

domestic law insofar as

Detaining insurgents

is

it

complies with international law. 33

one of the main

activities carried

out by the

allied for-

eign forces in Iraq. Detention by a multinational force in a "host" country poses
significant legal

and

practical challenges,

which are discussed below.

Legal Basis for Detention/Internment in a Multinational Non-international

Armed Conflict
no debate

There

is

of the

UN

UNSCR

on June 8, 2004 under Chapter VII
Charter, and the exchange of letters annexed thereto provided a legal
that

1546, adopted

basis for internment. 34 This right of the

MNF-I to intern, for imperative reasons of
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was extended in UNSCRs 1637 (2005), 35 1723 (2006) 36 and 1790 (2007), 37
but ended on December 31, 2008 with the expiration of UNSCR 1790. This led to
security,

conduct of detention operations by the

significant changes in the

On November

17,

MNF-I

in Iraq.

2008 the United States and Iraq signed a security agreement

on the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and the organization of their activities
during their remaining time in the country. 38 This agreement, which entered into
effect

on January

1,

2009, does not provide a legal basis for the United States to in-

tern people, nor does

include any provision regarding the continuation of

it

internment.

form of deprivation of liberty that is an inevitable and lawful
result of armed conflict. 39 The fact that Common Article 3 neither expressly mentions internment, nor elaborates on permissible grounds or process, has become a
Internment

is

a

source of different positions on the legal basis for internment in a multinational
non-international

armed

conflict. In the
40

international humanitarian law

may be

ICRCs view, both treaty and customary

contain an inherent power to intern and thus

said to provide a legal basis for internment in non-international

conflicts.

However, in the absence of any

or of 1977 Additional Protocol
process to be followed, the

II

(GP

II)

specific provision

of Common Article 3

on the grounds for internment or on the

ICRC believes that an international agreement between

the multinational force and the "host" State should be concluded

law adopted

—

specifying grounds

principle of legality.

It is

ministrative detention

41

armed

and process

—or domestic

for internment in keeping with the

the ICRCs understanding that neither internment nor adis

permitted under Iraqi law. The transfer of internees to

the Iraqi government to continue internment activities is therefore not an option.
It

has been announced that the security agreement would be supplemented with

standard operating procedures or other procedures.

It is

also the

ICRCs view that

would not provide the multinational force sufficient legal basis for internment as they do not have the force of law. As a result, internees will have to be either
these

released or charged

In the event that
Iraqi authorities to

under

some

Iraqi law.

internees are not released, but are

handed over

to the

be criminally prosecuted, they must be transferred in accor-

dance with Iraqi criminal procedure. To this end, the security agreement stipulates
that "[t]he United States Forces shall act in full

and effective coordination with the

government of Iraq to turn over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi authorities

pursuant to a valid Iraqi arrest warrant." 42

In addition, the security agreement stipulates that Iraqi authorities can also ask
the

MNF-I

some

to arrest

wanted

individuals; 43 thus

individuals.
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authorities continue to detain
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MNF-I Detention/Internment

Another important humanitarian and

legal

concern follows from the release of

persons from MNF-I internment. All the detainees
authorities

by US

who are not transferred to Iraqi

authorities shall be released in a safe

and orderly manner, unless

otherwise requested by the government of Iraq in accordance with the security

agreement. 44

Holding internees beyond the date on which they have been authorized
cannot be justified, as

lease

ternees

still

logistical

are

present in

it is

US

legal basis.

and security- related difficulties

some delays

in releasing internees, a

the

MNF-I

in carrying

out

this task.

all

the

problem

files.

for re-

Given the high number of in-

facilities,

internment

authorities, since they review

the

without

45

is

facing serious

As a

result, there

that also partly lies with the Iraqi

Considering these practical constraints,

ICRC recommended avoiding unnecessary delays of releases and promptly in-

forming each internee selected for release of the reasons for any delay in

his or her

release.

After they were released at their places of capture,

some

internees suffered inci-

dents of revenge. Guidance could be drawn from Article 5(4) of

GP

II,

which

re-

quires that necessary measures shall be taken to ensure the safety of released

persons 46 in order to organize release in a safe environment.

asked

To this end, the ICRC

US authorities to establish a system for safe release, leaving the choice of the

location to be released to the greatest extent possible to the concerned internee

on a detailed assessment of his/her fears. The ICRC considsystem would address the fears generally expressed about releases

himself/herself, based

ered that such a
at the points

of capture.

Transfer of Internees and Criminal Detainees
In addition to the concerns with regard to the release of individuals, the transfer of

persons between States in situations where multinational forces are detaining persons in the territory of a "host" State has given
cal

—

rise to a

issues, particularly the respect for the principle

range of legal

—and

practi-

of non-refoulement.

Non-refoulement is the principle of international law that precludes a State from
transferring a person within

its

grounds to believe that

person faces a risk of certain fundamental

rights violations

this

—notably

control to another State

torture, other

if

there are substantial

human

forms of ill-treatment, persecution or

ar-

bitrary deprivation of life. 47

An
IHL

obligation to respect the principle of non-refoulement expressly appears in

in the context of international

GC IV.

48

armed

conflicts, as reflected in Article 45(4),

Furthermore, broader restrictions on transfer between detaining powers

can be found in Article 12(2),

GC

III

and
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Article 45(3),

GC

IV, 49

which prohibit
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transfer of persons deprived of liberty in

tions

would not be observed by the

any situation where the Geneva Conven-

receiving State, without limiting this prohibi-

tion to the restrictive case of non-refoulement.

Most pertinent to the

under human

rule as

it

plicitly

recognized in a

exists

situation in Iraq

and US obligations

rights law. 50

The

number of human

in this context

is

the

principle of non-refoulement

is

ex-

rights instruments, e.g., in Article 3 of

and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading TreatWhile not explicitly contained in the International

the Convention against Torture
51

ment or Punishment (CAT).
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 52

it is

the

ICRCs understanding

component of the
absolute prohibitions of arbitrary deprivation of life and of torture, cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment provided for in Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR. 53 This interpretation is based on the view that the rights in question are of such fundamental
importance that a State cannot circumvent its obligations by turning a blind eye to
that the principle of non-refoulement constitutes a fundamental

the risk that a person will be subjected to ill-treatment or arbitrary deprivation of

own authorities'

on transfer. In practical terms, these
obligations require the United States to refrain from transferring to Iraqi authorities

life

as a result of its

its

custody who risks being subjected to torture or

who

faces the possibility of the imposition or exe-

or to any other State any person in
other forms of ill-treatment, or

decision

cution of the death penalty following a

trial

that does not respect fundamental

guarantees. These obligations apply not only when a person
State,

but also extraterritorially when a person

tive control,

of the State's authorities.

is

is

in the territory of a

in the power, or

under the

effec-

54

One of the questions that has arisen in the context of Iraq is whether the principle of non-refoulement applies even

though persons are transferred from one

to another without actually crossing

State

an international border. In other words, does

the principle of non-refoulement also apply when persons are transferred from the

MNF-I to Iraqi authorities within the territory of Iraq? Both the wording of existing treaty law provisions and the rationale of the principle of non-refoulement are
relevant in determining whether non-refoulement applies only to transfer across an
international border or not. Article 3 of the
State" only. Article 45(4),

CAT

refers to refoulement "to

another

GC IV refers to transfer "to a country" and Articles

12(2),

GC III and 45(3), GC IV refer to transfer "by the Detaining Power to a Power which
is

party to the Convention."

international border

None of these formulations explicitiy suggests that an

must be crossed. In addition to the wording, the

rationale for

The idea behind the
principle is to protect persons from transfers if there is a risk that some of their fundamental rights may be violated. The material question, therefore, should not be
the principle oi non-refoulement is critical to

its

interpretation.

whether a transferred person crosses an international border, but whether the
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is

put at

real risk
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of violations of his/her fundamental rights as a result of

transfer to the effective control of another State. If crossing a physical border

were

the decisive criteria, the principle of non-refoulement could be easily circumvented

through a simple formality. For instance, a detainee could be transferred from

Guantanamo Bay to the US internment facility at Bagram in Afghanistan, and then
from Bagram to the Afghan authorities. The principle of non-refoulement would
obviously not apply to the first step of the transfer (from Guantanamo Bay to
Bagram) as the detainee would remain under the control of US authorities. Requiring the physical crossing of a border in order to recognize the applicability of the
principle of non-refoulement to the second step of this transfer

would lead

to the

absurd conclusion that the principle of non-refoulement cannot apply to transfers
of detainees between two States
real issue is

when they are carried out in two phases. Thus, the

whether a person has been transferred from the control of a detaining

State to the control or jurisdiction of another State, regardless of whether the indi-

vidual has crossed an international border. 55

Contrary to the

explicit obligation

conflicts (Article 45(4),

armed
12(2),

GC IV),

there

conflicts. Nonetheless, the

of non-refoulement in international armed

no such provision

is

for non-international

humanitarian principles enshrined in Article

GC III and Article 45(3), GC IV, namely that a detaining State transferring a

detainee to an ally shall ensure that the transferred detainee will be treated in ac-

cordance with the Geneva Conventions by the receiving

when

taken into account
to

which they transfer

international
that

armed

foreign troops intervene

their detainees.

conflict,

56

on the

State,

should also be

side of the

government

In these situations of multinational non-

such as the current one in Iraq, the underlying logic

an individual protected by IHL should not

a transfer between allies should be the

same

lose his or her protection

as the

through

one governing international

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions absolutely prohibits murder, as well as torture and other forms of ill-treatment. A State
would act in contradiction of Common Article 3 when it transferred a detainee to
armed conflicts. In

another State

would be

addition,

if there

ill-treated

were substantial grounds to believe that the transferred person

or arbitrarily deprived of life. Just as the Geneva Conventions

prohibit circumvention of the protections
to a non-compliant State (Articles 12(2),
in non-international

armed

conflict

owed

to protected persons

by

transfer

GC III and 45(3), GC IV), IHL applicable

should not be circumvented by transferring

internees to a State that will not respect

its

obligations under

Common Article 3.

Furthermore,

[t]his

provision should be interpreted in the light of the interpretation given to the

parallel provisions in

human rights law. If the absolute human rights law prohibition of
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and other forms of ill-treatment precludes the transfer of a person at risk of
such treatment, there is no reason why the absolute prohibition in humanitarian law
should not be interpreted in the same way. 57
torture

In any event, these existing

norms of IHL applying to transfers would not preclude

application of the principle of non-refoulement under
rights

human

rights law, 58 as the

concerned are non-derogable.

An additional problem is created by the fact that the United States has an obligation to transfer detained persons to Iraq pursuant to the security agreement. 59

Thus, the practical challenges that the application of the principle of non-

must be recognized, and should not be underestimated.
however, solutions that respect the principle of non-refoulement. They

refoulement can create

There

are,

include,

among others,

monitoring, or even joint administration, of places of de-

tention in order to follow

up on

transferred persons. Moreover, respecting the

principle of non-refoulement does not
as

impede the transfer of thousands of persons

only applies to those specific individuals

it

their

maybe violated.

fundamental rights

tinational forces

face a real risk that certain of

In the context of transfers between mul-

and the "host" country,

practical solutions

take into consideration the balance between,
security concerns

who

and material limitations

must be found

that

on the one hand, a transferring State's

to detain persons

who should normally

be detained by the host country, and, on the other hand, the need to provide

real

protection against ill-treatment or arbitrary deprivation of life. In striking this balance, particular respect
in

mind the

must be given to the

principle of non-refoulement, keeping

overriding humanitarian purpose of IHL. 60

In order for a person to be able to challenge his or her transfer meaningfully, a

number of procedural guarantees
fundamental
there

is

rights, the

no such

risk,

are essential. 61 If there

is

person must not be transferred. If

the transferring State

a risk of violations of
it is

determined that

must

•

inform the concerned person in a timely manner of the intended

•

give the person the opportunity to express

transfer;

any fears that he or she

may have

give the person the opportunity to challenge the transfer before a

body that

about the transfer;
•

is

independent from the one that made the decision to transfer;
•

give the person the option to explain

receiving State to the independent

why he

or she would be at risk in the

body that reviews whether

his or her fears are

well founded;
•

assess the existence

of the risk on a case-by-case
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suspend the transfer during the independent review of whether such

are well

founded because of the

person were indeed

at risk.

harm

irreversible

that

would be caused

fears

the

if

62

ICRC

In the course of its visits to persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq, the

conducts pre-departure interviews with certain detainees subject to transfer or
lease in order to be able to transmit

ferring authorities.

being transferred
authority,

It is

is

any fears the detainees might have to the trans-

not the ICRC's mandate to assess whether a person's fear of

well-founded. This responsibility rests with the transferring

which must interview the detainee

risk for the

re-

as part

own

of its

assessment of the

person concerned.

ICRC

In addition, the

frequently lends

its

services to facilitate the return of

detainees to their places of origin or their transfer to third States. 63 In this respect,

each foreigner (third-country national)

is

met individually and asked whether he

or she wants his/her State of nationality to be notified. If he or she agrees, the

informs his/her embassy about his/her presence in the detention
request, the

ICRC

facility.

ICRC
Upon

carries out repatriation of released foreigners. In 2008, twenty-

MNF-I

nine detainees released from

(twenty-three), central Iraqi (three)

and

regional Kurdish (three) custody were repatriated to their countries of origin un-

der the auspices of the ICRC. The
it

would be contrary to

those

international legal requirements. Moreover, as a matter of

ICRC

general policy, the

ICRC will not facilitate a transfer if it thinks that

only

assists

persons

who

wish to be transferred; that

is,

who have given their informed consent to transfer, since it would be incom-

patible with

its

humanitarian mandate to assist in a transfer which, even

against the will of the person concerned.

if lawful, is

64

Post-transfer Responsibilities

Another important

issue related to the transfer

ferring authority retains

some

between

allies is

whether the trans-

responsibilities after the transfer.

If a transfer takes place, the responsibility for the transferred

the receiving State.

The sending

State might, however, have a

transfer responsibilities, even in cases

where the transfer

spect given to the principle of non-refoulement.

(prisoners of war)

and

Article 45(3),

post-transfer responsibilities

GC

65

is

person

rests

number of

with
post-

carried out with full re-

For instance, Article 12(3),

GC III

IV (protected persons) contain strong

under which the transferring

State has to assure itself

that the receiving State will respect the Convention. Article 12 provides:

If that

Power

[to

which the prisoners of war are transferred]

upon being
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notified

to carry out the

Power by whom the
by the Protecting Power,

provisions of the Convention in any important respect, the
prisoners of war were transferred shall,

fails
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take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the

prisoners of war/protected persons. Such requests

must be complied with.

Similarly, Article 45(3) provides:

Power

which the protected persons are transferred] fails to carry out the
provisions of the Convention in any important respect, the Power by which the
protected persons were transferred shall, upon being so notified by the Protecting
Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the
protected persons. Such requests must be complied with.
If that

[to

As stated by the Commentary on GC III, the

States

"adopted a system of subsidiary

responsibility, subject to certain specific conditions." 66

The Commentary adds that
"[t]he general conditions of internment stipulated in the Convention must be respected: quarters, food, hygiene. ... If the receiving Power fails to carry out these
provisions in any 'important' respect, the responsibility of the transferring Power
is

again involved." 67

no equivalent provision for post-transfer responsibilities in noninternational armed conflicts. A situation in which a person captured in a noninternational armed conflict would be transferred between different States was
probably not considered in 1949 when the Conventions were drafted. Now, however, in a multinational non-international armed conflict like the one in Iraq, the
There

is

protection needs of a transferee can be very similar to

than

—those envisaged

Iraqi detainee

is

armed

tected person

not

armed

GC

transferred

in international
is

in

III

and

GC

IV

from the MNF-I

conflict the situation

is

in circumstances such as

greater

when an

to his/her State of nationality.

assumption

conflict the general

at risk in his/her

—or probably even
is

While

that a repatriated pro-

country of nationality, in non-international

different because the transferred person

may have

been fighting against the authorities of his/her country of nationality and therefore

may

45(3),

face reprisals. Thus, the considerations of Articles 12(3),

GC

III

and

GC IV should also be taken into account in transfers between allied powers

in the context of multinational

non- international armed

sure that transferred persons are protected

Such post-transfer
to ensure respect for

Conventions.

69

responsibilities

IHL

as

conflicts in order to en-

from violations of IHL. 68

would

also correspond to States' obligation

provided for in

Common

This duty entails a responsibility for

all

Article

1

of the Geneva

States to take feasible

and

appropriate measures to ensure that the rules of IHL are respected by the parties to

an armed conflict. 70 It is a commitment to promote compliance with IHL. 71 Transferring States, in particular, have greater

means to ensure respect in contexts where

they have a strong diplomatic and military presence in the receiving State, as
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They can engage

in a dialogue

on the treatment

of detainees and undertake other measures, such as post-transfer follow-up or
capacity building at the different levels of the chain of custody, to ensure that the
receiving State abides

by its

obligations.

Judicial Guarantees

An additional legal challenge for the MNF-I stems from the disrupted Iraqi judicial
system. 72 US authorities continue to give custodial support to Iraqi authorities,
thus effectively retaining control over

some criminal

authorities, including those arrested in 2009.

73

US

on behalf of Iraqi
must therefore en-

detainees

authorities

sure that such custody complies with the requirements of Iraqi national legislation

and internationally recognized standards,

To
•

this end,
all

US

particularly judicial guarantees.

authorities should use their influence to ensure that

persons arrested in 2009 benefit from safeguards under Iraqi law

the requirements for arrest warrants, detention orders

(e.g.,

and appearances before a

judge within 24 hours), provided these safeguards are in compliance with
internationally recognized standards;
•

information obtained by

US

forces without observing the safeguards

provided for in Iraqi criminal law, in particular in those instances where the
person
•

is

without

legal assistance,

the time spent in

imposed by

is

not transmitted to the Iraqi authorities; and

MNF-I internment

is

deducted from the sentences

Iraqi courts if the reasons for criminal

facts that led to the

imprisonment are based on

internment. 74

Given the concerns about the capacity of an already overstretched Iraqi judicial
system to efficiently and promptly absorb such an important
tainees, the influence exercised

by the United

States

caseload of de-

and the support provided

Iraqi authorities are crucial to ensuring those authorities

correctional staff to

new

have the

meet international standards. 75 In addition,

to

ability to train

this

US

support

should ensure that basic judicial guarantees are respected so that persons transferred to the Iraqi criminal system can benefit

V.

from

fair trials.

Conclusion

Despite significant security and political improvements, conditions in Iraq are volatile

and unpredictable, and

security remains

one of the ICRC's

first

concerns.

Even if its operations in Iraq remain driven by security constraints, the ICRC wants
to continue to maintain a sufficient level of activities to identify

needs of the most vulnerable people in the country:
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and address the

Laurent Colassis
The recent experience of the ICRC

in Iraq

.

.

.

made

a difference to the lives of many

hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. Maintaining a presence and proximity on the ground,
taking action wherever possible, not only allows [the ICRC] to carry out humanitarian
also serves as a basis for increasing [its] knowledge and understanding of a
complex situation and keeping track of humanitarian needs. ... A presence on the
ground provides opportunities for humanitarian dialogue, on which a positive
perception and consequent acceptance often heavily depend. Such a presence on a

work but

broader scale also enables a balanced stance to be maintained

among

the various

communities by addressing their needs, however different they may be from one place
to another.

76

ICRC to protect and assist
persons covered by IHL, in accordance with its international mandate and its own
commitment to do so, the relevance and the credibility of the ICRC also come from
If its

presence on the ground

is

crucial to enabling the

Through its neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action, 77 i.e., remaining distinct from political interests and not taking sides,
the ICRC can better reach those persons in need and act on their behalf. In a polarized world, such an approach may also reduce tension and contribute to the stabilits

operational approach.

ity

of a devastated country like Iraq. In 2007, Toni Pfanner stated:

Perhaps one way back to a stable Iraq, one that would serve equally the needs of its
is through the unanimous acceptance of impartial humanitarian action.
Such action, which makes no distinction between victims, could foster reconciliation
and serve to counter the pernicious idea that human lives must inevitably be
sacrificed
an idea that will only further encourage hatred and then more hatred,
revenge followed by more revenge. 78

entire people,

—

Today, some two years

The ICRC

is

later, that

statement

also confronted with

activities in Iraq.

These

complex

legal challenges are

help the various parties to the

still

shows the best way forward.

legal issues arising

numerous, and the ICRC's

down by IHL

role

is

is

precisely to ensure that

are respected so that violations are prevented.

Professor Sandoz indicated,

Surely respect for every

human being, and compassion for those who suffer, are values

on which the future of the world must be built. By defending these values even
the guardian of international humanitarian law
helplessness
isolation.

and

fear that

to

armed conflict abide by their obligations under IHL.

Rules protect. The purpose of ICRC activities in this area
the rules laid

from detention

make

is

also

combating the

in war,

feelings

of

peoples indifferent to each other and drive them into

79
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Adherence to the law enhances security and

and

a return to peace,

international

which are the

armed conflicts.

80

likely

facilitates

national reconciliation

long-term goals of most parties to non-

In this sense,

it

can be also said that the

tributes to the stabilization of Iraq, as well as of any other place in the

the

ICRC works for the faithful application of IHL.
and

their well-being

their dignity.

armed

world where

IHL protects people,

Apart from the importance of respecting the

human

beings, respecting those

conflict can also facilitate the

resumption of dialogue

fundamental values embodied in IHL to protect
values in times of

Respect for

ICRC con-

between the parties to the conflict and ultimately the restoration of peace.
utmost importance that
pliance with the law
that could

is

one day lead

all

It is

those involved in the Iraqi conflict recognize that

also a necessary

to the

component of a broader

end of the tragedy in

of

com-

political process

Iraq.
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bypassing the one sanctioned by a country's legislature and courts. The rights of
criminal suspects
Pejic,

would thus be gravely undermined.

supra note 45, at 381.

75.

[There are]

many problems

number of

detainees that has resulted

operations, allegations

They include the large
from the surge of US and Iraqi military
of the use of torture to extract confessions and concerns
afflicting Iraq's legal system.

about the impartiality of some court

officials.

This state of affairs hardly bodes well

promotion of national reconciliation in Iraq. Nor is it conducive to the
development of an independent, transparent and accessible judicial system, which
is a key component of social reconstruction.
for the

Stover, Sissons,

Pham & Vinck, supra

& Gasser, supra note

note 72, at 27.

76.

Mattli

77.

For a more detailed analysis of the ICRC's neutral, impartial and independent humani-

1 1,

tarian action, see Pierre Krahenbiihl,

at 168.
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(2004),

at

http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/
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78.
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XIX
Concluding Observations: The Influence of
the Conflict in Iraq

on International Law

Yoram Dinstein*

The and

conference from which these articles derive was an exceptionally success-

ful

multilayered one in which a rich lode of legal insights and lessons

learned (based, in

cannot do justice to

struck.

I

ume;

will

I

many instances, on
all

firsthand experience in the field)

the contributions to the conference

was truly

and to this vol-

simply focus on ten points that look particularly apposite to me.

A. "Lawfare" versus Warfare

The first point relates to the dichotomy between the laws of warfare and the war of
"lawfare." The term "lawfare"
apparently coined, and certainly popularized, by
Major General Dunlap is not just a clever play of words. We live at a time when
the shrewd use of law as a weapon in the marketplace of public relations may often
counterbalance the successful employment of weapons in the battlefield. In the debate, General Dunlap has suggested that it may be a good idea to educate the civilian population, which is potentially subject to aerial bombardment, to reconcile
itself to the inevitability of some collateral damage being engendered by almost any
attack. My own submission is that before you undertake the massive (and perhaps

—

—

impossible) task of teaching the
* Professor Emeritus, Tel

enemy population to accept death as a fact of life, it

Aviv University,

Israel.

—
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may be more productive to educate the general public on our side of the aisle
especially the

up

media and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

—

—and

to face

to the ineluctable consequences of war.

Speaking of the media,
with

little

it

cannot be ignored that they report armed conflicts

understanding of the legal

perceptions of the public at large.

niceties,

and

The very

this has a serious

availability

impact on the

of precision-guided

—

moment in history a subject matter that I shall return to
has made commentators jump to the hasty conclusion that every attack
infra C
can be surgical, that every payload may acquire the target "on the nose" and that no
munitions (PGMs)

at this

—

damage should be viewed as immaculate anymore. As a matter of fact, in
April of this year, a major West Coast newspaper deemed fit to state that " [y] ou can
kill all the combatants you want. What you are not allowed to do is cause collateral
damage civilian casualties." Astonishingly, the authority cited for this implausible assertion is supposed to be no other than yours truly! I hope that I do not have
collateral

—

1

to persuade those present here that, in fact,

there

is

I

have always argued otherwise,

no way to avert altogether collateral damage to civilians. But the real issue is

not the misleading authority:

What

is

to be

(LOAC)? In

it is

the misleading statement.

done about such misrepresentations of the law of armed

conflict

my opinion, there are three practical steps that should be taken:

In the daily briefings provided to the

•

that

i.e.,

indispensable to incorporate

some

media during

legal interpretation. In other

hostilities,

words,

it

it is

is

not

enough to describe what happened, or even to include real-time visual (camera or
video) coverage of Air Force missions and similar highlights of the military
operations.

It is

absolutely necessary to offer the media a legal appraisal of the

events or, in other words, a bit of "lawfare" adjoined to reports of warfare. Surely,
the

US

Air Force

—employing,

personnel required to

fill

what

as
is

it

does,

some

1,300 lawyers

currently a dangerous

—can

vacuum

allocate the

in the

media

briefings.
•

As pointed out by Professor Heintschel von Heinegg, the armed forces

cannot afford the interminable delays occurring prior to the publication of the
final

conclusions of "in-house" armed forces fact-finding reviews of lethal

The high command must
understand that, in the context of "lawfare," such investigations must be
drastically condensed in time: they may even deserve priority over some military
operations. The critical exigencies of "lawfare" demand putting an end to the
incidents in which something has gone wrong.

present state of affairs in which charges of wrongdoing are immediately splashed

over the front pages of the world press

whereas

results

—without any

authoritative response

of the in-house inquiries, once released (frequently,
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later), are

buried at the bottom of a back page.

the public

is

By then, irrespective of the outcome,

convinced that the charges have been vindicated.

New procedures must be found for fact-finding reviews of this nature. I do
not believe that human rights NGOs should take over the investigations. On the
•

when all is said and done, the incontrovertible reality is that the public
has become (rightly or wrongly) skeptical about the credibility of in-house
probes. The time has come to consider the possibility of leavening the fact-finding
process with the addition of some impartial observers to the board of inquiry.
other hand,

B.

The Nature of the Armed Conflict

Diverse views were voiced at the conference as regards the nature of the armed con-

is

—

As far as I am concerned, from a US standpoint this has been and still
an international armed conflict. The United States (and its allies) went to war
in Iraq.

flict

—

against the Baathist Iraq of

Saddam Hussein

(as to the

sequence of events in the

Gulf War, see infra J). This was an inter-State war when it started, and it remains an
inter-State

war

until

it is

finished. It

is

true that Saddam's

overthrown and a new Iraqi government has been
(and allied) forces have been acting in

full

government has been
Baghdad. The

installed in

cooperation with that

US

new government,

which has been recognized by the Security Council and by the international com-

The United States-Iraq Agreement on the Withdrawal of United
States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Tem-

munity at

large.

porary Presence in Iraq, signed in 2008, only attests to that continued cooperation.
Yet,

remnants of the Saddamist forces (minus Saddam himself)

jihadist foreigners

long as

—

are

still

armed

by US troops formally ended

conflict.

in

2004

The

belligerent occupation of parts of

(see infra G),

was glad to glean from various presentations

US

and they have yet to be rooted out. As

US troops persist in waging combat operations against them, the hostilities

constitute an international

Iraq

fighting in Iraq,

—strengthened by

at the

but the war has gone on.

conference that, in practice, the

military authorities in Iraq continue to apply the law of international

conflict.

This

This

is

the

is

as

it

should be. The war in Iraq

is

not over until

it is

is

raging between the

US

(and

allied) forces

plagued by a non-international armed

ment

is

armed

over.

US outiook on Iraq. Evidently, the position is different insofar as in-

ternal Iraqi affairs are concerned. Side by side with the international
still

armed conflict

and the remaining Saddamists, Iraq

conflict, in

which the Baghdad govern-

equally trying to eliminate the last vestiges of the ancien regime. That

non-international

widespread

I

armed

spatially,

it is

conflict: since the fighting

is

is

a

protracted temporally and

impossible to consider the ongoing violence as merely a

"below the threshold" internal disturbance.
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If I interpret correctly the presentation

that

we encounter

in Iraq

two

parallel

other non-international. There

by Professor Turns, I think that he agrees

armed

conflicts:

nothing exceptional about the phenomenon of

is

the simultaneous prosecution of an international
conflict within the borders of the

1986. Iraq

is

and

same country. 2 This

knowledged by the International Court of
3

one international and the

just a paradigmatic recent

Justice in

a non-international
possibility
its

armed

was expressly ac-

Nicaragua judgment of

example of two-pronged armed

conflicts,

which are waged concurrently.

armed conflicts must be analyzed discretely. In
many respects, the contemporary rules of LOAC in both international and noninternational armed conflicts have virtually blended. 4 However, there is a crucial
Legally speaking, the parallel

divergence with respect to a

number of pivotal

capture treatment of personnel

war

is

strictly

him

—

where post-

concerned: the privileged status of prisoners of

confined to international armed conflicts. 5 The issue came to the

fore in the personal case of

treated

is

subjects, primarily

—

rightly

as a

Saddam Hussein. When captured, the United States
prisoner of war. Of course, Saddam could have been

prosecuted by an American military tribunal for war crimes

(i.e.,

grave breaches of

LOAC). But the United States chose not to proceed with the case. Instead,
Saddam was handed over to the Iraqi government, and once subject to Iraqi jurisdiction
he no longer benefited from the advantages of prisoner of war status.
The end of the story is well known.

—

—

G Precision-Guided Munitions
The wide

availability

cially in air

manned

and accuracy of precision-guided munitions (PGMs)

—

espe-

when employed in combination with unwas extolled by many participants in this

warfare (and particularly

aerial vehicles

conference. There

is

surgical attacks that

(UAVs))

—

no doubt about the
minimize

collateral

radically increased capability to

conduct

damage. Yet, several caveats have been

corroborated by the proceedings.

The first point to bear in mind is that accuracy in delivering a weapon to a target
perhaps, preemiis contingent not only on the availability of PGMs but also
nently on a good reading of the target area and meticulous preplanning. The

—

—

trouble

is

that there are

numerous

instances in which air attacks (especially, albeit

not exclusively, when launched in close support of ground troops) are not linked to

any in-depth preplanning. Absent the element of advance preparation, the accuracy of a precision-guided munition cannot by

avoiding mistaken identity of targets.
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on good intelligence (this is
where reconnaissance by UAVs may be a vital component in the equation). The
key to a successful attack may lie less in the availability of PGMs and more in the
collation and evaluation of reliable data. If an attack is launched on the basis of outIn the final analysis, accuracy in attack is predicated

dated or otherwise flawed information, the

PGM may strike

the target "on the

and nevertheless the results can be devastating to civilians. For a vivid illustration, suffice it to remind ourselves of the unfortunate episode of the Baghdad
nose,"

bunker in 1991,

in

which hundreds of Iraqi civilians lost their lives by mistake since

they had sought shelter from air raids in the wrong place. 6

must be added that the post-event gauging of the legality of any attack must be
predicated not on hindsight but on foresight. In other words, what really counts is
not what we clearly see after the event, but what is glimpsed through the "fog of
war" by the commander in real time. Decisions on the battlefield are often warped
by an honest but mistaken belief in the existence of a constellation of facts which is
It

not borne out by reality.

It is

therefore useful to recall that Article 32(1) of the 1998

Rome Statute of the ICC (International Criminal Court) recognizes mistake of fact
as

an admissible defense, thereby excluding criminal responsibility for war crimes. 7
D. Proportionality

The principle of proportionality is the key to the effective protection of civilians
and civilian objects from collateral damage in attack. The trouble is that, while everybody pays

lip service to

the principle in the abstract,

its

specific

dimensions are

not always understood by the media, by NGOs or by the general public. Obviously,
proportionality

is

a relative term:

it

presupposes a comparison between

A and B.

What are these A and B in the context of LOAC? It is frequently suggested by the media that the proper comparison to be drawn is between the number of human losses

—and

—

amount of property destroyed by both sides. Nothing is farther from the legal truth. The proportionality that really counts for the purposes of
weighing collateral damage is (A) the expectation of excessive incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, comsustained

the

pared to (B) the anticipation of the concrete and direct military advantage to be
gained (see Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol

I

of 1977). 8

The first is that proportionality has nothing to do with injury to combatants or damage to military objectives. LOAC does
not require any proportionality between combatants' losses on the two warring
sides: the losses inflicted on enemy combatants and damage to military objectives
may be immeasurably greater than the counterpart casualties and destruction sufIt is

necessary to stress several points.

fered at the enemy's hand. Indeed, nothing precludes a belligerent party capable of
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doing so from pursuing a "zero casualties policy" where

own combatants

its

are

concerned, while inflicting horrific losses on the enemy's armed forces. Proportionality

is strictly

limited to collateral

damage

to civilians

and

civilian objects.

damage to civilians and civilian objects is concerned,
proportionality is by no means determined by purely crunching numbers of casualties and destruction on both sides. The quintessence of proportionality is that the
expectation of collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects must not be "excessive." Some NGOs appear to confuse "excessive" with "any." The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) commentary on Additional Protocol I
seems to mix up the term "excessive" with "extensive." 9 Both are misreadings of
Even where

collateral

the text. 10 Even "extensive" civilian casualties
"excessive" in light of the concrete

bombardment of a

and

may be

acceptable,

if

they are not

direct military advantage anticipated.

vital military objective (like a

The

naval shipyard or an industrial

plant producing military aircraft) where there are hundreds or even thousands of
civilian

employees need not be aborted merely because of the palpable hazards to

those civilians. 11

The whole assessment of what

injury or

damage

excessive in the circum-

is

stances entails a mental process of pondering dissimilar considerations lacking a

common

denominator

—namely,

civilian losses

and military advantage

not an exact science. 12 In the words of the Elements of Crime of the
of the ICC, this

is

a "value judgement."

—and

Rome

is

Statute

13

From the text of Article 51 (5) (b) of Additional Protocol I one can clearly deduce
that the appraisal of proportionality

pectation (of injury to civilians or

is

not about

damage

results:

it is

to civilian objects)

the military advantage). In other words, what counts

is

what

about the

initial ex-

and anticipation (of
is

foreseeable before

the event.

The concrete and

must be perceived in a contextual
of the Rome Statute, what counts is the

direct military advantage

fashion. According to Article 8(2)(b)(iv)

"overall" military advantage anticipated. 14

By introducing the term

"overall," the

Statute clearly permits looking at the larger operational picture, as distinct

cusing on the particular point under attack. The attacker may argue,
raid of no perceptible military advantage in itself is justified

e.g.,

from fo-

that an air

by misleading the en-

emy to shift its strategic gaze to the wrong sector of the front (the extensive air raids
in the Pas-de-Calais on the eve of the Allied landings in Normandy on D-Day in
World War II are an emblematic illustration). 15
Preplanning, albeit of major significance,

is

not conclusive: the scene of a mili-

tary encounter frequently changes rapidly. In training,

it is

required to underscore

the importance of situational awareness to the risks of excessive collateral damage.
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If an aviator

or a platoon

commander on the ground finds out that reality does not

match the pre-attack briefing, he has

to abort the attack.

E. Direct Participation in Hostilities

Civilian protection

from attack

Additional Protocol
ties."

16

I,

"unless

is

vouchsafed, in conformity with Article 51(3) of

and for such time as they take a direct part in hostili-

Direct participation in hostilities has proved to be a matter of critical im-

enemy flagrantly disregards the
cardinal principle of distinction between combatants and civilians. The need to deportance in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the

coming within the ambit of direct participation in hostilities is perhaps the "hottest" topic in LOAC today. It has become even hotter after the ICRC
published (in June 2009) an "Interpretive Guidance" on the subject, 17 formulated
after thorough consultation with a fairly large group of experts but in disharmony
with the views of most of the Western members.
In the Newport conference of 2007 1 addressed the specific (and complex) hypothetical scenario of a civilian driving a munitions truck to supply the armed
forces. 18 There is a host of new settings of direct participation in hostilities coming
to light all the time. This year we heard about civilians who have to move around
Iraq for strictly civilian purposes, but
in order to get from one place to another
have no choice other than joining a military convoy for their protection and en
route they are handed over weapons to be used against attack, thus becoming gunmen. No doubt, in case of an actual exchange of fire with the enemy, such civilians
fine activities

—

will

be viewed as directly participating in

The most
is

hostilities.

controversial issue in the context of direct participation in hostilities

that of the "revolving door" syndrome,

i.e.,

the case of persons

who

repetitively

up arms against the enemy and then reassume the posture of innocent civilians. The ICRC maintains that civilian immunity from attack is restored each time
that the person ends his engagement in a hostile act and that no prediction as to his
future conduct is allowed. 19 1 and others profoundly disagree. In fact, the proposition is irreconcilable with the universal rejection of the concept of "a soldier by
night and peaceful citizen by day," even by the ICRC commentary on the Additake

tional Protocol. 20

do not want to go at length into the complex details of the "revolving door"
problem or other related issues, since I have a proposal to the organizers of the
Newport conferences. My proposal is to devote next year's session to a systematic
I

examination of the whole topic of direct participation in
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F. Private

This

is

Military Contractors

a subject that has gained priority

on the

international legal agenda because

of Iraq and the large numbers of private military contractors (PMCs) involved
there (according to

US

some estimates,

the

number of PMCs in Iraq equals that of the

troops deployed). Intensive consultations by inter-governmental experts pro-

duced

in

2008 The Montreux Document on pertinent international

legal obligations

and good practices for States related to operations ofprivate military and security companies during armed conflicts? According to this document, PMCs retain their ci1

not incorporated into the armed forces and do

vilian standing as long as they are

not directly participate in

PMCs

hostilities. 22

include engineers, technicians, instructors, construction workers, pro-

and weapon
However, if PMCs

viders of food services

and

repairs).

23

specialists (tasked

are hired

with training, maintenance

by the military to

actually operate

weapons systems or otherwise take part in the hostilities, they lose their civilian
protection. 24 Even PMCs who retain their civilian status run a tangible risk of being
the victims of collateral damage (for instance, should the enemy attack a military
base in which they are employed). 25

PMCs

are particularly vulnerable to attack

if

they put on military uniforms while in service.

G. Belligerent Occupation

Many of the presentations at the conference
eral

(for instance, those

by Brigadier Gen-

Tate and Colonel Pregent) were linked to the dilemmas of occupation in Iraq,

whether under the guise of a belligerent occupation regime or in the context of a

when belligerent occupaand when it ends.

post-occupation regime. The underlying questions are
tion begins,

As

what occupation

far as the

about while

is all

lasts

beginning of belligerent occupation

Benvenisti rightly pointed out that
sion

it

and occupation

stages.

But in

it is

is

concerned, Professor

necessary to distinguish between the inva-

my opinion it is advisable to note the possibility

of a hiatus between the two stages. 26 This came to light in Iraq

at the

time of the

Museum in Baghdad in April 2003. The Iraqi troops in the
area had already been defeated and driven away. The US combat troops advanced

looting of the National

through the area in pursuit of the enemy, but
to proceed to other destinations.

—being on

a

combat mission

—had

The rear echelons had not yet established effective

control in Baghdad; the result was chaos enabling the Iraqi looters to act freely. 27

What

is

the lesson learned? General Rogers has suggested that
28

accompany combat troops. But
you cannot prepare for everything.

future be assigned to
is

regrettably clear:
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this practical?

One

thing
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The legal foundation of the law of belligerent occupation can be traced back to
Hague Regulation 43 of 1907, which reads (in its common non-binding English
translation):

The authority of the

legitimate

power having

in fact passed into the

hands of the

occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far
as possible, public order

and

laws in force in the country.

safety,
29

while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the

The international law of belligerent occupation thus makes it plain that it is incumbent on the occupying power(s) to ensure, as far as possible, security to the population. Indeed, I

—

submit that

if in real estate

are location, location, location

—

the three predominant considerations

in belligerent occupation the three preponderant

considerations are security, security, security.
I

found it almost amusing to hear in this conference that the US occupation au-

thorities

were deeply concerned about the revision of the Iraqi copyright law.

well understand that the existence of an outdated copyright law

sue after a prolonged belligerent occupation. After
frozen for many years

(let

all,

the local law cannot be

alone decades), and over a stretch of time the reasons for

ory from April 2003 through June 2004,

about

can

may become an is-

law reform become compelling. Yet, when the belligerent occupation

minds of the

I

how

did copyright even

lasts in the-

come

into the

They should have worried
and then perhaps Iraq would have been a better

authorities of the occupying power(s)?

security, security, security,

place to live in today.

As for the end of belligerent occupation, I bow to the binding decision of the Security Council in Resolution 1546 (2004),

Charter of the

—

which

acting under Chapter VII of the

UN—established that the occupation of Iraq was terminated by the

end of June 2004. 30

do so because I strongly believe that, by virtue of the combined effect of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, 31 the Security Council is vested
with the power to override all norms of international law (with the possible excepI

norms constituting jus cogens), 32 including those of LOAC. De
jure, the end of belligerent occupation in Iraq in June 2004
as decreed by the Security Council
was therefore unassailable. De facto, however, the end of belligerent
occupation of Iraq in 2004 was more notional than real. 33 In realistic terms, the belligerent occupation should have been looked upon as continuing in some parts of
Iraq to this day. Only now when US combat troops are finally evacuating the main
Iraqi urban areas is the belligerent occupation of certain parts of Iraq perhaps comtion of peremptory

—

—

ing to a close. Like war, an occupation

is

not over until
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The de

jure termination of the belligerent occupation in Iraq in June 2004, of

made

course,

it

"transformative"

may well

ask

if

34

possible

for

the

legislation

adopted

there

to

without being in breach of international law. But de

the effective control of substantial parts of Iraq

become
facto,

by US (and

one

allied)

troops has been really affected by the Security Council resolution defining the end

of belligerent occupation.
fare

Who actually has looked after the security and the wel-

of the population? The Iraqi government in Baghdad? There

told in Iraq about an inhabitant of an area controlled

is

an anecdote

by Romanian troops (no

of-

Romanians intended) coming to a local police station complaining
that a Swiss soldier has just stolen from him a precious Romanian-made watch.
The sergeant at the desk asked the Iraqi if he was drunk. "Surely," said the sergeant,
fense to the

"you mean that a Romanian soldier

stole

from you

a precious

Swiss-made watch."

"You said that," answered the Iraqi, "not I." Well, just as it is pure fiction that there
are Swiss soldiers in Iraq, it is pure fiction that between 2004 and 2009 all Iraqis
have been under the effective control of the Baghdad government.
H. "Stability Operations"
Captain Stephens quoted a manual on

Army

have become "a core

stability operations, telling us that these

mission." Assuming that stability operations (or, as

some other participants in the conference, "nation-building")
not merely a euphemism for counterterrorism combat missions, I am worried.

they were called by
are

Undertaking such a transformative mission transforms not only the occupied
country:

it is

bound to transform also the armed forces of the occupying power(s).

Soldiers are supposed to be soldiers, not policemen or experts in political, social

and economic affairs. The core mission of an army is to carry out combat missions,
in order to defeat the

sonnel are

enemy and win

—and ought

Stability as such, in

sought

is

stability

to be

the war. This

—trained

any event,

is

officers

overrated. Saddam's regime

think that

rule of law.

should be rendered by those qualified to do

task in

there are qualified professionals.

lawyer or a plumber to do what

are separate teams for "defense"

and

is

How-

new democratic and stable Iraq is a wor-

I

it

and other per-

was stable. What is

under a democratic government based on the

thy cause,

tor, a

what

for.

ever, while assistance in the building of a

life

is

so.

For every

When the need arises, we rely on a doc-

required.

Even

in

American

football there

for "offense," each requiring different

skills.

By the same token, you cannot expect the same folks in the military to specialize
both in combat and in "nation-building." It is far better for the Army to concentrate on what it does best
combat and to recruit civilian professionals to do
what they do best.

—

—
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do not deny

I

that the civilian professionals that

I

am

addressing have to dis-

charge their duties under the overall supervision of the armed forces. Indeed,
basic premise of belligerent occupation that the

tory must be military, and any

civil

it is

government of an occupied

a

terri-

administration must function as a subdivision

of the military government. 35 Yet, even a military government

—employ

in appropriate cases should

civilian professionals

dentials, in order to fulfill specific tasks that in

is

entitled to

—and

with the proper cre-

my view do not constitute part of the

core mission of any army.

I.

At the conference, we heard
the relationship between
ever, that

it is

Human Rights Law

(principally,

human

rights

often forgotten that

from Ms. Modirzadeh) about the issue of

law (HRL) and LOAC. Let

most human

me

how-

add,

rights are subject to derogation in

wartime. As a good illustration, take internment (a topic that we heard about from

Captain

Bill).

Under HRL,

in principle, "a policy of preventive internment, that

is

the arrest and detention of those who are considered dangerous without any inten-

them to trial" is inconsistent with the basic human rights instruthe same European Court of Human Rights
which is the authority

tion of bringing

ments. 36 Yet,

—

for this proposition, underlying

1961

—

also

very

its

pronounced that the norm

other public emergency,

37

is

first

judgment, in the Lawless case of

subject to derogation in time of war or

as per Article 15

of the 1950 European Convention on

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 38 Derogation of most human
rights

and

is

also possible

under

Article 4 of the 1966 International

Unlike HRL, derogation from

treme instances

Civil

(ICCPR). 39

Political Rights

40

Covenant on

—

LOAC

rights

—although

possible in

is

limited to specific persons or situations

se

does not justify derogation from

and no

LOAC:

some

ex-

others. Cer-

by its very

tainly,

wartime per

nature

LOAC is designed for application in wartime. The upshot is that LOAC may

provide a better solution to a given problem than

under belligerent occupation
tion

IV of 1949:

is

concerned,

this provision explicitly

ative reasons of security,

but

this

is

It

(to

be

set

HRL. Thus, where internment

we have Article 78 of Geneva Conven-

permits preventive internment for imper-

if possible

up by the occupying power).

every six months, by a competent

41

ensues that in wartime, as far as internment goes,

edge over HRL.
tarianism

—

let's

It is

true that in peacetime,

even say one hundred

protection can drop to zero.

all,

subject to a procedure including the right of

appeal as well as a "periodical review,

body"

after

LOAC has a humanitarian

HRL attains a higher level of humani-

—

but, if derogated in wartime, the level of

LOAC may not
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aspire as high as

HRL, but

it

never

The Influence of the Conflict in Iraq on International Law
drops so low:

it

delivers a constant

face of a possibility of getting

Admittedly, some
a leading

example

no

human

fifty. I

loaf at

find the half loaf most reassuring in the

all.

rights are non-derogable:

freedom from torture

aforementioned provisions of the

(see the

ECHR

is

and

most non-derogable human rights coincide with rights established directly by LOAC, independently of HRL. Thus, torture in international
armed conflicts is expressly forbidden by all four Geneva Conventions, 42 as well
ICCPR).

Yet,

as Additional Protocol

I.

43

An ICTY

(International Criminal Tribunal for the

former Yugoslavia) Trial Chamber held in the Furundzija

LOAC prohibition
The

norm of customary

of torture constitutes a peremptory

national law (jus cogens).

—

deprivation of

in the

conduct of

hostilities

determined by the

life is

—the

test

lex specialis

Wall.

The

full

of

combatants,

LOAC. 45 The
its

lex specialis

2004 advisory opinion

connotations of the lex specialis status of LOAC can best be

appreciated in the context of the fundamental right to
in the Nuclear

on Nuclear

of an (unlawful) arbitrary

construct of LOAC has been reaffirmed by the Court in
46

inter-

44

International Court of Justice held, in the advisory opinion

Weapons, that

on the

case, in 1998, that the

life,

addressed by the Court

Weapons advisory opinion. In allowing lethal

attacks against

enemy

LOAC runs counter to the basic tenets of human rights law concern-

ing extrajudicial deprivation of life. 47 Nevertheless, in the event of an international

armed conflict, the

human

—

as lex specialis

—

prevail over the lexgeneralis of

rights.

This does not
ized

LOAC norms

by constant

mean

that relations

between

friction. In reality, there are

LOAC and HRL law are

character-

only a few examples of collision be-

no denying the incompatible approaches of LOAC and
HRL to some central issues, and it must be observed that the discrepancies are not
limited to the treatment of combatants. Thus, in the words of Theodor Meron:
"Unlike human rights law, the law of war allows, or at least tolerates, the killing and
tween them.

48

Still,

there

is

wounding of innocent human beings not
as civilian victims of lawful collateral

/.

Lieutenant

is

Jus ad Bellum

a controversial topic.

previous Newport conference,
just say, very succinctly, that
lies

damage." 49

Commander Wall addressed the

everybody knows,

of Iraq

directly participating in hostilities, such

50

—

I

issue of jus

to repeat

—the key

my part

in Iraq. This, as

have addressed the subject myself in a

and do not wish

for

ad bellum

my arguments.

to unlocking the

Let

me

conundrum

in understanding that (a) the Gulf War that started with the invasion of

Kuwait in 1990

is still

going on, (b) the period between 1991 and 2003 was largely
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one of ceasefire (punctuated by sporadic hostilities between Iraq and the coalition

by the United States), (c) Iraq (as authoritatively determined by the Security
Council 51 ) was in material breach of its ceasefire obligations (especially insofar as
the destruction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was concerned), and (d)
the fighting of 2003 and thereafter should be viewed merely as the resumption of
led

general hostilities by the coalition in response to that material breach. 52

WMD

were actually found in Iraq does not affect the legal analThe fact that no
at earlier times
in material breach of the
ysis. Iraq had clearly amassed
ceasefire
and all intelligence services worldwide were convinced that it continued
to do so. Even those who were opposed to the coalition's military action in 2003 did
not deny that basic fact and merely wished to postpone the clash of arms (some
commentators now argue that Saddam himself deliberately misled the world to befor some convoluted reasons that escape me). Well,
lieve that he possessed
in wartime, smoke and mirrors can become all too real. In the sphere of the jus ad
helium no less than in that of the jus in hello what ultimately counts is reason-

—

WMD

—

WMD

—

—

able evaluations of the facts as they appear at the time of action, rather than post-

event hindsight knowledge.

K, Conclusion

Although the worst appears to be over in

Iraq, the "nation-building" there

is still

in

many

respects a

curve.

Winston Churchill famously said that Americans always come to the right de-

cision

—

after

work

in progress.

The United

they have tried everything

already been tried. Let us

else.

States finds itself

In Iraq

hope that Americans will

it

still

on

a learning

seems that everything else has

arrive at a right decision soon.
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